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ABSTRACT

THE BEDS OF EMPIRE: POWER AND PROFIT AT THE PEARL FISHERIES OF
SOUTH INDIA AND SRI LANKA, C. 1770-1840
Samuel M. Ostroff
Daud Ali
The Gulf of Mannar—the shallow body of water between present-day India and Sri
Lanka—was one of the largest sources of natural pearls in the world for at least two
millennia. This dissertation focuses on a relatively brief period during which managerial
control over the human and natural resources of the pearling industry transferred from
Dutch to British powers. The late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries also
witnessed a shift in political economic thought, as classical liberalism dislodged
mercantilism as the prevailing framework for interpreting the relationship between the
state and economy. The Company and Crown governments brought an assemblage of
ideas to bear on the management and governance of people and oysters that sought to not
only increase productivity but also fundamentally reshape the social, economic, and
political foundations of the pearling industry. However, the attempt by British officials to
extricate local networks and institutions from pearling operations was fraught with
contradictions and seldom delivered on the promise of reform. Through an examination
of key targets of government intervention—labor, markets, merchants, sovereignty, and
corruption—this dissertation explores the interstices between success and failure and
tracks such developments through the evolving contexts of colonialism and imperialism
in India and Sri Lanka.
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INTRODUCTION: CONSIDER THE PEARL OYSTER

In 1833, as parliamentary debates over the renewal of the East India Company’s charter
reached a crescendo, Harriet Martineau (1802-76), a young British social theorist and
activist, gained increasingly notoriety for her recently-published The Illustrations of
Political Economy.1 A collection of novellas, Illustrations elaborated various strands of
liberal political and economic thought to the general public through a series of
softhearted parables. One of the stories in this collection, “Cinnamon and Pearls,” is set
in early nineteenth-century Ceylon (present-day Sri Lanka). Alexander Johnston, a
prominent Scottish orientalist and judge, encouraged Martineau to write about Ceylon.
She remarked that Johnston was “more thoroughly acquainted with the Cingalese than
perhaps any other man then in England.”2 Indeed, Johnston served as Chief Judge and
President of the Royal Council in Ceylon, during which time he became interested in
pearling and collected information on “fisheries, geology, and natural history.”3 When he
returned to England, Johnston facilitated the publication of materials related to pearling
in the journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, an organization that he helped found with
Henry Thomas Colebrooke in 1823.
1

Harriet Martineau, Illustrations in Political Economy (London: C. Fox, 1832-34). For recent scholarly
treatments of Harriet Martineau’s life and work, see Deborah Logan, The Hour and the Woman: Harriet
Martineau’s ‘Somewhat Remarkable’ Life (DeKalb: Northern Illinois Press, 2002); Logan, Harriet
Martineau, Victorian Imperialism, and the Civilizing Mission (Farnham: Ashgate, 2010); Sharae Deckard,
Paradise Discourse, Imperialism, Globalization: Exploiting Eden (London: Routledge, 2014), 133-59.
2
Harriet Martineau, Harriet Martineau’s Autobiography, ed. Maria Weston Chapman (Boston: J. R.
Osgood and Company, 1877), 1:245-46; Logan Harriet Martineau, 105.
3
James Steuart, An Account of the Pearl Fisheries of Ceylon (Cotta: Church Mission Press, 1843), 2.
1

Martineau’s “Cinnamon and Pearls” is a highly romanticized tale about an
aspirational pearl diver named Rayo and his fiancée Marana. It is an allegory about
colonial negligence and the deleterious effects of British rule on local populations and the
environment. Martineau meant for her story about a lowly pearl diver to educate the
British middle class and advance a vision of economic freedom, moral uplift, and
personal fulfillment, all of which, she maintained, the colonial government denied to the
people of Ceylon. To promote this project, Martineau combined a sentimental narrative
with the language of classical liberal political economy and utilitarianism, translating the
abstract political and economic theories of Adam Smith, Jeremy Bentham, and Thomas
Malthus into popular form.4 For Martineau, Ceylon was a suitable context to explore
these issues because the island had been “more thoroughly and ingeniously beggared than
any dependency.”5
The story of Rayo and Marana begins with the young couple aboard a small boat.
Unable to afford seashell bangles for their wedding, Rayo and Marana resort to stealing
conch shells under the cover of night. As Marana acts as lookout for guard boats and
sharks, Rayo makes stealthy dives to the ocean floor. The couple returns to shore with
4

Liberalism, political economy, utilitarianism, and the Victorian drive to civilize are familiar themes in the
historiography of the British Empire. A classic study in this body of literature is Eric Stokes, The English
Utilitarians and India (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959). See also Gauri Viswanathan, Masks of Conquest:
Literary Study and British Rule in India (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989); Javed Majeed,
Ungoverned Imaginings: James Mill’s ‘The History of British India’ and Orientalism (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1992); Thomas Metcalf, Ideologies of the Raj (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Lynn
Zastoupil, John Stuart Mill and India (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994); Uday Singh Mehta,
Liberalism and Empire: A Study in Nineteenth-Century British Liberal Thought (Chicago: The University
of Chicago Press, 1999); Niall Ferguson, Empire: The Rise and Demise of the British World Order and the
Lessons for Global Power (New York: Basic Books, 2003); Sankar Muthu, Enlightenment against Empire
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003); Jennifer Pitts, A Turn to Empire: The Rise of Imperial
Liberalism in Britain and France (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006); Karuna Mantena, Alibis of
Empire: Henry Maine and the Ends of Liberal Imperialism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010).
For two recent contributions, see C. A. Bayly, Recovering Liberties: Indian Thought in the Age of
Liberalism and Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Andrew Sartori, Liberalism in
Empire: An Alternative History (Oakland: University of California Press, 2015).
5
Martineau, “Cinnamon and Pearls,” 22; Logan, Harriet Martineau, 108.
2

various treasures of the sea when they are spotted by a local priest who admonishes them
for violating the commandment against theft. Rayo counters, “Is it theft to get chanks for
my bride, when I have worked long for them, and can get no chanks by working? I
thought God laid the chanks in our seas for our brides.” The priest responds, “God gave
them into the hands of those who possess them,” alluding to the colonial government of
British Ceylon. The government “will be angry with any who take them away by fraud
and violence.” Fearing that a curse will strike her family, Marana avails herself of a boat
to return the stolen conch shells to the sea. However, she is unable to part with a
particularly beautiful right-handed conch shell, which she hides in her dress. Failing to
lift the curse, Marana flees to her father, a shark-charmer practiced in the art of magic.
Marana sought special protection for Rayo, who was preparing for his work at the
approaching pearl fishery. “No circumstances had ever produced so happy an effect on
[Rayo] as his advancement to be a pearl-diver, an advancement in dignity, if not in gain,”
Martineau wrote. During the pearl fishery, Marana’s father joins the pearl fishers in the
boat, reciting incantations to protect his future son-in-law and the divers from sharks and
other dangers. During a break in the action, Rayo bobs in the water and spots on the boat
a bright white pearl that slipped from an open oyster. Not only would possession of this
pearl change his life, Rayo thought, allowing him to build a home and turn Marana into a
beautiful bride, but it was “the proper payment of his labour, considering that strangers
carried away all the profit from the country people.” He reaches for the pearl and puts it
in his mouth. Rayo is immediately apprehended, flogged, and issued an emetic to expel
the pearl from his gut. The couple is then publicly shamed and forced to work as
cinnamon peelers in exile.
3

For Martineau and her contemporaries, Ceylon was a spoiled paradise, a latterday Eden ruined by corporate greed and colonial negligence.6 Writings by Martineau and
others portrayed British colonial policies as a threat to the environment of Ceylon and the
source of the spiritual and material decay of its inhabitants. In “Cinnamon and Pearls,”
Martineau juxtaposed the harsh treatment of pearl divers and cinnamon bark strippers
with the bounty of the sea and the beauty of the land. She found a system of colonial
dirigisme that kept the local population of Ceylon poor and destitute despite the natural
endowments of the island, as those who harvested pearls and peeled cinnamon bark did
not enjoy the fruits of their labor. Even though pearl divers were “the natural owners of
the native wealth of the region,” they had been “kept bare of almost the necessaries of
life” by an overbearing and extractive colonial regime.7 Symbolically tied to the island,
cinnamon and pearls were two of Ceylon’s chief exports. British Ceylon also exercised
tight monopolistic control over the production of both commodities.8 The fertile pearl
oyster beds and fragrant cinnamon groves of Ceylon therefore offered Martineau
appropriate settings for a story about the dark sides of British involvement overseas. In a
section titled “Summary of Principles,” Martineau wrote that monopolies were
“disadvantageous as impairing the resources of the dependency, which are part of the
resources of the empire, and the very material of the trade which is the object of desire.”9

6

Logan, Harriet Martineau; Deckard, Paradise Discourse. For a discussion of Ceylon as an “Island Eden”
in European scientific and environmental discourses, see Richard Grove, Green Imperialism: Colonial
Expansion, Tropical Island Edens, and the Origins of Environmentalism, 1600-1860 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1995).
7
Martineau, “Cinnamon and Pearls,” 21.
8
Whereas the government monopoly over the cinnamon industry was lifted in the early nineteenth century,
British Ceylon continued to manage the pearl fishery as a government enterprise through the early
twentieth century. For more on the cinnamon trade, see Colvin R. De Silva, Ceylon Under British
Occupation, 1795-1833, 2nd ed. (Colombo: Colombo Apothecaries’ Co.), 2:414-44; Vijaya Samaraweera,
“The Cinnamon Trade of Ceylon,” Indian Economic and Social History Review 8, no. 4 (1971): 415-42.
9
Martineau, “Cinnamon and Pearls,” 124.
4

In using pearling in the Gulf of Mannar to illustrate her belief that monopolies should be
abolished, Martineau offered an eclectic vision of British colonialism based on various
principles of liberalism and classic political economy.
This dissertation— “The Beds of Empire: Power and Profit at the Pearl Fisheries
of South India and Sri Lanka, c. 1770-1840”—focuses on a relatively brief period in the
long history of human engagement with pearl oysters and the marine ecosystem of the
Gulf of Mannar. In the late eighteenth century, local and global forces led to the
transference of control over the pearling industry from the Dutch to the British. In the
context of the Napoleonic Wars, the Dutch East India Company (Verenigde Oostindische
Compagnie or VOC) withdrew most of its military and commercial presence from South
India and Sri Lanka and pivoted to Southeast Asia. In 1796, by virtue of its defeat of the
Dutch, the British East India Company claimed the pearl fishery as a “right of conquest”
and assumed managerial control over the human and natural resources of the industry. In
1802, the Company transferred its Ceylon territories to the Crown, which established the
island as a formal colony of the British state. This period also witnessed a shift in
political and economic thought at a global intellectual level, as classical liberalism
dislodged mercantilism as the prevailing framework for interpreting the relationship
between the state and the economy. Yet British Ceylon and the Company Raj fiercely
guarded their respective monopolies over the pearling industry, even as officers on both
sides of the Gulf promoted liberal-minded reforms. This created a contradictory state of
affairs. In bringing an assemblage of ideas to bear on the management of people and
oysters, the Company and Crown governments sought to not only increase productivity,
but also reshape the preexisting social, economic, and political makeup of the industry.
5

However, attempts by British officials to disembed the pearling industry from local
networks and institutions seldom delivered on the promise of total reform. This
dissertation explores the space between success and failure, and tracks such
developments through the evolving contexts of colonialism and imperialism in India and
Sri Lanka.
Focusing on the period 1770-1840, the five chapters of this dissertation are
bookended by the present introduction and a conclusion. Each chapter addresses a
particular domain of the pearling industry that officials targeted for reform—labor,
markets, merchants, sovereignty, and corruption. The lower limit of the temporal frame
(c. 1770) is demarcated by a series of events that signaled a changing of the guard. 1768
was the last year the Dutch VOC organized a pearl fishery. Two years later, Dutch
Ceylon sent a diplomatic mission to the Nawab of Arcot to negotiate the terms of an
agreement concerning the rights and revenue to the industry. In 1784, the British East
India Company organized its first pearl fishery near Tuticorin, and the transition from
Dutch to British regimes was underway. Seventy-years later (c. 1840), the Company and
Crown had solidified their place as the preeminent political powers in the region.
Between 1767 and 1837, there were at least thirty-seven pearl fisheries on either side of
the Gulf of Mannar, a period of remarkable productivity and intense exploitation. This
last decade also marked the beginning of a long fallow period. There was no pearl fishery
on the India-side of Mannar between 1830 and 1850, and British Ceylon did not organize
a fishery between 1837 and 1854.

6

Figure 1. “Map of the Gulf of Manar, ‘The Sea Abounding in Pearls.’” Frederic Courtland Penfield,
Wanderings East of Suez (London: George Bell and Sons, 1907).

The Gulf of Mannar is a shallow body of water between southeastern India and
western Sri Lanka. It is part of the Laccadive Sea, which borders India, Sri Lanka, and
the Maldives, and is located in the Indian Ocean. The eastern boundary of the Gulf of
Mannar is the west coast of Sri Lanka between present-day Galle district in the south and
the Mannar district in the north. The western boundary is formed by the southeastern
coast of the Indian subcontinent. The districts of Kanyakumari, Tirunelveli, Thoothukudi,
and Ramanathapuram in the state of Tamil Nadu form the present-day political
boundaries of the western littoral. Adam’s Bridge, a chain of low-lying shoals and
islands, and the Island of Mannar off the western coast of Sri Lanka, create a narrow
passageway between the Gulf of Mannar and Palk Bay known as Palk Strait. Today, the
7

Gulf of Mannar is a diverse marine ecosystem home to thousands of varieties of flora and
fauna, from algae and coral to birds and dolphins, that is protected as a biosphere reserve
under the authority of the Indian government.
The Gulf of Mannar was one of the most abundant sources of natural pearls in the
world for more than two millennia. The pearling industry is all but extinct today, but
under the right conditions, millions upon millions of pearl-producing bi-valve mollusks
(Margaritifera vulgaris) populated the low-lying shoals and rock and coral formations of
the Gulf of Mannar. In the first century, Pliny the Elder described the oysters of
Taprobane (Sri Lanka) “as the most productive of pearls of all parts of the world.”10 The
reputation of Margaritifera vulgaris as the “greatest pearl producer in the family of pearl
oyster” continued to the early twentieth century.11 Marine biologist William Herdman
wrote in a report commissioned by British Ceylon that “the animal is not a true oyster.”
He wrote that Margaritifera vulgaris was “more related to the Mussels (Mytilus) than to
the Oysters (Ostrea) of our British seas.”12 On the western littoral of the Gulf of Mannar,
the richest beds were located off the coast of Thoothukudi. Fertile pearl banks were found
short distances from the land between Negombo in the south and Karaitivu to the north.
European writings on pearling in the region used the local term paar to describe the
banks of rock and coral upon which clusters of pearl oysters grew. Tamil words were also
used to name and identify specific paars. The association between the region and
pearling was so close-knit that the Portuguese and Dutch both referred to the southeastern

10

Pliny the Elder, Naturalis historia, 10 Vols. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2014).
George F. Kunz, The Book of the Pearl: The History, Art, Science, and Industry of the Queen of Gems
(New York: The Century Co., 1908), 67.
12
William A. Herdman, Report to the Government of Ceylon on the Pearl Oyster Fisheries of the Gulf of
Manaar (London: The Royal Society, 1903-06), 1:1.
8
11

coast of India as the “Fishery Coast.” One of the Portuguese names for this area was the
costa de pescaria, while the Dutch rendered the toponym as the visserijkust.
The pearl fishery as a conceptual entity evolved along with the management
thereof. The classic definition of a fishery in environmental studies refers to the
exploitation of fish populations for commercial purposes. Yet further historical
contextualization of the term suggests more variegated, and somewhat slippery,
meanings. For instance, the pearl fishery in European discourses signified geographic
spaces. During the season, the paars upon which pearling operations took place were
described in such terms. The whole grouping of pearl oyster banks spread across the Gulf
of Mannar were also understood to have constituted the pearl fishery. The pearl fishery
was also emerged as a discrete administrative category in the Portuguese, Dutch, and
English governments. For instance, the Portuguese referred to it as pescaria, while the
Dutch rendered it as parelvisserij. Documents related to pearling in the Gulf of Mannar
produced during the era of European management suggests that officials also understood
the pearl fishery as an industry comprised of certain communities and specific
institutions. From divers and merchants to temples and courts, a complex of local actors
and institutions had pivotal roles in the industry, many of which claimed special rights
and privileges. Finally, the pearl fishery can be seen as a specific object of knowledge. As
this dissertation will show, pearling in the Gulf of Mannar generated significant interest
amongst European officials, travelers, cartographers, and naturalists. The scientific study
of pearls, mollusks, and marine ecosystems found accommodating homes in colonial
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Madras and Ceylon, both of which continued to serve as centers of marine animal and
fisheries research through the twentieth century.13
The geographic boundaries of the pearl fishery were also not fixed. An
intermittent event, the location of the pearl fishery shifted by season. Indeed, European
observers regularly commented on the infrequent nature of the pearl fishery and
bemoaned the challenges they faced in determining its location and predicting its yield. In
his report to British Ceylon, Herdman remarked generally that “a notable feature of these
fisheries, under all administrations, has been their uncertainty and intermittent
character.”14 Dutch and British administrators of the pearl fishery also expressed
frustration with the sporadic nature of the industry. For instance, Dutch Governor
Gustaav Willem Baron van Imhoff wrote in 1740, “experience has shown that, on former
occasion, the banks have been unproductive even for a longer period than has yet
occurred at present.”15 The exact number of paars was also not constant across eras. For
instance, a Dutch report from 1682 recorded thirty-one pearl oyster banks off the coast of
India. Less than a decade later, another survey by Dutch VOC officials identified fortyseven paars.16 By the early twentieth century, marine biologist James Hornell found at
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least fifty or sixty paars off the coast of Madras, which he further categorized into three
geographic divisions.17
Pearling in the Gulf of Mannar attracted the attention of travelers, naturalists,
composers, poets, and scholars from at least the early first millennium through the
twentieth century. From Pliny the Elder’s Natural History to Marco Polo’s celebrated
travelogue, from Arabian Nights and Paradise Lost to Twenty Thousand Leagues under
the Sea and Leonard Woolf’s autobiography, references to pearling in India and Sri
Lanka are found in a remarkably wide range of texts.18 In the ancient world, for instance,
Pliny the Elder’s late first-century encyclopedia Natural History characterized the Gulf of
Mannar as a source of the finest pearls in the world.19 There are numerous references to
the pearling in Tamil literature from the early first millennium, including such canonical
texts at Maduraikanchi and Silapadirakaram. There are also literary and epigraphical
sources that describe the use of pearls as diplomatic gifts, objects in temple gift-giving
and patronage, and jewelry adorned by royalty and courtly elites.20 For instance, a Cholaera inscription records an in-kind gift to the Pañcanadīśvara temple in Tanjavur: “[Prince
Śrīvisnuvattanadevar] graciously presented to [Ātavallār] 4 necklaces containing 851
pearls and weighing 22 kalañcu, 6 mañcāti, and 2 mā. [He also gave] an ornament for the
foot composed of 1,109 pearls and a cloth sewn with 315 pearls, with a weight of 47, 6
mañcāti, and 1 mā. Altogether [the total is] 2,285 pearls, and a weight of 72 kalañcu, 1
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mañcāti, and 3 mā.”21 Medieval Tamil inscriptions concerned with the trading activities
of merchant guilds provide evidence of pearls as objects of trade.22 A sixteenth-century
Tamil inscription at a temple in Kilakkarai provides information about taxes on pearls
sold in the market. It records “an agreement by which half a panam was to be given on
every 100 pearls sold in Kilakkarai and the proceeds to be utilized for the worship and
repairs to the temple.”23
In the late medieval and early modern periods, merchants, travelers, diplomats,
and naturalists gave first-hand accounts of pearling in the Gulf of Mannar.24 The intrepid
Venetian Marco Polo, for instance, offered vivid descriptions of pearl diving, merchant
activities, and tax systems.25 Jordanus, a contemporary of Marco Polo and friar from the
Catalan region, penned Mirabilia Descripta, an early fourteenth-century travel account
that contains a purported eyewitness account of over eight thousand boats that harvested
an “astounding and almost incredible” volume of pearls.26 Shortly after the time of Marco
Polo and Friar Jordanus, Muhammad Ibn Battuta, an Islamic scholar and traveler from
North Africa, arrived to Sri Lanka and secured a meeting with its “idolater Sultan,”
during which they discussed, among other topics, the superlative quality of pearls
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harvested from waters in the king’s domain.27 From the turn of the sixteenth century, with
the arrival of organized trading ventures from Europe, the spiritual descendants of Marco
Polo and Ibn Battuta—Duarte Barbosa, Pedro Teixeira, Caesar Frederick, Jan Huyghen
van Linschoten, and countless others—seldom missed an opportunity to witness the
spectacle of pearling.28 A report by British officer George Turnour submitted to Governor
Frederic North of Ceylon in 1799, for instance, reproduced large sections of texts by
Marco Polo, Philipus Baldaeus, João Ribeiro, and others.29 Likewise, a royal
commissioner for the British colonial office wrote, “from the descriptions of ancient
travelers, [the pearl fishery] is carried on nearly in the same manner that was practised
several centuries ago.”30 As historian Sanjay Subrahmanyam writes, the pearl fishery has
been depicted “as unchanging and primitive in character, withstanding the ‘vicissitudes of
three thousand years’ without losing an iota of its pristine, romantic, character.”31
To better contextualize British management of the pearl industry, it is important
to first develop a picture of the preexisting social, political, economic, and environmental
conditions surrounding the industry. The turn of the sixteenth century is an important
27
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juncture because it is when European powers became directly involved with the
management and oversight of the industry. Three European imperial forces in early
modern and modern Asia—Portuguese, Dutch, and English—had direct and successive
involvement with the pearl fishery between the sixteenth and twentieth centuries. As
historian Sanjay Subrahmanyam writes, “One can scarcely find an enterprise then that
encapsulates the phases of European ‘expansion’ in Asia better than the fishery, which
passed through the hands of each of the great colonial powers in Asia of the early modern
and modern periods.”32 The turn of the sixteenth century is also important because at this
moment European powers started to produce a large body of detailed historical texts
related to pearling that provide information about the location, frequency, volume, and
organization of the industry. These materials allow for a historical analysis of pearling in
the Gulf of Mannar that belies its characterization as an immutable industry.
The Portuguese Estado da Índia was involved with the pearling industry in
different capacities from around the turn of the sixteenth century to the mid-seventeenth
century. Vasco da Gama expressed an interest in pearls sourced from the Gulf of Mannar
during his visit to the court of the Zamorin of Calicut at the end of the fifteenth century.33
A few years later, Francisco de Almeida, Portuguese Viceroy of India, wrote to the King
of Portugal in November 1507, “The seed pearls and pearls which you command me to
send you, I cannot get, as they are in Ceylon and Caile which are the sources of their
production. I should have to purchase them with my blood or with my money, which I
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have because you have given it to me.”34 By the 1520s, the King of Portugal and Estado
da Índia appointed a captain or chief factor of the pearling industry. He brokered deals
with Muslim chieftains of Kilakkarai and Old Kayalpatnam that allowed the banks to be
fished under local control in exchange for tribute. In the latter half of the sixteenth
century, the Nayakas of Madurai and Jesuits supported by the Portuguese crown came to
an agreement wherein the Nayakas would receive an award equivalent to one day of
fishing. Although the pearl fishery was a nominal seigniorage of the Nayakas, the actual
management of the industry was in the hands of the Jesuits and Christian Paravas, and the
proceeds flowed to the purse of the Estado da Índia.35 Historian C. R. de Silva writes that
“the most important source of income for the Crown was the tax on the divers.” The
Portuguese also taxed merchants and boat-owners to participate in the pearl fishery and
levied duties on various activities in the bazaar.36 Some aspects of Portuguese
management conformed to the political and commercial practices that are commonly
associated with the Iberian empires in the greater Eurasian world.37 The Portuguese also
inserted themselves into local matrices of power. They extended patronage and protection
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to Tamil Paravas, extracted tribute and imposed taxes, deployed the use of force, and kept
up diplomatic relations with local polities.38
With the support of the Kandyans of Sri Lanka, the Dutch VOC drove the
Portuguese from maritime Ceylon and the Fishery Coast by 1658.39 Present-day scholars
have examined the relationship between the VOC and local polities, looking at the place
of the pearl fishery in the political economy of the region and its connections to merchant
culture, patronage, and identity.40 The VOC claimed rights to the pearling industry and
assumed a role as patrons and protectors of the Paravas community like their vanquished
Portuguese rivals. Dutch claims to the pearling industry as a “right of conquest” were
further solidified through treaties with indigenous polities such as the Nayakas of
Madurai and Setupatis of Ramnad. The VOC also drew upon juridical discourses
concerned with territory and sovereignty to further substantiate their claims. Dutch
officials built upon the organizational strengths of their Iberian predecessors to develop
what appears to be a far more regular and systematic mode of managing the pearl fishery.
This common-held perspective is partly due to the nature of the Dutch VOC records,
which are well recognized for being very detailed and preoccupied with political and
commercial affairs. For instance, William Herdman wrote, “As would be expected, we
38
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have much more definite records of the details of the fisheries during the Dutch and
British occupations than during previous times.”41 In the historiography of so-called
“European expansion,” the Dutch VOC has often been contrasted with that of the
Portuguese. Iberian imperialism in Asia is depicted as definitively “medieval,”
characterized by an overreliance on violence, taxation, and religious conversion to
advance its agenda. On the other side of the coin, the VOC is described as a “modern”
enterprise and its affairs overseas are portrayed as more capitalist, organized, and
tolerant.42 Yet the Dutch VOC elaborated many aspects of Portuguese management of the
pearling industry. In the latter half of the seventeenth century, the Dutch continued to
extract tribute from vested parties, impose taxes, and distribute shares of the season’s
catch to various stakeholders. The Dutch also taxed diving stones at variable rates based
on community membership or religious affiliation. Dutch officials divided the taxstructure into three categories—Christian, “Heathen,” and “Moor”—and graded it with
Christian divers paying the lowest rate and Muslim divers subject to the highest tax
burden. The VOC also sought to juggle various rights that structured the pearling
industry, including the claims of Madurai and Ramnad, as well as the role of local
communities such as the Paravas and Maraikkayars that had enjoyed certain privileges
under the Portuguese. Violence was also a regular fixture at the pearl fishery during the
Dutch era.43
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The mid-eighteenth century marked a major policy shift in Dutch management of
the pearling industry.44 There were only two pearl fisheries organized by Dutch Ceylon in
the first few decades of the eighteenth century, 1708 and 1724, and mounting frustration
about this dry spell prompted VOC officials to rethink the government’s approach. The
VOC had organized most fisheries up to his point under the amani system. The amani
system was a form of direct management in which the government proprietor assumed all
the risk and fished the banks on its own account. Governor Gustaav Willem Baron van
Imhoff shifted away from the amani system and introduced a type of revenue-farming,
adapted from a system of “renting” that had been employed in the agrarian sectors of the
pre-modern economy in the ancien régimes of India and Sri Lanka.45 In 1740, Governor
Baron van Imhoff wrote to his successor, “I am inclined to think that unless the fishery is
very successful, it would be rather prejudicial than profitable to the Company, and that it
would much better if they could be avoided, even if it were by a yearly lease of the
license to dive on the pearl banks, in the same way as at present an experiment is made
with the diving of chanks, the number of people and tonys [boats] being regulated.”46
Under this arrangement, Dutch Ceylon leased the right to the pearl fishery to a local
merchant, who assumed all the risk if the fishery failed to deliver on its expected returns.
Contemporaries recognized Governor van Imhoff for his innovative management
program. Governor Jan Schreuder wrote in 1762 that Baron van Imhoff “clearly
demonstrated to what risk, indeed to what disadvantage the Company was exposed”
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when it conducted the pearl fishery under amani or direct management.47 After nearly a
century of amani as the predominant choice, renting became the preferred mode of
management for the Dutch VOC in the latter half of the eighteenth century.
By 1796, the British East India Company had expelled the Dutch VOC from
maritime Ceylon and the Fishery Coast. From 1796 to 1802, the East India Company
governed the erstwhile territories of Dutch Ceylon from its administrative headquarters at
Fort St. George, Madras. Both Dutch and English representatives believed that the East
India Company takeover of the island was a temporary arrangement. It was assumed that
control over the island would be restored to the Dutch at the end of the Napoleonic Wars.
However, high-ranking officials in London decided otherwise and kept it as an English
possession. It was also determined that the East India Company would manage Ceylon
under the auspices of its Indian government. In 1802, under the Treaty of Amiens, the
Company transferred power over the coastal areas of Ceylon to the British Crown, while
the coastal districts of southeastern India remained under Company rule. The Company
Raj superintended the pearl fishery on the India-side of the Gulf, while British Ceylon
took care of the banks off the western coast of the island. Thus, during the first half of the
nineteenth century the pearl oyster beds were situated within the domains of two different
British powers. Some high-ranking officials proposed bringing the management of the
entire pearl fishery under the collective authority of Madras and Colombo, though such a
plan never materialized. For instance, Alexander Johnston wrote to the British Secretary
of State for the Colonies in 1809 with a “plan for changing the system observed by the
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Ceylon Government, in the management of the Pearl and Chank fisheries on the North
West Coast of Ceylon, for placing all the Pearl and Chank Banks in the gulf of Manaar,
as well as those belonging to the East India Company as those belonging to the Crown,
under the same management.”48
The Madras and Ceylon governments experimented with both renting and amani
during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. As British traveler James
Cordiner wrote, “sometimes government fishes the banks entirely at its own risk;
sometimes the boats are let to many speculators; but, most frequently, the right of fishing
is sold to one individual, who sub-rents boats to others.”49 While renting out the entire
fishery to single renter was the principal mode of management during the early years of
British management it was often accompanied by elements of amani when the renter’s
contract expired. In such cases, when the fishery was leased to a single renter, the
principal leaseholder maintained a right to extend his rental period if a sufficient quantity
of oysters remained on the beds at the expiration of his lease. If the renter declined, then
the attending officers would take over the fishery and conduct it under amani. Decisions
about how to best manage the pearl fisheries were regular features of the administrative
proceedings of British Ceylon and the Company Raj and many British officials held
strong views on the subject. Governor North of Ceylon advanced an argument in favor of
amani. He wrote: “At all Events I intend to conduct it myself in Amannee, as I shall any
other Pearl-Fishery which may take Place during my stay on this Island. Every Reason
both of Calculation & Experience has convinced me that there is no mode of carrying on
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that Business, either so economical, so productive, so certain, or so little liable to
abuse.”50 He warned against devolving too much power to local merchants and asserted
that amani promoted better natural resource management. These debates over the best
mode of management continued through the nineteenth century, yet no concrete
government-wide policy emerged.51 Most of the pearl fisheries in the late eighteenth and
early nineteenth centuries were conducted under the renting system. By the 1830s,
however, British Ceylon officials wanted to turn away from the renting system and
reintroduce a system of direct management, and by the mid-nineteenth century, officials
such as George Vane remarked that the renting “had given much trouble at former
fisheries so conducted, and led to abuses of the rights of the divers and boatmen (also, as
believed, to the over-fishing of the banks).”52
A historical study of the pearling in the Gulf of Mannar sheds light—a pearly,
iridescent light—on some of the underlying aspects of British colonialism, imperialism,
and governance in late eighteenth-century and early nineteenth-century India and Sri
Lanka. Historians have typically identified this period as a critical juncture in the
historiography of the British Empire. According to an older historiographical model
popularized by British scholar Vincent Harlow, the second half of the eighteenth century
is distinguished by the emergence of the “Second British Empire,” which displaced the
“First British Empire,” the latter being a system characterized by territorial possessions in
the Atlantic and intense commercial regulation. As the American colonies slipped away
in the late eighteenth century, this historiographical tradition maintains that Britain swung
50
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its attention from the Atlantic to the Asian world, expanding or acquiring territorial
possessions in the East while reducing its overall emphasis on trade.53 More recent
studies have challenged the two-phase model of British imperial history and instead
followed a line of inquiry that teases out connections across and between the western and
eastern frontiers of the British imperium.54 The second half of the eighteenth century also
witnessed a transformation in the relationship between the Company and Crown. The
British Parliament started in earnest to undermine the Company’s commercial power by
gradually eroding its monopoly and staging a hostile takeover of corporate governance.55
Through a series of legislative acts, often in response to changing realities or events in
India, the world’s most powerful corporation turned from a trading entity with the
inherent qualities of a state into a territorial and administrative political power in Asia.56
At the same time, the British Crown continued to expand its global footprint, establishing
formal colonies that stretched from Guyana to New Zealand.
As the strands of Pax Britannica came together to form a global assemblage of
power, major intellectual shifts occurred in the realms of political and economic thought.
The eighteenth century welcomed the arrival of liberalism as a distinct political theory
53
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and philosophical system that, as many historians have promulgated, eventually merged
with classic political economy, utilitarianism, and evangelism to create a distinct, if
somewhat inconsistent, ideology of imperial governance in India.57 Historian Eric Stokes
argued in The English Utilitarians and India (1959) that British colonial policy in India
stemmed largely from a transformation in the way that markets and culture were
understood in Victorian England, an intellectual shift represented by Benthamites such as
James Mill.58 The English Utilitarians and India initiated a paradigm shift by changing
the way in which historians understood the relationship between intellectual thought and
public policy in the metropole and colony. It pushed scholars of eighteenth-century and
nineteenth-century Britain and its empire to seriously consider how ideas about law,
markets, and society that have been naturalized as the products of European modernity
were in fact hammered out in colonial contexts. Those writing in the wake of The English
Utilitarians and India have drawn further attention to a deep irony. British colonialism in
South Asia functioned as a petri dish for the growth and development of liberalism while
the tenets of universal freedom and progress espoused by figures such as J. S. Mill and
Thomas Macaulay were denied to colonial subjects. Historians of political thought such
as Uday Singh Mehta, Javed Majeed, and Jennifer Pitts have demonstrated through
careful readings of Jeremy Bentham, James Mill, J. S. Mill, and others that liberalism
was not in fact anathema to British imperialism (or other European empires, for that
matter), but rather part and parcel to autocratic rule in India, Sri Lanka, and other foreign
lands.59 Mehta’s Liberalism and Empire, for example, argues that liberalism was, and
perhaps continues to be, constitutive of colonial domination and imperial rule, buttressed
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by racist and culturalist discourses spun from essentialist assumptions about Indian
history.60 Figures like James Mill and Thomas Macaulay expressed universalist and
abstract ideas about freedom and emancipation even as they promoted paternalistic and
interventionist policies in the colonies that sought to “civilize” the darker nations.
In the realm of economic thought, liberal economics displaced mercantilism as the
prevailing framework for understanding the relationship between states and economies.61
Also known as classical economics, this school of economic thought is represented most
famously by the works of political economists such as Adam Smith, David Ricardo, and
Thomas Malthus, and asserts that markets optimally function under conditions of
minimal government intervention. As many economic and intellectual historians have
shown, the rise of free trade ideology emerged alongside the birth and development of a
British global imperial order in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Debates
about the relative benefits of monopoly had ensued since at least the seventeenth century,
often pivoting around the East India Company. Competition between mercantilism and
liberal economics continued to shape policy and discourse on trade and empire into the
nineteenth century. Bernard Semmel’s classic The Rise of Free Trade Imperialism made
this connection between the rise of free trade ideology and the expansion of the British
empire in the latter half of the eighteenth century.62 From liberal axioms about progress
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and improvement articulated by political philosophers like James Mill and J. S. Mill, to
ideas about private property and markets found in the writings of Adam Smith, liberalism
is notorious for its polysemy. As historian Thomas Metcalf writes, “Liberalism was, to be
sure, in no sense a coherent doctrine” and “within early Victorian England there exited
liberals of many kinds.”63
Historians who have examined the relationship between the discourse of political
economy and early colonialism in India have focused on land and private property.
Alongside The English Utilitarians and British India, there is perhaps no more influential
book than Ranajit Guha’s A Rule of Property for Bengal (1963) on the ways in which
historians analyze the impact of British political and economic thought on policy
decisions and administrative structures in eighteenth-century and nineteenth-century
India.64 Guha’s classic essay demonstrates that the Company Raj in post-Plassey Bengal
was not only influenced by anti-feudalism and physiocratic ideas about land and value,
but also tried to create an entire administrative land management system based on such
principles in the form of the “Permanent Settlement” of 1793. In an effort to bring a
private property regime to the Bengal countryside, Lord Cornwallis, Philip Francis and
other Company officers introduced a land tenancy system that created a class of property
owners, drawn largely from hereditary zamindari groups seen as an “ancient aristocracy,”
from whom the Company Raj collected revenue.65 Guha’s seminal work illustrated ways
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in which political economic thought shaped the contours of the administrative and
governing apparatuses of the Company Raj in Bengal. In the South Indian context,
historians have explored the ideological foundations and economic effects of the ryotwari
settlement in Madras. The brainchild of Governor Thomas Munro, the ryotwari system—
introduced in 1820—was presented as an alternative to the “Bengal Model” because it
theoretically removed local intermediaries and allowed the state to collect revenue
straight from the cultivator.66 However, the ryotwari system was still undergirded by the
rule of law and English concepts of private property, and the ideal of “improvement”
functioned as its primary engine. Historian Jon Wilson offers an important intervention in
The Domination of Strangers, arguing that the emergence of the Company Raj in Bengal
was not isolated from global transformation in systems of governance.67 He demonstrates
that ideological and institutional shifts displaced indigenous systems of rule based on
kinship and social hierarchies and replaced it with a model motivated by the “domination
of strangers.” Wilson builds upon the work of Stokes, Guha, and others by showing that
modern “impersonal” forms of bureaucratic rule were first tested in late eighteenthcentury Bengal before finding a place in the domestic political culture of Britain. He also
draws attention to the fact that British officials did not fully understand the cultural
differences that they confronted in India. The Company Raj in turn undertook “an

66

T. H. Beaglehole, Thomas Munro and the Development of Administrative Policy in Madras, 1792-1818
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966); Nilmani Mukherjee, The Ryotwari System of Madras,
1792-1827 (Calcutta: Firma K. L. Mukopadhyay, 1962); Burton Stein, Thomas Munro: The Origins of the
Colonial State and His Vision of Empire (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1989).
67
Jon E. Wilson, The Domination of Strangers: Modern Governance in Eastern India, 1780-1835
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).
26

anxious search for semantic coherence,” for which officials used abstract categories and
concepts to bring a semblance of epistemological and bureaucratic order.68
These works on the administrative structures of the Company Raj are important
because they help contextualize the modalities through which British officers attended to
the management of the pearl fishery. Indeed, management of the pearl fishery was not
cordoned off from wider debates within Company administration about land and revenue
structures. As historian Sanjay Subrahmanyam writes, “the spirit of raiyatwari, so much
in the air in these years, could not leave the fishery’s administration untouched.”69
Indeed, debates around renting and amani resonated with discussions about agrarian land
systems. Under the renting system, the government proprietor collected revenue by
leasing the pearl fishery to a local commercial magnate, who then sub-leased boats to
individuals or partnerships. The amani system enabled the government to extract revenue
by leasing boats directly to individual merchants. British Ceylon and the Company Raj
introduced regimes of private property in the agrarian economy, but asserted a monopoly
over the production of commodities such as pearls, conch shells, and cinnamon. British
officers differentiated pearls from other commodities. The pearl fishery was a seasonal,
intermittent event that did not yield annual revenue. Officials also argued that the unique
nature of the product, and the fragility of the ecosystem in which it was produced,
rendered pearl oyster populations particularly vulnerable to overfishing. The physical
qualities of pearls—small, valuable, and easily concealed—and the nature of extraction—
miles from the coast and fathoms under water—heightened anxieties. Officers of the
Company and Crown promulgated a position that only the skilled and capable hands of a
68
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strong government could modulate use, protect the persons and property, and provide the
proper inducements to attract labor and capital. It was thus incumbent upon the Madras
and Ceylon governments to turn the pearl fishery from, as one official wrote, an
“uncertain venture” into a “state of regular and rich annual reproduction.” Governor
North wrote that “in other farms the Revenue may be indemnified by the Certainty of
what it receives from the Sacrifice which It makes. But in this the private Renter has no
Superior means of Vigilance; nor is any Sufficient temporary advantage likely to accrue
from that mode of administration which can compensate the mischiefs of private avarice
armed with public authority.”70
The pearl fishery monopoly was a point of contention for philosophers, political
economists, politicians, and civil servants who not only engaged in debates about
fisheries management and governance but also over trade and empire. The East India
Company was a natural enemy to dyed-in-the-wool free trade political economists like
Adam Smith. Smith wrote in The Wealth of Nations (1776) that the East India Company
was a “company of merchants” who considered themselves “sovereigns.” He
characterized the East India Company as a corporation that profited from a state-granted
monopoly, run by deluded merchants who acted like princes, and offered no added value
to the economy of its home country. To many, the pearl fishery of Mannar was a
particularly egregious case of the deleterious effects of state-granted or state-operated
monopolies. Scottish political economist John Ramsay McCulloch—an acolyte of David
Ricardo who edited and introduced an 1828 edition of Adam Smith’s The Wealth of
Nations—discussed the pearl fishery in A Dictionary, Practical, Theoretical and
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Historical of Commerce and Commercial Navigation (1832). He wrote unequivocally
that “these monopolies are of no value.”71 For McCulloch, mercantilism was an
outmoded theory and monopolies were ineffective instruments with which to manage the
economy. In the case of the pearl fishery McCulloch reasoned that “the sum for which the
fishery is let, equal the expenses incurred in guarding, surveying, and managing the
banks.”72 McCulloch and similar-minded liberal political economists advocated for the
total abolition of a government monopoly over the pearl fishery. Lifting the monopoly,
and ending “some very oppressive regulations enacted by the Dutch,” would breath
“fresh life into the fishery.”73 Instead of leasing the pearl fishery to a local merchant or
reaping the harvest as a government-controlled enterprise, McCulloch recommended that
any capable businessman ought to purchase a license.
On the other hand, there were those who advanced arguments in favor of a
government monopoly. Individuals who believed in the value and purpose of the pearl
fishery monopoly usually had first-hand experience with the industry in contrast to those
thinkers and reformers who addressed the issue from a distance as an intellectual topic.
For instance, James Steuart served as the master attendant and chief inspector of the pearl
banks for British Ceylon in the 1820s and 1830s and authored one of the first singlesubject works on the pearl fishery.74 Steuart wrote in An Account of the Pearl Fisheries of
Ceylon (1843) “that the Gulf of Manaar pearl fisheries can only be made of general
benefit to the community, by their being protected and preserved, or in the language of
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political economists, monopolized by Government.”75 British Ceylon and the Company
Raj ought not be high-handed government-proprietors of the industry but should instead
be seen as “Trustees of a monopoly” that belonged to the people of India and Ceylon. He
wrote, “it is the duty of the Trustees or Guardians of the interests of the community to
adopt measures calculated to increase the revenue obtained from it, in order, that the
taxes which bear directly upon the people may be lightened.”76 Steuart did not support
government monopolies in all instances, but in his estimate the pearl fishery was unique.
He wrote, “We would not be supposed to be favourers of monopoly, or of exclusive
rights and privileges of some of the community to the injury of others; nor do we approve
of trading Government.”77 He added, “when a beneficent Providence blesses a country
with a peculiar benefit, it is right in the Government of that country jealously to preserve
and monopolize such natural advantage for the good of its people.”78 Jonathan Forbes,
the author of an early nineteenth-century study of Ceylon, also supported the retention of
a government monopoly. He wrote, “Theorists have called for the abolition of what they
are pleased to term ‘the pearl-fishery monopoly,’ and have had the hardihood to assert,
that to throw it open would benefit the inhabitants of Ceylon; but it is to be hoped that
neither vague theory, nor the sound of a word—monopoly, will triumph over common
sense and justice, to deprive the public of Ceylon of this unexceptionable source of
revenue.”79 Monopolists also advanced an argument that government control over the
pearl fishery was the most effective method to protect and manage the pearl oyster
populations and the marine ecosystem of Mannar. Forbes feared that the lack of
75
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government oversight would ruin the pearl oyster banks. He wrote, “If the pearl-fisheries
of the island were thrown open to all speculators, a very short period would suffice to
annihilate this mine of wealth.”80 Anti-monopolists like McCulloch dismissed this
argument wholesale: “The fears of exhausting the banks is quite ludicrous. The fishery
would be abandoned as unprofitable long before the breed of oysters had been injuriously
diminished; and in a few years it would be as productive as ever.” 81
Nevertheless, a complete transition from a monopolistic system based on the
principles of mercantilism to free trade liberalism never fully materialized. Historian
Sudipta Sen has shown how the twinned forces of commercial expansion and territorial
conquest led to the erection of a powerful apparatus through which the East India
Company interfered in eighteenth-century politics, economy, and society.82 Interventions
by the Company Raj into market affairs through legal, commercial, administrative, and
even violent mechanisms flew in the face of free trade principles. Sen illustrates that the
political and symbolic economies of certain “prestige goods,” such as betel, salt, and
tobacco, were areas in which the company-state regularly interfered. As this dissertation
will show, the pearling industry was also a site in which the company-state and colonial
state intervened, though the results varied. A peculiar feature during these early years of
British management was that neither Company nor Crown expressed much interest in the
pearl trade per se. The actual buying and selling of pearls was concentrated largely in the
hands of a heterogeneous mix of Indian merchants and private European traders. Instead
of pearls, and the profit derived from buying and selling precious gems, Madras and
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Colombo in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries were far more concerned
with the management side of the enterprise. Historians of the British period have focused
largely on how the pearl fishery conformed to the larger revenue systems of the Company
Raj and British Raj, focusing primarily on the years and dates in which fisheries were
held and the revenue that each generated for treasuries.83 Yet the pearl fishery constituted
a rather small section of the overall revenue picture on both the mainland and island.
Taxes collected from agricultural lands, as well as cash crops such as cinnamon and tea
produced in a plantation system, represented more substantial sources of revenue.
Moreover, the pearl fishery was a seasonal event and was difficult to predict, which
meant that the two fledgling British governments in the region could not rely on it for
annual returns. Discussions of pearls as commodities with trade value are seldom found
in official writings produced by Company and Crown officers during this period. By the
time the East India Company had wrested managerial control over the pearl fishery from
the Dutch in 1796, the Madras government was well on its way towards diversifying its
economic base to include revenue extracted from sources beyond the buying and selling
of raw materials and finished goods. Through its acquisition of the power to tax
agricultural lands in Madras, Bengal, and Bombay, as well as the changing nature of the
global economy and money markets, the East India Company consciously entered the
world of land and revenue management. The production and consumption of pearls from
the perspective of the Company and Crown was not about fishing for oysters and trading
precious jewels.
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Bits and pieces of mercantilism and liberal economics converged along the sandy
shores of southeastern India and western Sri Lanka to shape the contours of British
management of the pearling industry. What may appear at first glance to be some
irreconcilable tensions between mercantilism and liberal economics were to some extent
eased in a colonial context. Both approaches conformed to the scientific discourse of
political economy, suited the liberal tenets of progress, and fit squarely within the
idealized work of a political sovereign. French theorist Michel Foucault drew attention to
a distinct form of modern governmental power he called governmentality. He remarked
that governmentality is “the ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses
and reflections, the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific
albeit complex form of power, which has as its target population, as its principal form of
knowledge political economy, and as its essential technical means apparatuses of
security.”84 Through abstract and universalized knowledge, political economy produced
and created a distinct sphere of governmental intervention. It capacitated Company and
Crown officials to identify the people, institutions, and natural marine environment that
produced and consumed pearls as objects of reform. It was this aspect of British
management that represented a novel development in the history of pearling even though
the results were far less dramatic.
The governments of Madras and Ceylon in turn introduced various measures that
sought to convert preexisting pearling practices, as well as the supporting social, political,
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and economic infrastructure, into a revenue-generating industry. The aim to dissolve
patrimonial and non-economic relationships was further complicated by the fact that
officials depended upon local networks and institutions for authority, labor, information,
supplies, and capital. A rich and somewhat contentious body of scholarship on
intermediaries and services groups in the historiography of early colonial South Asia
suggests that this problem was not unique to the pearling industry but common
throughout British territories in South Asia during the eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries. Scholars have considered the extent to which scribes, bankers, merchants,
fixers, landed elites, and other native intermediaries enabled colonial state formation and
conquest.85 Another line of inquiry has focused on the place of intermediaries in scientific
and humanistic knowledge production.86 From religious institutions and royal courts to
skilled divers and wealthy merchants, numerous local people and institutions had a
pivotal role in the pearling industry, which marked such key stakeholder groups as the
objects of governmental reform. Madras and Colombo produced fields of state
intervention that not only sought to increase extractive capabilities, but also aimed to
fundamentally reshape the social, economic, and political foundations of the pearl
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fishery.87 From restructuring the rights of local polities to training the flow of labor and
interfering in merchant affairs, the governments of Madras and Ceylon sought to break up
“traditional” arrangements, and to turn the pearl fishery from an industry “embedded” in
local economy and society to one operationalized by the logic of markets and protected
by the rule of law.88
The temporal framework of this dissertation (c. 1770-1840) is not only important
for understanding the history of the pearling in the Gulf of Mannar, but also has
significance in the broader historiography of South Asia. This seventy-year period
witnessed the so-called “colonial transition,” as the British East India Company in India
and British colonial state in Ceylon effectively vanquished their European rivals and
subdued indigenous opponents such as the Marathas of western India, Kandyans of Sri
Lanka, and the “little kingdoms” of the Tamil countryside to solidify British military,
political, and economic preeminence in the region. The introduction of land reforms in
Bengal and Madras, as well as the increased use of modern investigative modalities such
as surveying and anthropology, further illustrate some of the developments in colonial
policy and ideology during this period. Yet historians have been at odds over the exact
nature of this era for decades.89 Indeed, the eighteenth century is one of the most
contentious and spirited topics of debate in the historiography of South Asia.90 One of the
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central questions animating debates over the eighteenth century is the extent to which
British colonial practices and ideologies impacted or altered the preexisting structures of
South Asian politics, economy, and society. Scholars such as David Washbrook and C.
A. Bayly brought a revisionist impulse to the field, minimizing the importance of great
men and the rise and fall of empires and instead analyzing the structural undercurrents of
Indian society and economy from a Marxist-inspired and social-historical viewpoint. In
doing so, Bayly, Washbrook, and others came to represent a strain of thinking that
advanced a thesis of continuity, suggesting that many elements inherent to indigenous
economics and societies set the stage for changes witnessed during the early colonial era,
and effectively deemphasizing the influence of British policy and practices on Indian
society.91 Writing from a different perspective, scholars such as Partha Chatterjee, Ranajit
Guha, Bernard Cohn, Nicholas Dirks, and Sudipta Kaviraj view the eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries as constituting a stark break with the precolonial past, implying that
the Company Raj in India and British state in Ceylon were not only different beasts than
their European and indigenous predecessors but also penetrated local society more deeply
through modern forms of knowledge and power.92 Whereas Bayly, Washbrook, and
others focused on the critical role of agential intermediaries such as bankers, fixers,
merchants, and landed elites in facilitating both precolonial and colonial state formation,
those writing from within the “Subaltern Studies” camp sought to recover the life-worlds
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of non-elites like peasants and laborers for whom the weight of colonial rule was acutely
felt. It was during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries that many historians
argue the British poured the administrative and ideological concrete for the foundation
upon which the modern colonial state was built. British engagements with the pearling
industry provides an excellent site to parse these issues, and this dissertation explores the
space between these two arguments by presenting an image of two fledgling governments
in the East India Company and British Ceylon that brought an assemblage of ideas and
practices to bear on the management of a single industry. British officials differentiated
pearling from other industries and introduced new techniques of modern governance to
the production-side of the pearl trade. However, a complete overhaul of the industry
never materialized as some officers wished. In the case of the pearling industry, the socalled colonial transition not only denotes the passage from indigenous to British regimes
and the establishment of British hegemony in the region, but also includes an intraEuropean changeover from Dutch to British control.
Scholars writing about the history of the pearl fishery also reproduced many
commonly held assumptions about the relationship between geography and empire.
Colonial (and later nationalist) historians understood political suzerainty and territorial
control as isomorphic, a convenient idea derived from Roman legal thought that afforded
the political entity in whose jurisdiction the pearl fishery was located with full right and
power over that resource. The question of the “sovereignty of the sea” was also taken up
by early modern and modern legal and political theorists such as Hugo Grotius, Samuel
von Pufendorf, and Emmerich de Vattel, who debated the extent to which a political
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entity might legitimately claim control over coastlines and open waters.93 Twentiethcentury professional historians from India used different source materials to write the
history of the pearl fishery but reproduced many assumptions about the relationship
between sovereignty and territory vis-à-vis the pearl fishery. Take for example the work
of K. A. Nilakanta Sastri, historian of South India, who wrote in his study of the early
medieval Pandya dynasty that pearling operations conducted from Korkai—the ancient
seat of the pearl fishery—fell squarely in the domain of the state.94 He characterized the
relationship between polities and pearling during the Chola period along the same lines.95
Historian S. Arunachalam promulgated a similar view in The Pearl Fishery on the Tamil
Coast (1952). An historical overview of the pearl fishery from ancient times to the
twentieth century, the impressive temporal scope of the book is overshadowed by its
near-exclusive focus on the India-side of the Gulf of Mannar.96 Published shortly after
both India and Sri Lanka gained independence from British rule, Arunachalam’s book
represented a strain of Tamil geographic nationalism that obscured the historical
connections between the island and mainland. For Arunachalam, the pearl fishery
belonged to Tamil Nadu and the Tamil people. Arunachalam followed another trend in
colonial histories of the pearl fishery. As marine biologist William A. Herdman wrote in
his early nineteenth-century report to the government of British Ceylon, “And so we
continue to have glimpses, through the centuries, of this ancient and highly prized
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industry being carried on with little or no change, first under the Sinhalese kings of
Kandy and the Tamil kings of Jaffna, and subsequently under the successive European
rulers.”97 Likewise, Arunachalam’s periodization tracked the rise and fall of dominant
states and empires, following a neat unfolding path that leads from the Pandyas and
Cholas of medieval Tamil Nadu to the age of European imperialism and ends with the
birth of the nation-state. Historians have also argued that British colonialism in the region
initiated a stark break with the past. For instance, historian M. M. M. Mahroof writes,
“the arrival of the British was a precursor of a more systematic approach to pearling.”98
Jorge Manual Flores, a historian of the Portuguese Empire in Asia, characterizes
the Gulf of Mannar and Palk Strait as a discrete “microworld” of the Indian Ocean.99 The
turn towards a microworld addresses a concern highlighted by Flores in which historians
tend to emphasize long-distance trade by capital-heavy merchants across vast oceanic
spaces at the expense of local and regional trade. Flores instead turns his attention to
neglected trades— “substantially more discrete”—that took place on a smaller scale
between merchants of more modest means and primarily in staples and essential
commodities like rice. Flores uses the term microworld to not only describe the unique
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geography of the region but also the milieu in which people and goods moved between
the island and mainland over the longue durée. The Gulf of Mannar, according to Flores,
is a “gold mine for the historian who enters the scope of the small change.”100 The
microworld of Mannar was importantly not a self-contained one because it sat at the
crossroads of a busy interregional oceanic highway system, uniquely situated to serve as
an interchange for the eastern and western zones of the Indian Ocean. Oceanic
frameworks have allowed historians to analyze connections across geographic spaces and
time periods that are otherwise obscured by the borders of nation-states and hardening of
modern identities.101 According to global historian Jerry Bentley, one of the greatest
intellectual challenges by historians of oceans is to simultaneously address the dynamics
that integrated maritime regions “without losing sight of either local experiences or of the
global interactions that sometimes conditioned the experiences of the regions
themselves.”102 According to Bentley, seas and oceans have enormous potential as
frameworks to analyze complex historical processes, and to bringing into focus cultural,
biological, intellectual, and commercial exchanges between societies. Historian Sugata
Bose’s A Hundred Horizons offers a potential model to address the such concerns. He
conceptualizes the Indian Ocean as an “interregional arena” rather than a coherent
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cultural and economic unit, one that lies somewhere between a totalizing “world-system”
and hyper-locality.103
Pearling in the Gulf of Mannar was one such horizon in the interregional arena of
the Indian Ocean. Merchants, capital, labor, information, diseases, and provisions moved
along the coasts of India and Sri Lanka and through the Gulf of Mannar during the
pearling season. The circulation of people and things animated by season pearling
activities formed a distinct route within a wider “circulatory regime” of South India and
Sri Lanka.104 From migration patterns and information networks to capital flows and
military deployments, an array of people and things coalesced during the pearling season.
Viewed through the lens of circulation, pearling in the Gulf of Mannar provides an
opportunity to further bridge the gap between historical studies of India and Sri Lanka.
The historiographies of island and mainland are too often divided into smaller units of
study to reflect imagined ethno-nationalist geographies and identities.105 Historian Sujit
Sivasundaram argues in a recent study that policies and practices of British colonialism
and imperialism effectively separated Sri Lanka from the India during the course of the
nineteenth century.106 Through geographic knowledge production, policing strategies,
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legal power, administrative organization, and numerous other approaches to governing
and studying Sri Lanka, the early colonial British government remade the island into a
“unit in the Indian Ocean” separate and apart from the wider regional sphere of South
Asia.107 The movement of people and things through the Gulf of Mannar during the
pearling season, however, suggests that the process of “islanding” Sri Lanka from India
was always a work in progress. Yet the movement of people and things through the Gulf
of Mannar at the time of the pearl fishery undermined attempts by Madras and Ceylon to
actualize a vision of distinct realms for the Company and Crown. From seasonal
migration and smuggling to disease outbreaks and poaching, circulatory patterns related
to the pearl fishery compromised the ability of Madras and Ceylon to solidify, reinforce,
and police the maritime borderland of Mannar. A comparable set of circumstances can be
seen along the Anglo-Dutch maritime frontiers in late nineteenth-century and early
twentieth-century Southeast Asia. Historian Eric Tagliacozzo’s Secret Trades, Porous
Borders examines the formation of a “porous border” through the “illegal trafficking” of
drugs, guns, money, and people in Southeast Asia from 1865 to 1915. The formation of
an Anglo-Dutch border was intimately connected with “boundary transgression” through
the smuggling of contraband along the frontier.108 British colonial powers of Madras and
Ceylon used various mechanisms to police pearling-related activities in the region. From
violence and surveillance technologies to mapping projects and interventions in the
marketplace, attempts to police and control the circulation of people and things vis-à-vis
the pearl fishery shaped the maritime borderlands of Mannar. The frontier has been a
useful geographic and conceptual construct in South Asian historiography to understand
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environmental, economic, political, cultural, and social change and interaction.109 Jan
Heesterman, scholar of South Asia history and culture, also identified the coastline as
special type of frontier zone. He wrote, “The Littoral forms a frontier zone that is not
there to separate or enclose, but which rather finds its meaning in its permeability.”110 In
other words, the fertile pearl oyster beds of Mannar constituted a “fluid frontier,” a space
between terra and mare.111 The pearling grounds of the region found their meaning in the
permeability of the political and geographic area in which they were located, along the
frontier zone between land and sea, humans and animals, island and mainland, Company
and Crown, and Europe and Asia.
A heavily securitized zone, the Gulf of Mannar witnessed a surge of military
activity during the pearling season when tens of thousands of people migrated to the
location of the event. There were many forts and garrisons on the coasts of southeastern
India and western Ceylon from whence Madras and Ceylon mobilized troops, artillery,
and supplies. The Palk Strait also afforded safeguarded passage and reduced travel time
between the Bay of Bengal and Arabian Sea because ships did not have to sail exposed
around the southern tip of Ceylon to reach the Malabar and Coromandel coasts.112 British
Ceylon civil servant Anthony Bertolacci described the importance of the Gulf region in a
report on the economic and social conditions of Ceylon: “It ought further be observed,
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that the narrowness of the channel, which separates the Island of Ceylon from the
Continent of India—and the position of Adam's Bridge, which checks the violence of the
monsoons—leaves on either side of it a calm sea, and facilitates a passage to the opposite
coast at all times of the year.”113 Beyond its military and commercial value, the region
was a critical site through which the Company and Crown articulated claims to imperial
sovereignty. As historian Lauren Benton illustrates in A Search for Sovereignty, empires
between the fifteenth and nineteenth centuries did “not cover space evenly.”114 Far from
uniform, the geography of early modern and modern empires “composed a fabric that
was full of holes, stitched together out of pieces.”115 Benton writes, “Although empires
did lay claim to vast stretches of territory, the nature of such claims was tempered by
control that was exercised over narrow bands, or corridors, and other enclaves and
irregular zones about them.”116 As this dissertation will show, the Gulf of Mannar was
one such “corridor” through which the English East India Company and British Ceylon
stitched together various, and often times contradictory, claims to territorial and thalassic
control.
Through the production of maps and charts of the pearl oyster beds, British
officials and experts in their employ came to represent the Gulf of Mannar as a knowable
and governable space. Cartography was an important discipline through which the
Company Raj and British Ceylon produced knowledge about the people, animals, and
environment of Mannar. Maps served a valuable purpose, supplying British officials in
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charge of managing the human and natural resources of Mannar with practical
information such as the location of pearl oysters and optimal navigation routes. Yet mapmaking supported British colonialism and imperialism in other capacities. Scholars of
India, Sri Lanka, and other colonial and postcolonial societies have shown how
cartography, for instance, accompanied colonial knowledge production, governmental
power, and territorialized sovereignty.117 British Ceylon and the Company Raj prioritized
the production of reliable geographic knowledge to support its management of the
pearling industry. However, during the early years of British management, Madras and
Ceylon had neither the skill and expertise nor the infrastructure and funds to support firstrate cartography.118 In November 1798, for example, fishery superintendents Hugh
Cleghorn and George Turnour wrote to Governor Frederic North, “agreeable to your
Desire we shall proceed to the Inspection of the Banks of Chelaw when that of the Banks
of Manar is finished and we beg that you would give the necessary orders to enquire
whether any Chart of the Chelaw Banks may be found among the Dutch Papers, as such a
Chart would much facilitate the Object of our enquiries.”119 Such documents were also
sent from other offices within the East India Company administration. For instance,
Governor North wrote to his counterpart in Bombay, “Having learned that there are many
valuable Charts of this Island, with its Sea Coast and Pearl Banks, in the Engineers [sic]
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Office at Bombay, I take the liberty of requesting you Honble Sir in Council to be
pleased to give Orders for furnishing me with Copies of them, with as little delay as
possible, and particularly of those which regard the Pearl Banks.”120 Officials relied on
maps and charts that were already in circulation and tapped local knowledge networks to
learn more. East India Company officials and British Ceylon civil servants also
appropriated many charts from the archives of Dutch Ceylon.121 At that time, the Dutch
VOC enjoyed the reputation of employing some of the finest mapmakers in the world and
cartography functioned as a “vital instrument” of Dutch rule in Ceylon.122 Like rivers and
mountains, the pearling grounds of Mannar were a favorite cartographic subject for early
modern and modern mapmakers. Indeed, as historian Lauren Benton writes, “identifying
singularities in nature was in some ways very similar to drawing attention to marvels and
prodigies, those oddities that defined the norm and appeared to multiply at the margins of
the civilized world.”123 In 1800, Governor Frederic North of Ceylon appointed French
naturalist and surveyor Eudelin de Jonville the first surveyor general of Ceylon.124 Along
with important settlements, roads, and waterways, de Jonville highlighted the location of
the pearl oyster beds off the western coast.125 During the course of the early nineteenth
century, both Madras and Ceylon attempted to increase their capacities to bring more
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technicality and precision to bear on their mappings of the pearl fishery, but this was
always a work in progress. For instance, James Steuart wrote, “The incorrectness of the
Chart on which the pearl banks were defined, as attended with much inconvenience, and
the earliest opportunity was seized in March 1827, to measure the distances between the
most conspicuous places on the sea coast off which the pearl banks lay, and prepare from
such bearings and measurements as time and circumstances admitted of being taken, a
rough chart upon which the oyster beds might be more correctly defined.”126

Figure 2. “A Chart Shewing [sic] the Positions of the Pearl Banks of Ceylon and Tuticorin.” James Steuart,
An Account of the Pearl Fisheries of Ceylon (Cotta: Church Mission Press, 1843).
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The production and consumption of commodities has become an increasingly
popular framework for understanding global connections and historical trends. From
agricultural products like sugar and cotton that served as the bedrock upon which the
modern capitalist economy was built, to luxury items such as ostrich feathers and
porcelain and foodstuffs like pineapples and bananas, the range of commodities that have
been the topic of single-subject books by professional historians is remarkable.127 A
cottage industry of popular and journalistic books that focus on particular animals or
objects has also emerged.128 In many ways, pearls stand apart in the history of global
commodities because, as some scholars have noted, they were not a global commodity in
the same style as sugar, cotton, and spices.129 The global pearl trade was far more modest
in volume and never mapped neatly onto “center-periphery” models.130 From the turn of
the sixteenth century, a global pearl trade emerged that supported the integration of
oceanic economies and facilitated the expansion of European empires.131 With the
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opening of the New World, pearls from American fisheries started to mingle with
“oriental” pearls from Persia and Ceylon in the metropolitan gem markets of Lisbon,
Madrid, Antwerp, Amsterdam, Paris, and London.132 India was a major center of the
global gem trade, a de facto clearinghouse. Pearls and precious stones from across the
world arrived to emporia such as Goa and Madras before merchants trafficked them to
other parts of the world.133 Dutch gem trader Jan Huyghen van Linschoten spent time in
late sixteenth-century Portuguese Goa. He described the process of appraising jewels and
also referred to the introduction of pearls from America to the Indian market, which, in
his estimate, were of lesser quality than pearls fished from “Oriental Beds.”134 In the
early nineteenth century, British travelers James Cordiner wrote that “the pearls of the
largest dimensions, being the most costly, and esteemed as emblems of greatness, find a
ready sale among the rich natives of the Nizam’s dominions, the country of Guzerat [sic],
and other parts of the Indian peninsula.”135 He found that the “finest pearls” from India
and Ceylon were made into “the most beautiful necklaces” in Europe, while the largest
supply of tiny seed pearls were shipped to China.136 As British powers became
increasingly involved with pearling in India and Sri Lanka, reference material such as
commercial handbooks and dictionaries helped codify knowledge about the gem and its
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trade. For instance, C. H. Kauffman’s The Dictionary of Merchandize, and Nomenclature
in All Languages (1803) has an entire section devoted to pearls: “Though these
ornaments are met with in all parts of the globe, the most esteemed have always been
those of Asia, and the east coast of Africa. In the kingdom of Madura, which lies on the
east of Malabar, there are many pearl fisheries. Tutukurin or Tutucorin is the principal, if
not the only city, on the fishery coast.” He added that the “pearls taken at Baharen,
though not so white as those of China and Ceylon, are much larger than those of the latter
place, and much more regularly shaped than the former.”137 In addition to professional
publications for merchant classes, texts such as travelogues, newspaper items, and
popular journalistic writings flooded the public sphere of London and other commercial
centers, filling the imagination of a reading public with wonder about treasures from the
East Indies and the advances of the Company and Crown.138
Yet there remains a relative dearth of historical studies on pearls and other
precious gems compared to commodities like cotton and sugar in the historiography of
capitalism and empire. This marginalization is due partly to the nature of the source
material. Aside from questions of language training and archive accessibility, the history

137

C. H. Kaufmann, The Dictionary of Merchandize, and Nomenclature in All Languages (London, 1803),
259-260.
138
The Universal Magazine of Knowledge and Pleasure, a London-based periodical published with a royal
license in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, provided an emergent middle-class with useful
information on subjects ranging from gardening and cookery to philosophy and politics. The magazine
intended to be “instructive and entertaining” for “gentry, merchants, farmers, and tradesman.” Such
publications often contained first-hand accounts of travels to the East, giving readers a glimpse of the world
beyond their shores, areas that were becoming part of their daily lives through commerce, politics, and
culture. More than a form of entertainment, such articles mapped onto wider colonial and imperial
discourses about the pearl fishery and governance as a form of both “profit and instruction.” The author
provides the following introduction: “As your Magazine is now the general Repository for Pieces whose
Tendency is either Profit or Instruction, I have remarked, with a secret Pleasure, the great Progress it has
made in the World; and, in order to contribute all in my Power towards a Work which so evidently tends to
promote the happiness of Society, I have sent you the following Account of a Voyage to the East-Indies.”
Universal Magazine of Knowledge and Pleasure, July 1753, Vol. 13, 13.
50

of the gem trade is difficult to track through archival sources because the object of trade
does not always appear in the documentary record. Historian George Winius wrote that
“jewel trading, both amateur and professional, must surely have constituted one of the
greatest semi-visible, half-clandestine economic activities of the early modern period.”139
Historian Molly Warsh has also described pearls as a mercurial commodity. She finds
that “pearls possessed an elusive quality” and a “difficult-to-define mutability that made
them only as prominent as their bearers desired.”140 Indeed, pearls were also easy to
transport without detection by authorities, simply concealed in tiny pouches and held on
the person, and conveniently left off manifests and other official documents. Warsh also
discusses the tendency of pearls and the people who carried them to cross borders. She
writes that “pearls did enable a wide range of people to navigate distinct social,
geographic, and economic spheres of early modern life.”141 Recent studies have also
started to focus more intensively on the transnational aspects of the global gem trade.
Historian Kris Lane, for instance, finds connections between the emerald mines of
Colombia and the royal courts of the Mughal, Ottoman, and Savafid empires.142 Arash
Khazeni’s Sky Blue Stone draws upon an impressive archive of Persian mineralogical
texts (“books of stone”) from the early modern Islamic world to trace the production and
consumption of turquoise across Eurasia.143 Pearls sourced from the Gulf of Mannar also
traveled in the slipstreams of an emergent global economy. In the early nineteenth
century, James Cordiner described the possible itinerary of a pearl fished from the Gulf
139
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of Mannar. He wrote, “various and curious are the operations which the pearls undergo
from the time that they are first raised from their native beds by the poorest of the human
species, until at last they blaze in the eye of an Indian idol, shine in a diadem, or add
grace and beauty to the bosom of a queen.”144 There are also references to the use of pearl
powder in Indian medicines and amulets.145 Certain low-grade seed pearls and leftover
oyster shells were also turned into a lime that was ingested with betel leaf. For instance,
traveler Alan Walters, in a late nineteenth-century text on Ceylon, described the
“chunam, or fine lime made from calcined pearl shells” in a section on betel-leaf
chewing.146 Chunam was also used in construction as a type of plaster.147
A product of the sea, the marine environmental history of pearl production in the
Gulf of Mannar is an important aspect of the enterprise to consider. To borrow a phrase
from global environmental historian J. R. McNeil, the history of pearling in the Gulf of
Mannar should be written “as if nature existed.”148 Yet even as environmental history has
become an increasingly popular and rich area of scholarly inquiry, the oceans remains
largely mare incognito.149 The time is right, in other words, to put the “ocean back in
history.”150 Recent marine environmental histories of fisheries in various historical and
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geographic contexts have started to close the knowledge-gap between land and sea.151 In
the American context, oysters and oyster culture have received attention from historians
of science and the environment.152 Yet the environmental historiography of South Asia
has focused largely on forests and irrigation thereby neglecting much of the
subcontinent’s expansive coastline and nearby islands and archipelagos, as well as its sea
life.153 Many studies have shown how scientific encounters between European empires
and the natural worlds of Asia, Africa, and the Americas went hand in hand with
territorial and colonial expansion.154 European naturalists came to India and Ceylon to
observe the spectacle of the pearl fishery and study the marine ecosystem of Mannar. In
1691, for instance, Dutch VOC official and naturalist Hendrick Adriaan van Rheede
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submitted a report to his superiors in Amsterdam on the location of pearl oyster banks
among many matters of interests, including descriptions of pearl diving and writings
about the life cycle of pearl oysters.155 The Dutch also undertook an extensive census of
the pearl fishery for the first time in 1694.156 Both Company and Crown governments
commissioned reports on the natural history of India and Sri Lanka and one particularly
important topic was pearl oysters and their natural habitat. Governor Frederic North of
Ceylon, for instance, enlisted de Jonville to study the natural history of the island at the
turn of the nineteenth century. During his tenure as surveyor general, de Jonville
produced a French manuscript (Quelques notions sur l’Isle de Ceylan) that provided an
account of his journey around Ceylon complemented by lush illustrations of flora and
fauna.157 De Jonville included descriptions and drawings of pearl oysters that brought
specific knowledge about the habitat and life-cycle of the species to the attention of
government officials. De Jonville’s contemporaries praised him for his work on the pearl
fishery. British traveler George Annesley wrote that de Jonville was “possessed of
considerable talents.” He had a “very great knowledge in several branches of natural
history” and “collected the most important information relative to the pearl fishery.”158
De Jonville even presented Valentia with a gift of rare and beautiful pearls.159 Reports by
naturalists such as de Jonville equipped government officials with useful knowledge
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about pearls and oysters to inform their decision-making around the management of the
pearl fishery. The general attitude of the colonial officials about the relationship between
science, management, and pearling might be summarized by marine biologist William
Herdman who wrote in the early twentieth century, “There is no reason for any
despondency in regard to the future of the pearl fisheries, if they are treated
scientifically…The material exists, ready for man’s operations.”160

Figure 3. Oyster (De Jonville Manuscript, British Library, London).

Figure 4. Oyster (De Jonville Manuscript, British Library, London).
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Figure 5. Oyster (De Jonville Manuscript, British Library, London).

Like the pearl oyster beds of Mannar, the archives of the East India Company and
British Ceylon have yielded some rich and valuable returns for this project. The archives
of the East India Company and British Ceylon are replete with materials that address
issues ranging from labor problems and moneylending to disease control that, when taken
together, provide a window on the organization of the pearl fishery in evolving colonial
and imperial contexts. These documents largely contain material related to people and
institutions that preoccupied Company and Crown officials. Indeed, it was only through
encounters with government officials that information about the lives and work of local
populations such as merchants and divers left an impression in the annals of the Madras
and Ceylon governments. While previous historical studies of pearling in Mannar have
also tapped Company and Crown records from the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries, the materials used for such works are mainly housed at archives in London.
These repositories include the East India Company archives at the India Office Records
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of the British Library and the Colonial Office of British Ceylon at the United Kingdom
National Archives in Kew Gardens. Yet documents at these archives offer only a glimpse
of conditions on the ground. Many of the accounts, reports, policy statements, petitions,
and other documents related to the pearl fishery composed by Madras and Ceylon
officers at the local level never reached London. Clerks rewrote and edited documents as
information went up the chain of command from the district-level office (cutcherry)
through Madras to London. During this process, key information about the pearl fishery
was abridged, synopsized, and even lost. Regular reports sent to London from Madras
and Colombo were mainly concerned with revenue returns and management policy at the
most general level. In addition to London-based archives, this dissertation uses records
from the East India Company’s Madras government housed at the Tamil Nadu State
Archives in Chennai (India). A particularly rich body of material from the Tamil Nadu
State Archives derived from the districts of Tirunelveli, Madurai, Ramnad, and other
areas within which the pearl fishery was regularly located. Historian David Ludden
writes that District Collectorate records of Madras “represent the most detailed
documentary resource for the study of local history in South India.”161 From notes on the
examinations of the pearl oyster banks and debates over management strategies to
interactions with local merchants and laborers, district-level records offer a textured
image of the pearling operations. Furthermore, this dissertation adds unpublished archival
material to the historiography of eighteenth-century and nineteenth-century South Asia
by bringing documents produced by the Dutch VOC into conversation with Englishlanguage texts.
Chapter 1— “The Pearl Fishers”—focuses on the lives and labor of divers,
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boatmen, washers, sorters, and other members of the workforce. “The Pearl Fishers”
offers a description of pearling in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries and
focuses on the ways in which the company-state and colonial government sought to
discipline labor. Pearl diving is perhaps one of the most commented on features of the
industry, and through contemporary travel writings, as well as numerous secondary
historical and anthropological studies, we actually have some very rich material on the
ins and outs of pearling, such as the make-up of the workforce, the tools and equipment
used, and diving practices. Pulling from various archival records, this chapter tracks how,
through the use of forced migration and violence to tax inducements and new diving
technologies, the governments of Madras and Ceylon, often with the assistance of local
community authorities and mercantile elites, sought to reorganize traditional structures
and practices of skilled and unskilled labor at the pearl fishery, albeit with mixed results.
The dissertation then takes up the important themes of markets and marketplaces
in Chapter 2. “The Great Pearl Fishery Bazaar” critically examines the formation and
dynamics of markets and marketplaces that coalesced around pearl fishery compounds
near Tuticorin, Punnaikayal, Kilakkarai, and elsewhere on the southeastern coast of India
and places like Arippu, Kondachi, and Chilaw on the western coast of Sri Lanka.
Attempts to establish regular marketplaces represented efforts by the company-state and
colonial state to break-up the traditional circulation patterns of humans, capital, and
goods within the Gulf of Mannar during the pearling season. Whereas the pearl fishery
was a seasonal event that floated from year to year, Madras and Colombo tried to fix the
location of the pearl fishery to single spots, which they believed would increase both
security and profitability. From infrastructure projects such as the construction of
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permanent buildings to the manipulation of currency standards and money markets,
British administrations on both sides of the Gulf tried to reengineer the marketplaces of
the pearl fishery through a contradictory set of political economic ideologies and
practices.
From the market of the fishery the dissertation turns to the business worlds of
pearl merchants. Chapter 3— “The Business World is Mine Oysters”—focuses on the
relationships between merchants and states during and after the rent of the pearl fishery.
The chapter addresses efforts by Madras and Ceylon to shape the business practices and
organization of merchants engaged in the pearl trade. After a general description and
overview of the mercantile organization of the pearl trade, Chapter 3 then profiles four
commercial magnates that rented the pearl fishery from the Madras government in the
early nineteenth century. Each “case study” sheds light on certain aspects of the
mercantile cultures and practices of pearl traders.
Chapter 4— “The Most Sovereign Commodity”—explores the historical
relationships between the pearl fisheries and politics. This chapter looks at how efforts by
the British East India Company and, after 1802, the colonial state of British Ceylon, to
establish control over the human and natural resources of Mannar dovetailed with
questions about sovereignty. Chapter 4 focuses on disputes over rights, authority, and
privileges claimed by local courts and temples. Claims to tax-free boats and shares of the
revenue by Indian states and religious institutions were not only concerned with the
material benefits derived from the industry but also motivated by the need to have
“traditional” rights and honors recognized by the Company Raj and British Ceylon.
During the course of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, both Madras and
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Ceylon sought to erode the preexisting economy of gifts and honors that undergirded the
pearl fishery. In some cases, the Company and Crown perpetuated the strategies and
practices employed by their Dutch predecessors, while in other instances a more
complete reordering of the landscape was desired.
Chapter 5 focuses on corruption. “Foul Oysters” describes and analyzes a series
frauds and defalcations investigated by the East India Company around the turn of the
nineteenth century. When the Company assumed managerial control over the pearling
industry from the Dutch VOC in 1796, officials in Madras and Colombo immediately
turned their attention to management of the industry, hoping to use it as a source of
revenue to help offset heavy military expenditures accrued during the Napoleonic Wars
and shore up its legitimacy over the Gulf of Mannar region. The East India Company
organized four consecutive fisheries between 1796-1799, which, according to Company
officials in Madras, Colombo, and London, were all racked by fraud and corruption.
Frederic North, then the highest ranking Company official on Ceylon, launched a massive
investigation into the conduct of the commissioners. A close reading of the results of this
investigation reveals that corruption functioned as an instrumental category through
which to justify the presence of the East India Company in India and Ceylon. Not only
did the investigation address the misconduct of government officials but it also probed
the inner workings of the pearl fishery. The investigation quickly turned into a dragnet
that gave the Company Raj the latest information about its newest—and potentially most
lucrative—source of revenue.
This dissertation seeks to examine the extent to which the pearl fishery was not
only a source of jewels and revenue for the Company and Crown, but also functioned as a
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site through which governmental power flowed and imperial sovereignty established.
Through an examination of government-sponsored engagements with the people and
institutions that constituted the industry, this dissertation considers the history of pearling
in the wider context of modern colonial governance, statecraft, and imperialism. It also
explores the interstitial spaces between success and failure and finds that official
discourse and policy intended to bring about major change to the industry were much
smaller and less dramatic than intended. The enthusiasm with which Company and
Crown officials turned to the administration of the pearl fishery of Mannar also belies any
impressions that the British sleepwalked into empire. The depth of engagement by British
officials with the people, institutions, and environment reflected the significance of the
pearling industry in wider political and economic terrain of South India and Sri Lanka. At
the precise moment when the East India Company consolidated its position in southern
India, and the British state founded Ceylon as a formal colony of the Crown,
administrators on both sides of Mannar turned their attention to the people and marine
environment that produced a tiny luminous gem.
Humans throughout history have lived side-by-side with animals yet our
interpretations of the past seldom address relationships between us and other members of
the animal kingdom.162 Oysters are modest creatures and have not received the same level
of attention as magnificent beasts and friendly companions. A diverse group of bivalve
mollusks, some oysters are prized for their culinary qualities while others are celebrated
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for their non-edible products, such as pearls and mother-of-pearl shells. One of the
central aims of this dissertation is to not only analyze the techniques and applications of
governmental power at the pearl fishery but to also pay homage to the humble pearl
oyster. To this end, the discussion below tries to impart historical agency to the pearl
oyster, to see it more than a producer of gems and shells but a live actor in a complex
formed by interactions between humans and the environment.163 For thousands of years,
pearls—formed by the secretion of nacre by mollusks to coat and neutralize foreign
irritants like stones and sand—were largely harvested in the wilds of marine and freshwater environments. Divers in pearling centers across the globe plunged below the
water’s surface, fighting against the elements and the limits of their own bodies, in search
of a tiny, valuable, and naturally occurring jewel. For Rayo and Marana, the world they
inhabited was far different, a world in which the only way of procuring pearls was from
nature. This dissertation explores a slice of that bygone world.
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Table 1

Locations of Pearl Fishery and Statements of Revenue, Ceylon, 1796-1837
Year
1796
1797
1798
1799
1801
1803
1804
1806
1808
1809
1814
1815
1816
1820
1828
1829
1830
1831
1832
1833
1835
1836
1837

Location
Arippu
Arippu
Arippu
Arippu
Kondachi
Chilaw
Arippu
Arippu
Arippu
Arippu
Arippu
Chilaw
Arippu
Arippu
Arippu
Arippu
Arippu
Arippu
Karaitivu
Arippu
Arippu
Arippu
Arippu

Organizing Body
East India Company
East India Company
East India Company
East India Company
East India Company
British Ceylon
British Ceylon
British Ceylon
British Ceylon
British Ceylon
British Ceylon
British Ceylon
British Ceylon
British Ceylon
British Ceylon
British Ceylon
British Ceylon
British Ceylon
British Ceylon
British Ceylon
British Ceylon
British Ceylon
British Ceylon

Revenue
PNP 93,826
P 321,702
P 368,019
SP 62,185.36.57
SP 32,054.31.79
PNP 40,638.14.3
PNP 184,348.15.0
RD 374,481.4.2
PNP 236,443
PNP 71,413.49.40
RD 1,160,609.4.2
RD 4,858.0.3
RD 4,085.10.2
RD 29,233.6.1
MR 311,956.2.1
MR 397,265.12.3
MR 243,690.8.8
MR 317,464.1.6
------

Revenue (£)
31,000
106,000
122,673
23,319.7.6
12,020.5.0
12,191.8.0
55,304.8.0
28,086.2.0
57,863.0.8
18,696.12.11
87,045.10.6
364.7.1
306.8.9
2,192.10.3
31,195.12.3
39,726.11.6
24,369.1.0
31,746.8.1
3,869.18.4
25,043.10.0
38,247.0.9
23,535.15.9
9,397.15.5

Sources: James Steuart, An Account of the Pearl Fisheries of Ceylon (Cotta: Church Mission Press, 1843),
33-36; C. R. de Silva, “The Pearl Fisheries of Ceylon, 1796-1837,” Ceylon Literary Register 2, no. 10
(1932): 433-442. Abbreviations: Porto Novo Pagodas (PNP); Pagodas (P); Star Pagodas (SP); Rix Dollars
(RD); Madras Rupees (MR).
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Table 2

Locations of Pearl Fishery and Modes of Management, Madras, 1784-1830
Year
1784
1787
1792
1800
1805
1807
1810
1815
1818
1822
1828
1830

Location
Tuticorin
Tuticorin
Tuticorin
Tuticorin
Tuticorin
Tuticorin
Tuticorin
Tiruchendur
Punnaikayal
Tuticorin
Tuticorin/Punnaikayal
Tuticorin

Organizing Body
East India Company
East India Company
East India Company
East India Company
East India Company
East India Company
East India Company
East India Company
East India Company
East India Company
East India Company
East India Company
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Mode of Management
Amani
Amani
Rent/Amani
Rent
Rent
Rent
Rent
Rent
Amani
Rent
Amani
Rent

CHAPTER 1: THE PEARL FISHERS

LABOR

In “Isabella, or the Pot of Basil” (1818), the English poet John Keats invokes the brutal
treatment of divers at the pearl fishery of Ceylon. Adapted from Giovanni Boccaccio’s
The Decameron, a fourteenth-century Italian text, Keats’s poem narrates the tragic story
of a wealthy English maiden named Isabella. She endears herself to Lorenzo, a man of
humble origins, kindling a forbidden love that sets in motion a series of unfortunate and
ultimately tragic events. Isabella’s set of vicious and controlling brothers, who intend to
marry her to a more distinguished suitor to satisfy their upwardly mobile ambitions,
murder the object of her affection. Lorenzo’s ghost then visits Isabella in a lucid dream to
reveal the true identity of his killers. She exhumes her lover’s body and buries his head in
a basil pot, sullenly caring for the plant and mourning her loss. In this romantic epic,
Keats finds literary parallels between the grisly act of Isabella’s brothers and their
business exploits, which spanned the “torched mines and noisy factories” of
industrializing England to the distant edges of the nation’s overseas empire. In addition to
investments in the domestic economy, the brothers reaped great rewards from speculating
in the new-found British colony of Ceylon, particularly through a stake in the pearl
fishery. But their material gains in the colony came at the expense of the health and
safety of poor anonymous pearl divers. Keats wrote, “For them the Ceylon diver held his
breath/And went all naked to the hungry shark; For them his ears gush’d blood; for them
in death.”
The physically demanding work of pearl divers and other low-level laborers at the
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pearl fishery captivated the imaginations of scholars, artists, and travelers who either
witnessed pearling operations or read secondhand accounts.164 Indeed, diving is perhaps
the most commented on feature of the pearling industry yet such attention over nearly
two millennia, from literary sagas and opera librettos to lavish travelogues and fiery
political tracts, has by and large invested the lives and labor of the workforce with an
idealized, unchanging quality.165 For instance, the classic three-act opera Les Pêcheurs de
Perles (1863) by French composer George Bizet is a romanticized tale about tragic love
and friendship set in fictionalized ancient Ceylon village, a place far away from the
stages and salons of nineteenth-century Paris. American composer Les Baxter and his
band released a song titled “Pearls of Ceylon” on the album Ports of Pleasure (1957). In
the literary realm, travel accounts by globetrotting luminaries such as Marco Polo became
cornerstones of subsequent understandings and interpretations of the life and work of
pearl divers. His descriptions of pearling in the Gulf of Mannar bear a striking
resemblance to those of Dutch and British officials during the early modern and modern
periods: “The pearl-fishers take their vessels, great and small, and proceed into this gulf,
where they stop from the beginning of April till the middle of May.”166 Travelers’
descriptions of pearling further reverberated through writings by government officials,
naturalists, and travelers in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. George
Turnour, East India Company officer and superintendent of the 1799 pearl fishery at
Arippu, for instance, submitted a report on the social and economic conditions of the
island to his supervisor, Governor Frederick North, in which Turnour wrote that diving
was “prescribed by ancient usage, from which these people cannot be prevailed upon to
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depart, by any consideration whatever. No degree of richness of the Banks, or value of
the Pearls, would induce the Pilot & Arapannars to deviate one Iota from what their
Fathers, did before them.”167 A similar discourse on the pearl diver and his work
continued into the twentieth century. George Kunz, for example, a scholar of gems and
precious jewels, wrote in the early twentieth century, “A remarkable instance of
immutability of custom in the Orient is found in the fact that, except in a few minor
particulars, accounts written more than three centuries ago, could serve as a description
of the methods of the fisheries in recent years.”168 Sea crafts and other tools used at the
pearl fishery received the same treatment.169 James Steuart, for example, commented on
the primitive design of the boats that made up the pearling fleets: “Indeed, when the rude
state of their craft and their awkward management are considered, it would appear, that
no improvement could have taken place in the people, since the days when the pearls of
Cleopatra's earrings were landed at Aripo.”170 From poems and operas to travelogues and
government reports, various writings about pearling over many centuries imbued
representations of the lives, labor, and leisure of the industry’s workforce with an
idealized and romantic quality.
This chapter seeks to historically contextualize labor at the pearl fishery during
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. The practice and process of diving for
pearls in the shallow waters of the Gulf of Mannar became the objects of governmental
reform and improvement during the early years of British management. When British
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officers assumed direct managerial control over the human and natural resources of the
pearl fishery at the close of the eighteenth century, they encountered a complex system of
rights, institutions, and practices that had evolved through centuries of engagement with
both local and foreign political powers. Far from an antediluvian pastime, many of the
problems identified by British officials related to labor had also been singled out by their
European predecessors and continued to trouble even the most ardent reformers. For
instance, smuggling and poaching were recurring themes in writings by Dutch officials, a
topic that also preoccupied British officials on both sides of the Gulf of Mannar. As
discussed in the introduction, as the strands of Pax Britannica came together in the late
eighteenth century, a major intellectual shift occurred in the realm of economic thought,
with classical liberalism displacing mercantilism as the preferred framework of political
economy. The Company and Crown governments in turn brought new ideas to bear on
the management and governance of people and oysters, strategies and techniques that
sought to not only increase profits and productivity by attenuating the financial and
physical hazards of pearling, but also fundamentally reshape the social, economic, and
political foundations of the industry. From armed vessels at sea and police forces on
shore, to tax inducements and technological innovations, government officials, as well as
native mercantile elites, meant to interrupt “traditional” labor relations and organization.
Efforts by the company-state and colonial state to deploy modern forms of governmental
power through the management of pearling labor was, of course, not isolated to this
particular industry, as scholars such as economic historian Prasannan Parthasarathi have
demonstrated in the case of weavers in late eighteenth-century and early nineteenth-
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century Madras.171 During the course of the early nineteenth century, the sway of liberal
utilitarianism and free market ideologies sought to break-up the traditional arrangements
and customary rights of laborers and introduce market-based reforms, such as monetary
wages and open labor markets. Archival documents and contemporary travel accounts are
replete with references to the strategies and tactics employed by the governments of
Madras and Ceylon and local pearl merchants to discipline labor at the pearl fishery. Yet
many preexisting structures and conditions of labor at the pearl fishery, such as diving
technologies, labor relations, migratory patterns, and disciplinary regimes persisted
through the early colonial period without being completely transformed as some
administrators had imagined.
The discussion below not only provides a description of the pearling process from
start to finish but also tracks the impact of company-state and colonial state rule on the
lives and work of pearl divers and other laboring groups whose toils were integral to the
overall functioning of the industry. The first section— “A Pearling Life”—describes the
process by which pearls were harvested from the Gulf of Mannar. It begins with a short
description of the examination process that community leaders, local experts, and
government officials undertook each year. Based on the results of the assaying process,
and after local jewelers and gem merchants evaluated samples of product, officials in
consultation with local experts determined the viability of a pearl fishery. The first
section also includes a discussion of diving techniques with special attention paid to the
simple instruments used by pearl divers and attempts by officials in Madras and Ceylon
to “modernize” the practice through the introduction of diving bells, steamships, and
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other technologies. The second section— “Labor, Discipline, and Circulation”—
examines attempts by the Madras and Ceylon governments to manipulate seasonal
migratory flows and other forms of geographic mobility. From coercive measures such as
forced migration and physical violence to subtler means like tax incentives, the
governments of Madras and Ceylon used a wide range of tools and mechanisms designed
to discipline labor and promote the overall profitability and productivity of the pearl
fishery. This section further highlights the impact felt by labor after the political
transition at the turn of the nineteenth century when the East India Company transferred
power over Ceylon to the British Crown in 1802. It pays special attention to how the two
government proprietors of the pearl fishery variously competed and cooperated for labor,
capital, and information, facilitating (or impeding) the movement of such resources
between the island and mainland. The third and final section of this chapter addresses
labor, security, and violence by critically examining the elaborate security apparatus
erected at the pearl fishery designed to curb theft and smuggling amongst divers,
boatmen, and other members of the workforce deemed problematic by British officials
and local merchant-investors.

A Pearling Life
When the East India Company assumed control over Dutch Ceylon in 1796, solidifying
its position as the preeminent European power in the region, officials involved in
managing (and increasing) revenue sources in newly captured areas turned their attention
with alacrity to the human resources of the pearling industry. During the early years of
Company management, officials on both sides of the Gulf of Mannar concerned
70

themselves with local Indian and Sri Lankan workers who dove for pearls, commanded
pearling fleets, washed and sorted the day’s catch, and appraised the product. As
discussed in the introduction, the Company produced valuable information about the
political and natural histories of the pearl fishery, which dovetailed with efforts to
understand the practices and organization of pearling labor. A careful reading of the
archival records of the Madras and Ceylon governments and various eyewitness accounts
not only provides insight into the practical mechanics of pearling at his particular
moment in history but also sheds light on the techniques of powers with which British
officials managed a diverse and complex workforce.
Assaying the pearl oyster beds was the first step in the process of organizing a
pearl fishery. Descriptions of boats and divers venturing from the shore to known
locations of oyster beds and drawing up samples of product are found in precolonial
texts, a process that continued to attract the attention of administrators, travelers,
jewelers, and naturalists during the era of European management. During the Portuguese
era, according to historian C. R. De Silva, native fishermen conducted a survey of the
banks at the behest of the factor or captain overseeing the event.172 Hendrick
Zwaardecroon, Dutch VOC Commander of Jaffnapatnam, wrote to the Council of
Jaffnapatnam in 1697, “The banks are to be inspected in November by a Commission
sent for this purpose, who come in tonys [boats] from Jaffnapatam, Manaar, and Madura,
and with them also some Patangatyns and other native chiefs who understand this
work.”173 Three decades later, Dutch VOC official Jacob Pielat wrote in 1734, “The pearl
banks must be again inspected in February and March as formerly done. The weather is
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more suitable for an inspection at that time than any other, so that the work can be carried
out with less inconvenience. The inspection in autumn must be revived as soon as the
Commissioners consider the pearl banks in a condition to make a dive possible in the
following year.”174 In another instance, Dutch Ceylon Governor Julius Stein van
Golleneese (1743-1751) wrote about examining the pearl banks in a formal
administrative report to his successor Gerrit Joan Vreeland in February 1751: “And
though we have dispensed with the inspection of the banks for this year in order to spare
unnecessary trouble and because they were inspected in the previous year with utmost
care and were found to be covered only with young and no full-grown oysters, this must
be resumed in the following year once more in order to be satisfied that the Company
does not lose such important profits by the neglect of its officers.”175 By the nineteenth
century, contemporary observers found that annual examinations continued to serve a
useful purpose. As British military officer Jonathan Forbes wrote in 1840, “Repeated
examinations of the banks, and judicious restrictions of the fishery to those places where
the oysters are of full size, have almost brought the pearl-fishery to be a regular annual
addition to the income of the island.”176 An annual examination of the state of the oyster
populations usually occurred in October and November when the southwest monsoon
winds subsided, the waters became relatively placid, and travel from the sandy beaches to
the pearling grounds was less treacherous. If the results were favorable, then a pearl
fishery would be held during the next break in the monsoon winds, which usually came
anytime between late February and early April. An examination typically included a
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British officer such as a district collector or specially appointed civil servant who worked
in consultation with a small group of local divers and boatmen commanded by the jati
talaivan. British chaplain and traveler James Cordiner provided a description of the
examination during his visit to the pearl banks in the early nineteenth century: “In this
service nine boats are employed, in each of which is one pilot, or Arripanaar, two divers,
and about eight sailors. The English superintendent, or inspector of the banks, takes his
station in the boat of the head arripanar, who has exercised this profession from his
infancy, and received it, like almost all occupations in India, in hereditary succession
from his father.”177
The Company Raj incorporated local authorities and intermediaries into its
governing apparatus, which provided the government access to the laboring groups at the
pearl fishery that were critical for its success. At the start of the British era, the Company
continued to recognize the titles and privileges that their predecessors had bestowed upon
local authorities from the Parava community in recognition of services rendered during
the examination of the banks and help procuring boats and divers. In March 1808, for
example, Madras extended the title of jati talaivan to a certain Dom Gaspar Anthony
Dakroos Waascaricah, whose father and other forbearers held the same position, by
awarding him a sanad, or a document grant confirming his title and authority, and
offering him tax-free mauniam boats. One British official wrote in a report on the subject
in 1808: “There is at Tutacoryn, a family of Parawars or Christian fishermen in which
tribe most of the Pearl and the Chank Divers are included, the principal person of which
has for some ages past been acknowledged as the head of the Cast [sic] and as such the
Officers of Government during the Control both of the Dutch and English have been in
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the habit of availing themselves of the Persons experience and assistance in examining
the Pearl banks and Divers and of procuring through his influence the Number of Boats
and Divers required for whose appearance and Conduct he is in some degree responsible
in order to add to the respect of the Situation the Dutch have usually granted a
commission under the signature of the Governor in Council at Columbo, for the
appointment.”178 George Powney awarded the same title to Dom Gaspar Anthony
Dakroos Waascaricah’s father in 1795. According to the Board of Revenue, “As the
Cowle [grant] furnished by Mr. Powney to the Parawars was only a temporary one agreed
to desire he will transmit to the Board with a draft of another Cowle calculated to secure
these People in their just rights and privileges and to give the Head man the power of
exercising the same jurisdiction subject to the Collector's authority as he possessed in the
time of the Dutch.”179 The role of the jati talaivan (“caste headman”) in particular was
critical, as this individual and his associates superintended the examination process,
submitted written reports on the state of the pearl oyster banks, mobilized labor, supplies,
and capital, and mediated conflicts.
The examination of the pearl banks was undertaken more or less on an annual
basis. Dutch naturalist and biologist Henry Le Beck, who visited the pearl fishery of 1797
at Arippu, highlighted the importance of the annual examination and described the
process by which it unfolded. He wrote, “The length of time required for this purpose, or
from one general fishing to another, has not yet been exactly determined; it is, therefore,
a practice to depute some persons to visit the banks annually, and to give their opinions,
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whether the fishery might be undertaken with any degree of success.”180 The length of
time between fisheries did vary by season and location, but it was commonsense amongst
officials who managed the pearl fisheries that seven years was the optimal life cycle of a
pearl oyster. But this was not always the case. They derived this information from their
readings of the Dutch records in their possession and through consultations with local
divers and boatmen involved in the examination process who knew about the rhythms
between the tides. In January 1800, as Fort St. George was planning its first full-scale
fishery on the India-side of Mannar since its annexation of Dutch Ceylon, Collector of
Ramnad reported on the life cycle of oysters to the Board of Revenue. The East India
Company had previously organized small fisheries off the coast of Tuticorin in 1784,
1787, and 1792. One of his assistants had gleaned this information from a local boat
captain who had piloted pearling fleets. According to the report, the captain had
“informed him there were a great many Oysters which they supposed to be of the age of
six and a quarter years old that they seldom or ever exceed the age of seven at which
period they vomit the Pearl and die that consequently it has become absolutely
necessary…to fish it that it be commenced on the latter end of March or beginning of
April otherwise the Oysters will die and the Company sustain much loss.”181 In another
instance a Company official wrote in 1811 that one of the pearl oyster banks, the
Klateepaar, had been fished in six years ago and therefore ought to be ripe for harvesting:
“It was supposed that in the course of the present month or the next year it would be in a
state to be fished again seven years having nearly elapsed since the last fishery which is
generally reckoned a Sufficient time for the Oysters to reach maturity. With this view the
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Bank was carefully inspected last year but I am Sorry to state to the Board that from the
age of the Oysters they do not appear to have begun to grow again upon the Bank till
some time after the old ones were removed as none of those now to be found upon it
appeared to be more than three years old and consequently no fishing can be looked for in
less than four years hence.”182 The chief revenue officer for British Ceylon went so far as
to appoint a special commission of “several respectable natives” to study the life cycle of
pearl oysters on the western coast of the island in 1831.183
Over the course of a few days, the examination crew pulled up a relatively modest
sample of pearl oysters—anywhere from between a few hundred to a few thousand—and
later determined the age and size of the specimens and assessed the yield and quality of
pearls. All of this was closely documented by both government officials and members of
the assaying team. Following the Dutch practice, British officers kept diaries of the
inspections. The day-by-day accounts composed by superintending officers were often
filled with rather mundane information and general statements about the assaying
process, such as the time boats set sail, the number and frequency of dives, and weather
conditions. For example, the second assistant collector to James Cotton of Tirunelveli
submitted a diary of his examination of the pearl oyster banks near Tuticorin in January
1818. It contained such gripping details as “2 divers left Tutacorreen about 4 o’clock
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A.M. and anchored on the Tolayeram paar at 8 o’clock.”184 Diaries also contained
descriptions of the physical qualities and conditions of the marine environment, such as
water clarity and depth.185 The crew submitted written reports with information about the
size, duration, location, and expected returns of the fishery. These reports were usually
written in Tamil and signed by the jati talaivan and other members of the examination
crew. Even divers and boatmen affixed their names to the document. For instance, a
report submitted to the Board of Revenue at Fort St. George contained the results of an
examination near Punnaikayal in 1818. Referred to as either urzee or muchelka, both
Anglo-Persian administrative terms that became increasingly part of the bureaucratic
parlance of the East India Company, these reports were drafted in Tamil and
subsequently translated into English by cutcherry scribes. The jati talaivan, a young
assistant, four so-called “paar mundaddies,” and six divers examined three banks off the
coast of Punnaikayal and “consider those Banks to be in a proper state for a fishery to
take place this year, and declare to the best of our Judgement [sic], that, there are oysters
sufficient to fish for seven days at 50 Boats a day.”186
Examinations usually took place at locations known for hosting the most
bountiful and reliable harvests, the largest banks of this sort included the Tolaiyerium
Paar near Tuticorin, and the Arippu beds off the western coast of Ceylon. Government

184

TNA, BOR Proceedings, Vol. 788, 4336-62 (6 April 1818).
For example, Collector Hanbury of Tirunelveli wrote to the Board during preparations for the 1810 pearl
fishery at Tuticorin about poor water quality: “This operation has been retarded this year to an unusual late
period in Consequence of the Divers having Stated to me that from the great freshes [sic] in the River, the
Water upon the Pearl Banks was so muddy as to make it impossible for them either to pick up the Oysters
as to ascertain what the [probable] number might be.” TNA, TDR, Vol. 3586, 19-20 (19 January 1810).
This may have reflected wider interests within the naturalist community at the time. For example, see John
Davy, “Observations on the Temperature of the Ocean and Atmosphere, and on the Density of Seawater,
Made During a Voyage to Ceylon,” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London 107 (1817):
275-92.
186
TNA, TDR, Vol. 3595, 46-9 (7 February 1818).
77
185

officials also sought to explore previously unknown reserves of pearl oysters and open up
new fisheries to exploitation. VOC officials entertained the use of forced migration to
bring Tamil pearl divers from India and Ceylon to other Dutch territories in the Indian
Ocean world. As early as 1665, notes and memoranda from Dutch Commander at
Jaffnapatnam Anthony Paviljoen floated the idea of sending “four good pearl divers with
their tools and implements” from India and Ceylon to the Banda Islands “with a view to
discover a bank.”187 British Ceylon and the Company Raj continued to investigate the
possibility of opening new pearl fisheries. These somewhat curious episodes illustrate
how Madras and Ceylon spotlighted oysters and pearls, seeking to expand the frontiers of
the industry, though such efforts seldom yielded favorable results. Reports occasionally
arrived to Madras and Colombo about the prospects of new sources of pearls. In 1815, for
instance, Fort St. George learned about the discovery of seed pearls from a “discontented
goldsmith” in Guntur district north of Madras.188 In another case, Madras officials
intended to hold a pearl fishery west of Kanyakumari (Cape Comorin) near Travancore in
1822.189 In 1832, reports alerted officials in Colombo to a new pearl oyster batches. A
certain Gabriel Casie Chetty found a pearl oysters near Karadive, a small island in the
Gulf of Mannar northwest of Calpetyn, and a modest fishery took place there in March of
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that year.190 The Madras government accepted bids for the contract to examine a newfound batch of pearl oysters off the coast of Ramnad in 1833. Three Kilakkarai-based
Maraikkayar entrepreneurs—Muhammad Kasim Sahib Maraikkayar, Sheikh Sadah
Doolah Maraikkayar, and Vurshay Ebroy Maraikkayar—submitted applications to Fort
St. George.191 In 1834, the jati talaivan submitted a curious report in which a village
inhabitant stumbled across some discarded oyster shells and broken diving stones
abandoned by a river’s edge.192
Pearl merchants and other gem specialists appraised the results of the
examination, and estimated the potential value of the season’s harvest to determine the
feasibility of hosting a pearl fishery the following spring. British officials appear to have
also elaborated the practice of employing local experts to evaluate the quality of the
product obtained during the assaying process. As the Dutch commander at Jaffnapatnam
wrote in 1697, “If the pearls found in each heap were found by the appraisers to be worth
an ecu or more, the beds from which the oyster were taken were held to be capable of
yielding a rich harvest; if they were worth no more than thirty sous, the beds were
considered unlikely to yield a profit over and above the expense of working them. As
soon as the testing was completed, it was publicly announced either that there would, or
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that there would not be a fishery that year.”193 In the early years of British management,
valuations usually took place on-site or at the office of district collector. Appraisers
received pearls that had been classed and sorted based on such qualities as size, shape,
and color. This was the case at Tuticorin in 1800 when the sub-collector of Tirunelveli
reported that “after Collecting the whole of the Pearls” he had them “valued by four
merchants” in the presence of other British officials and “many of the other Principal
native inhabitants.”194 After the pearls were evaluated, the district collector sent half the
product to Fort St. George and kept the remainder at his office with the idea that
prospective renters could view samples of pearls. In January 1807, for example, Collector
James Hepburn of Tirunelveli wrote to the Board of Revenue, “The enclosed Bag
contains one half of the Pearls found properly classed and sorted which are sent to serve
as Masters for the satisfaction of any person at Madras division of offering for the
Fishery, the other half is retained by me for the same purpose here.” Hepburn added that
this particular batch “have been seen by some very good Judges here who declares them
to be of a very colour and of more than a commonly good shape.”195 Madras and
Colombo also actively participated in facilitating the employment of merchants and
jewelers skilled in the art of appraisal. In the months leading up to the pearl fishery of
1800, for instance, Frederick North of Ceylon wrote to Fort St. George about sending
appraisers and other specialized labor to assist in the Company’s preparation for pearl
fishery at Tuticorin: “Should it appear to you that any Pearl appraisers Pilots or other
persons residing on Ceylon can be of use, to you, I will send them immediately.”196
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However, British Ceylon appears to have modified the preexisting system of
appraising pearls and oysters collected during the examination process in the early 1820s.
A specially appointed team of British civil servants superintended the washing and
sorting process instead of leaving such responsibilities in the hands of native authorities
and local officers. Rather than inspect the pearls on-site or at a nearby district-level
office, officials shipped samples of pearls and shells from the far western and
northwestern shores of the island to Colombo. In the capital city, a small group of gem
specialist appraised the product. As master attendant and chief inspector of the pearl
fishery, British officer James Steuart had first-hand experience with this process. He
wrote, “These samples are taken to Colombo, where a Committee of officers is appointed
to superintend the washing away of the decayed fish from the shells: to see the Pearls
collected from the sandy remains, and afterwards sorted, classed and valued, by an
assembly of five or six native pearl dealers.”197 Steuart refers to these pearl dealers as
“respectable Moormen” who “perform their work faithfully.”198 He notes that they are
paid modest wages in cash, suggesting a further turn away from the “traditional” system
of honors and in-kind payments that had previously structured the organization of their
labor.
The viability of the pearl fishery was greatly enhanced by the ability of British
officials to tap local knowledge networks. From the men who assayed the pearl oyster
banks to gem specialists who valued the product, the superintendent and other officials
involved in the preparation and performance of the pearl fishery relied on individuals and
communities that possessed first-hand knowledge of pearls and oysters. This was
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especially true during the early years of British management when Company and Crown
officials lacked knowledge, information, or awareness about the local details of pearl
oysters and the natural marine environment of the Gulf of Mannar. In advance of the
1810 pearl fishery at Tuticorin, for instance, Collector James Hepburn of Tirunelveli
wrote, “My opinion must of Course be guided by the Judgement [sic] of others as it is a
Subject in which I can be but little Skilled and as the Fishery itself is a Lottery
Speculation therefore has room for a wide range.”199 At first, officials extolled the deep
insight, intimate knowledge, and autochthonic wisdom that local people had about the
pearl fishery. Hepburn continued, “the Divers and Boat People at Tutacoryn who have
made an observance & knowledge of these Banks the business of their lives and whose
judgement [sic] is therefore entitled to attention.”200 Local experts shaped knowledge
about pearls, oysters, marine ecosystems, and navigation within what might be
characterized as “contact zone” created by the encounter between local experts and
British officials.201 Knowledge about pearls and oysters, the location of the richest beds,
the best techniques to harvest and manage pearl oysters, and the best sailing routes to
their location were importantly not forged in the prototypical “contact zone” of colonial
cities but instead on the sandy shores of southeastern Indian and western Ceylon and a
few nautical miles from the coasts.
However, during the course of the early nineteenth century, individuals and

199

TNA, TDR, Vol. 3586, 65, 21 February 1810.
Ibid., 66.
201
Raj, Relocating Modern Science, 2007. Raj demonstrates that scientific knowledge about the natural
world was forged in the crucible of the “contact zone” of colonial cities and can therefore be seen as the
product of an encounter between European and local knowledge systems. Challenging a “diffusionist
model” of scientific knowledge, Raj persuasively shows that vernacular knowledge systems and local
knowledge-producing methodologies in South Asia circulated alongside European approaches. Raj adopts
the term “contact zone” from Mary Louise Pratt, Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation,
(London: Routledge, 1992).
82
200

groups formerly seen as authorities on pearls and oysters were often portrayed as
peddlers of dubious knowledge. For example, James Steuart, superintendent of the pearl
fishery and master attendant at Colombo, doubted the nautical skill of local mariners.
Even though the boat pilots and captains had “professed with apparent confidence to
distinguish one oyster bed from another,” Steuart found that they did not know how to
read the navigation charts, proving that “that the local knowledge of the Adapanaars [boat
captains] did not make up for their want of experience as mariners and navigators.”202
Steuart recommended to his superiors at Colombo and London that British Ceylon scale
back the duties and responsibilities of local boat captains. He wrote, “The full
consideration of these circumstances confirmed the belief, that dependence could not be
placed implicitly on the judgement [sic] of these men, and that some measures were
necessary to prevent one bed of oysters being mistaken for another, which there appeared
to be good reason to conclude had been the case, and that fisheries had been lost in
consequence.”203 Steuart proposed replacing local navigators with European ones. In a
report he intended for Commissioners Colebrooke and Cameron, Steuart remarked on
“the improvement of Ceylon mariners” and discussed “the advantages which might be
expected to result from the service of European officers, if they were employed on Board
the Government vessels, instead of Ceylonese.”204 The European sea officers “would
make themselves acquainted with the pearl banks,” which would lead to an “increase of
knowledge” because “every new Inspector “ would no longer have to learn “every
particle of useful information.”205
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By limiting the influence of local authorities and instead building infrastructure
from within the colonial administration headed by British officers and staffed by
indigenous civil servants, Madras and Ceylon created an increasingly bureaucratized and
professional setting in which the pearl fishery was managed. British Ceylon in particular
sought to expose the examination process to the logic of markets by dissolving traditional
arrangements, such as customary roles, hereditary offices, and material privileges, and
the introduction of wage-based employment systems. As Steuart wrote, “Several native
headmen are attached to the establishment. Formerly these persons received salaries, and
the privilege of employing a limited number of divers at the fisheries; but they are now
remunerated by a limited rate of pay, during their attendant on pearl fishery duty, and the
privilege of fishing with two or four divers, or, as they call it, one or two stones,
according to their ranking the public service.”206 In the early 1820s, Governor Edward
Barnes and Governor Edward Paget established the position of a permanent master
attendant and inspector of the pearl banks, which brought the examination process closer
into the ambits of the colonial administrative structures. In 1820, for instance, Barnes
appointed his personal deputy, a certain Colonel Hamilton, to superintend the pearl
fishery. According to one assessment, the experience with Hamilton at the helm had
“forcibly pointed out the propriety of a properly qualified officer being appointed to the
sole duty of superintending the pearl fisheries, as the best means of obtaining correct
information on a subject of such importance to the revenue of the Colony, and much
general interest to the community.”207
Another area in which the governments of Madras and Ceylon sought to modify
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was the actual techniques of pearl diving. From at least the medieval period moving
forward, the practice of pearl diving is one of the most commented on aspects of the
industry. Some of the earliest detailed written descriptions of pearl diving are found in
travel accounts from the medieval period, particularly Chinese and European texts dating
from as early as the thirteenth century.208 For instance, an account by Chinese merchant
Wang Tu-Yuan from the fourteenth century contains the following description: “There
are five men as a rule to each boat, of whom two act as oarsmen, while two…work the
rope. The fifth man hangs his neck and bag fitted with a bamboo ring to keep the mouth
open, and then, having tied a stone round his waist, he is lowered on the rope-line to the
bottom of the sea.”209 At the turn of the eighteenth century, French Jesuit missionary Fr.
Martin wrote a detailed description of diving during his visit to a pearl fishery off the
coast of Tuticorin: “When each vessel reached its place, half of its complement of divers
plunged into the sea, each with a heavy stone tied to his feet to make him sink rapidly,
and furnished with a sack into which he put his oysters, and having a rope tied round his
body, the end of which was passed round a pulley and held by some of the boatmen.”210
It appears from most available sources that divers continued to employ many of
these techniques during the early British period. Indeed, archival and published texts
from the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries suggest that divers typically used a
pyramid-shaped stone with loops to help accelerate their descent to the bottom of the
ocean floor. The diver placed his foot in a stirrup-like loop made from coir and carried a
basket, formed by a wooden or iron hoop and coir netting and about eighteenth inches in
diameter, in which he placed the oysters. Each reddish granite stone weighed about
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twenty to thirty pounds, a hefty load to handle for the crew of rudimentary sea-crafts
navigating rough water. Pearling boats usually contained five stones and ten divers, as
two divers shared to each stone. Divers worked at a breakneck pace, alternating between
resting and diving for hours on end, from the early morning till late in the afternoon.
Robert Percival, an early nineteenth-century British traveler, wrote, “the diver thus
prepared, seizes another rope with his right hand, and holding his nostrils shut with the
left, plunges into the water, and by the assistance of the stone, speedily reaches the
bottom.”211 When the diver reached the bottom of the ocean, a depth of anywhere
between one and ten fathoms, he released the stone from his waist for his partners on
board to haul up. For as long as his lungs would allow, no more than a minute or two, the
diver collected oysters and other marine products like coral, often aided by stones tied
around their waist. When the diver came to the surface, a group of men helped bring
baskets full of oysters, rocks, coral, and other marine products on board the boat. The
productivity of the divers is astounding by any measure, as a crew of around twenty to
thirty people would bring thousands of oysters per day and, over the course of thirty days
of fishing, tens and hundreds of thousands of oysters.212 Aside from diving stones, coir
nets, and other tools, the boats used during the pearl fishery, called dhonies or tonies, the
general term for a boat in Tamil, and were often seen as simple and primitive crafts.213 By
the late 1830s, British Ceylon started to experiment with the use of steamships to use
during the examination instead of traditional coastal crafts with sails and oars. The use of
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steamships was not limited to pearling. For instance, Governor Stewart Mackenzie of
British Ceylon wanted to use a steamboat to patrol the pearl banks, convey “treasure,”
and transport personnel.214 In 1840, a steamer named the Seaforth, built for the express
purpose of pearling, arrived to Colombo from Bombay, which a superintendent of the
Ceylon pearl fishery in the late nineteenth century described as an “important change and
improvement.”215
Pearl diving was an arduous, physically demanding task. The diver’s body, the
challenging nature of his work, and the tremendous skill he exhibited became imprinted
in the minds of European travelers and government officials. Tamil divers, in particular,
were seen as some of the most skilled divers in the world. The introduction of European
divers in the mid-nineteenth century, many of whom used breathing apparatuses and
newfangled diving equipment, was considered a failure by contemporary observers.216
The arrival of Arab divers from the Persian Gulf via Bombay to the 1887 Ceylon pearl
fishery was met with some controversy though their skills were praised.217 Percival
observed that Tamil Indian divers were quite dexterous with both hands and feet. He
wrote that it was “customary with all the natives to use their toes as well as their fingers
in working or holding, and such is the power of habit, that they can pick up even the
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smallest objects from the ground with their toes, almost as nimbly as a European can do
so with his fingers.”218 Eyewitnesses were obsessed with duration of each dive. As early
as the fourteenth century, Ibn Battuta remarked that “some [divers] remain down an hour,
others two hours, others less.”219 In 1669, Philiberto Vernatti, British Resident at Batavia,
reported to the Royal Society of London: “The greatest length of time that pearl-divers in
these part can continue under waters is about a quarter of an hour; and that by no other
means than custom; for pearl-diving lasts no above six weeks, and the divers stay a great
while longer at the end of the season than at the beginning.”220 Accounts from the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries include discussions of the length of time a diver
could hold his breath with increasingly exactitude. For instance, James Steuart, master
attendant and fishery superintendent of British Ceylon in 1820s and 1830s, wrote, “When
divers are regularly at work, they seldom remain under water more than a minute, the
more common time is from fifty three to fifty seven seconds; but when requested or paid
to remain under water as long as they are able, we have witnessed the period of their
immersion to be from eight four to eight seven seconds.”221
There were many health and safety risks commonly associated with pearl diving.
Plunging fathoms below the water’s surface exposed the divers’ body to punishingly high
levels of pressure, which sometimes resulted in physical damage, such as bloody ears and
noses. British official and traveler Jonathan Fellowes, for instance, wrote, “The blood
sometimes gushes from the nose and ears of the diver after his emersion from the
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deep.”222 Likewise, Steuart observed somewhat less alarmingly that pearl divers
“sometimes bleed at the nose and at the ears, but not sufficiently to do them injury.”223 A
full day of diving for pearls was an exhausting and demanding proposition. According to
Fellowes, “One day, owing to a calm, the boats were rowed with oars to the banks, and
back to the shore. They set out at one o’clock A.M. and did not return until near eight in
the evening. But notwithstanding this excessive toil, they renewed their daily labours in
less than five hours.”224 Not only was the actual act of pearl diving dangerous but also the
schedule of a divers workday was structured and enforced through rather belligerent
means. Take for instance the early morning wake-up call made by the thunderous sounds
of cannons and drums. There are references to the use of firearms to signal the start of
pearling operations from at least the late Portuguese era and continue through the early
years of British management.225 According to a description offered by Cordiner during
his visit to the 1804 pearl fishery at Arippu, “The boat people are raised from their
slumbers by the noise of horns and tom-toms, and the firing of a field-piece, generally
before midnight, when the land-wind is favourable. The noise and confusion of collecting
and embarking upwards of six thousand people in the darkness of night, may be more
easily conceived than described.”226 Under such grueling conditions, it was common for
exhaustion and fatigue to set in, which not only compromised the health and safety of the
workforce but also impacted the overall productivity and profitability of the pearl fishery.
These issues typically surfaced in representations by merchant-renters addressed to
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Madras and Ceylon in search of remission payments to offset or reduce financial losses.
For instance, Annasami Chetti, the renter of the 1807 pearl fishery at Tuticorin, claimed
in a petition to Fort St. George that the physical demands of pearl diving inter alia
reduced the overall yield of pearls and oysters. He wrote, “the Boats are to be sailed at 10
o’clock at Night and arrive at the Fishery at 6 o’clock in the morning and the divers are to
fish only for 1 1/2 or 2 Hours the most, but causing them to do it by force, while there
was no Wind, the Boats were obliged to be rowed, by which, the Boat people are quite
exhausted and arrives there between the hours of 10, 11, 12 o’clock in the forenoon.”227
From going naked except for “a slip of calico about his loins” to the lack of any
diving instruments such as nose clips, contemporary observers were also impressed by
the simple tools and equipment used by divers at the pearl fishery.228 Indeed, the general
absence of nose clips, oils, and similar types of diving aids at the pearl fishery of Mannar
struck writers from the medieval period onward.229 There were coordinated efforts by the
governments of Madras and Ceylon to update and modernize the diving process during
the course of the early nineteenth century. Historian C. R. de Silva suggests that the
Portuguese did not introduce any game-changing technologies.230 The Dutch brought
diving bells to pearling centers in the Indian Ocean without much success.231 A report by
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French naturalist Eudelin de Jonville mentions the use of diving bells at the Mannar
fishery during the Dutch period but wrote that such equipment was “not found to answer
the purpose expected.”232 In the early nineteenth century, British Ceylon officials took
another shot. Governor Edward Barnes of British Ceylon, for instance, lauded by his
contemporaries for his ingenuity and vision, fetishized technology. Following a series of
unsuccessful fisheries in the late 1810s and early 1820s, Governor Barnes “resolved to
leave no stone unturned to investigate the subject.”233 As he prepared to assume the
governorship of in 1823, Barnes had two diving bells shipped from England. The first
one was a wooden diving bell constructed by the Royal Staff Corps and the second was a
more sophisticated type made of cast iron that arrived to the Colombo around June 1825.
James Steuart, who was appointed master attendant of Colombo and chief inspector of
the pearl banks by 1826, used the diving bells during an examination in March the
following year. Men like Barnes believed that the introduction of new technologies and
equipment would revolutionize pearling in the Gulf of Mannar. The use of diving bells
would deter illicit fishing, provide officials with a more precise assessment of the state of
the banks, and prevent the formation of secret agreements amongst divers and merchants
to misrepresent the size of the season’s harvest. According to Steuart, “It had been
believed by many persons, that the native divers employed by Government at the
examination of the banks, were subject to improper influence of certain wealthy natives,
who were suspected of employing boats and divers to rob the oyster beds, and that
therefore the reports given by the divers could not be depend upon. It had also been said
that the oyster beds were at some periods overwhelmed with drifted sand, which at other
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times passed away. To clear up these doubtful reports, appears to have been one, if not
the only use of the diving bells; for one native diver at a pearl fishery, would collect more
oysters in a day than could be obtained by all the men that could work in a diving
bell.”234 Beyond its intended commercial use, the diving bell also supported marine
science studies in the region. For instance, Austrian naturalist and artist Eugen
Ransonnet-Villez used a diving bell to render the “submarine scenery” of coral gardens
on the floor of the Gulf of Mannar in beautiful colored paintings in the mid-nineteenth
century.235
Not all officials in British Ceylon involved with the management of the pearl
fishery at this time shared his enthusiasm for the diving bell. According to Robert Boyd,
a revenue officer of British Ceylon, part of the problem may have been poor design. He
wrote, “The inapplicability of the diving bells to fishing for oysters arises from the
difficulty of working such a machine from the small surface included within its
circumference.”236 There were also those who voiced concerns about the environmental
damage such equipment might wreak on the pearl banks. For instance, according to
Captain James Crisp, described as “the most intelligent Master Attendant at Ceylon,” the
diving bell “may answer very well at first; but it will ultimately be the means of
destroying the oysters.”237 Crisp sounded the alarms, noting that the marine environment
of Mannar and its pearl oyster population was too fragile, susceptible to severe damage
by a diver in heavy diving equipment tramping along the ocean floor. The diving bell

234

Steuart, Account of the Pearl Fisheries, 20.
Eugen Ransonnet-Villez, Sketches of the Inhabitants, Animals Life and Vegetation in the Lowlands and
High Mountains of Ceylon (Vienna, 1867).
236
Steuart, Account of the Pearl Fisheries, 52.
237
John Bennett, Ceylon and its Capabilities: An Account of Its Natural Resources, Indigenous
Productions, and Commercial Facilities (London: W. H. Allen and Co., 1843), 206.
92
235

“must crush a great many [oysters]; which will putrefy; and so extremely delicate is the
nature of the oysters, that it will spread like a plague, gradually extending its vortex, and
destroying all within.”238 To some extent, Crisp’s comments anticipated the spread of the
diving bell to many pearling centers around the world. Colonial powers and enterprising
prospectors continued to introduce new technologies such as diving bells and dredging
machines at pearling centers across the globe, from Mexico and the Caribbean to the
Persian Gulf and Australia.239

Labor, Discipline, and Circulation
Most of the divers and boatmen came from southeastern India and the western and
northern districts of Ceylon. As one contemporary eyewitness wrote, “The boats with
their crews and divers come from Manaar, Jaffna, Ramisseram, Nagore, Tutakoreen,
Travancore, Kilkerry, and other parts of the coast of Coromandel. They arrive completely
equipped, and furnished with every thing necessary to conduct the business of the
fishing.”240 This description, however, gives the impression that the seasonal migration of
boats and divers, as well as the movement of goods and supplies, were unmediated and
routine phenomena. But the governments of Madras and Ceylon were involved with the
facilitation of seasonal migration and employment of labor. Interventions by political
powers into the spatial mobility of pearling labor was by no means a British innovation.
References to labor at the pearl fisheries extend as far back as the early first millennium.
For instance, the ancient Greek text Periplus of Erythraean (c. 100-300 CE) contains
descriptions of pearl fishing off the coast of the southern tip of the Indian subcontinent,
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noting that “condemned criminals are employed in this service” and that the king is “the
owner of the fishery.”241 There are no mentions of slaves or criminals forced to work as
pearl divers during the eras of European management but this passage from the Periplus
does suggest a precedent for government involvement with labor. The Portuguese and
Dutch relied on local intermediaries to support the recruitment and mobilization of labor
for the pearl fishery. Maintaining relationships with local Parava, Maraikkayar, and
Lubbai communities along the Indian and Ceylon coasts was crucial for the success of the
pearl fishery and often assumed the form extending patronage and protection. There are
also concerns with the unregulated movement of people and things during the pearling
season generated by fears of smuggling and security. British powers also demonstrated
considerable unease when confronted with heavy seasonal migration and undertook
measures accordingly to mobilize and discipline labor through a loose assemblage of
tools and policies that targeted divers, boatmen, and other members of the workforce.
British Ceylon and the Company Raj turned to the medium of print at the turn of
the nineteenth century to spread information about the pearl fishery. This media was not
exclusive to the pear fishery but also used to promote leasing opportunities for other
industries such as betel, tobacco, salt, chank, and arrack.242 Madras and Colombo
published advertisements encouraging divers, boatmen, and other low-level laborers to
repair to the site of the pearl fishery. Published in English, Tamil, Sinhala, and sometimes
even Dutch, advertisements contained important information about the pearl fishery, such
as the dates and location of the event, as well as the number of boats that the event would
admit. For example, an advertisement for the 1803 Ceylon pearl fishery at Chilaw

241
242

Caldwell, History of Tinnevelly, 19-20; Kunz, Book of the Pearl, 100.
TNA, BOR Proceedings, Vol. 81, 6847-51 (18 October 1793).
94

contained the following passage: “Notice is hereby given that a Pearl Fishery will take
place at Chilaw, in the Island of Ceylon, in the Ensuing season - the Number of Boats
employed will be from Eighty, to one hundred, and the fishery will commence on the
20th February 1803, by which day, it is requested that the Boats, and Divers, intending to
seek employment for the usual Reward of on fourth part of the Oysters taken, may be at
Chilaw that [season] being peculiarly favorable for the operations.”243 Whereas
prospective renters and merchants were addressed by the government in metropolitan
newspapers and other media, the divers, boatmen, and laborers resided mostly in coastal
towns of Ramnad, Tirunelveli, and Madurai districts and so, in addition to published
advertisements and handbill pamphlets, word of a pearl fishery reached the coastal towns
and villages of these areas by notices posted in places like public squares, churches, and
by the beat of tom-tom drums.244
In the early years of British management, when the maritime districts of Ceylon
were governed by Fort St. George, and the East India Company was the sole proprietor of
the pearl fishery, there was a considerably high degree of cooperation and coordination
between officials on the island and mainland. Madras, Colombo, and district-level
officers shared and collectively facilitated the circulation of labor, capital, goods, and
information to and from the pearl fishery each season. In March 1800, for example,
Governor Frederic North of Ceylon shared his infinite wisdom with his counterparts in
Madras. North advised and assisted the Madras government as it prepared to host the first
full-scale fishery on the India-side of Mannar under British management. He volunteered
pearl appraisers and other laborers, provided information about the value and class of
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pearls, and suggested sending over an old Dutch sloop that could be used for examining
and patrolling the pearling grounds.245 The following year, Fort St. George reciprocated
in kind when it furnished Collector Lushington of Ramnad with instructions to facilitate
the movement of boats and divers from his district to the site of the Ceylon pearl fishery.
North had requested from Lord Clive at Fort St. George that Collector Lushington be
instructed to “facilitate the intended Enterprise” by “sending over the Boats and Divers in
his District.”246 In another instance, the district collectors of areas that formed the
southeast Indian coastline—Tirunelveli, Ramnad, Madurai, and Arcot—agreed to
distribute advertisements instructing able-bodied divers, boatmen, laborers, and
merchants to attend the 1803 pearl fishery at Chilaw on Ceylon’s western coast.
According to the advertisement, “It is requested that the Boats, and Divers, intending to
seek employment for the usual Reward of on fourth part of the Oysters taken, may be at
Chilaw that season being peculiarly favorable.”247 This was also the case during
preparations for the 1809 pearl fishery at Arippu, as Madras and Colombo agreed to share
information and distribute “12 printed Copies of the advertisement.”248
The relationship between Madras and Colombo cooled with regime change in
1802 when Ceylon was established as a formal colony of the British state. Colonial
officials of British Ceylon became increasingly concerned with keeping wealth and
resources derived from the pearl fishery on the island. The labor question was one way
through which this problem manifested itself in the administrative discourse of British
Ceylon. Indeed, much of the labor and capital for the pearl fishery was thought to have
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come from India. British officer and traveler Jonathan Forbes identified this problem
during his lengthy stay on Ceylon in the early nineteenth century. He wrote, “none of the
pearl divers are Cingalese, and only those few who come from Manar are subjects of the
British Government; the remainder arrive from various towns and villages on the
opposite coast of the Indian continent.”249 This reflected more general concerns about the
overall profitability of the pearl fishery. British Ceylon civil servant Anthony Bertolacci
wrote that “the island of Ceylon does not at present derive all the advantages that it ought
from the pearl fishery.”250 Officials like Bertolacci were anxious about losing money and
profits to the mainland at the end of the season when merchants, divers, and others
returned home, and his early nineteenth-century study of the economic and social
conditions of Ceylon paid special attention to the outward flow of labor and capital. He
wrote, “The divers, who receive a fourth share of the whole number of oysters fished, are
almost all persons from the opposite coast, who come to the fishery to accumulate a little
fortune, and take it away. These divers are likewise employed, during another part of the
year, in the fishery of chanks, round the coast of Ceylon. This is another source of
revenue to the Colonial Government, in which the natives of Ceylon have not hitherto
participated in proportion in which they ought.”251 From Bertolacci’s perspective, Ceylon
was overly “dependent upon foreign divers” who received a handsome share of the
season’s catch but returned to the mainland at the end of pearl fishery. He saw this drift
of labor and capital as “a very serious loss indeed to the colony.”252 Nearly two decades
after Bertolacci, Commissioners Colebrooke and Cameron addressed similar issues
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related to labor. In this report, the commissioners wrote “It may further be remarked, in
support of the opinion that the natives of India are not indisposed to emigrate, that
numbers annually come over to Ceylon to seek employment during the pearl fisheries,
and in the coasting trade of the island.”253 In another section, the commissioners wrote
that the pearl fishery “still attracts a large assemblage of speculators from the coast of
India, and of labouring people who come over in search of employment.”254
One idea that was regularly entertained to address this problem of seasonal
migration was the forced settlement of communities skilled in the art of diving and
navigation along the coast of western Ceylon near the sites of the pearl fishery. These
proposals, which had been floated by British officers from at least the turn of the
nineteenth century, specifically concerned Tamil Paravas. The Dutch VOC had also
considered the forced migration and settlement of Parava divers and others skilled in the
art of pearling. It may be recalled that Anthony Paviljoen, Dutch Commander at
Jaffnapatnam, recommended that “four good pearl divers with their tools and
implements” be spirited away to the Banda Islands in Southeast Asia.255 He emphasized
that such a plan had to be executed by force. He wrote, “If asked to go no one will
consent to do so, and should they hear of our plan they will all conceal themselves for a
time. Four of them must therefore be secretly pointed out by the Patangatyn and be taken
on board. Fair promises must be held out to them, and they may be told that they will be
required to stay away one year only and receive high wages. This must also be told to
those who remain behind, with a view to prevent any general discontentment among them
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with regard to our action, which apparently would seem rather hard.”256 In the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, British administrators spun a new rationale for
the forced migration of pearling labor. According to early colonial histories of Ceylon,
the western maritime regions had been devastated by war, famine, disease, and drought.
The dry, arid landscape was largely sparsely populated and underdeveloped. According
to one weary traveler, when the pearl fishery came to a close, the seasonal migrants who
populated a once bustling coastal town returned to the mainland, denuding the coastline:
“The moment the fishery is over, Kondatchie’s glory ceases and it then becomes the same
miserable waterless (for it has no water except from Arippo), and arid spot that is has
been for ages past.”257 Officials from various corners of the company-state and colonial
state administrations believed that offering incentives to members of the Parava
community to settle near Arippu would not only provide the pearl fishery with a regular
and fixed supply of labor but also facilitate the development of irrigation and agriculture
in the area. British traveler Cordiner discussed settling divers, boatmen, and other
laborers at Arippu, a measure that he argued would increase rice cultivation and improve
infrastructure for water storage: “The ruins of a large tank or reservoir, capable of
watering ground sufficient to produce one hundred thousand parrahs of paddee [sic],
afford one proof of its former prosperity. It might be highly beneficial to the interest of
the pearl fishery, if settlers were again encouraged to reside there; and it ought especially
to be rendered the head-quarters of the pilots, divers, and the persons necessary to be
employed in conducting the concern.”258 Establishing a permanent community of divers
near the site of the pearl fishery would not only contribute to the development of the
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region but also reduce seasonal traffic between the island and mainland, a security
problem that made government officials on both sides of the Gulf anxious. John
McDowall, one of the commissioners of the 1799 pearl fishery at Arippu, wrote to his
colleague George Turnour a few months before the start of the event: “[Governor North]
will apply to the Bombay Government for the protection you have suggested and will
direct the Superintendent of the Fishery to guard against an evil, which threatens to [serve
as an] inconvenience to the Divers on the Pearl Banks. It is certainly much to be wished
that some of these should settle at Arreppo, and every means should be used during the
Fishery to induce them thereto.”259 In his report on the economic and social conditions of
Ceylon, British officer Davey Roberson proposed that Parava divers and boatmen whom
inhabited the Indian coast by granting them tax-free land.260 Likewise, Bertolacci
considered directly employing divers and inducing them to settle near the pearling
grounds by providing them with free land, tax abatements, and other benefits: “It
becomes, therefore, in every way, an object of great importance to protect the interests of
the Ceylon divers; and to induce those of the opposite coast, who accumulate wealth in
the Ceylon fisheries, to settle in it, by granting them lands, and such advantages as may
make them comfortable in it.”261
Talks about the forced settlement and migration of laborers to the location of the
pearl fishery increased during the late 1820s, a period of intense road construction and
infrastructure projects that sought to connect the newly-opened highlands of the erstwhile
Kandyan territories to the rest of the island for military, commercial, and political
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purposes.262 In the Colebrooke-Cameron report, for example, the commissioners
proposed various measures in support of efforts to repopulate the desolate shorelines of
the western districts of Ceylon. For instance, Commissioners Colebrooke and Cameron
wrote, “The constant residence of the superintendent at Aripo…might enable him to
promote the settlement in the district of many of the people who come over from the
continent during the pearl fisheries, and who, if lands were granted to them, might
employ capital in repairing the ruined tanks.”263 Not only would this improve the
management of the pearl fishery and reduce dependence on “foreign” labor from the
India coast but it would also provide a boon to other industries—such as chaya root
cultivation and chank diving—and contribute to the agricultural production and
development of the region.
The East India Company’s government of Madras found itself in competition with
its neighbors over the human and natural resources of the pearl fishery, a tension that
became palpable during years in which multiple pearl fisheries were planned in the
region.264 As early as 1809, just seven years after the transfer of Ceylon to the Crown, the
relationship between British officials on the island and mainland started to show signs of
wear vis-à-vis labor. Collector Hepburn of Tirunelveli expressed his frustration that the
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Ceylon government had organized a fishery at Arippu that coincided with one his district.
He feared that Arippu, one of the largest and potentially most lucrative pearling grounds
in the region, would attract labor and capital that would have otherwise attended the pearl
fishery at Tuticorin. Hepburn wrote to the Board, “I can now begin to feel some anxiety
as a fishery there would affect the value of the one at Tutacoryn very much from its
drawing away, not only the dealers in Pearls, but also the Boat men and Divers who
would of course resort to Ceylon in preference to remaining at Tutacoryn.”265 He was
“very doubtful” that there would be an adequate supply of boats and divers to satisfy the
demands of two simultaneous fisheries and recommended to the Board that it delay the
event. He wrote, “Should certain information therefore be obtained of a Fishery at Manar,
it would be preferable to defer that at Tutacoryn, if possible, till next year as both
fisheries occurring at the same time would create a Competition hurtful to the revenue of
both Governments of this however a better opinion can be formed after the inspection of
the Banks.”266 Hepburn and his superiors at Fort St. George ultimately decided to
postpone the pearl fishery until the following year. They even acceded to Colombo’s
request to promote its pearl fishery by agreeing to distribute advertisements and provide
other forms of assistance.267 A similar set of circumstances arose during preparations for
the 1822 pearl fishery at Tuticorin, an event that Madras already delayed by a year
because it conflicted with British Ceylon’s timetable. In this case, Madras and Ceylon
took far more accommodative approaches. The collector of Tirunelveli wrote to the
Board of Revenue, encouraging Fort St. George to move forward with plans to host a
pearl fishery and apprise Colombo of such intentions. He wrote, “it will be expedient to
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lose no time in making it known by advertisement in order that the Ceylon Government
may postpone the fishery of the Manaar banks which as there were expected to be fished
last year and delayed as our fishery was might otherwise materially interfere with the
fishery on the Coast.”268 In response, Secretary to the Government of Ceylon, George
Lusignan, referred to the “practice which has prevailed on the part of both Governments
to accommodate each other, on occasions such as the present.”269 The secretary conveyed
the message to the Governor and instructed the collectors of Mannar and Jaffna “to
signify that such Boats and Divers in this Island as may be willing to engage in the
Tutacoren Pearl Fishery, should and have license to proceed there forthwith giving notice
of their intentions to the Collector of the District that the number of Divers and Boats
may be registered.”270
The relationship between Madras and Ceylon continued to run and cold. In 1828,
the governments organized simultaneous pearl fisheries at Punnaikayal and Arippu.
Officials from Madras feared that the Arippu fishery would magnetize resources,
attracting a disproportionate and unfair share of labor, capital, and supplies from the
mainland to the island, effectively jeopardizing the productivity and profitability of the
event at Punnaikayal. Collector Kindersley of Tirunelveli wrote to the Board in
December 1827, “there is every prospect a Considerable fishery on this Coast” and that
the publication of an advertisement for the Ceylon fishery “would be highly
objectionable.” Kindersley feared that “it would lead the Merchants, Boat Owners, and
divers to suppose that the Fishery had been abandoned and under such an impression they
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would of Course be induced to [proceed] to Arippoo.”271
The mobilization and migration of labor was not the only arena of the pearling
industry in which the governments of Madras and Ceylon meddled. Concerns about
security and mobility continued as the divers and boatmen assembled at the location of
the pearl fishery, when the superintendent and local members of his administrative team
undertook an extensive registration process. Historian C. R. de Silva describes a similar
system in place during the Portuguese era: “Then the vessels and the divers due to
participate were registered. The number of such vessels varied between two and four
hundred with a maximum of eight divers to boats.”272 Likewise, the Dutch deployed
naval vessels to the pearling grounds during the fishery. Governor Thomas van Rhee,
Governor of Dutch Ceylon, wrote to his successor, Gerri de Heere, in 1697: “The fluitje
‘de Santloper’ has been ordered to remain at the banks during the pearl fishery, partly to
serve as a beacon to the thonys, partly to prevent any of the thonys engaged in the fishery
from leaving without paying the dues or stone money, which they might otherwise do.”273
At the end of the seventeenth century, Hendrick Zwaardecroon, Dutch Commandant at
Jaffnapatnam, discussed the various uses of sloop: “The sloop ‘Jaffnapatam’ has been
built more for convenience and conveys usually important advices and money, as also the
Company’s servants. As this vessel can be made to navigate the Mannar river, it is also
used as a cruiser at the pearl banks, during the pearl fishery.”274 There are also references
in the Dutch annals to the practice of registering boats (uitschrijving) and divers at the
start of the pearl fishery. For instance, Dutch Governor Hendrick Becker wrote to his
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successor Isaac Rumpf in 1716: “The names of the all the divers with their number of
stones, each under his Pattangatyn, must be carefully entered by the Commissioners, and
each individual must receive a certificate signed on behalf of the Company, while a
number of sloops must constantly cruise about the scene of the pearl fishery, to examine
every vessel and to see that it has no unauthorized divers or stones on board.”275 In the
early nineteenth century, James Cordiner observed during his visit to Arippu, “As the
boats arrive at Condaatchy to be employed in the fishery they are regularly numbered,
and their description and the names of their crew are registered in a book.”276 The
collector in whose district the pearl fishery that season was located sent instructions to the
superintendent that contained a description of these procedures. Collector Drury of
Tirunelveli, for example, wrote to the master attendant of the 1822 pearl fishery at
Tuticorin: “You will ascertain at the time of examining the Passes every day that no Boat
contains [more] people, divers, or stones than the Number specified in its Pass. Any
deviation from this you will report with the number of the boats for my information.”277
Each boat was assigned a number and issued a passport, complete with a passenger
manifest that provided the exact number and names of the divers, pilots, and other
crewmen. A copper plate inscribed with both Roman and Tamil numerals that
corresponded to superintendent’s logbook was then tied to the boat with coir rope. As
Collector Lushington of Tirunelveli reported from Tuticorin in 1800: “A Copper Plate
with the number of the Boat Marked upon in in English and Malabar with several yards
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of Cord attached to it.”278 These measures were supposed to enable government officials
to record and track participants, to know exactly how many boats were cruising the
pearling grounds at any given moment, which was an important piece of information
since Madras and Ceylon wanted to modulate the exploitation of the pearl banks each
season. The registration process, assignment of number, and issuing of passports was also
meant to deter illicit fishing, as boats, government agents, and other participants were
given the tools to monitor the boats. If there was any behavior deemed suspicious or
illegal, an informant could identify the boat by number and notify the authorities. Guard
vessels also regularly checked that each boat carried with it proper documentation.
According to a public announcement released during the 1799 pearl fishery Arippu, “a
Certificate containing the No. of the Boat and the Names of the Tindals, Crew, and
Divers [shall] be open for inspection, and that a general Register of the same [shall] be
kept by the Commissioners.” 279 If the crew did not have its paperwork in order, carried a
phony passport, or employed over and above the assigned number of divers and stones,
then government officials were empowered to mete out punishment, which ranged from
fines and the confiscation of property to arrest and corporeal punishment. According to
the regulations posted at the 1799 pearl fishery at Arippu: “And if any person or persons
shall presume the employment of a Boat on the Pearl Oyster bank, not fairly purchase at
the Public Outcry, and as such bearing a Certificate signed by the Commissioner such,
Boat, shall on proof of such fraudulent fishing be instantly confiscated, and the persons
so employing it, shall be punished [with] fine, imprisonment, and Corporal punishment as
the Commissioners shall Judge the offence to deserve, as well as the Tindall Crew and
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Divers who are employed on board such boat, and the letter to discover and to bring to
punishment such offenders the commissioners hereby promise a reward of 200 St.
Pagodas to any person or persons as may give such information as shall convict those
employed in such fraudulent transactions.” 280
Another site of regulation was the content and make-up of pearling boats. The
usual complement of crew and equipment included a head pilot or captain, some
oarsmen, ten divers, diver assistants, guards, five diving stones, and miscellaneous items
such as nets and baskets. The Portuguese and Dutch had also taken an interest in the
various members and components of a pearling fleet. This may have been partly due to
the fact that both Portuguese and Dutch authorities collected taxes on diving stones and,
as evidence suggest, imposed differently based on religious community.281 Historian C.
R. de Silva suggests that the “tax on divers” was the “most important source of income
for the Crown” derived from the pearl fishery during the Portuguese era.282 Rijklof van
Goens, Dutch Governor of Ceylon and Governor-General of the Dutch East Indies,
consulted the Portuguese tombos (descriptions or registers) in his possession shortly after
the VOC wrested managerial control of the pearl fishery from their Iberian rivals. He
found that “the profits derived from the pearl banks…vary in proportion to the number of
oysters caught and the number of divers employed.”283 He added: “It is needless to state
here the necessity for good supervision on both banks during the first time of diving.”284
Anthony Paviljoen, Dutch commander at Jaffnapatnam, wrote that he heard “bad reports”
concerning the pearl fisheries and recommended that the “commissioners must obtain all
280
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the information possible in order that measures may be taken to make the receipts cover
the expenditure.” For Paviljoen and his colleagues, collecting information about the pearl
fishery entailed a close look at the boats and divers. He wrote: “As far as I know the
number of vessels with divers is at present from 350 to 400 Chiampans [small coastal
crafts], each having on board 8, 10, 12 divers, and as many stones with which the divers
sink. The income is affected by the number of stones used, because every stone is paid
for by the men; the Moor pay 60 and the Christians only 30 [fanams] for each.”285
Likewise, Governor Hendrick Becker of Dutch Ceylon wrote in 1716, “The tax on the
stones is regulated according to the character and position of the divers.”286 The East
India Company and colonial state of British Ceylon did not extend the practice of levying
duties on diving stones. Nor did the Company or Crown governments impose a variablerate tax system based on “the character and position of the divers.”
Even when the Madras and Ceylon governments collected revenue from the
industry by leasing out the pearl fishery, officials still took an interest in regulating labor
organization, often in consultation with local mercantile elites. During the early years of
British management, the makeup of any given pearling boat’s crew and equipment was
further regulated by the contract sealed between the renter and government. For example,
Chinniah Mudaliar, the renter of the 1805 pearl fishery, included the following clause in
his proposal: “That each boat employed in the Fishery shall be Provided with five stones
having two divers to each stone, and with the usual Number of Boatmen for working the
Boat.”287 According to the contract, it was incumbent upon the superintendent to inspect
and certify each boat through the registration process described above, and Chinniah
285
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Mudaliar stipulated as much: “That the Boats before leaving the shore shall be inspected
by the servant of the Superintendent, in order to see that each Boat is provided with no
more than the regulated number of Stones, Divers, etc.”288 In another case, a proposal
from a certain Cabal Mahamed Mercayer of Killakarai for the rent of the 1810 pearl
fishery specified that each boat contain twenty-five men.289
Yet, despite these efforts by government officials and merchant-renters, the
distribution of labor in each boat was a persistent problem in the late eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries. One reason for this problem according to official reports was that
both British officers and local merchants discerned a considerable skill gap amongst
divers and other crewmembers. Not all divers, according to reports, were capable of
efficient and productive work. A criterion used to evaluate the skill and ability of a diver
was the maximum depth to which he was capable of diving. For instance, a report from
the 1799 pearl fishery at Kondachi read, “of the Divers, many were found unequal to
diving the Depth of Water where the Oyster Banks lay which were fished.”290 Another
way to assess the relative skill of a boat and its crew was based on volume of oysters. The
commissioners of the 1799 pearl fishery at Arippu wrote to Governor North that some
“rejected boats” averaged only 800 oysters per day, or about twenty-percent less oysters
than “that of the Prime boats.”291
A boat loaded with the least skilled and knowledgeable team of pilots and divers
could fetch a lower price at auction, which government officials considered undesirable
not only because it debilitated the market but also tipped the scales in favor of merchants
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privy to such information. A savvy businessman could place less skilled divers in boats
that auctioned or sub-leased while keeping the more capable crews to fish for his own
benefit. Fearing that powerful and influential merchants manipulated boat assignments in
their favor, the superintendent and his agents thus had no qualms about interfering with
the selection process An advertisement from the 1799 pearl fishery at Arippu, for
instance, announced that “the Commissioners will, to the utmost of their powers make a
fair and impartial distribution of the Divers previously the Sale of the Boat.”292 Here,
government officials attempted to fill boats with divers of equal skill and expertise by
dividing them by “character.” Prior to the public auction, the commissioners reported,
“we distributed the Divers among the different Boats according to the information we
could obtain of their respective Characters, a measure which [thereof] it met with some
opposition, we were however enabled to effectuate.”293 They added that “the correct
Justice of this distribution” would prevent any “future combinations” between native
merchants.294 Despite their best efforts, this plan did not work out as they had hoped. The
commissioners found it virtually impossible to distribute labor fairly across the boats and,
according to Company account books, boat prices fluctuated wildly. According to a letter
form the commissioners to Governor North: “We are at loss to account for the difference
of price at the respective sales and of the different Boats, [otherwise] than from a
difference in quality of the Divers, which notwithstanding all our exertions cannot be
perfectly equally distributed.”295
Yet Company and Crown officers regularly allowed clauses to enter leasing
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contracts that awarded merchant-renters the capacity to hand-pick divers at the start of
pearling operations. For instance, Chinniah Mudaliar, renter of the 1805 pearl fishery at
Tuticorin, included the following condition in his contract with Fort St. George: “That I,
or my Manager, be allowed to make choice of Boats, Divers, and Boatmen, and to
[change] such Divers or Boatmen as may be disabled from working by sickness accident
or otherwise.”296 Rental applications for the next pearl fishery at Tuticorin in 1807
contained similar articles.297 However, the inclusion of such provisions in contracts
between renters and the governments of Madras and Ceylon did not always protect
renting parties from seeking compensatory damages. For instance, two native agents,
Rama Chetti and Venkatachalam Chetti, employed by the principal renter of the 1800
pearl fishery at Tuticorin submitted numerous petitions to the superintendent, one of
which contained a demand to shift the location of the pearl fishery and to allow the
renter’s managers to outfit boats as they saw fit. Rama Chetti and Venkatachalam Chetti
wrote, “We beg the favor that you will pleased to order that the Fishery be charged to
some better Bank than the present one and likewise we beg leave to inform you that there
is some Boats for want of proper Divers brings very few Oysters in them therefore we
beg that those Boats and people may be changed and place others in their room.”298 The
superintendent acceded to the request of the renter’s agents. He wrote in reply, “You will
point out such Boats and Divers as you wish to be changed.”299
As Madras and Ceylon struggled with merchant-renters over the authority to
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allocate human resources, government officials advanced ideas more fluid and open labor
market. From the early days of Company proprietorship, government officials entertained
the hope of short-circuiting the power, influence, and sway mercantile elites exercised
over the workforce. Governor North of Ceylon, for instance, proposed to the
commissioners of the 1799 pearl fishery at Arippu that divers ought to choose their boats
freely instead of being given an assignment. He wrote, “it appears to me that it would
save great trouble and contention, and rather increases than diminish the grand total of
the Receipt, if the Divers should be allowed to enter in [which] Boats they pleased the
price of each Boat might vary more.”300 Not only would the boats command a price more
favorable to government purses but also the divers would “act with more Spirit, when
[with] their Friends.”301 This idea never came to fruition, and by the late 1820s and 1820s
in British Ceylon, officials promoted a system in which divers, pilots, and other members
of a pearling fleet were designated by a lottery system. As James Steuart wrote in his
report on the pearl fishery, “Those that arrive first at Silāwatorre, provided they were
good boats properly fitted up for the service, and having the full-complement of divers,
were formerly preferred; but lately it has been found more expedient, to fix a certain day
for the Tindals to draw lots of employment.”302
In the dark hours of the night and early morning, the pearling crews, merchants,
government officials, and curious spectators gathered on the beach to begin the day’s
proceedings. The launch zone of the boats was a central hub of activity and in close
proximity to other important spaces such as auction sites, marketplaces, warehouses, and
washing stations. James Cordiner described the qualities of Arippu that made it a
300
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favorable place to launch and moor boats: “The beach, extending upwards of three miles,
from the bay of Condaatchy to the fortress of Aripo, is admirably adapted for the
convenient riding of the boats, the water being deep close to a sandy beach, and not
agitated by any surf. They drop one anchor, and turn their prows to the sea; their crooked
sterns line the shore, and the vessels are securely moored, only a few steps from land, by
a rope fastened round a pole.”303 Each of the boats had been assigned numbers and
passports, and buoys and flags placed a few miles from shore marked the boundaries of
the pearling grounds for that day. The shot of a cannon signaled the start of the day and
the boats set out, guided by a lead pilot, on a three-hour journey to the location of that
day’s fishing. There are references to the use of firearms to signal the start of pearling
operations from at least the late Portuguese era. For instance, João Ribeiro’s famous
seventeenth-century History of Ceylon contains the following passage: “At four in the
morning, the officer in command of the four vessels of war fires a gun as a signal, and
immediately all the boats put off to sea, steering for the place which they have selected to
fish at casting anchor there.”304 Jonathan Fellowes described a similar series of events in
his early nineteenth-century travel account. “All the boats depart and return at a given
signal. About midnight the whole fleet sails with the breeze that blows from the shore;
and, after reaching their destined station, they cast anchor and await the dawn. The diving
commences between six and seven o’clock in the morning.”305 Many of these procedures
were formalized by government officials and further codified in policy statements,
reports, and lists of rules and regulations drawn up and posted at the pearl fishery. For
instance, a document from the 1800 pearl fishery at Tuticorin prescribed how pearling
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boats ought to proceed to the pearling grounds: “The fishery shall begin on the 22nd of
March on that Day as also on all the following, all the Donies shall sail on a given signal,
at the same time under the conduct of such as are called Pilots who shall lead them duly
to the Bank which is to be Dived.” 306 Officials and their appointed representatives
continued to keep a close watch over such activities. Collector Drury of Tinnevelly, for
instance, instructed one of his sub-officials ahead of the 1828 pearl fishery near Tuticorin
and Punnaikayal to “make a signal to commence the fishery” and to close the fishery
“[at] the usual time.”307 The collector emphasized the need to be extra vigilant that “none
of the divers go down after the signal is made” and requested that he be notified about
“any deviation from this rule stating the Number of the Boat in which it occurred.”308
When the East India Company assumed managerial rights to the pearl fishery of
the Gulf of Mannar in 1796, the divers, pilots, and other workers were paid primarily in
the form of oysters, usually either one-third or one-fourth of the day’s catch. Records
dating back to the sixteenth century indicate that the Portuguese also awarded a share of
oysters to the divers, a practice continued by the Dutch.309 This number of oysters was
deducted from the total amount brought on shore each day; the remainder went to the
renter or government and small fraction went to the tax-free mauniam boats awarded to
religious institutions. At the end of the season the superintendent submitted a carefully
tallied account of the oysters, a sum that included the divers’ share, and usually amounted
to many tens of thousands. From this reserve of oysters, other members of the crew such
as the pilots and unskilled peons were paid out. The jati talaivan and other such figures
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who had special relationships with the company-state, however, received certain
privileges like tax-free boats and reduced levies. Shark-charmers, security forces, and
other workers not technically part of the diving team also received a share of the catch.310
The counting and distribution of the so-called “divers’ share” was a highly sensitive issue
for the superintendent and other government officials because there were many
opportunities for laborers and merchants to cheat the system by skimming oysters off the
top or reducing the count to ensure a greater haul for themselves and their partners. For
that reason, the superintendent assigned a person to count oyster as they were hauled up
onto each boat. Collector Lushington described the accounting system at the 1800 pearl
fishery: “A Copper Plate with the number of the Boat Marked upon in English and
Malabar with several yards of Cord attached to it, is delivered to the Peons who attends
on the part of the Company in each Boat, and for every seventy oysters fished he ties a
Knot to Express the units another small string is attached on the return of the Boats the
plates are delivered up to my Assistant and the whole quantity fished is at once known.
To correct errors, they are also compared with the Accounts kept by the Renters
Servants.”311
Yet despite such flaws, government officials, especially officers of the East India
Company, recognized that permitting divers, pilots, shark-charmers, and others that
provided services to receive a share of the season’s catch was an essential feature of
economy of the pearl fishery. British officers recognized that the practice had been in
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place for some time and thus it captured their attention accordingly. Allocating a share of
the oysters to the divers and other laboring groups was also meant to further attract divers
to the pearl fishery and induce them to stay for its duration. Government officials
expressed concerns season after season about divers and other skilled laborers
absconding when the pearl fishery failed to deliver on its expected returns, labor
conditions deteriorated, or activities in the bazaar slowed to a crawl. It was therefore
incumbent upon government officials as managers of the industry to provide the divers
with incentives to remain engaged with their work. At the 1799 pearl fishery at Arippu,
for instance, the commissioners distributed a notice addressed to the divers that
concerned the dustoor or duties and tariffs usually imposed on their share of the
oysters.312 The superintendents were “resolved to give to the Divers every possible
protection and encouragement” and announced that the divers’ “share of oysters during
the present Fishery shall be subject to no Dustoor or imposition whatsoever.”313 The
announcement added that the commissioners would extend support to in the divers’
“refusal to comply with such claims,” should any disputes arise.314
Oysters served as a form of in-kind payment in exchange for a range of goods and
services. As special legal counsel to the East India Company, Henry Smith undertook a
diagnostic of the pearling industry at the turn of the nineteenth century in London. He
wrote, “The Boats and Apparatus are the Property of Individuals, who, as well as the
divers and crew are remunerated for each days [sic] Work, by a certain proportion of the
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produce of each days Adventure there are also certain Officers, such as the Pilot who
conducts the fleet of Boats to the fishing Banks, the Shark Charmers etc. etc. [sic] who
are paid by a certain number of Oysters from each Boat, the residue of the Oysters taken,
is the gain of the Proprietors of the Fishery, who have been accustomed to make it
available to them in several ways.”315 Divers could sell their oysters in the marketplace or
presumably try their luck by opening the oysters with the hope of finding a valuable
pearl. The proceeds from the sale of oysters in the marketplace went to support their daily
sustenance and other needs by purchasing provisions such as rice and liquor in the
bazaar. Any windfall profits would be remitted to their villages at the end of the pearling
season, although time and again divers and other laborers faced crushing debts. From the
perspective of the boat owners, renters, and government proprietors, this system of inkind payments was cost-effective and reduced risk because there were little up-front labor
costs. The divers’ wages, as it were, largely came from the sea. This meant that the
livelihood of divers and their families were highly precarious, open to the volatility of the
marketplace. If the returns of pearls and oysters were low, or the pearling grounds were
struck by inclement weather, then activity in the bazaar waned effectively reducing profit
margins from oyster sales. The precarious circumstances of a diver’s life were further
threatened because the pearl oysters of Mannar did not serve as a desirable (or tasty) food
source. As British military officer Jonathan Forbes wrote, “the pearl-oyster, although
neither palatable nor wholesome, has no poisonous quality, and is said to be sometimes
eaten by the poorest of those people who frequent the fishery.”316 The so-called
“cutcherry servants”—the scribes, accountants, cash-keepers, and others administrative
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staff—also received a share of the oysters in addition to their normal wages.317
The practice of paying divers and other members of the workforce payments in
oysters underwent some noticeable changes during the course of the nineteenth century.
The colonial government of British Ceylon in particular sought to open the labor system
at the pearl fishery to a more market-based and monetary wage structure. Commissioners
Colebrooke and Cameron, for instance, referred to the fix-wages received by divers in
their report to the Colonial Office in the early 1830s: “The divers generally come over
from the continent of India, though some reside in Ceylon. By the schedule of rates fixed
by government in the year 1825, the established wages for labourers employed by
government in the district of Manar is 3d. per day.”318 Attempts to promote monetary
payments for work also affected the compensation received British civil servants,
including master attendant or inspector of the pearl banks, a position that once received a
ten oysters per day from each fishing boat. However, in the mid-1830s, the government
awarded the master attendant “compensation in money, and the oysters were not taken
from the boat people.”319 Officials, of course, received more than just oysters for their
work, and Ceylon officials in particular enjoy a comfortable salary.320 Across the Gulf,
Company officials received a portion of the revenue derived from each pearling season.
Not only did the total compensation vary from season to season but the percentage was
not fixed. It was not uncommon for the district collector and his subordinates to lobby
their superiors in Madras and London after the close of each pearling for bonuses. If the
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season was particularly robust, or the officials faced especially trying circumstances such
as disease and less than dignified accommodations, then they argued that extra
commission was owed.

Security, Theft, and Violence
Safety and security were issues of paramount importance for both government proprietors
and mercantile elites who strived to safeguard their investments from various threats. The
physical qualities of pearls—small, valuable, and easily concealable—and the nature of
extraction—miles from the coast and deep beneath the surface of the water—magnified
worries about theft. Concerns about theft and security did not arise at the moment the
East India Company assumed managerial control over the pearl fishery but had been an
issue of critical importance for the Portuguese and Dutch. In the early nineteenth century,
a British travelers James Cordiner described the nature of the problem during his visit to
the pearl fishery: “The divers, the boat-men, the persons employed in washing the oysters
and sifting the sand, leave no expedient untried to accomplish frauds. Even the peons,
employed as a check upon the laborers, have been known to attach a viscous substance to
the end of their canes, and extract from washing-troughs valuable pearls, with the very
instrument used to punish such delinquencies.”321 There were those who inevitably cast
the subject in a moral light, including British military officer turned travel-writer,
Jonathan Forbes: “Where thefts are so easily made, and a valuable article like a pearl is
so easily secreted, incessant watchfulness is necessary…but I believe their utmost
endeavors are ineffectual, as the moral character of most of those assembled [affords] no
check to their inclinations...[T]heir only principle and pursuit is how to make money, and
321
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if successful, the end to them would sufficiently sanctify the means.”322 From the
physical safety and well-being of divers to the specters of theft and smuggling, there were
many dangers—real and imagined—that not only caused incalculable financial losses and
damages but also took the limbs, lives, and livelihoods of divers and other members of
the labor force. To reduce or moderate the risks and vulnerabilities of pearling, both
Company and Crown officers, as well as local mercantile elites, assembled a
multidimensional security apparatus designed to protect people and pearls but also direct
the flow of governmental power to the lives and work of divers, boatmen, sharkcharmers, washers, sorters, and other members of the workforce. By limiting the
boundaries of the pearling grounds, positioning security guards and armed vessels on the
water, facilitating the work of shark-charmers, and a host of other techniques, Madras and
Ceylon intervened in pearling operations through modern techniques of government
power, seeking to shape and influence the lives and work of pearl divers and other
laboring groups on which the profitability and productivity of the industry depended.
The threats of theft, smuggling, and poaching were not limited to those few weeks
of the pearling season between late February and early April when tens of thousands of
people gathered on the shores of southeastern India or western Ceylon. Both Portuguese
and Dutch officials had recognized that various smuggling and poaching operations were
often linked with pearl fishing. Moreover, according to Dutch sources from the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, pearls were not the only goods that were conveyed
secretly or illicitly. Dutch officers were particularly concerned with the illegal movement
of cotton, areca, and pepper, all commodities over which the VOC claimed monopolies.
For instance, Governor G. W. Baron van Imhoff of Dutch Ceylon (1736-1740) drew
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attention to this problem in a report to his successor. He wrote: “the standstill in the
Company’s trade here for a [time] on account of the difficulty of preventing the
smuggling of cotton goods up-country. And now we may add also the smuggling of
pepper, not to speak of the loss in the sale of the areca-nut, because the presence of more
than 100,000 people in the country for more than two or three months will mean that a
large quantity of these nuts will be consumed, on which the Company will have no profit
whatever.”323 Anthony Paviljoen, Dutch Commander at Jaffnapatnam, recommended that
the VOC deploy security forces such as guard ships to protect the pearling grounds from
poaching and prevent the illegal movement of goods. In a memorandum from 1665,
Paviljoen wrote, “The prospects for next year are better than they have ever been since
our possession. Next January the banks must be careful inspected, and a good sloop must
be made to sail coastwise with a view to keep away Moors and other thieves, or to
otherwise capture them so that they may be punished.”324 British officials on both sides
of the Gulf of Mannar were also wise to the “notorious fact that the banks are extensively
robbed” between the end of the examination and start of the pearl fishery.325 According to
Governor Barnes of British Ceylon in March 1821, this interlude “affords the season for
the dhoneys [boats] to pass from the Southern Coast of Coromandel to this Island,
anchoring as they do on our pearl oyster banks and their crews are all divers!”326 There
were also concerns expressed by officials that boats and divers poached the pearl beds
during the off-season under the pretense of chank fishing. For instance, Collector
Hudleston of Tirunelveli sent a letter to the Board of Revenue at Fort St. George in 1822
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that called attention to the importance of guarding the pearl banks. He wrote: “It is
strongly suspected that the chank divers are in the habits of poaching upon the Pearl
banks and in Ceylon a Guard vessel is for some time before a fishery employed to protect
the Banks. The greater value of the produce of the Pearl fishery on that Coast may require
more watchful attention there is necessary for the Tinnevelly Banks but totally exposed
as they have hitherto been it is highly probable that they have not [escaped]
depredation.”327
Divers, boatmen, and other members of the workforce were subjected to
additional forms of regulation, coercion, and physical violence during the pearl fishery.
Posting rules and issuing edicts concerned with the pearl fishery appears to have also
been a preferred tool of the Dutch. Plakkaaten (placards) issued by the Dutch Governor
Rijcklof van Goens often concerned the pearl fishery. For instance, a plakkaat from 1665
issued by Dutch Ceylon explicitly forbid Muslims from traveling to the pearl banks of the
Gulf of Mannar during the pearling season because officers “received information” that
“many Muslims are not afraid to steal or pilfer.”328 According to the announcement, the
VOC claimed “sovereign jurisdiction” over the “pearl banks of Manar yet these “enemies
of the state and general public” steal under “the pretense that they are making a trip or
sailing somewhere else.”329 British officials also issued edicts that established certain
rules and prohibitions and posted them in public places at or near the pearl fishery
compound, such as the district-collector’s temporary cutcherry or a nearby church or
place of worship. Aside from promulgating the rules of the pearl fishery, these document
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also laid down the penalties for violating them, which ran the gamut from petty fines to
heavy flogging.
Another favorite tool through which British officials monitored and regulated
activities of divers and boats was the placement of buoys and flags to mark the
boundaries of the pearling grounds. This aspect of the pearl fishery was undertaken prior
to the start of the event by the superintendent and his assistants with the help of local
authorities such as the jati talaivan. Supplies like wood, rope, and paint were shipped to
the location of the pearl fishery each season, the overall costs of which were relatively
affordable.330 Flags and buoys also marked the locations and qualities of specific clusters
of oyster. British traveler James Cordiner described this practice: “The buoys are rafts of
wood of a triangular shape, having flats of different colours raised upon them, and are
fixed to the place by a cable and wooden anchor, with two large stones attached to it.
Drawings of the flags are inserted in a book, and a particularly description is given of the
quality, age, and denomination of the oysters found where they are laid.”331 The
placement of flags and buoys not only served as a way to deter theft by keeping all the
pearling boats within a specially marked area but also functioned as a de facto mode of
natural resource management by concentrating the location of the harvest. The Dutch
VOC had also used the placement of buoys and flags. In the late seventeenth century,
Governor Gerrit de Heere sent instructions to opperkoopman (senior merchant) at
Jaffnapatnam concerning the construction and placement of buoys at the pearl fishery. He
wrote, “four buoys should be made as beacons for the vessels, each having a chain of 12
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fathoms long, with the necessary adaptations in the links for turning.”332 The East India
Company employed this system from the outset of its management. As Governor North
wrote to Fort St. George in 1800, the Company had an interest “in preserving the Banks
from premature exhaustion & the Power which it has of restraining the Divers on the spot
from fishing in improper Places, & of immediately punishing any Irregularity in that
Respect.”333 In a separate letter from Colombo to Madras, Governor North wrote, it “will
be necessary for those of Manar to keep the Boats from passing out of the Boundaries
affixed to them.”334 He also recommended controlling the progression of the fishing
boats, to make sure that they swept the entire area of the pearling grounds and no oysters
went undetected. North wrote, “[I] recommend to you to see that they be obliged to Fish
in regular progression from one end to the other of the Banks, without being allowed to
go from place to place as their fancy may direct them, by which means a great deal of
profitable ground may be left totally unfished.”335
Formal contracts with the renter further stipulated that it was incumbent upon the
superintendent to mark the boundaries of the pearl fishery using the flag-and-buoy
system. During the 1828 pearl fishery at Tuticorin, Collector Drury of Tirunelveli wrote
to a certain Mr. Hughes, whom he contracted to command a vessel to patrol the pearl
banks. Drury told Hughes that there should be no changes or modifications to the
placement of the buoys: “You will be careful that no person approach or change the
Buoys upon the Banks excepting those sent under my express orders for that purpose, and
they must produce a written authority from me previous to the alteration of the position
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of the Buoys taking place.”336 Rules posted for public viewing at the temporary cutcherry
also contained information about the perimeter of the pearling grounds. According to a
list of rules and regulations at the 1800 pearl fishery at Tuticorin, “Proper Buoys will be
laid down to mark the space to be fished by the Boats daily and the Tindals will be held
answerable not to pass the Boundary prescribed no excuse will be admitted for a
disregard of this order but such as transgress it will invariably punished with severity.”337
By the 1820s and 1830s, British Ceylon took positive steps to replace the use of
flags and buoys made specially for the pearl fishery each season with a more permanent
system of marking the pearling grounds. Instead of wooden buoys and colored canvas
flags, British Ceylon officials recommended the placement of solid columns in the water.
The use of sea-markers was previously seen as untenable because the government did not
want to identify the location of rich pearl oyster beds to potential poachers, which would
have required year-round guard vessels. As Cordiner wrote in the first decade of the
nineteenth century, “The buoys are not allowed to continue permanent, as they would
either require a vessel constantly to guard them, or, if not watched, would leave the beds
exposed to the ravages of pirates.”338 Master attendant and fisheries superintendent of
British Ceylon James Steuart echo expressed similar concerns over three decades after
Cordiner: “The land seen from the Aripo pearl banks being at a considerable distance,
and having no striking objects upon it to answer as sea marks, it was considered that such
buoys as are used for marking sand banks and dangers, would be useful in defining the
relative position of the several beds of oysters: but such buoys would also point out
336
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oysters to plunderers, and further, they would not render distinguishing marks upon the
land unnecessary—for, if the buoys should break adrift, which they were likely to do in
the S.W. monsoon, it would be difficult to replace them with requisite correctness,
without the aid of distinct marks upon the land.”339 Concerns over permanent markers
leaving the pearl oyster banks open to the “ravages of pirates” subsided. Governor Barnes
in the mid-1820s decided to mark pearling zones with durable, permanent columns.
According to Steuart, “[Governor Barnes] resolved to consider the best sites for erecting
some columns to answer as sea marks,” and assembled a team to carry out the project,
which included Steuart and a captain in the Royal Staff corps. After the team identified
the best location of the markers, “plans and estimates were prepared, and the requisite
number of bricks ordered to be made of some clay found in the neighborhood of
Condatchy.”340 British officials continued to search for ways to improve the flag-andbuoy system through the nineteenth century. In 1862, George Vane, superintendent of the
pearl fishery for British Ceylon, recommended replacement of wooden buoys with less
“clumsy buoys” made of iron.341 However, according to one assessment, “Instead of neat,
serviceable iron buoys the Department entrusted with the duty of furnishing the buoys
sent up, for the inspection of November, 1862, a number of large, heavy clumsy, iron,
coal tar drums, with cables much too short for them and small anchors which could not
hold them.”342 However, “the bungholes not having been properly soldered,” the metal
buoys sank to the bottom of the ocean and the commanding officer “reverted to the old
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triangular wooden buoys.”343
Another way in which organizers of the pearl fishery monitored and regulated the
activities of boats and diving crews was through the placement of security guards on
board. Their primary duties were to detect and deter any frauds or thefts by the divers and
crew, such as palming or swallowing pearls, or secretly opening oysters and picking the
valuable product out of the animal’s shell with their fingers or slender instruments. As
naturalist Henry Le Beck wrote at the turn of the nineteenth century, “the boat owners
and purchasers often lose many of the best pearls while the [boat] is still returning from
the bank; for, as long as the animal is alive, and untouched, the shells are frequently open
near an inch; and if any of them contain a large pearl, it is easily discovered, and taken
out by means of a small piece of stiff grass, or bit of stick, without hurting the pearl fish.
In this practice they are extremely expert. Some of them were discovered whilst I was
there, and received their due punishment.”344 There were even reports of divers
swallowing pearls who, if caught, were given “strong emetics and purgatives” by force.
Robert Percival observed in the early nineteenth century, “Those fellows who are
employed to search among the fish also commit many depredations, and even swallow
the pearls to conceal them; when this is suspected, the plan followed by merchants is to
lock the fellows up, and give them strong emetics and purgatives, which have frequently
the effect of discovering the stolen goods.”345 Guardsmen were also employed by the
proprietor of the boat, a merchant who purchased the boat at auction or sub-leased it from
the principal renter. Cordiner wrote, for instance, that to the crew was “added a peon on
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the part of the renter, to guard against fraud.”346 Likewise, government officials placed a
servant in their employ on board to ensure that the day’s catch was accurately measured.
This was sometimes written into the contract of the renter. For instance, the contract
between the East India Company and Manali Chinniah Mudaliar, renter of the 1805 pearl
fishery at Tuticorin, stipulated “a servant belonging to the Superintendent shall be placed
in each Boat to take an account of the Number of Oysters fished in the Course of each
Day.”347
Outside the boats, armed vessels patrolled the waters. The primary duties of these
boats were to make sure that pearling fleets fished within demarcated boundaries,
checked passports and licenses, and looking for signs of pilfering. This was an expense
largely shouldered by the government proprietor. The Portuguese and Dutch had also
employed naval fleets to guard the banks and escort boats. For instance, Governor Joan
Gideon Loten (1752-1757) of Dutch Ceylon references the use of a guard vessel to
monitor the activities of boats during the pearl fishery in a report to his successor in 1757.
Governor Loten wrote, “Under [the] pretext of going out fishing, the Moors rob the pearl
banks and chank reefs which are situated in front of that place; and although a soldier is
stationed there as resident on behalf of the Company, whose duty it is to see whether the
vessels which are supposed to go out fishing return again in the evening, it would not be
unnatural to suppose that there was opportunity for fraud.”348 During the British period,
some officials stated that the commander of such naval fleets should ideally have been
346
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either a European officer or military contractor. For instance, Collector Hepburn wrote to
the Board with an update on the progress of organizing and preparing the 1810 pearl
fishery. He wrote about the need to post European officers to inspect passports and other
documents: “I request the sanction of the Board to employ a Vessel upon the Bank at the
rate of ten Star Pag. a day Commanded by a European to regulate the tie of Fishing
inspect the passes of the Several Boats & to prevent the Banks being destroyed by the
Divers examining over it at will before they have Cleared away all the Shells regularly
from the part at which they Commence this is a most necessary precaution & one that has
always been used.”349 A minor expenditure in comparison to the total value of the pearl
fishery, the hiring of guard vessels was an essential part of managing and protecting the
treasures (and persons) that lay in the water. In a report on the status of the pearl banks
submitted to the Board of Revenue in January 1807, Collector James Hepburn provided a
rationale for the placement of armed vessels. He wrote: “It has always been customary
for the Government when this Bank was fished to station a Vessel on it at its own
expense with some respectable person on board to regulate the Boats while fishing and to
alter the Buoys when required and to inspect the License of each Boat daily [although] it
may at first appear that these concerns belong more properly to the Renter, yet I am told
that it is so necessary for the security of Government to limit the Divers to a particular
part of the Bank and not to allow them to leave till it is compleatly [sic] cleaned of
Oysters, otherwise the whole could be ransacked in the course of a few days to a probable
serious loss and protest from the renter that he had been deceived in the report of the state
of the Banks.”350 The guard vessels were granted authority to not only patrol the pearling
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grounds but also to go upon the boats to enforce the rules. Collector Drury of Tirunelveli
wrote to one of his sub-officials supervising the 1828 pearl fishery at Tuticorin, “You are
to be particularly careful that no Boats attempt to come on the Banks where the Buoys are
placed without a Regular Pass under any Seal and signature, and in order to ascertain this
you are to examine every day the Pass of each Boat that comes upon the Bank should any
Boat be found fishing without a regular pass, you are immediately to seize and send it
and the person in it to me.”351 If boats ventured beyond the flags and buoys, a warning
shot straight from the barrel of a cannon was fired. According to a set of regulations
posted at the 1800 pearl fishery, “Those Donies which begin Fishing before the signal is
given, and those that continue to fish after the signal is shown for leaving off shall be
fired into from the Guard sloop or otherwise punished.”352 The guard vessels were also
used to signal the start and end of each day’s proceedings by firing a cannon. As the
collector of the 1822 pearl fishery wrote to one of his sub-officials, “The Divers do not
assemble in their Boats regularly on the firing of The Gun should be fired…and Tom
Tom sent in all directions to assemble the Divers who must embark and row out.”353 To
protect the pearl fishery, military supplies, and guns, cannons, and other types of heavy
artillery, were transported from various forts and garrisons to the location of the season’s
event. In 1822, for instance, Madras hired a bullock train to transport a gun from
Palamcottah to Tuticorin.354 One of the delivery men was even retained by the collector
because he needed additional servicemen at the pearl fishery: “I have thought it advisable
to detained [sic] the escort who accompanied the gun in order to avail myself of their
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service during the fishery for the protection of the valuable Property which will be
collected here under the hope that no inconvenience will result to your arrangements
from the measure, but should you particularly require the presence of the men in question
they will of course be sent at Palamcottah as you had previously detached a Guard hither
on the duty.”355 Additional supplies and provisions also arrived to the site of the pearl
fishery. Collector James Cotton of Tirunelveli, for instance, requested gunpowder along
with additional armed guards for the 1815 pearl fishery at Tiruchendur. The collector
wanted “a Barrel of Gun Powder, required for making signals at the Pearl Fishery and for
the use of the Tenant Sibbendy on guard over the several Treasures in the Tinnevelly
District.”356
Besides the physical toils of pearling, and when not dodging cannon balls, divers
also had to contend with natural enemies such as sharks, jellyfish, and venomous sea
snakes. Even though shark attacks were quite rare, both superintendent and merchantinvestors employed shark-charmers or “binders of sharks” (Tm. kadalkutti). From the
shore, as the boats went out to the pearling grounds each morning, shark-charmers recited
prayers and cast spells that protected divers and crewmembers from sea predators. An
early twentieth-century historian characterized the use of shark charmers as “one of the
most novel features” of the pearl fishery of Mannar.357 References to shark charmers are
found in some of the earliest written accounts of the pearl fishery. Marco Polo provides a
widely cited description: “In consequence of the gulf being infested with a kind of large
fish, which often prove destructive to the divers, the merchants take the precaution of
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being accompanied by certain enchanters belonging to a class of Brahmans, who, by
means of their diabolical art, have the power of constraining and stupefying these fish so
as to prevent them from doing mischief.”358 He added that the shark charmers
“discontinue the effects of the charm in the evening in order that dishonest persons who
might be inclined to take the opportunity of diving at night and stealing oysters, may be
deterred by the apprehension they feel of the unrestrained ravages of these animals.”359
Both Portuguese and Dutch continued to employ shark charmers though the numbers may
have been reduced.360 While often represented in contemporary travel accounts as a
curiosity, the shark-charmers were an integral part of the moral economy at the pearl
fishery, as well as the overall production and exchange of goods and services. Some
historians have claimed that the British governments did not interfere in this sphere of the
pearl fishery because of the policy of religious tolerance. George Kunz, author of an early
twentieth-century history of pearls and pearling, wrote “The British government, in its
policy of noninterference with the superstitions or semi-religious customs of the natives,
tolerated these seeming imposters, owing, probably, in a measure, to the fact that the
superstitious belief in their necessity was favorable to the preservation of the resources,
since it restricted poaching on the reefs.”361 Not only did the governments of Madras and
Ceylon employ shark-charmers but they also actively engaged in facilitating their
movement to the location of the fishery each season. In 1802, for example, Robert
Arbuthnot, Chief Secretary of the Ceylon Government, requested a pair a shark-charmers
from a district-level official in the northern part of the island “to assist at the ensuing
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inspection of the Pearl Banks of Arripo.”362
In addition to regular wages, the governments of Madras and Ceylon usually
allocated a share of the oysters to the shark-charmers. As colonial officer James Bennett
reported in his study of British Ceylon, “This shark charming trade is a very lucrative
one, because as it is not the mere government stipend that satisfies them, they insist upon
the additional daily tithe of ten or a dozen oysters from each boat, which is readily
paid.”363 Shark-charmers were paid in various forms, including coin, pearls, oysters, and
other valuables for their work. According to statements from the 1822 pearl fishery, the
“kudulcutties or conjurers” received ten oysters from each boat. The shark-charmers
received 5240 oysters from the divers’ share of oysters and 23,849 from the state’s share
of oysters for a total of 29,089.364 Mercantile elites also patronized shark-charmers. As
Percival wrote, “The conjurers reap here a rich harvest, for besides being paid by the
government, they get money and presents of all sorts from the black merchants and those
successful in fishing up the oysters.”365 Kundappah Chetti, for instance, during his rent
of the 1804 pearl fishery at Arippu, engaged some shark-charmers to protect and promote
the prosperity of his investment. According to the description of one eyewitness, “the
renter indulged in a number of superstitious ceremonies, with a view of promoting his
success; and allowed himself to be led away by soothsayers and magicians. In all his
conduct he discovered low cunning, duplicity, and mysteriousness, which characterized
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the higher ranks of Indians.”366 The British governments of Madras and Ceylon later
prohibited local merchants, divers, and boatmen from patronizing shark-charmers.
According to some reports, there were no shark charmers employed after 1859, and by
1885, the entire system was dissolved.367
The social make-up of the shark-charmers at the pearl fishery is not known, but
according to contemporary sources, shark-charmers were both “Hindu” and “Christian,”
which suggests that they worked across and between communities, transcending any
neatly defined religious and communal categories. As officer James Bennet of British
Ceylon wrote in the nineteenth century, “Although all the divers are not pagans,
superstition so predominates in almost everything connected with the native character,
that, however, incredible, it is an indisputable fact, that even the Roman Catholic priests
impose a similar farce upon the divers of their faith; for not one of them will descend
without a charm, composed of brief extracts from scripture fastened around the arm,
which he is told will protect him from danger.”368 Like frontier zones in other nineteenthcentury Asian contexts, the pearl fishery of Mannar was a site through which miracleworkers moved between elite and non-elite worlds and facilitated the extraction and
exploitation of natural resources.369 These miracle-workers used their position within the
subaltern and elite worlds to accrue material and spiritual wealth with an entrepreneurial
frame of mind. As Fellowes wrote, “As these conjurers are in high repute, and great faith
is placed in the potency of their incantations, they are liberally rewarded by the credulity
of their votaries; and, as accidents appear very seldom to happen, they readily manage to
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maintain their credit unimpaired.”370 Shark-charmers performed certain rites and rituals,
and tales about their magical prowess and accomplishments circulated through both
indigenous and non-indigenous knowledge networks. Fantastical stories of sharkcharmers appeared frequently in traveler’s accounts of the pearl fishery. Naturalist Henry
Le Beck, for instance, wrote about one such tale that he heard about during his visit to the
1797 pearl fishery at Arippu: “I was told, that, in one of the preceding fisheries, a diver
lost his leg by a shark; and when the head conjurers was called to an account for the
accident, he replied, that an old witch had just come from the coast, who from envy and
malice, had caused this disaster, by a counter-conjuration, which made fruitless his skill,
and of which he was informed too late; but he afterwards shewed [sic] his superiority, by
enchanting the poor sharks so effectually, that, though they appeared in the midst of the
divers, they were unable to open their mouths.”371
Despite such attention paid to shark-charmers, shark attacks were actually quite
rare. Even as Le Beck heard fanciful tales about “counter-conjurations” he witnessed “no
accident of this kind” at Arippu in 1797.372 By that same token, the documentary records
of early colonial Madras and Ceylon contain no known references to shark attacks at the
pearl fishery. This was also the case through the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, as numerous British officers involved with the management and scientific
study of the pearl fishery noted the absence of shark attacks.373 Some contemporary
observers attributed the low rate of shark attacks to an elaborate system of
communication between the crewmembers, in which “the divers immediately signal” if a
370
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shark was seen and “all the boats return instantly.”374 However, this system did not
always work as planned. Le Beck noticed: “A diver who trod upon a hammer oyster, and
was somewhat wounded, thought he was bit by a shark, consequently made the usual
signal, which caused many boats to return; for which mistake he was afterwards
punished.”375 Even though the threat of shark-attacks was remote, measures were put in
place time and again to protect those with vested interests in the pearl fishery from
potential dangers that lurked beneath. Renting proposals and contracts, for instance,
usually contained a clause that protected the renter from being charged for boats that
were unable to fish due to shark attacks. The lease of Chinniah Mudaliar for the 1805
pearl fishery at Tuticorin stipulated that if boats were not able to fish “owing to sharks
appearing or otherwise” then they “shall not be included in the Number of Boats charged
to [him].”376 In 1815, at least two of the nine applications for the rent that year contained
a similar clause.377
Sharks were more a phantom menace than a clear and present danger. While
stories about shark-attacks appear to be more apocryphal than authentic, it was another
sea-creature—the jellyfish—that presented a real and recurring threat to the safety of
divers. Jellyfish could bring a halt to a pearl fishery by preventing divers from plunging
below the water’s surface. As the superintendent of the 1800 pearl fishery at Tuticorin
wrote, “The duty of a diver is known at all times to be dangerous and that danger
increasing towards the latter End of the Months of April and the beginning of May when
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the Land winds bring the Blubbers towards the shore.”378 That year, an unfortunate bunch
of divers sustained very serious injuries from a jellyfish bloom; some even died. Two
native agents of the principal renter submitted a petition to the Collector of Ramnad, the
official superintending the pearl fishery that year. Rama Chetti and Venkatachalam Chetti
wrote, “the [Blubbers] has begin [sic] to be much frequent in tutching [sic] the Divers and
upon some dead, and many wounded, these reasons absolutely will fritten [sic] any man
to do their duty [properly].”379 In a dispatch from Tuticorin to the Board of Revenue at
Fort St. George, Collector Lushington confirmed that the sting of a jellyfish had killed at
least one diver, curtailing diver operations. He remarked, “the southerly winds blew with
such violence and the blubber which caused the death of one man collecting in such
quantity upon the bank that the Boats only attempted going out three days.”380 Other
times, however, government officials responded with indifference to the safety of divers,
believing that deaths by sharks and jellyfish was either an occupational hazard or just the
stuff of rumor. Lushington reported that jellyfish attack had become “excited in the minds
of the other divers.”381 Diving was “known at all times to be dangerous…when the Land
winds bring the Blubbers towards the shore,” and under such conditions, “nothing but the
fear of punishment will compell [sic] them to go on with it.”382
After a long day of fishing, the boats returned to shore in the late afternoon,
greeted by teams of porters to help unload the day’s catch, while merchants, jewelers,
boat-owners, and other people who had financial interests in the enterprise watched with
bated breath. Cordiner described the scene during his early nineteenth-century visit to
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Arippu: “Every boat comes to its own station, and the oysters are immediately put on the
shoulders of divers, and carried into the inclosures.”383 The oysters were divided into
separate piles, allocated to the different classes or groups that had claims to the product,
and further prepared for the washing and sorting and sorting process that followed. The
produce then shifted to enclosed structures called “kootoos,” which functioned as a place
to continue to wash, sort, and store oysters. These areas were usually marked off by
wooden fences and paved with an oyster-shell based plaster chunam that created a hard
surface on which to securely and efficiently wash oysters. British military official
Jonathan Forbes offered the following description based on his visit to the pearl fishery at
Arippu in 1828: “Those oysters which were not sold immediately on the arrival of the
boats were thrown into enclosures, which were paved, the floors having a slope towards a
shallow reservoir.”384 These structures became increasingly elaborate in British Ceylon
from the early 1820s. Workers left the oysters to rot in the hot tropical sun, which killed
the animal, and left nothing but the dried flesh of the organism and its shell. It was a
simple, cheap, and effective way to find pearls, though special instruments were also used
to clip or cut away pearls that formed affixed to inside of the shell. Individuals employed
to do the heavy lifting dug large pits in which there were piles oysters, or sometimes left
the produce in ballam, a long hallowed out canoe-like trough, and rinsed with brackish
water. At this point about “twelve to fifteen naked coolies are ranged along the sides of
the canoe,” who tilt the canoe on one side to let the water drain, a process repeated until
the water ran mostly clear.385 As European eyewitnesses often mentioned, the washing
and sorting process emitted a rancid smell, the mix of putrid oysters and contaminated
383
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seawater stretched the limits of even the most tolerant olfactory system. As
Subrahmanyam writes, “[visitors] were struck by the singular lack of hygiene and
overpowering stench of putrefaction that attended the process once the oysters had been
brought ashore and sold in heaps by auction.”386 Some claimed, though, that natives
involved in this process were used to such offensives smells, including Cordiner, who
wrote, “The labourers and overseers, however, from habit become insensible of the smell,
and prosecute their business, without expressing any disagreeable sensations.”387
It is at this stage in descriptions of the washing and sorting process that
contemporary eyewitnesses and a few scattered government documents, record the labor
of women and children, both groups that are otherwise absent from late eighteenthcentury and early nineteenth-century accounts. The silence is a curious one, considering
that some visitors to the pearl fishery witnessed “great numbers of women and children
resort to Condaatchy.”388 According to a report by James Steuart, for instance, “when all
the pearls that the women can see are extracted, it is again examined by little boys, whose
young eyes manage to collect the smallest seed pearls, which could not be seen by the
women.”389 Here, we see that the primary duties and responsibilities of women and
children at the pearl fishery were to sort through dried oysters shells and buckets of sand
looking for pearls, work for which they were paid paltry wages, though according to
some, they willingly did so “with the hope of accidental plunder.”390 According to these
accounts, women sat aligned in rows on the floor of simple huts, working five to a team,
picking at oysters shells and sifting sand, making sure that no pearls, even those of the
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smallest size and value, went unnoticed.391
The security apparatus that materialized at the pearl fishery each season continued
its work during the washing and sorting process because it afforded another opportunity,
according to government officials, for laborers to skim product. During his visit to the
pearl fishery in the early nineteenth-century, British traveler and writer Robert Percival
referred to “many who follow no other occupation but to procure their livelihood by the
arts of filching and thieving, at which they are exceedingly dexterous.”392 He also
referred to “rogues” who “flock thither from all parts of India, and no precaution is
sufficient to prevent their depredations. Their practice of picking out the pearls from the
oysters and secreting them is, in particular, carried to a great height, and it has been found
impossible to put a stop to it.”393 Jonathan Forbes, a British military officer, provided a
less than favorable description of the men who came to the pearl fishery when he visited
Arippu in 1828, casting the problem in a moral light. He wrote, “I believe their utmost
endeavours [sic] are ineffectual, as the moral character of most of those assembled at
Kondatchie, affords no check to their inclinations or interest they have been attracted,
many of them from distance, and at great risk and exertion, by avarice, and their only
principle and pursuit is how to make money, and if successful, the end to them would
sufficiently sanctify the means.”394 There was also a story recounted in several
contemporary travel accounts about a scheme concocted by some washers and sorters
employed by a boat-owner, though evidence of such an event are not found in the official
records of the East India Company and British colonial state of Ceylon. In this well-
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planned ruse, one of the washers and sorters created a distraction by conspicuously
stealing low-valued pearls. During the commotion, his accomplices disappeared a larger
bunch of more valuable pearls. However, when the man who caused the commotion was
not given a proportionate share of the stolen pearls, he reported the entire cabal to the
authorities. The entire group was physically punished and the pearls returned to the boatowner.395
Even as divers, crewmen, washers, sorters and other peons employed at the pearl
fishery were subject to various degrees of oversight and discipline they also found ways
to undercut both governmental and elite authority through protests, boycotts, and
petitioning. As we have seen above, a commonly cited reasons that divers refused to
work was the presence of predatory sea animals that threatened the physical safety of
divers. If an attack or near-attack occurred, divers would often refuse to plunge below the
water’s surface, grinding pearling operations to a halt. However, there were other means
of protest at the disposal of labor, some as simple as tardiness. Contemporary observes
viewed such occurrences as “an example of great procrastination, which marks their
character in all concerns.”396 Late arrivals to the pearl fishery by boats and divers
certainly delayed the start of pearling operations, but such acts were a way through which
divers communicated grievances to authorities. Even as British officials engaged in the
mobilization of labor ahead of the pearl fishery, the late arrival of divers and boatmen to
the camp frequently delayed the state of the event and deepened financial loss. The
commissioners of the 1799 pearl fishery at Arippu, for instance, wrote to Governor
North, “we found ourselves under the necessity of postponing the Sale of the Boats, from
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neither Boats or Divers having arrived,” adding that “this delay in the arrival of the boats
and Divers is by no means unexpected, as, during the three preceding Fisheries, they
never made their Appearance at Arripo before the end of the present month.”397 The
commissioners, in turn, wrote to the collector of Ramnad, “the non arrival [sic] of the
Divers from the Coast having already occasioned a very considerable loss of Revenue,”
reiterating the need of his “assistance and influence to induce that Class of people in
[Ramnad] to proceed” to Arippu.398 In another case, the superintendent of the 1822 pearl
fishery at Tuticorin wrote to his counterparts in Madurai and Thanjavur with a sense of
urgency about boats and divers, requesting that his colleague “adopt the most effectual
means for hastening their departure,” as the “most serious loss must result to Government
from the arrival of the Boats being longer protracted.”399
Besides late arrivals to the pearl fishery, divers also flat-out refused to work. For
example, a report from the 1815 pearl fishery at Tiruchendur described the event as a
total failure, so “equally unproductive” that the “Boat People and divers now refuse in a
body to go out again to fish.”400 Labor boycotts also exposed the government to
remissions claims from the principal renter, which further reduced the amount of revenue
derived from the event. The refusal of divers to conduct their work came into focus when
a renter submitted a petition for reimbursement. For example, the principal creditor to the
renter of the 1807 pearl fishery referred to labor boycotts in a petition addressed to the
Board of Revenue at Fort St. George. He wrote, “The Divers say that the Assistant
Collector forbids them not to fish the Oysters in any other place but the place he has
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pointed out in which they could find no Oysters nor Could they get any here equal to
their Labor and are running away from the work.”401
Epidemic cholera was another reason that divers refused to work and absconded
from camp. Death and disease at the pearl fishery had previously been attributed to
insalubrious conditions caused by rotting oysters. Dutch Governor Baron van Imhoff
addressed some of the “inconveniences and dangers” encountered at a pearl fishery in the
mid-eighteenth century, including “the risk of a hundred accidents arising from the
gathering together of such a crowd with only a handful of men to control them
and “the sickness and mortality both during and after the fishery owing to the stench of
the oysters.”402 British officers in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries were
also concerned with the stench of rotting oysters but had also become aware of the
devastating effects of cholera. When cholera swept through the pearl fishery compound it
caused great panic amongst attendees and postponed proceedings, especially when it
converged with other problems, such as the lack of sufficient specie and low yields of
pearls and oysters. As the superintendent of the 1822 pearl fishery wrote, “The
appearance of the spasmodic cholera would probably under any circumstances have
operated most detrimentally to the Interest of the Fishery but united with the deficient
produce it was sufficient to have put a stop to it altogether.” He also wrote about how
cholera “was particularly felt amongst the Divers whose exposure to the weather and
habits of intoxication predisposed them for the attack of the disease.”403 Over a twentyday period, cholera infected 239 people; 73 of these were divers and 49 of which died.404
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The disease not only incapacitated diving and laboring populations but it also led to them
abandoning the fishery altogether. In another case, the superintendent of the 1828 pearl
fishery removed boats and divers from active service because low oyster yields and
cholera outbreaks made the fishery unavailing. Collector Drury wrote from Punnaikayal
to the Board in April 1828, “The divers however had become exceedingly to work; their
share was of little or no value to them; and many boats had been withdrawn daily in
consequence of some of their crews having been carried off by Cholera. I therefore
directed their employment to be discontinued.”405 According to James Steuart, a cholera
outbreak at the 1829 pearl fishery “made fearful havoc of human life.” He added,
“[cholera morbus] made its appearance in the first instance among the parawa [sic]
coolies from Tuticoreen [sic], and soon spread from them to the boatmen and divers, and
put an end to the fishery some days before the tie prescribed by the contract with the
Renter.”406
Another contested area was money, wages, and compensation. In a report on the
examination of pearl banks in 1834, for example, the jati talaivan reported that the divers
and boat people refused to work over a wage dispute. He wrote, “The Boat men and
divers employed in the Examination refused to work at the rate of pay formerly allowed
to them.”407 Divers and laborers also faced heavy debts and other forms of financial
insecurity at the pearl fishery. While there was nothing on the level of slavery witnessed
at the Gulf and Caribbean pearling industries, a system of debts and obligations, which,
when coupled with an industry that was full of risk and speculation, basically guaranteed
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that divers came to the pearling grounds each season.408 Pearling was, of course, not the
only industry in which they plied their trade, as there was the year-long chank fishery, as
well as farming and small-time trading ventures, but the opportunities afforded by the
pearl fishery could be a boon to the welfare of divers and other laboring groups. Divers
received a share of the day’s catch, which they could or sell in the bazaar but prices
fluctuated and it was often difficult to unload oysters. This meant that divers were not
always able to meet basic needs and often resorted to borrowing money, sometimes at
usurious rates. As Cordiner wrote, “Notwithstanding the many exactions and drawbacks
imposed on the divers when the fishery proves successful, each man carries home at the
end of the season from forty to fifty pagodas to his family. But when oysters do not
abound on the banks, the reward for his toil is not more than sufficient to afford him daily
subsistence.”409 Collector Hepburn described the precarious circumstances of a diver’s
life at the 1807 pearl fishery at Tuticorin: “When the Diver returns to the shore at night
his share of Oysters is delivered to him and then he must dispose of before he can
purchase his supper, he usually lands at three, four or six o’clock and he must be in his
Boat again by eleven at night. In this space of time he has to sell his Oysters, to purchase,
dress and eat his meal; he cannot therefore spare much time in waiting for a Customer or
in haggling about the price. He is obliged to take what is offered to him and as the Buyers
are few he is at their mercy.”410 There was always the hope of finding a valuable pearl,
but this was the stuff of myth and legend. Le Beck wrote, “The many disappointments
usually experienced by the lower classes of men in particular, make them often repent of
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their coming here. They are often ruined, as they risk all they are worth to purchase pearl
shells; however, there are many instance of their making a fortune beyond all
expectations. A particular circumstance of this kind fell within my own observation: a
day labourer bought three oysters for a copper fanam (about the value of two-pence) and
was so fortunate as to find one of the largest pearls which the fishery produced this
season.”411
While contemporary observers seized on the image of a humble diver striking it
rich, his fortunes turning instantaneously with the discovery of a handsome pearl, the
financial lives of divers were patterned by the structures of the marketplace and
organization of the pearling industry. Reports from the 1815 pearl fishery at Tiruchendur,
for example, refer to the dip in the prices of oysters and pearls in the bazaar. Collector
Cotton of Tirunelveli wrote, “It did not however appear that the produce of these Oysters
was more valuable, than those of former days fishing, and although on the first return of
the Boats, the first day, their Prices rode in the Bazar, it soon fell again, and the Divers
and Boat people continued their Complaints, that by the sale of their shares, they were
unable to gain a subsistence.”412 Divers also fell into a debt trap, the victims of usurious
moneylenders, many of whom were also the principal boat renters. Ceylon civil servant
Anthony Bertolacci discussed the role of debt in the life and work of divers: “To these
divers the renters have been in the habit of making advances of money, and keeping them
in their debt. By so doing, and making them pay a high interest for the money thus
advanced, they derive considerable profits, and keep the divers in constant subjection; so
that, being masters of their services, they prevent competitors coming forward in the
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purchase of the chank farms and by these means obtain it upon lower terms when they
otherwise could procure it. The Ceylon divers have, therefore been discouraged from that
occupation; and those from the coast of the continent have continued to frequent Ceylon,
during certain seasons in the year, for the chank and pearl fisheries, and have regularly
returned to their villages with the little wealth they have accumulated.”413 The impact of
predatory moneylending and debt on divers came into frame during the 1815 pearl
fishery, when the Madras government received numerous petitions from Parava divers
and others that had fallen into debt, borrowing money at high-rates in the money market
at the pearl fishery. According to a petition submitted by the renter of the 1815 pearl
fishery, a certain Cuttah Narrainasawmy, the divers and other boat people suffered from
serious material setbacks, which he used as further evidence that the pearl fishery was a
calamitous affair, and grossly mismanaged by the superintendent: “They had sustained a
loss of 100 to 110 Pagodas each Tonies’s [sic] and had become Debtors and they were
also obliged to sell their cloths for their maintenance and for every stone they dived 3 or
4 times it was very difficult to get 1 or 2 Oysters in the Paar and their is not much oysters
neither good ones in the paar and the share that came to the divers did not exceed 20 or
40 Cash each man and that they are daily Starving without any advantage to them.” 414

Conclusion
While there is no pearl diving scene in the Disney movie version of Johan David Wyss’s
Swiss Family Robinson, the morality-cum-adventure tale about a family stranded on a
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fictional island in the eastern Indian Ocean contains a vignette about a hunt for pearls.415
During a solo canoe trip, the eldest son Fritz paddles through a narrow passage to enter a
small bay surrounded by low-lying grasslands and shrubs. The bright shimmer of oyster
shells at the bottom of the clear tropical waters attracts his attention. He dislodges a few
oysters from the rocky seabed, brings them to the shore, and leaves them to decompose in
the hot sun. Afterwards, Fritz remarks, “I felt some little round, hard stones, like peas,
under my knife; I took them out, and found them so brilliant, that I filled a little box with
them.” His father William examines the contents of the box and determines that the
stones were not only genuine but “oriental pearls of the greatest beauty.” William then
proceeds to talk about pearling operations across the world. From the types of boats and
diving techniques to the sorting process and the origins of pearls, the family learns about
the pearl fisheries of Ceylon, Arabia, Americas, Africa, and Scotland. But learning about
the pearl fisheries of the world does not satisfy their curiosity. Inspired by the events and
methods of pearl diving from across the globe, the Robinson family organizes their own
pearl diving adventure. This was no mere replication of the “traditional” pearling
techniques but instead contained lessons about ingenuity, self-reliance, and hard work.
For instance, William encourages each of his children to improve upon the traditional
practices of pearling: The father jury-rigs an instrument with rakes and hooks to drag
over the beds and the children fashion other tools such as nets to hold the catch. At the
newly-named Bay of Pearls, William, Fritz, and other members of the family haul up a
“large quantity of precious oysters.”
Tales from the Swiss Family Robinson about pearl diving in exotic (and
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fictionalized) islands in the Indian Ocean may be mapped onto wider discourses about
labor, nature, and empire operational during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries. Indeed, there are many parallels between the Robinson’s pearl fishery and the
methods through which the East India Company and British colonial state of Ceylon
governed the human and natural resources of the Gulf of Mannar. As the discussion
above illustrates, the pearl fishery in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries
was far from an ancient pastime. From armed vessels at sea and police forces on shore, to
tax inducements and technological innovations, government officials, as well as native
mercantile elites, exposed divers and other laboring populations at the pearl fishery to
various forms of oversight, surveillance, and even physical violence. Travel accounts and
archival sources from this period are chockfull of details about the strategies and tactics
put into practice by authorities to coerce and discipline labor.
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CHAPTER 2: THE GREAT PEARL FISHERY BAZAAR

MARKETS

“For a month or six weeks previous to the commencement of a fishery, numbers of boats
arrive from the ports of Hindostan [sic] and parts of Ceylon, filled with people,
merchandize, and supplies of all kinds…In an incredibly short time, this barren plain, and
the shore where the sea turtle basked in peace, are covered with huts and stalls for the
sale of all kinds of goods, both Indian and European. Thousands of new inhabitants of all
ages and both sexes, in every variety of costume crowd this busy scene.”416 This is how
British Ceylon officer James Steuart described the assembling of people and goods at the
location of the pearl fishery each season. Steuart, like numerous commentators from the
medieval period onward, provided a detailed eyewitness account of tens of thousands of
people flocking to the sandy shores of western Ceylon and southeastern India during the
weeks and months prior to the scheduled start of the event. Sixteenth-century Venetian
trader Caesar Frederick offered a description of the pearl fishery compound: “When the
time of this fishing draws near, they send very good Divers, that go to discover where the
greatest heaps of Oysters be under water, and right against that place where greatest store
of Oysters be, there they make or plant a village, with houses and a Bazaar, which stands
as long as the fishing time lasts, and it is furnished with all things necessary, and now and
then it is near unto places that are inhabited, and other times far off, according to the
place where they fish.”417 The volume and diversity of people, goods, and things that
416
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coursed through the sea lanes and roads of the region were striking to even the most
seasoned traveler.
In travel accounts and government documents from around the turn of the
nineteenth century, the settlement of the pearl fishery compound, as well as the economic
activities that took place in its streets and markets, appear by and large as unplanned
phenomena. British traveler and military officer Jonathan Forbes, for instance, “heard
that the concourse of people assembled at the fishery” was a great spectacle, and he was
excited to see how the people that gathered there “caused a large town, with long streets
and valuable shops, to start up as if by magic from the barren plain.”418 Likewise, British
Reverend James Cordiner drew an ironic contrast between the vibrancy and energy of the
bazaar and the desolate landscape of western Ceylon: “Retailers in every branch of
commerce, even from the remotest parts of India resort to Condaatchy during the season
of a pearl fishery, to catch what they can of the transient stream of wealth which flows
periodically through its barren plains.”419 Whereas these writings represent the camp and
marketplace at the pearl fishery as an awesome, ephemeral space that emerged on “barren
plains,” the reality of the situation was less magical. As historian Sanjay Subrahmanyam
writes, “The pearl fishery was never part of a ‘competitive economy’ in any sense: rather,
partly because of its geographic location and partly because of the prestigious nature of
the product itself, it had long been a privileged sphere for state interference.”420 Indeed,
the markets and marketplaces of the pearl fishery were actually social and economic
spaces treated by both Company and Crown officials as the targets of interference and

418

Forbes, Eleven Years in Ceylon, 1:249.
Cordiner, Descriptions of Ceylon, 2:74.
420
Subrahmanyam, “Noble Harvest from the Sea,” 136.
151
419

improvement. From marking out boundaries of the settlement and facilitating the
movement of goods, capital, and labor to policing and addressing grievances by
attendees, British officials on both sides of the Gulf of Mannar sought to organize,
control, and manage many aspects of the pearl fishery and its marketplace. To begin with,
for government officials in charge of managing the pearl fishery, the unfettered
movement of people and things was also problem. From security issues and the spread of
disease to unregulated commercial transactions, the pearl fishery compound in general
and the bazaar in particular conjured up myriad fears and concerns for British officials,
problems that they maintained could only be solved through governmental oversight
based on sound management principles. As Robert Percival wrote, “The revenue which
Governments derives from [the pearl fishery] is still however considerable, and may by
good management be increased.”421 Backed by the power of their respective monopolies,
and equipped with the languages of liberal political economy and utilitarianism, the
British governments of Madras and Ceylon drew upon a new set of tools designed to
shape the landscape upon which local economic actors searched for pearls and profit.
The bazaar has been the subject of many studies of colonial and postcolonial
South Asia.422 This chapter examines some of the mechanisms through which the
governments of Madras and Ceylon sought to manipulate and influence the markets and
marketplaces at the pearl fishery. Three interconnected sections draw attention to the
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mechanisms through which the governments of Madras and Ceylon intervened in a range
of social and economic activities that coalesced around the pearl fishery each season. The
first section— “A Fair on the Grandest Scale”—discusses the formation and organization
of the bazaar at the pearl fishery compound. The second section— “An Uncertain
Nature”—describes and analyzes various hazards and dangers that government officials
identified as threats to the productivity and profitability of the pearl fishery. The final
section— “Management Strategies”—offers a close reading of the different modes
through which Madras and Ceylon managed the pearl fishery. Government interference
in the economic spaces of the pearl fishery was ostensibly meant to attenuate the
financial, physical, and environmental hazards of the industry. Protecting the property
and interests of merchants that invested in the pearl fishery and others whose labor and
capital upon which the industry depended was not the work of benevolent states and
enlightened bureaucrats but integrated into projects of colonial statecraft, imperial
expansion, and governmental power. In doing so, Madras and Ceylon sought to not only
turn the seasonal event of the pearl fishery into a regular stream of revenue but also
reshape the conditions within which merchants, divers, boatmen, and others conducted
their work and business.
An examination of the mechanisms and techniques through which Madras and
Ceylon regulated the pearl fishery and its economy is a window on the nature of British
power over markets and societies in India and Sri Lanka during the late eighteenth and
early nineteenth centuries. Historian Sudipta Sen demonstrates in Empire of Free Trade
that, in the case of late eighteenth-century and early nineteenth-century eastern India,
markets and marketplaces were sites of competing authority. Two distinct visions of how
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markets and marketplaces functioned, one based on European principles of mercantilism
and free trade liberalism, the other based on Indian notions of substantive and relational
honors, titles, and gifts embedded in social and political systems, converged. “Yet
throughout the age of colonization,” Sen writes in Empire of Free Trade, “one of the
principal issues of conflict with local Indian rulers was not the economy of Indian
principalities but the actual sites for the display and passage of wealth, indices of social
and political eminence.”423 The friction caused by rivalries between Indian and European
political powers over the production and consumption of “prestige goods” like betel, salt,
and tobacco, Sen argues, moved colonial state formation forward in Bengal following the
Battle of Plassey in 1757. The English company-state, local polities, religious
institutions, and powerful commercial figures struggled to influence and control these
materially rich and symbolically important sectors of the Indian economy. Drawing on
policy reports and documents produced by the Bengal government, Sen argues that the
administrative discourse of the Company Raj treated marketplaces merely as sites of
economic transactions, which effectively ignored the complex web of social and cultural
functions that such marketplaces served. District-level records produced by British
Ceylon and the Company Raj concerning the pearl fisheries offer further insight into
company-state and colonial state attitudes towards markets and marketplaces. The
pearling industry was also a site of contested authorities, as the Dutch and British
company-states encountered competing claims of local polities such as Arcot and
Ramnad, as well as religious institutions such as regional temples and shrines.424
However, in the case of the pearl fisheries, for the East India Company (and, later, British
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Ceylon), which had more or less vanquished their European, Indian, and Sri Lankan
rivals by the early nineteenth century, the bazaar of the pearl fishery was less a site of
contested authority and became more a channel through which governmental power
flowed.

Figure 6. “Boats Returning from the Ceylon Pearl Banks in March 1828.” Hippolyte Silvaf, Watercolor on
Wood (Natural History Museum, London). Rohan Pethiyagoda, Pearls, Spices, and Green Gold: An
Illustrated History of Biodiversity Exploration in Sri Lanka (Colombo: WHT Publications, 2007).

A Fair on the Grandest Scale
The pearl fishery usually commenced between late February and early April during a
break in the monsoon winds that one English officer referred to as the “lull.” The
collector of Tirunelveli wrote to the Board as he prepared for the 1828 pearl fishery, “The
season for fishing, the Banks is necessarily limited to the kind of Lull that usually takes
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place, both in winds and Currents, between the two Monsoons.” 425 From the time
Madras and Colombo published the dates of the pearl fishery to the scheduled start date
of the pearling season, tens of thousands of people from the island and mainland
congregated at the site of the event. British traveler Robert Percival remarked on the
“several thousands of people of different colors, countries, casts [sic], and occupations”
that came to the pearl fishery. The compound, he continued, had “vast numbers of small
tents and huts erected on the shore” and “the bazar or market before each.”426 British
Ceylon officer James Bennett offered a similar description: “About the middle of
January, the boats begin to assemble; between which period and the commencement of
the fishery, the medley of adventurers will have constructed their various dwellings, with
areka or bamboo poles, and the fronds of the talipat palmyra, and coco-nut palms, paddee
straw, and colored cotton cloths, in endless variety, and in tolerable order, upon the arid
sands of Aripo.”427 Descriptions of the town and bazaar also found their way into
contemporary newspaper accounts. In 1814, a correspondent for the Ceylon Government
Gazette, reported on “a most interesting scene—a Town, containing Twenty Thousand
People, collected from all parts of India, has risen in the course of few days on 2 spots of
Ground, which a short while before the commencement of the Fishery, exhibited not a
single Hut.”428 In the literary realm, Harriet Martineau evocatively characterized the pearl
fishery camp as “a mushroom city.”429 William Millburn, the author of a popular early
nineteenth-century handbook on the commercial products of the East, Oriental
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Commerce (1813), described the transformation of the area: “About three miles distant
from Aripo, where in general nothing is to be seen but a few miserable huts, and a sandy
desert; but during the period of the pearl fishery, it braches out into a populous town,
several streets of which extend upwards of a mile in length. The scene altogether
resembles a crowded fair on the grandest scale.”430 These characterizations of the pearl
fishery compound as a “temporary” village and a “crowded fair on the grandest scale”
produced by travelers, administrators, novelist, and scholars migrated further into the
work of professional historians. For instance, C. R. de Silva, historian of Portuguese
Ceylon, wrote: “In the month before the fishing was due to be held a series of temporary
buildings was constructed on the sea-shore near the oyster-beds. These buildings served
as storehouses, shops, and dwellings.”431 Likewise, historian Sanjay Subrahmanyam
described it as a “mobile improvised town,” a characterization that echoes writers from
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, such as Edgar Thurston, who, in his 1890
monograph on pearls and chanks of southern India and Ceylon, referred to the pearl
fishery at Tuticorin as a “temporary improvised village.”432
The settlement and formation of the pearl fishery bazaar activated capital and
commodity networks that connected the marketplace of the pearl fishery with “marine
goods entrepôt,” from large capital cities like Madras and Colombo to regional port
towns such as Tuticorin and Kilakkarai.433 Pearls sourced from the Gulf of Mannar
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traveled far and wide, from London to Shanghai. As British military officer Jonathan
Forbes wrote in Eleven Years in Ceylon, “large pearls appeared to me to sell at prices
nearly as high as what they could be purchased for in Britain; trash, or seed pearls, as the
very small ones are called, sold much higher; and it was understood that this kind was
principally intended for the Chinese market.”434 The Portuguese and Dutch had procured
pearls for their own commercial purposes. For instance, Governor Thomas van Rhee of
Dutch Ceylon reported in 1697 to his successor, Gerrit de Heere, that VOC
commissioners had “orders to purchase pearls for the Fatherland to the amount of f.
60,000 or f. 80,000 and 50 lb. for the Chinese merchants.”435 In the late eighteenth and
early nineteenth centuries, however, British Ceylon and the East India Company had little
interest in the pearl trade per se. The extraction of revenue through renting and amani
was a central concern for the Company and Crown governments, but the buying and
selling of pearls was left in the hands of a heterogeneous group of merchants who
assembled at the pearl fishery marketplace each season, as well as metropolitan gem
markets such as Madras and Colombo. By the end of the eighteenth century, Madras had
become the commercial and financial center of the pearl trade in south India,
overshadowing smaller “indigenous” coastal entrepôts, such as Tuticorin and
Kayalpatnam as the primary centers for buying and selling precious stones. Whereas
large Indian ports such as Surat and Masulipatnam belonged to states that relied on land
tax for revenue, colonial port cities like Madras and Bombay were not dependent on land
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revenues to the same degree, and instead relied on more diverse sources of capital. These
places attracted merchants and other members of commercial society and attracted Indian
merchants, bankers, artisans, and laborers, as well as European traders and entrepreneurs.
While Madras became the financial and commercial capital of the pearl trade with the
rise of the British East India Company, a short period of time each season, the pearl
fishery became a temporary urban center that attracted people, goods, and capital, which
connected it with other nodes in the pearl trade network.
Descriptions of the physical characteristics and spatial layout of the pearl fishery
compound are found in late eighteenth and early nineteenth century accounts. In a report
on the pearl fishery addressed to the government of British Ceylon, superintendent James
Steuart provided a description of the physical geography of the marketplace and its
environs on the western coast of the island: “The small solitary street of native houses at
the place where the oyster are landed, is commonly known by the name of Condatchy.
But Condatchy properly so called, is a village two miles from the sea, at the head of the
bay which bears its name. It is on the northern shore of this bay that the oysters are
landed at the village of Silāwatorre, which in the Tamil language means fish market or
landing place of the fishery.”436 He even referred to the bazaar as “Billingsgate,” the
famous fish market in London.437 Likewise, Jonathan Forbes wrote about the layout of
the pearl fishery compound during his visit to the 1828 pearl fishery at Arippu,
coincidentally one of the pearl fisheries at which Steuart had served as superintendent:
“Having heard that the concourse of people assembled at the fishery, caused a large town,
with long streets and valuable shops, to start up as if by magic from the barren plain, my
436
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disappointment was great to find that natives sitting near, or sleeping under two or three
palmyra leaves, supported on one side to the height of three feet, procured for such a
shelter the appellation of a house, and that lines of the same were miscalled streets.”438
Besides the physical layout, contemporary observers also took note of the numerous
types of residents of the camp, which included merchants, traders and skilled craftsmen
from different areas of commerce, as well as acrobats, jugglers, and various mendicanttypes. Many of the people at the pearl fishery were directly preoccupied with the pearl
trade. In addition to merchants who rented and sub-rented boats, specialist gem traders
and jewelers gathered in the bazar to work their craft. Robert Percival, for instance,
witnessed such a scene during his visit to the pearl fishery in the early nineteenth century.
He wrote, “the vast number of jewelers, brokers, merchants, of all colours and
descriptions, both native and foreigners, who are occupied in some way or other with the
pearls, some separating and assorting them, others weighing them and ascertainment their
number and value, while others are hawking them about, or drilling and boring them for
future use: all of these circumstances tend to impress the mind with the value and
importance of that object which can itself create this scene.”439 The eyes of European
observers were also drawn to the diversity of religious practices and figures. Naturalist
Henry Le Beck, for example, wrote at length about the “Hindu monks, fakirs, beggars,
and the like” and how “vagabonds of every description” are found in the vast crowd.440
Likewise, Fellowes referred to the remarkable array of people that came to the pearl
fishery: “During the season of the fishery, the bay of Condatchy exhibits a most
interesting spectacle. At that period this barren spot displayed a variegated assemblage of
438
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persons of different nations, religion, and manner, and from the most remote regions. It
exhibits the commercial bustle of a great mart, and all the combined amusement of a fair
on the largest scale. Here are artificers and traders of every description, mingled with
jugglers, tumblers, female dancers, mendicants, sharpers, and pilferers of every class,
form, and hue.”441 These descriptions also included references to such notorious practices
at hook-swinging, ritualized piercings, and other forms of penance practices in Tamil
communities in India, Sri Lanka, and Southeast Asia that fascinated (and shocked)
colonial administrators, missionaries, scholars, and travelers.442
However, the pearl fishery compound did not spontaneously emerge but was
actually embedded in the conventions of colonial infrastructure projects, development
regimes, and governmental management. These works included the construction of
warehouses for storing oysters, clearing the grounds of discarded shells, erecting
permanent buildings, connecting the pearl fishery via roads, and development safe and
secure water infrastructure. The Dutch VOC had also emphasized the importance of
providing certain provisions to the assembled population and improving the physical
infrastructure of the pearl fishery. For example, Hendrick Zwaardecroon, Commander of
Jaffnapatnam, wrote in 1697, “The chief points to be considered when a pearl fishery has
been authorized are the lodgings for the Commissioners appointed in Colombo; by
inclosure [sic] of the tanks in Mantotte with banks for obtaining good drinking water; the
supply of poultry, butter, oil, rice, sheep, cattle, etc., for provisions.”443 British
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administrators elaborated some of these efforts and brought a new perspective to the task.
As Governor North of Ceylon wrote to the Court of Directors in London shortly before
the transfer of power from Company to Crown, “the works completed by the Civil
Architect of the Establishment, of whose Officer, I informed your Honorable Court in my
last dispatch, are confined to the Banksaul for the ensuring Fishery at Arippo, which will
be extended & regulated for all future ones.”444 These projects, according to North, would
“secure the property of the speculators” and “preserve the assembled population from the
diseases inseparable from the stench of the place when accompanied with the filth of
crowded & unprepared habitations.”445 Officers such as Governor North supposed that
the establishment of orderly and sanitary camps would not only reduce the risk of disease
but also create a safe economic zone in which people attending the pearl fishery could
conduct business. James Cordiner observed with great pleasure the benefits of an orderly
camp a few years after North sent his report to London: “The fishery of 1804 was
conducted with more uniform regularity, and less confusion, than any other which
previously took place under the British administration. The disputes amongst the natives
were less frequent, and less litigious than usual. There was no riot; and no accident
happened by fire.”446
A major undertaking, much of the planning and work to construct the pearl
fishery compound was done under the auspices of the government that hosted the event,
the responsibility for which usually devolved to the local superintendent and his agents.
Reflecting an interest in bolstering the profitability of the fisheries, the governments of
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Madras and Ceylon usually appointed a commissioner to oversee the actual construction
of the camp. His tasks included clearing the grounds of discarded oyster shells from the
previous fishery, the construction of “banksalls” or thatched-roof warehouses and
godowns for storing produce, marking off areas for the washing and boiling of oysters,
erecting shelters for the renter and his entourage, digging spring wells, and preparing an
area where all others in attendance could set up temporary dwellings. The construction of
the camp and its supporting infrastructure was an expense almost entirely shouldered by
the government, an arrangement that was also usually written into the contract of the
renter. For example, the proposal of Chinniah Mudaliar for the 1805 pearl fishery at
Tuticorin contained a clause that stipulated a “Sufficient number of Banksalls, Dwelling
Huts, Tarpaulins, wells or Springs to be digged [sic] and sufficient Number of Sepoys
Peons etc. should be supplyed [sic] by the Superintendent of the Pearl Fishery.”447 The
Madras and Ceylon governments were more or less happy to cover these expenses
because the potential revenue gained from the fishery far exceeded the cost of organizing
one. Expenses, though, were not insignificant factors. For instance, Governor North
wrote to the Court of Directors in London, “The expences [sic] of preparation will be
trifling, and altho’ they are borne immediately by your finances, they are not to be
compared to the waste of Labour in the Construction of Houses, the Collection of
Provisions and the Transport of Persons which must attend the concourse of the
Multitude and which however incurred, must ultimately be deducted from your Profits on
the property you dispose of.”448 Collector James Hepburn of Tirunelveli referred to the
cost of erecting warehouses and a shelter for the renter and his retinue in a report on the
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state of the pearl fishery at Tuticorin to the Board of Revenue at Fort St. George in
January 1807. He wrote, “There is also a considerable expense incurred in erecting the
Enclosure for preserving the Oysters Sheds Banksals [sic] etc. for the accommodation of
the Renter which it is usual to do at the expense of Government and a pretty large
contingent [Sibbendy] is also required during the continuance of the Fishery.”449 He also
reassured the Board “that every thing shall be conducted in the most economical manner
possible.”450
The attending officers hired people to build temporary enclosures for washing,
boiling, sorting, and storing pearls and oysters. The area marked off as a square that was
populated by huts used to store oysters called a kottu. As Le Beck wrote, “The owners of
the boats sometimes sell their oysters, and at other times open them on their own account.
In the latter case, som [sic] put them on mats in a square, surrounded with a fence; others
dig holes of almost a foot deep, and throw them in till the animal dies; after which they
open the shells, and take out the pearls with more ease.”451 James Cordiner also offered a
description. He wrote: “In some of the palisades, within which the oysters are deposited,
there are four square spaces paved and inclosed [sic] by brick walls about a foot in
height, for the better preservation of the pearls. These compartments communicated by
four uncovered drains of gradual descent, with a small bath in the centre of the inclosure
[sic], so that whatever pearls are swept away by accidental rains, or the washing of
oysters, are carried into this cistern, and none can be lost.”452 At the close of the fishery,
the government or principal renter then farmed out the right to sift through the sands in
449
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search of pearls that may have escaped this elaborate set-up. Dutch Governor Jan
Schreuder mentions this practice in a report from March 1762 to his successor, Jan Baron
van Eck: “The Company farms their collections yearly, or rather the permission to sift
them out along the shore; and during my government we obtained [pounds of pearls]
although during the first two years no rent was possible owing to the lack of anyone who
wished to obtain it. I must however observe that by waiting for two years no higher rent
could be expected, as owing to the play of the waves the shore is almost daily washed
level.”453 Collector James Hepburn of Tirunelveli referred to this practice when he wrote
to the Board during his preparations for the 1810 pearl fishery: “At Tutacoryn it has
always been Considered a privilege of the renter to dispose of the right of Selling the
Sand of the Compound were [sic] his Oysters were washed for his own advantage and it
has always been Sold for a Considerable Sum.”454 Likewise, Cordiner wrote about the
government farming out “the privilege of examining and sifting this soil” because pearls
“of considerable size and value, escape attention, and elude the diligence of search.”455
Ceylon civil servant Anthony Bertolacci reported that the government charged
remarkably high rates for this privilege: “If the fishery has been successful, the spot
where the contents of each boat have been deposited will sell for 120 or 130 Porto-Novo
pagodas, about 5 or 600 rix-dollars. After these six weeks, the privilege of further search
belongs to Government; and the whole farm, for the first six months following, will sell,
sometimes, for 7 or 8,000 rix-dollars.”456

453

Schreuder, Memoir, 83.
TNA, TDR, Vol. 3586, 23-4 (19 January 1810).
455
Cordiner, Description of Ceylon, 2:61.
456
Bertolacci, Interests of Ceylon, 258-9.
454

165

Besides the buying and selling of oysters and pearls, there were other economic
activities in the marketplace, as the bazaar attracted textile merchants, potters, grain
sellers and other tradesmen and craftsmen. Dutch VOC officers grumbled about how
economic activity in the region came to a grinding halt during the pearling season.
Common household and consumer products such as cloth and cookware were available
along with basic foodstuffs like rice and vegetables. British military official Jonathan
Forbes, for instance, observed during his visit to the 1828 pearl fishery at Arippu, “As to
the valuables exposed for sale, during the week I remained, they consisted of a few
coarse cloths, and the commonest earthenware vessels in which the natives cook their
rice.”457 The pearl fishery stimulated other commercial activities beyond the bazaar. For
small-time purveyors, the sale of cookware or local seafood could even be parlayed into
oyster speculation. For instance, fishermen from the nearby coastal areas flocked to the
pearl fishery compound to sell various sorts of seafood to people that populated the camp.
Cordiner, for instance, described an exchange he had with local fishmongers: “A fleet of
Negombo fishing boats surrounded the vessel, these being the only conveyances at that
time ready to assist us: and they had come on speculation, to gain what they could by
catching fish, and selling them for the refreshment of the adventurers at the pearl
market.”458 Besides seafood, which could be expensive depending on the season, the
superintendent and other officials were also needed to make sure that a sufficient supply
of grain and other foodstuffs were available for sale in the marketplace, as famine was a
clear and present threat during the pearling season. As Governor North wrote to the
Governor General of Madras ahead of the 1804 pearl fishery at Arippu, “May I take the
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liberty of requesting your Lordship in Council, to allow the exportation of Grain from
your Southern Provinces to Condatchy in Donies during the ensuing Pearl Fishery, in
case circumstances should render it advisable to prohibit its General exportation.” He
added: “The daily consumption of that Population assembled of that place has hitherto
been amply supplied from the opposite Coast, and as their numbers will probably be very
great a want of food would be most a dreadful Calamity.”459
Government officials laid out the camp and enlisted people to build structures
such as the warehouses and washing stations, but there were many other types of
buildings and settlement patterns that fell outside the purview of the government. These
included huts of people attending the fishery that did not have a direct relationship with
the government proprietor, individuals unlike the principal renter and his retinue. Those
who did not receive special privileges from the government instead were left to carry
their own building supplies to the site of the pearl fishery. Robert Fellowes, for instance,
wrote, “During their stay they reside in temporary huts formed of sticks, mat, pieces of
cloth, rice-straw, and Palmyra leaves. The huts are ranged in regular streets, and contain
thousands of busy and animated inhabitants.”460 Likewise, Cordiner referred to people
transporting construction materials to build temporary shelters. He wrote, “Every man
carries with him the materials necessary for this purpose, which consists of sticks, mats,
pieces of cotton cloth of various colours, rice-straw, cocoa-nut, and palmyra leaves: he
raises his simple shed almost as easily and as speedily as he could pitch a tent.”461 The
erection of rude structures, however, became increasingly unacceptable to government
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officials during the course of the nineteenth century as concerns over migration, disease,
and security at the pearl fishery mounted. By improving the infrastructure of the pearl
fishery, colonial officials intended to fix the event to particular spots instead of shifting
its location from season to season.462 Madras and Colombo took many approaches to
achieving this goal. Some proposed permanently settling certain populations to Arippu,
which presumably reduced the number of bodies moving between the island and
mainland during the pearling season. There were also plans to improve existing structures
at various locations of the pearl fishery. For example, British officials took notice of a
small home near the site of the pearl fishery that once belonged to the Dutch VOC chief
resident at Tuticorin. For instance, Collector Hepburn of Tirunelveli wrote to the Board
requesting permission for one of his subordinates to use the house during the 1807 pearl
fishery at Tuticorin. Even though the house was in a “very bad state of repair” and
“striped [sic] of its doors and Windows,” Hepburn wanted Fort St. George to grant
Company servants working at Tuticorin permission to live in the house during the
pearling season.463
But perhaps the most elaborate and ostentatious display of efforts by the British
governments to develop the pearl fishery was undertaken by Governor North of Ceylon
in the first decade of the nineteenth century. North designed and constructed a rather
impressive structure that sat overlooking the pearling grounds at Arippu, providing the
highest-ranking official on the island with a view of the proceedings.464 Conceived as a
residence for the governor and his retinue during the pearling season, construction on the
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building finished by 1804, and the Governor North took up residence there soon after. It
became known simply as “The Doric,” a name derived from the classical design of its
exterior columns. In 1802, Governor North happily reported to London, “A Lodge for the
Residence of the Governour [sic], or the Commissioners of the Pearl Fishery near Arripo,
[is] nearly Finished.” There were other infrastructure projects undertaken in conjunction
with, and in the vicinity of, the Doric such as the “Brick Pavements & Drains for the
Pearl Oysters at Kandatchey.”465 Governor North provided London with periodic
construction reports, though usually these included information on how the project was
over time and over budget. For example, in one dispatch to London, Governor North
wrote, “The Small House at Arripo is nearly finished, and a beautiful Building, but,
owing to the unfavourable Circumstances of the Distance of Materials, the Awkwardness
of the Natives employed in its Construction, and the Illness which prevailed among
Them, during the greater Part of the Term of their Labour, the Expence has exceeded the
Estimate in a Triple Proportion.”466 The construction of the Doric and expansion of
government oversight of the pearling industry in the first decade of the nineteenth century
were not coincidental. The Doric represented the highest ideal of the pearl fishery as a
government-regulated space and enterprise. As James Bennett wrote, “[Upon the arid
sands of Aripo] stands the beautiful Doric mansion, built by Governor North. This is
occupied by the supervisor (who is vested with full magisterial powers) and his
friends.”467
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Figure 7. “The Governor's House at Aripo.” James Cordiner, A Description of Ceylon: Containing an
Account of the Country, Inhabitants, and Natural Productions (London: Longman, Hurst, Rees, and Orme,
1807).

Many travelers and friends of the governors who occupied the building expressed
wonder at the majesty of the Doric. For example, George Annesley wrote a vivid and
detailed description of his stay at the house while a guest of governor: “It is certainly a
pretty piece of Doric architecture, and, I believe, very pure. The outside is entirely
covered with a brilliant white chunam, which has all the effect of marble. The oyster
shells have been burnt to form it, and certainly answer better than any thing else.”468
However, Annesley was less dazzled by the modest interior of the building and judged
North’s choice of locale. He wrote, “The interior is inconvenient, and small. I am
surprised that Mr. North did not prefer St. Sebastian to this place, where he can reside for
a few weeks only in the year. He would also there have had the benefit of beautiful
468

Annesley, Voyages and Travels in India, 1:335.
170

scenery, and lofty shady trees; whilst here nothing can be more unsightly than the country
around, which is a perfect flat, sandy, and without a tree.”469 He continued: “A garden,
they say, is to be formed; but for years nothing but the ocean, and as dreary a waste on
land, will be visible from the windows.”470 Traveler Jonathan Forbes gave the Doric a far
less glowing review: “A very large house, built by Governor North, at a great expense, is
called the Doric, from the style of its architecture, which may be correct, but its plan and
situation are so ill suited to the place, as to make it appear one of the most prominent
features of the ugliest landscape I had seen in Ceylon.”471
Yet the power to survey and watch over the proceedings of the pearl fishery was
clearly a priority for Governor North when he selected the location of his residence.
Cordiner noticed the strategic value and appeal of the buildings design in his account of
Ceylon: “At one end of it a winding staircase is cut off, leading up to the terraced too,
from which there is a most extensive prospect of the level country in three directions, and
in the fourth the open sea, and a fine view of the line of boats, when they are returning
from the banks of oysters.”472 Cordiner added, “The house is pleasantly situate on the
elevated bank, about a stone’s cast from the sea; and the apartments are delightfully cool,
being completely surrounded by Venetian doors, or windows reaching to the floor, and
constantly fanned by a regular succession of land and sea breezes.”473 By the midnineteenth century, the Doric had even become a regular feature of writings on Ceylon.
For instance, an item in the Ceylon Gazetteer (1843) included a description of the
building: “On an elevated bank near the sea shore stands a large house erected by the late
469
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Earl Guilford, commonly called the Doric, from the front being of that order of
architecture. During the period of the pearl fishery off Condachy, it is the residence of the
Governor, if he visits the place.”474 The pearl fishery might even have been something of
a leisure activity for English officers and their families. An item in the Ceylon
Government Gazette, for example, noted that “Governor [Brownrigg] and Mrs.
Brownrigg, Sir Alexander & Lady Johnston and a large Party went out on the 15th to see
the Diving.”475
By the 1830s, the Doric no longer served its intended purpose and officials turned
their attention to improving the functioning of markets and marketplaces at the pearl
fishery in other ways. The government of British Ceylon in particular continued to
improve the infrastructure of the pearl fishery compound by building permanent
structures, such as warehouses, army barracks, officers’ quarters, and administrative
buildings. James Steuart wrote: “Since the year 1834, some comfortable barracks for the
accommodation of the Troops, who attend the fisheries as guards over the property, have
been built with brick at a convenient distance from the place where the oysters are landed
from the Aripo banks. There has also been erected a small custom house, and had the
fisheries continued successful, it was intended to have a Court House for the District
Judge, and an Office or Cutcherry for the Government Agent built in a permanent
manner. Formerly all these erections were of a temporary nature, consisting of bungalows
formed of sticks, Palmyra leaves, and mats—the only government building being that
which from the style of its architecture, is called the Doric.”476 The Doric, once a shining
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example of governmental power and surveillance had fallen into a state of disrepair only
a few short decades after its construction, quickly turning from a symbol of colonial state
power into a historical relic. It no longer served as a grand residence but instead
functioned as sea marker and curious ruin. In the late nineteenth century, one of the
superintendents of the pearl fishery for British Ceylon casually remarked, “The old Doric
building, which has now almost disappeared, was built, I believe, to serve as a mark as
well as a residence.”477 By the early twentieth century, marine biologist W. A. Herdman
wrote, “At Aripu, we visited the ruins of the ‘Doric,’ a classic structure often referred to
in the reports of the pearl fisheries, and which we had been using as a landmark.”478

An Uncertain Nature: Hazard, Security, and Protection
The Company Raj and British Ceylon employed different strategies to ensure that the
pearl fishery was a safe and profitable venture but a host of factors had the potential to
undermine the health and vitality of the industry. There were many interruptions to
activities at the pearl fishery that did not cause too much commotion or worry amongst
parties with vested interests in the enterprise. For instance, religious festivals such as
Ramadan, Pongal, and Good Friday often coincided with the scheduled dates of the pearl
fishery. Attended mostly by divers, boatmen, and other members of laboring classes,
religious and cultural events did cause delays, but they were usually marked off in
advance of the pearling season by government officials and the renters were reassured
that such special religious holidays would not impinge upon his lease. There were weekly
477
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church services at nearby chapels in Tuticorin and Arippu for the Christian workforce.
Sunday was an observed holiday at the pearl fishery, a practice that reached back to the
early Portuguese period that was also recognized by the Dutch. The renter was not
obligated to pay for these days. This “customary” practice was also written into the
contract between the renter and government proprietor as a way to minimize conflict and
disagreement between parties. For instance, the contract between Gregory Baboom, the
renter of the 1800 pearl fishery at Tuticorin, and Madras contained the following clause:
“Whereas it has been customary under the Dutch Government to grant the Divers a
respite from their labours Sunday the Sundays within the above [period] of the thirty days
of my rent but in consideration of my granting the divers the same indulgence as they
have heretofore enjoyed; the Right Hon’ble [Lordship in] Council must consent that four
days shall be added to the above mentioned period of my rent.”479 As seen in the previous
chapter, however, authorities did not always respect scheduled recesses from pearling, as
there are some documented episodes in which the divers and boatmen were forced by
physical violence and intimidation to work on Sundays. According to a petition submitted
by Dratcha Annasami Chetti, the renter of the 1807 pearl fishery at Tuticorin, “There was
no custom of carrying on the Fishery on Sundays anywhere, they have accordingly one
Sunday only but the Boat People were beat and forced to fish on all Sundays
afterwards.”480
Colonial administrators did not have control over gods and winds but they did
identify areas that threatened the profitability of the pearl fishery and placed themselves
in the role of mitigating such factors. Security and safety fears brought on by seasonal
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migration, epidemic outbreaks, predatory animals, fragile marine environments, theft, and
smuggling increased the risk of investing in a pearl fishery to local merchants. Concerns
over disease at the pearl fishery, as well as the uncontrolled migration of people, mapped
onto wider concerns in early colonial India and Sri Lanka about sanitation, health, and
security at crossroad institutions like bazaars, army barracks, and religious
pilgrimages.481 The pearl fisheries provided timely opportunities for Madras and
Colombo to increase the British military and naval presence in the region. The
deployment of military forces during the pearling season can also be found in sources
from the Portuguese and Dutch eras and were often embroiled in local political
rivalries.482 Likewise, when English East India Company was actively engaged in combat
during the Anglo-French Wars in the late eighteenth century, the opportunity to deploy
military and naval forces to Mannar during the pearl fishery reflected wider geo-military
and strategic concerns. George Turnour, a military-minded officer and one-time
superintendent of the pearl fishery, warned Governor North in November 1798 about the
vulnerability of the pearl fishery. He requested from Governor North a fresh supply of
troops and boats to protect the pearl banks and guard against French incursions. As
Turnour wrote, “The first point to which I wish to call your Excellency’s attention is the
facility with which the Government of the Isles of France might at a very small expense
effectually prevent the execution of a Pearl Fishery, unless precautions be taken that have
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not been used hitherto.”483 Turnour estimated that “two or three small Brigs, or Sloops,
armed with two or four Guns each at an Expense not exceeding £1,000 or £1,200” would
do the job.484 However, if the French war-boats or any other maritime forces arrived to
the pearling grounds and “find no English Cruiser there,” Turnour feared that the “the
end of the Expedition would be completely effected.”485 And though he was “perfectly
aware of the difficulty a Cruiser would find in getting out of the Gulph [sic] towards the
latter end of April,” Turnour was of the “Opinion that two small Bombay Cruisers cannot
perform a more valuable Service than protection the Pearl Fishery.”486
Turnour’s search for an adequate supply of troops and vessels to protect the
pearling grounds further illustrates how government officials from the island and
mainland shared military resources, transporting boats and arms various ports and harbors
each season depending on the needs and demands of the pearl fishery. In another
instance, the superintendent of the 1800 pearl fishery at Tuticorin anxiously waited for
the arrival of a sloop from Jaffnapatnam once owned by the Dutch because it “became
indispensably necessary for the Security of the Banks against plunder from the Many
Boats and Diverse assembled for the Fishery, to engage an armed Cutter to guard
them.”487 When a government boat was not available or delayed, or in cases when
officials requested additional support, stopgap measures were taken such as contracting
the services of experienced locals. The collector of Tirunelveli, for instance, wrote from
Kilakkarai in March 1800, “The Sloop in question will save the expense of hiring a vessel
for the indispensable purpose of guarding the banks during the Fishery, and as the people
483
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in charge of her have been accustomed to this service they will perform it better than
persons unacquainted with it.”488 In other cases, the superintendent of the pearl fishery
hired local Europeans for this work. At the 1822 pearl fishery at Punnaikayal, the
superintendent engaged a certain John Meyer, a man who had also served as a guarantor
for one of the prospective renters, as the private contractor for a guard vessel.489 The
collector provided Meyer with a list a list of duties and responsibilities to follow during
his service, which included checking passports and boat numbers and making sure that
boats did not venture beyond the demarcated boundaries of the fishery.490 Indeed, the
instructions sent to Meyer suggests that boats employed during the pearling season served
many functions. In his request to the Board for an armed vessel at the 1810 pearl fishery,
Collector Hepburn of Tirunelveli outlined how he intended to use one of the boats at his
disposal: “I request the sanction of the Board to employ a Vessel upon the Bank at the
rate of ten Star [Pagodas] a day Commanded by an European to regulate the tie of Fishing
inspect the passes of the Several Boats & to prevent the Banks being destroyed by the
Divers examining over it at will before they have Cleared away all the Shells regularly
from the part at which they Commence this is a most necessary precaution & one that has
always been used.”491
Military forces deployed during the pearl fishery were usually made up of native
troops under the command of European officers commonly known in Anglo-Indian
parlance as Sepoys. The fact that the East India Company employed native troops to
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guard the pearling grounds and police the event should not come as a surprise. Historians
have long acknowledged the role of Indian troops in supporting British advancement and
military achievements. Works by historians Seema Alavi, Nile Green, and many others
provide social profiles of the troops and the political systems which they inhabited, and
the close attention paid to such conditions brings the contours of discipline, recruitment,
and military cultures into view.492 Unfortunately, little information exists on the
constitution of the native regiments deployed by the Company army to the pearl fishery,
how service in the pearl fishery may have contributed to a transformation of military
culture in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, or whether there was a
traditional guard for the pearl fisheries employed by local states that were incorporated
into the military ranks of the company-state. Most of the references to Sepoys are
preoccupied by logistics and security concerns. The superintendents of the 1799 pearl
fishery wrote to Governor North with a request for more troops at the pearl fishery. They
wrote that while a “Detachment of Troops destined for the Duty of the Pearl Fishery” was
welcome, the contingent of troops only contained “Eighty five [sic] Sepoys,” a number
“not deemed sufficient for the necessary calls of that Service.”493 Sepoys were not the
only type of native military force deployed to protect the persons and property at the
pearl fishery. There are references, for example, to contingents of native military troops
that came from the Malay community of Ceylon. In addition to the eighty-five Sepoys
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requested by the commissioners, they also wanted Governor North to send an “additional
force” of a “Capt. & Compy. of Malays” from Calpetyn to Arippu.494 During his visit to
the 1797 pearl fishery, naturalist Henry Le Beck also noted the presence of Malay troops,
writing that in order “to prevent riot and disorder, an officer with a party of Malays is
stationed here.”495 They “occupy a large square, where they have a field-piece, and a
flag-staff for signals.”496 Besides temporary reinforcements and seasonal appointments,
there are evidence that suggest concerted efforts by British officials to maintain a
permanent military presence at forts in places like Arippu and Tuticorin, locations that
hosted some of the largest and most frequent pearl fisheries off the coast of the island and
mainland, respectively.
Superintendents of the pearl fishery also mobilized armed forces from local
zamindar households and compensated such troops with government funds. For instance,
the collector of Tirunelveli spent over Rs. 400 for an “Extra Police Establishment” during
his time as superintendent of the 1822 pearl fishery at Tuticorin. He believed that
reinforcements were necessary because this particular year promised to be a particularly
large and robust harvest. He anticipated a healthy return of pearls and profits and
witnessed many rich merchants with impressive supplies of coin start to populate the
camp. As the collector wrote in a dispatch to the Board of Revenue at Fort St. George,
“the great number of Merchants assembled with property not short of 14 lacs of Rupees is
in a totally unprotected part of the Coast, rendered it an imperious duty to afford the most
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effectual protection to their persons and property.”497 The “Ordinary police Establishment
could not have possibly answered” the security needs, according to Collector Hudleston,
which left the merchants and their property exposed to theft and robbery.498 Hudleston
requested armed persons from nearby zamindar estates as a stopgap measure to deter any
potential theft or robbery attempts. The collector informed the Board that he “not only
entertained the temporary sibbendy which appears in the account but also called on the
neighbouring Zamindars of Yettiapoorum and Moniatchy to furnish [men] and by the
regularity of the system of Police Established.”499 At the conclusion of the fishery, he
happily reported to the Board, “that not a single robbery of any consequence took place
which in such a situation so large a body of merchants and Capital Collected can only be
attributed to the efficiency of the extensive Establishment employed in keeping in the
[numerous] depredations who were prepared to have taken advantage of any opportunity
of plunder.”500 He also noted that he received positive feedback from merchants, a
contingent at the fishery that government officials were, of course, eager to please since
they possessed capital, expertise, and authority upon which Madras and Ceylon relied:
“The principal Merchants expressed to me their apprehensions of attack at the
Commencement of the fishery and I know them to be so well founded that I considered
myself bound to take the most effectual measure for their protection.”501
Smuggling and other forms of clandestine trade added to the general climate of
insecurity at the pearl fishery and further animated the formation of a multi-faceted
government security apparatus. Pearls were high-value and low-bulk commodities, which
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meant that thieves, pirates, and smugglers could more easily conceal and transport the
product without detection.502 Portuguese voyager Pedro Teixeira wrote in the late
sixteenth century that there was “much trade in smuggled pearls outside the [customs
house], free from such hindrances as customs or return of the goods.”503 Smuggling was
also at the forefront of concerns for Dutch VOC officers. Dutch Governor Jan Schreuder,
for example, requested that armed vessels target a “smugglers nest” near Calpetyn.504 A
rather broad category, colonial officials and other observers applied the term smuggling
to a variety of different acts, which was also the case in other historical contexts such as
late nineteenth-century Southeast Asia.505 In some cases, smuggling—at least as it related
to the movement of pearls—was used to describe the failure of merchants to deliver
proper paperwork to customs agents and their refusal to pay duties. For example, a
certain Gopal Das had seed pearls and embroidered cloths confiscated because he did not
have genuine documents.506 The British further interpreted smuggling as illicit or
unauthorized fishing, which was often done under the pretense of chank diving during the
off-season. The collector of Tirunelveli included a specific clause in the advertisement
for the rent of the 1825 chank fishery “as a warning to any renter from Ceylon who from
convenience of salutation may attempt to smuggle.”507 The advertisement noted that “it
may be useful to state that the necessary vessels and all their hands and equipments [sic]
may be engaged in the neighbourhood [sic] of the fishery and that the Chank must be
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landed and pay duty before it can be exported from the Coast of Tinnevelly.”508
Smuggling also applied to illegal or unauthorized fishing conducted during the season of
the pearl fishery. As a list of regulations posted at the 1800 pearl fishery at Tuticorin
read, “In case it should happen that a smuggling Dony be found amongst the others with
Design to fish Oysters under pretence [sic] of wind and Currents and of being driven
away by night, and others unfortunate Circumstances, it shall be immediately seized and
the parties threatened as the Circumstances shall require.”509 Illegal pearl diving during
the off-season and chank fishery were difficult to stop because both required regular
monitoring of pearling grounds. Nevertheless, the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries invested British Ceylon and the Company Raj with some new tools to monitor
and protect the pearl fishery from theft and smuggling. For instance, British Ceylon
codified its police powers through legislative acts in the early nineteenth century. A
legislative act of 1811 authorized the government to curb theft and clandestine fishing
during the off-season of the pearl fishery by arresting any boats and crews that violated
that space.510 The act was motivated by the suspicion that “depredations are committed in
the Pearl Banks of this Island by Boats and other Vessels frequenting those places in the
calm season without any necessity or lawful cause.”511
The camp at the pearl fishery was a favorite target of thieves. Government
officials believed that it was incumbent upon the superintendent and his assistants to
mobilize the necessary police forces to deter robbers and raiders from striking the camp.
508
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Collector Hudleston of Tirunelveli in his capacity as superintendent of the 1822 pearl
fishery near Tuticorin described the state of affairs to a military commander when he
requested a surge of troops and munitions. “It appears to me absolutely necessary,”
Hudleston wrote to Lieutenant Colonel Pollock at Palamcottah, “to the efficient
protection of the very large quantity of specie which is now collected here” that
additional police forces were needed.512 This was a “very extensive Pearl fishery being
expected to take place shortly,” Hudleston continued, and “I have to request that you will
have the goodness to order a Havildars Guard from the Corps on duty at Palamcottah to
be detached on the duty of Guarding the Banksols [warehouses] at such time as I may
apply to the officer commanding for their services.”513 From Hudleston’s perspective,
this was an “emergency,” as there were “upwards of 14 lacs of Rupees as well as that of
the valuable proceeds of the fishery” to protect.514 Under such circumstances, he wrote,
the number of guards “should be immediately strengthened to the number of 100 men”
commanded by an European officer.515 Hudleston suggested that these military supplies
could be retained for future pearl fisheries so that the government would not have to
scramble each season to mobilize troops and arms.516 Officials also stationed armed
vessels to patrol the waters and keep boats from venturing beyond the designated area of
the fishery. This required the shipment of military supplies from garrisons and other
military establishments to the site of the pearl fishery. After Hudleston requested some
firearms and artillery from the commanding officer at Palamcottah in Tirunelveli district,
Lieutenant Colonel Pollock dispatched a train of at least twenty bullocks and two drivers
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to transport the supplies from his station to the pearl fishery compound outside Tuticorin.
Hudleston then enlisted the transporters for added protection during the pearl fishery,
writing to Pollock, “I have thought it advisable to [detain] the escort who accompanied
the gun in order to avail myself of their service during the fishery for the protection of the
valuable Property which will be collected here under the hope that no inconvenience will
result to your arrangements from the measure.”517 Superintendents of the pearl fisheries
also requested supplies such as gunpowder from the military divisions of Madras and
Ceylon to be used for signal cannons and protection.
The use of heavy artillery for protecting the persons and property at the pearl
fishery was not simply for show, as administrators, merchants, and other people who
populated the compound regularly faced the threat of theft and violence. For example,
after attacking a local native revenue collector in a nearby town, a team of bandits stole
cash from the merchants’ quarters at the 1818 fishery at Punnaikayal. A letter from
Collector Cotton of Tirunelveli to the Board described “a daring attack by a Gang of
Robbers” in a town near Tuticorin “in which they severely beat & wounded” many in
attendance and “succeeded in carrying off” over one hundred pagodas that reportedly
belonged to the government.518 According to the collector, “the same Gang” followed
that raid with an attack on some of the merchants at the pearl fishery and “plundered to
the amount of Pagodas 400 which for a time caused great alarm” across the camp.519 In
order to assuage these fears, the collector ordered an escalation of police forces to protect
the compound, which apparently worked, because the happily reported later to the Board
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that “that by strengthening the guards of Peons we have succeeded in quitting their
fear.”520 Collector Cotton added that he was in hot pursuit of the suspects: “I trust through
the exertions now using The Offenders on either occasions will not escaped detention but
that I shall shortly be able to report to you their apprehension & recovery of some of the
Property Stolen.”521 Aside from actual physical harm and material losses, theft, or at least
the perceived threat of theft, could bring economic activity at the pearl fishery to a
standstill. For instance, the collector of Tirunelveli who superintended the 1818 pearl
fishery delayed the sale of boats at auction because “of the alarm which took place on
Occasion of the Robber” a few nights before. Collector Cotton wrote to the Board in
April 1818, “In Consequence of the alarm which took place on Occasion of the
Robber…the last sale of the Boats was postponed and since then the wind from the East
& North East has been strong as to have prevented the Boats from Going out to the Banks
after the new Moon tomorrow we may however expect another change of Weather and I
will hope…to be able to report to you that the Business of the fishery is again going on
prosperously.”522 British officials and their agents also heard complaints from aggrieved
parties. They investigated crimes such as theft and fraud, and meted out justice, which
sometimes assumed the form of physical punishment. At the 1799 pearl fishery, for
example, the commissioners at the 1799 pearl fishery heard complaints against a certain
Meera Lubbai who allegedly robbed the warehouse of a notable merchant and stabbed
with a knife some of the people who tried to arrest him. The commissioners listened to
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the case against the offender and ordered that he “receive [at least one] hundred strokes
of a Rattan.”523
In the face of security threats that ranged from night raids and illicit fishing to
theft, both Madras and Colombo supplied the wealthy elite merchants who rented the
pearl fishery with armed guards. Security details were a service provided to the renter
based on his special contractual relationship with the governments of Madras and Ceylon
and therefore not available to all attendees. There are many documented cases, for
instance, of security forces supplied by the Company Raj and British Ceylon escorting
the renter and his party to and from the camp. Merchants often carried large supplies of
coin, treasure, papers, and valuables to the pearl fishery making them targets for bandits.
Protective forces continued their work during the event, performing such duties as
watching over warehouses where pearls, oysters, and other high-value items were stored.
They also served also served as personal bodyguards of the renter. Their services,
however, were not always automatically provided by the government to the renter and his
colleagues. Prospective renters made requests for such favors in rental applications and
subsequent communications with government officials. For instance, the contract
between the Board of Revenue at Fort St. George and Chinniah Mudaliar for the rent of
the 1805 pearl fishery contained the following clause: “That I am to be provided with a
Guard for the protection and security of the fishery and with the usual accommodations
of Bankshalls to be erected at the companys [sic] Expense, Taurpaulins [sic], etc.”524 That
same year, the application of a certain Chidambaram Pillai read, “The Honble Company
should supply the sufficient Banksals and the mats for the Banksals and Houses that may
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be required by the Renter as also the sufficient Guard of Sepoys to guard the Banksalls,
Houses and Bazars from being plundered and Robbed or molested.”525 A Jaffna Tamil
merchant named Kundappah Chetti also wanted the East India Company to provide him
with armed escorts during his rent of the 1822 pearl fishery at Tuticorin, the same fishery
for which Collector Hudleston had called for additional troops to be sent from the fort at
Palamcottah. In a letter to the Board of Revenue, he wrote “I further solicit your Board
will be pleased to order a Guard consisting of 12 Sepoys and 1 [Nayak] to accompany me
and the merchants for the security of our persons and of our respective properties until
our safe return to Madras from pilfering and other thefts which may otherwise occasion
persons resorting to pearl fishery as was observed on former occasions.”526 He referred to
the pearl fishery as “being abounded with Robbers” who “pilfer the bankshalls where
Oysters are stored” in a petition to the Board.527 As “the Merchants having incurred
considerable losses in the former fisheries,” his petition read, “I humbly beg your
Honorable Board will be pleased to direct the Collector of Tinnevely or commanding
Officer to post an adequate number of sepoys and also such other peons that may be
sufficient to secure the Oysters and of supporting the renter with the Merchants
connected with this transaction.”528 To substantiate his plea, Kundappah Chetti even
enjoined the Board to consult the records of previous pearl fisheries in its office, as a
“similar indulgence was shewn [sic] to [him] by the Government of Ceylon in subsequent
years.”529 The Board met Kundappah Chetti’s request and then wrote to the governing
council at Fort St. George, asking its members to “procure the necessary authority” from
525
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the Governor of Madras for an escort of 12 Sepoys under the proper officer for the
protection of the Renter of the Pearl fishery of the Toleyaram parr near Tutacoryn on his
way to the place of fishery during his stay there and on his return, since he is under the
necessity of moving accompanied by a considerable property.”530 Under such protection,
Kundappah Chetti traveled to the site of the pearl fishery with a large retinue, many of
whom carried with them prodigious amounts of coin for the purpose of renting boats and
purchasing oysters. According to an official report, “The Renter left this
place…accompanied by the Guard which the Honorable the Governor in Council were
pleased to allow for the Security of his own Property, and of the large sums of Money
taken down by the Merchants who accompanied him, to purchaser the Oysters when
drawn up.”531 British traveler James Cordiner also noticed the size and glitz of the renter
and his retinue: “The renter reared a house for himself in one corner of [an extensive
square of temporary buildings], of the same perishable material. He brought a large
family with him, and thirteen palanquins, to each of which were attached thirteen bearers
well dressed, also a few sepoys with rusty muskets, some of which constantly attended
him, and ran by the side of his palanquin, when he went abroad in that conveyance.”532
While government officials employed guards and police to protect the produce,
persons, and property at the pearl fishery, there was also a market for protective services
that fell outside the immediate purview of British Ceylon and the Company Raj. From
eyewitness accounts, it appears that merchant-investors also hired private guards to
oversee operations at various stages of the pearling process. From fishing and diving at
530
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off the coast to washing and sorting pearls and oysters on the shore, the presence of
security forces was a regular fixture of the pearl fishery. The washing and sorting process
was watched particularly close by private security guards. British traveler Robert
Percival, for example, wrote that “the boat-owners and merchants dealing in the oysters,
are obliged to hire people to collect the pearls out of them; and to prevent embezzling,
confidential persons are appointed, who constantly attend to watch over and observe
them.”533 There is little information about the labor market for security and military
personnel at the pearl fishery, which is unfortunate because there is a relatively dearth of
studies on the topic in the context of southern India compared to northern regions of the
subcontinent and the wider Indian Ocean realm. Protection rackets and other forms of
organized violence as a form of extraction may have also happened at the pearl fishery
but there is not sufficient evidence to develop a complete picture. There is scant evidence
to suggest that anything like the seasonal military entrepreneur discussed by historian
Dirk Kolff in his classic study of military cultures in north India was present during the
pearl fishery.534
British officials on both sides of the Gulf also expressed concern about a range of
environmental factors, which they maintained had the potential to negatively impact the
performance and profitability of the pearl fishery. They were cognizant of the fact that a
healthy production of pearl oysters was contingent upon favorable environmental
conditions yet forces of nature like violent storms were beyond their immediate control.
These events were quite common and thus accounted for in many of the contracts signed
by merchant-renters and government proprietors. Such contractual provisions, however,
533
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did not always protect the government from compensatory claims, as merchants and other
parties with vested interests in pearling sought reparations when natural forces acted upon
the coastal and marine environments of Mannar. Such was the case at the 1810 pearl
fishery on the India-side of the Gulf when a tempest stirred up the water and made it too
cloudy for divers to locate and retrieve pearl oysters. The superintendent wrote to the
Board, “The weather however unfortunately proved very unfavorable on that day and in
Consequence of a very Strong north east wind blew all day and a very Strong Current
which rendered the water Muddy & a dark Cloudy day the number of Oysters brought in
was remarkably small.”535 One of the applications submitted for the rent by Cabal
Mahomed Mercay of Kilakkarai accounted for such circumstances: “Such of the days as
the Boats are prevented going to Sea by Gales of wind or the Muddy State of the sea must
not be reckoned.”536 In other cases, strong currents shifted sands and covered clusters of
pearl oysters on the seafloor. For example, when Collector Hudleston of Tirunelveli
launched an investigation into reasons for the underperformance of the 1822 pearl
fishery, he interrogated members of the crew that had undertaken the initial examination
of the banks who, he claimed had “acted with the most unpardonable negligence or
shameful fraud.”537 Most of those deposed blamed the low return of the pearl fishery on
this unusual marine environmental phenomenon. According to the results of the
investigation, two natives who worked on assaying the banks stated that the tides had
smothered the oysters between the time of the examination and the start of the fishery.
This not only made it difficult for divers to find the pearl oysters because they were
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covered with sand but it also killed off entire sections of the population. According to the
crew members, “The Produce fall short on account of sand and…vegetable substances
having come under the places before examined by which the oysters are prevented from
obtaining their food and consequently died.”538 Such environmental and climatic
conditions further impacted the financial viability of the pearl fishery when renters
brought forth remission claims. For example, as the renter of the 1815 pearl fishery at
Tiruchendur wrote in a petition to the Board of Revenue in late August of that year, “it
appears that a Hurricane happened at the vicinity of Totacoreen whereby and by the
Strength of the current the Pearl Oysters which were stuck to the Paars [pearl oyster
banks] were washed away.” 539
There were also health and sanitation issues with which government officials and
attendees contend. The pearl fishery compound had long been considered by government
officials and travelers as insalubrious, unsanitary, and injurious to a person’s physical
health and well-being. Portuguese chronicler João Ribeiro wrote, “for the last nine days
[of the fishery] the enclosures are cleansed, as so many flies are bred by the corrupt
matter that the adjacent places and the whole country might be annoyed by them, if care
were not taken to sweep into the sea the impurities collected during the fishery.”540 Dutch
Governor Baron van Imhoff also wrote about the unhygienic scene at the pearl fishery
and speculated about the risks it posed to VOC troops: “We must also mention the
hazards run by a few hundred men sent to keep immense crows in order, and their
exposure to sickness and death as well after the fishery as during its continuance from the
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stench of the oysters.”541 Tens of millions of oysters were hauled ashore and left to dry in
the hot sun, which created a miasma of rotting flesh and stale shells. The stench wafting
over from the drying grounds could perhaps be tolerated so long as a handsome profit
awaited. As British traveler and colonial official James Bennett wrote, “After the second
or third day’s fishing, the stench of the dead oysters becomes intolerable to all, except
those whose thirst for gain absorbs every other sense.”542 The intensity of the smell
diminished over time, as the flesh of the oyster wasted away, leaving all but the shell
and—hopefully—a bright, beautiful pearl. Bennett continued: “But, as use reconciles one
to most things in this life, custom soon neutralizes the olfactory effect of the nuisance; for
the stench is considered less diffusive, as the process progresses.”543 Ceylon-born Dutch
naturalist Henry Le Beck offered a graphic description of the scene at the 1797 pearl
fishery at Arippu: “The pestilential smell occasioned by the numbers of purifying pearl
fishes [sic], renders the atmosphere of Condatchey so insufferably offensive when the
southwest wind blows, that it sensibly affects the olfactory nerves of any one
unaccustomed to such cadaverous smells. This putrefaction generates immense numbers
of worms, flies, moschettoes [sic], and other vermin; all together forming a scene
strongly displeasing to the senses.”544 British traveler Robert Percival offered a similar
account: “The stench occasioned by the oysters being left to putrefy is intolerable; and
remains for a long while after the fishery is over. It corrupts the atmosphere for several
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miles round Condatchy, and renders the neighborhood of that country extremely
unpleasant till the monsoons and violent southwest winds set in and purify the air.”545
Like their predecessors, British officials were offended by the smell of rotting
oysters and pestered by swarms of flies. In late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries
they came to view the problem through a more epidemiological lens. The pearl fishery
compound came to be seen as a disease vector, a dangerous space in which contagions
spread. Indeed, there are many documented cases during this period in which European
travelers and officials attending the pearl fishery came down sick with various illnesses.
George Turnour, for example, contracted so-called “Manar fever” during his inspection
of the pearl banks in late 1798. He wrote to his colleague Hugh Cleghorn, “I am sorry to
add that the Dutch Surgeon (the only Medical person we have here) is of the opinion, that
my Complaint is the Manar fever, & that he is apprehensive of its returning today,
tomorrow, or next day; and if it should not return, he thinks that I must have recourse, for
eight or ten days to preventive remedies but as I have no doubt, but that with care & an
unbroken constitution, I shall be perfectly recovered by that time.”546 Turnour also feared
that he had been inflicted with smallpox during his service, while his colleague James
McDowall came down with a case of boils, and Cleghorn believed he contracted a fever
from “the putrid exhalations of the oysters.”547 Government officials also described how
the physical conditions of the pearl fishery camp negatively affected their health when
writing to their superiors in Madras and Colombo with requests for extra compensation.
For example, Collector James Hepburn of Tirunelveli requested a bonus from the Board
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following his superintendence of the 1810 pearl fishery. He wrote, “Conducting this
fishery required six weeks incessant vigilance and personal attendance on my part
obliging me to residing during the whole time a place rendered almost intolerable from
the putrid State of the atmasphree [sic] Caused by the Exposure of so many Millions of
Oysters to Corruption in the open air the bad effects of which were felt upon the health of
almost every Servant who Accompanied [my] performance of that duty.”548 Such
requests went to the highest levels of the East India Company and British Ceylon
governments and often took several years for replies from London to reach Madras or
Colombo.549
Cholera was a particularly contagious and aggressive bacterial disease that
regularly struck the pearl fishery camp and its inhabitants. Historian David Arnold has
called cholera in colonial India a “disease of disorder.”550 Cholera outbreaks at the pearl
fishery were partly caused by poor water supplies and irrigation works along the coasts of
western Ceylon and southeastern India. Tens of thousands of people occupied the same
densely packed space, meaning that population density was another factor that facilitated
the spread of the bacteria. Government officials this state of affairs and took positive
steps to mitigate the damage cholera and other diseases could have wrought on the
profitability and productivity of the pearl fishery. The employment of medical
professions to control outbreaks and treat patients was one way that British governments
intervened. In advance of the 1799 pearl fishery at Arippu, the superintendents wrote to
548
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Governor North, anxious about the potential of a vast number of people being exposed to
cholera. They wrote, “Besides the numbers of Europeans, and great concourse of Natives
daily expected at Arripo, there is, and probably will continue to be stationed here, nearly
100 of the Honble Company’s Troops, such a Multitude collected in one place, many of
whom from their particularly vocations exposed to casualties, must occasionally require
medical assistance.”551 In another case, Collector Hudleston, the superintendent of the
1822 pearl fishery at Tuticorin, urgently requested that a medical professional repair to
the camp. He wrote, “Several cases of cholera having recently occurred at the fishery one
poor individual being at this moment probably in extremity and the disease having likely
to make the most dreadful horror amongst a vast assembled population.”552 He continued:
“In such a situation and under such circumstances I deem the service of a medical officer
absolutely necessary here and…have to request your immediate attendance with ample
provisions of anti-cholera medicine at the fishery near Tutacoreen.”553 The nearest onstaff medical professional was William Turnbull, who received a letter from the Madras
government that contained dire warnings. Turnbull administered what were described as
European medicines, which most likely include opium and laudanum, and he quarantined
infected persons on a floating “Hospital Boat.”554
In addition to reducing the labor supply and increasing medical expenses,
epidemic cholera could further shrink the value of the pearl fishery to Madras and Ceylon
if such outbreaks led to the granting of remissions to renters and other commercial
peoples. When combined with other hazards such as low yields of pearls and oysters, a
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cholera outbreak could make the different between a profitable venture and losing one.
For instance, the collector of the 1828 pearl fishery at Punnaikayal recommended that the
government award refunds to sub-renters because members of certain diving crews
suffered from cholera. He wrote to the Board in April 1828: “It will be observed that one
boat returned without Oysters some of the divers of the boat were attacked with cholera
after reaching the banks and the crew became alarmed and immediately returned, I
therefore recommend that the Amount Value of this Boat for One day…may be remitted
and request that I may be allowed to return the Money to the Purchasers.”555 Besides
those merchants who rented and sub-rented boats for pearl diving, there were other
commercial ventures in the bazaar that were also impacted by cholera outbreaks, such as
liquor sales. For example, one of the arrack renters at the pearl fishery of 1828 requested
a remission from the collector and demanded the release of property he had advanced as
security. He claimed that he defaulted on this rent because of the cholera outbreak. The
collector of Tirunelveli appears to have agreed in a report submitted to the Board in late
August 1829: “The failure of Sodaly Mootoonadan was in a great measure caused by the
cholera having broken out among the Divers and Merchants who had assembled at
Pennacoil and altho’ the pearl fishery continued for the period intended, many of the
Crews abandoned their boats and many Merchants with their followers left the place
before the fishery was concluded.”556
Scarcity of coin was another problem that regularly beset the bazaar. Currency
shortages were endemic issues across much of late eighteenth-century and early
555
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nineteenth-century southern India and was especially acute in colonial capitals such as
Madras and Calcutta.557 Cash shortages coupled with a general climate of insecurity
generated the use of a range of financial instruments, such as government-issued bonds
and bank notes, and set off a flurry of short-term lending and currency exchange at the
pearl fishery. As the superintendent of the 1810 fishery at Tuticorin reported, “a great
scarcity of Money prevailed at Tutacoryn and if my information was Correct four per
Cent for fifteen days was the terms on which it could be borrowed.”558 Faced with cash
shortages, he chose to accept draft notes. “If I had insisted upon money,” he wrote to the
Board, “[the oysters] would have sold Cheap in proportion to the difficulty in procuring
them.”559 In the early nineteenth century, British Ceylon civil servant Anthony Bertolacci
provided a detailed description of how merchant-bankers took advantage of a market in
which ready money was in high demand. “One of the safest adventures is that made by
the Colombo and Jaffna merchants,” he wrote. Merchant-bankers “proceed to Condatchy
with large sums of Ceylon copper coin, which they change, during the time of the fishery,
for treasury notes, pagodas, Spanish dollars, or any other foreign gold or silver coin, at a
profit of three or four per cent.”560 According to Bertolacci, those who exchanged and
borrowed money were inclined to shed their “small change” at the expiration of the
fishery. The merchant-bankers who exchanged money at the start of the fishery “then
return the paper, gold, and silver; taking back the copper, with a new profit; and return
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with it to Colombo and Jaffnapatam [sic]; having gained seven or eight per cent. upon
their capital in two months.”561 The canny dealings of these men also give an indication
of the assortment of currency and coin that circulated in the bazaar at the pearl fishery. A
similarly complex picture emerged at Arippu in 1828. An advertisement distributed in
advance of the fishery provided merchants planning to attend the fishery with an itemized
list of the coins and currencies accepted by the Ceylon government.562 As an
advertisement for the 1828 pearl fishery at Ceylon read, which gives an indication of the
plethora of coins and different types of payment: “The arrangements of this Fishery will
be nearly the same as have been usual on similar occasions. The Biddings to be in
Madras Rupees the payments however may be made in Ceylon Currency and other Coins
at the rate which will be hereafter Notified. Bills on the Agents of this Government in
Calcutta, Madras, or Bombay will in like manner be taken or Letters of Credit being
produced to warrant the drawing of Bills on the said Agents. Bills on England will also
be taken on the Agent of this Island and the Honorable the Court of Directors calculating
the Pound Sterling, into Madras Rupees at the rate last reported by the Agents at Madras
of the Exchange there. The terms of [the] sale [is] ready money.”563 In another instance,
British Ceylon removed any additional stamp duties and regulations for transactions
ahead of the 1828 pearl fishery at Arippu “in order to facilitate the Business of the Pearl
Fishery.”564
The governments of Ceylon and Madras sanctioned financial mechanisms to
address chronic cash shortages and problems associated with currency exchange. Indeed,
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here too, by way of ensuring the circulation of money, the British government actively
engaged in promoting the economic viability of the fisheries. The Madras-based
merchant house of Messrs. Arbuthnot & Co., for example, sent a letter to the Board of
Revenue expressing its desire to make funds available to an agent attending the 1818
pearl fishery at Punnaikayal.565 In other cases, the government had a more direct hand in
manipulating the flow of money. For instance, Governor North requested a shipment of
gold and silver from Madras ahead of the 1799 pearl fishery at Arippu. “This total failure
of a supply of Gold will throe [sic] me entirely in the hands of few monied [sic] men
here,” North wrote.566 A series of advertisements in Tamil, Sinhala, Dutch, and English
distributed by the Ceylon government were meant to prepare merchants for a market
hamstrung by a shortage of coin. The advertisement encouraged merchants to pay either
the renter or superintendent for the purchase of boats, oysters, or pearls through draft
notes from the Carnatic and British Banks of Madras.567 The Board instructed the
superintendents of the pearl fishery to “assist the Circulation of these Drafts among the
Dealers in Pearls, by causing it to be perfectly understood that they will ultimately be
secured by the officers of your Government in discharge of any Public engagements, and
that they will be the safest and readiest mode of remittance to this Presidency.”568
However, pearl merchants did not always follow official directives, electing to use
methods of lending and transferring money other than those sanctioned by the
government. As the commissioners of the 1799 pearl fishery at Arippu reported to
Governor North, “private adventurers have not only been prevented from coming in the

565

TNA, BOR Proceedings, Vol. 786, 3600 (12 March 1818).
BL, IOR, F, 4, 129, 2401, 218.
567
BL, IOR, F, 4, 129, 2401, 304-7.
568
BL, IOR, F, 4, 130, 2402, 185.
199
566

number expected, but the greater part who have arrived neither brought cash nor draughts
from the Banks of Madras, and instead of these have been offering us Bills upon their
various correspondents in different parts of India.”569 The choice of draft notes and bills
of exchange over cash remittances or other forms of transferring money between centers
of commerce and the bazaar at the pearl fishery was significant. Both Company Madras
and British Ceylon recognized that the low availability of cash or lack of access to credit
could potentially bring commerce at the pearl fishery to a halt. While, at the same time,
concerted efforts by government officials to endorse some forms of economic practices
and discourage others were an attempt to discipline both merchants and markets at the
pearl fishery. The British governments of Madras and Ceylon facilitated the movement of
money and extension of credit, taking a more active role in the markets and marketplaces
of the pearl fishery at a moment of colonial state formation, imperial expansion, and
reform in the early nineteenth century. During the period of the Colebrooke-Cameron
commission in the late 1820s and early 1830s, for instance, British Ceylon officials
wanted to open the industry to more “local capitalists,” a policy designed to break the
hold that native mercantile elites exercised over the affairs of the pearl fishery.570

Conclusion
British Ceylon and the Company Raj sought to expand their respective influence over the
pearling fishery by interrupting preexisting patterns of circulation through such tactics as
controlling the flow of labor and capital, fixing the event to a particular spot, and shaping
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the rhythms and organization of the industry. Far from timeless and self-sustaining, the
markets and marketplaces of the pearl fishery were social and economic spaces treated by
both Company and Crown officials as targets of interference and subjects of reform.
From infrastructure projects such as the construction of permanent buildings to the
manipulation of currency standards and money markets, British administrations on both
sides of the Gulf tried to reengineer the marketplaces of the pearl fishery through a
contradictory set of political economic ideas and practices guided by the ideology
improvement. Agents of the company-state and colonial state brought many important
aspects of the pearling industry into their direct sphere of influence. However, there was a
considerable amount of activity in the social and economic spheres of the pearl fishery,
such as lending and borrowing amongst merchants and various sorts of smuggling, that
did not bend to the will of Madras and Ceylon officials. Through managerial reforms,
members of the Madras and Ceylon governments sought to turn the pearl fishery into a
regular and predictable source of revenue, efforts that went hand in hand with colonial
state formation and empire-making in the region. It followed that the vicissitudes of
colonial and imperial expansion in patterned certain aspects of the business worlds of
trading elites, the topic to which the next chapter turns.
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CHAPTER 3: THE BUSINESS WORLD IS MINE OYSTER

MERCHANTS

From the Safavid port city of Bandar Abbas in June 1685, Shah Sulaimān dispatched a
diplomatic mission aboard an English ship to King Narai of Siam. He commissioned the
secretary of the ambassadorial team to document the journey from the Straits of Hormuz
across the Indian Ocean to the Thai capital of Ayutthaya. The Ship of Sulaimān (Safīna‘i
sulaimānī) by Muhammad Rabi‘ bin Muhammad Ibrāhīm provides scintillating
descriptions of the political, commercial, and cultural contours of the Indian Ocean in the
late seventeenth century through the eyes of a Persian scribe.571 Muhammad Rabi‘
described Ceylon as the place from whence “the garden of Paradise draws its fair breeze”
and described the quality of pearls plucked from the shallow waters between the island
and mainland. He declared that pearls from the Gulf of Mannar were inferior to those of
Bahraini provenance because the former had “lost their bright countenance out of shame
and grief.”572 He added, “The jeweler of Time and Chance has relegated these Indian
jewels of lesser lustre to a low shelf in the bazaar of happiness.”573 Muhammad Rabi‘
echoed sentiments shared by knowledgeable parties across Indian Ocean: the color,
shape, and luster of Bahraini pearls were top-grade but Ceylon produced the largest
volume of this prized gem. The large volume of pearls handled by native merchants
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further impressed Muhammad Rabi‘ yet he slyly asked, “how will they convince the pearl
merchants of Bahrain that for purity and value the Ceylonese pearls can be ranked as
equal with his wares.”574 As a text by a Persian courtier aboard an English ship bound for
Siam, The Ship of Sulaimān exemplifies the increased connectivity that defined the early
modern and modern worlds and evinces the buying and selling of pearls by merchants as
windows on these interactions.
More than a century after Muhammad Rabi‘ ventured from the mouth of the
Persian Gulf across the Indian Ocean to present-day Thailand, another intrepid traveler
jotted down some observations—albeit more prosaically—during a visit to the famed
pearling grounds of Ceylon. James Cordiner, a chaplain in the service of the East India
Company at the turn of the nineteenth century, was also struck by the economic and
financial lives of pearl merchants. He wrote, “On the occasion of a pearl fishery,
immense sums of money are lent by pawnbrokers, a race of people that abounds in all
parts of Ceylon. Persons of every description flock to the market for the purpose of
gambling; and the lowest of the people, if they can command even the most trifling sum,
dream of nothing but making their fortunes here.”575 Muhammad Rabi‘ had also drawn
attention to the speculative nature of the enterprise when he described the pearl fishery as
the “world market of fate.”576 In the context of British colonialism and imperialism,
Cordiner’s characterization of the pearl fishery as a form of “gambling” acquired new
significance and was mapped onto wider discourses about the economic behavior of
Indian merchants. British civil servant James Bennett conjured up such an image. In
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describing the merchants who traveled between the island and mainland during the
pearling season, Bennett wrote, “there is scarcely a nation or caste of the immense
continent of India, exclusive of Parsee and Arabian traders, of which there are not many
individuals, whom the thirst of gain allures to this grand field of speculation.”577
This chapter explores the commercial and cultural worlds of the men who
inhabited the economic space of the pearl fishery. It concerns the business cultures and
practices of merchants by focusing on four commercial magnates who rented the pearl
fishery from the Madras and Ceylon governments in the late eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries. Profiling the types of businessmen who obtained the cowle or grant
of the pearl fishery brings into sharp relief certain aspects of how business elites managed
their social, cultural, and economic affairs during a transitional moment in the colonial
and imperial histories of India and Sri Lanka.
There are references in the medieval inscriptional record to mercantile
organizations of South India such as Manigrāmam and Ayyāvole involved in the buying
and selling of pearls and other precious stones.578 Marco Polo’s travel account offers a
description of merchant activities at the pearl fishery of Mannar. He wrote, “[The] many
merchants who go divide into various companies, and each of these must engage a
number of men on wages, hiring them for April and half of May.”579 Likewise, Venetian
traveler Caesar Frederick mentions the presence of merchant “companies” at the pearl
fishery in his account from the second half of the sixteenth century.580 In the mideighteenth century, under the guidance of Governor Baron van Imhoff, the Dutch VOC
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decided to reduce its risk by renting the pearl fishery to local merchants. There were still
some drawbacks, however. Governor Jan Schreuder wrote about the lease of the 1750
pearl fishery at Trincomalee in a report to his successor, Jan Baron van Eck: “The renter
who was probably encouraged to offer that amount owing to the great fuss which had
been made regarding those banks, and eager to carry on the work as diving was easy in a
bay where there was no drift or still less current, was grievously mistaken in his high
expectations.”581 Following the Dutch practice, British Ceylon and the Company Raj
tended to lease out the right to fish the banks. The cultures and practices of merchants
who rented the pearl fishery refracted through the lens of credit and debt sheds light on
how businessmen navigated a complex and evolving economic landscape. Much of the
material found in the archives of British Ceylon and Company Madras contains
information related to relationship between the principal renter of the pearl fishery and
those who underwrote his contract with the government. To pearl merchants at the turn of
the nineteenth century, credit and debt were more than abstract concepts and lines on a
balance sheet but also provided the substance of personal business relationships.
Materials related to the lease of the pearl fishery also provide details about the
relationship between local merchants and the British governments. From scrutinizing the
applications of prospective renters to adjudicating claims for remissions, Company and
Crown officials at various levels of the Madras and Ceylon governments interfaced with
local mercantile elites yet never fully realized efforts to influence decision-making, mold
economic behavior, and disrupt kin-based business ventures at the pearl fishery.
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The business worlds and cultural practices of merchants remains a relatively
neglected aspect of South Asian history. Economic historian Claude Markovits has called
to “return the merchant to South Asian history.”582 According to Markovits, one of the
reasons that historians of South Asia have not paid sufficient attention to world of the
merchant stems from biases and prejudices found within early colonial writings. Indeed,
many of the early historical writings on India’s economic past were penned by European
merchants. They were members of massive overseas trading corporations and did not
always sing the praises of their local counterparts, which often assumed the form of
expatiating Orientalist stereotypes about irrational, rapacious, and shifty locals. Colonial
administrators also railed against predatory banias or rural moneylenders who they
blamed for backwardness of the Indian agrarian economy. Markovits writes further that
Indian and other non-European businessmen “languished in obscurity,” blamed by
historians of various stripes for “having failed their mission of creating the bases of a
bourgeois capitalist society in India.”583 Some recent studies have profiled specific
merchants to offer alternative perspectives that are not hamstrung by the need to explain
the development of capitalism in India. For instance, historian Lakshmi Subramanian
writes, “This [new kind of business and economic history] would focus not so much on
problems of interpretation but on life histories and narratives that suggests a range of
complex impulses informing merchant behavior.”584
District-level records of the East India Company’s Government of Madras at Fort
St. George are a particularly rich trove of documents concerning the commercial
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magnates who rented the pearl fisheries and their interactions with the Company Raj.
Historian David Ludden writes that the District Collectorate Records of Madras
“represent the most detailed documentary resource for the study of local history in South
India.”585 Yet historians have not read such materials with a view towards the pearl
fisheries during these early years of British management because most scholarship has
relied on letters, reports, and other documents found at archives in London. Information
that reached the East India Company headquarters on Leadenhall Street or the Colonial
Office in London was generally concerned more with annual revenue figures and
managerial policy and less with the financial intricacies of the industry and its local
investors. The records of Tirunelveli are of particular interest because this was the
administrative division within which fell most of the pearl fisheries on the India-side of
Mannar fell. Records from the Tirunelveli cutcherry contain many papers that did not
become a part of the Board of Revenue’s official collection at Fort St. George, which, in
turn, meant that they seldom reached the metropole. Triangulating district-level records
with documents from the upper echelons of Company administration and published
primary and secondary sources provides a window on the commercial lending and
borrowing practices of merchants who invested in the pearl fishery. Correspondence
between local merchants and other sorts of private business papers have unfortunately not
been located but the Company archives are replete with official documents related to the
lease of the pearl fishery. Merchants that rented the pearl fisheries formed only a small
section of the traders, financiers, jewelers, and other businessmen involved in the pearl
trade but such figures are overrepresented in the documentary record due to the special
contractual relationships that they enjoyed with the government. Merchants who
585
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submitted applications for the rent of the pearl fishery hailed largely from elite trading
classes in colonial capitals like Madras or towns that had long-standing connections with
the pearl trade such as Tuticorin, Nagapattinam, and Kilakkarai. Credit and debt were
vitally important to the undertaking. Company policy stipulated that an applicant provide
the name of a guarantor, a person that ensured that the renter fulfill the obligations of his
contract (muchelka) with the government. The Board of Revenue also required the
winning bidder to deposit cash, draft notes, or other forms of property into the treasury as
a form of collateral.
The highly speculative and risk-laden nature of the pearling industry often
brought even the most prudent and well-heeled renters to the brink of ruin. In such cases,
the Board called upon a guarantor to satisfy the renter’s obligation. Through letters,
petitions, and in-person supplications, renters and their associates pursued remission
payments and other forms of remediation to offset financial loss. Documents related to
such claims suggest that there was more at stake than the material and financial wellbeing of a renter and his associates. Men also traded on their reputations. Those who
commanded extensive resources and cultivated a reputable status in the eyes of the
business community and British authorities improved their chances of winning the bid.
While men of modest means and lesser visibility regularly tendered rental applications, it
was more often than not their distinguished counterparts who received the grant.
Successful bidders often brought together a group of investors for the purpose of renting
a pearl fishery and engaged in other forms of social and cultural entrepreneurialism that
potentially augmented status and reputation. Types of social and cultural engagement by
merchants who invested in the pearl fishery included charitable contributions to religious
208

institutions, involvement in community and caste affairs, and the mediation of
interpersonal and business relationships through the language of honor, trust, and
friendship. In other words, the rent of the pearl fishery demanded the expenditure of
capital in all its forms.586 A tight braid of economic and social credit was threaded
through the business worlds of pearl merchants. When an aspiring renter put forward a
bid for the lease of the pearl fisheries he wagered both economic and social assets. If the
venture failed, he would not only lose a significant amount of money but also risked
falling out of favor with his creditors and other business associates.
Recent studies bring multi-disciplinary and global perspectives to the history of
money and credit, which provide blueprints on how to undertake a study of the social and
cultural aspects of lending and borrowing in specific historical settings such as the pearl
fishery and its attendant trade in late eighteenth-century and early nineteenth-century
India and Sri Lanka. Scholarship on topics ranging from traders of the medieval
Mediterranean world to the consuming and mercantile classes of England and the
dispersed trading networks of the early modern world have opened the doors for a new
historiography of the “cultures of credit.”587 The cultural aspects of credit and debt have
also received the attention of collaborative scholarly projects that provide valuable
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perspectives on non-western and global contexts.588 Such work brings new views of
business cultures and organization into sharper focus, shifting attention beyond account
books and the long-term evolution of commercial and credit institutions to see more
dynamic, relational, and contextualized business worlds. Whereas historical studies of
credit and debt usually treat the terms as abstract concepts in terms of accounting and
macroeconomics, for merchants with aspirations to rent the pearl fishery, credit and debt
shaped their everyday lives and structured interactions with their peers. As historian John
Smail writes in his study of eighteenth-century British mercantile cultures, “To appreciate
these aspects of commercial credit, we must stop treating credit as an abstract factor of
production (or consumption) and approach it instead as an open-ended and everyday
element in the lives of merchants and manufacturers.”589
To fully appreciate how the extension of credit and acquisition of debt structured
and affected the business worlds of pearl merchants at the turn of the nineteenth century,
it is necessary to situate such transactions within their specific social and cultural milieus.
In the case of South Asia, historians have long debated and discussed how caste and
kinship relationships shaped attitudes towards credit in mercantile organizations.590
Scholars have also discussed the meaning and use of financial instruments such as the
hundi or bill of exchange in indigenous banking systems and long-distance trade, as well
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as the significance of money in regional and transregional economic systems.591 One of
the central questions in this body of scholarly literature concerns the identities and
solidarities of mercantile communities in pre-modern social and economic dispensations.
Some have emphasized the importance of shared cultural traits, such as religion and
language, in fostering connections amongst members of a particular group and
maintaining collective mercantile identities. Others have downplayed the importance of
caste.592 Historian C. A. Bayly for instance, viewed caste as a significant feature of
mercantile communities and activities but emphasized that it was not the fundamental
unit of organization for those in urban markets. He wrote: “it is difficult to see how caste
in any sense could have been the prime parameter of mercantile organization in complex
cities. Forms of arbitration, market control, brokerage, neighborhood communities and
above all conceptions of mercantile honor and credit breached caste boundaries, however
construed, and imposed wider solidarities on merchant people.”593 Scholars have also
underscored the importance of kin and caste in the business worlds of Indian merchants.
Anthropologist David Rudner argues that caste was an essential feature of Nattukottai
Chettiar banking and trading activities, providing members of the group with valuable
bits of “social capital” that were especially useful in maintaining long-distance
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commercial relationships between the Tamil heartland and Southeast Asia.594 There are
others that see a more fluid system, in which the strength of caste and kin bonds varied by
institutional setting and context. For example, it has been argued by some historians that
temporary marketplaces, bazars, and fairs witnessed the temporary breakdown of caste as
an organizing principle of commerce.595
Looking through the prism of a single industry such as the pearl fishery provides a
distinct perspective on the business worlds of merchants because it does not focus on a
specific group or caste but instead reveals a spectrum of businessmen who invested in the
production of a single luxury commodity. This line of inquiry reveals a variegated
commercial landscape within which a multiplicity of social and economic actors
interacted. An in-depth review of applications submitted to the Madras government for
the rent of the pearl fisheries in the early nineteenth century suggests that shared or
overlapping identities were not hard and fast prerequisites for prospective renters. While
members of the same family or merchants who shared similar geographic and cultural
backgrounds often engaged in the rent of the pearl fisheries, such relationships were not
the exclusive type of arrangement. Many previous studies of the pearl fisheries have not
focused on the mercantile cultures and organization of the trade but instead emphasized
its sociological make-up.596 Indeed, most scholarship has formed a communal and groupbased profile of the industry, composing a portrait of the industry as a site of investment

594

David Rudner, “Religious Gift Giving and Inland Commerce in Seventeenth-Century South India,” The
Journal of Asian Studies 46, no. 2 (1987): 361-79; Rudner, “Banker’s Trust and the Culture of Banking
among the Nattukottai Chettiars of Colonial South India,” Modern Asian Studies 23, no. 3 (1989): 417-58;
Rudner, Caste and Capitalism.
595
T. Mizushima, Nattar and Socio-Economic Change in South India in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth
Centuries (Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, 1986); Washbrook, “Merchants, Markets, and Commerce.”
596
Roche, Fishermen of the Coromandel; Bayly, Saints, Goddesses and Kings; Malekandathil, “Fishing the
Pearl and the Soul.”
212

by Hindu and Muslim “mercantile communities,” such as Maraikkayars and Chettis,
while low-status Muslim Lubbai and Christian Parava populations provided labor as
divers, boatmen, and washers. An oft-cited passage in Duarte Barbosa’s early sixteenthcentury account described some aspects of the mercantile organization of the pearl trade.
He wrote: “A wealthy and distinguished Moor has long held the farm of the duties levied
on seed-pearls. He is so rich and powerful that all the people of the land honour him as
much as the King. He executes judgement and justice on the Moors without interference
from the King.”597 The pearl fishery and its attendant trade also appears to have attracted
merchants from across the region. As early as the seventeenth century, Dutch VOC
officials took an interests in merchant activities. In 1694, Dutch factor Floris Blom
addressed capital and commodity networks that coalesced around the pearl fishery: “This
dearness of the pearls is caused by the arrival of many merchants from the lands of the
Mogol, Madure, Tansjouwer, et cetera, with great capitals, each of whom wanted the
jewels most strongly, and who have bid so high and made purchases that many
experience native merchants swear that on some varieties they will make a loss rather
than a profit.”598 Historian Sanjay Subrahmanyam draws attention to the changing profile
of merchants who rented the pearl fishery from the Madras and Ceylon governments in
the nineteenth century.599 He finds that the Chettiars and Maraikkayars, as well as a few
stray European merchants, tended to be the most successful revenue-farmers during this
early period of British management. During the course of the nineteenth century,
Subrahmanyam writes, “Nattukottai Chettiars in the fishery grew more and more marked,
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reaching a height in the mid-nineteenth century.”600 He adds: “The earlier dominance of
Parava and Maraikkayar interests is thus no longer visible; the link between control of
labour (here, divers) and the investment of capital had turned relatively fragile.”601
The pearl trade may appear at first glance to meet certain expectations about
markets and societies in pre-modern Asian wherein primordial attributes such as
language, religion, caste, and kin formed the substance of economic relationships. While
pearl merchants tapped caste and kin networks for financial support, connections beyond
so-called “natural ties” provided alternative or supplemental sources of capital. Indeed,
there are many documented cases in which merchants without shared religious and
cultural affiliations joined forces to bid for the rent of a pearl fishery. For example, a
certain Muslim Maraikkayar merchant from Kilakkarai named Caveek Mahamad and
Ramasami Naick of Ramnad each offered the other’s name as security for their respective
rental applications for the 1807 fishery at Tuticorin.602 In another instance, a European
private merchant tendered an application for rent of the 1800 pearl fishery at Tuticorin
that included the names of “Camasoora Hucadoo, and Rajahram Lasastoo.”603 He
characterized these two men as “respectable Soucars [bankers]” and offered them as
guarantors of his proposal.604 Business relationships that coalesced around the pearl
fisheries—from partnerships in the highest echelons of the trading elites to micro-lending
and borrowing by divers and laborers—did not conform to standard interpretive models
about pre-modern economies and societies.
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Merchants often mediated relationships based on credit and debt obligations and
mobilized capital for the rent of a pearl fishery based on notions of trust, honor, and
friendship. These ideas also permeated relationships between local Indian agents or
dubashes and their British employers whom dabbled in the pearl trade. For example, a
certain Venkatachalam Pillai from Vandalur, a village on the southern outskirts of
Madras, was dubash to James Jervis, a British officer who served as head assistant at
Jaffnapatnam for the East India Company.605 In this capacity, Jervis undertook an
examination of the pearl oyster beds at the request of his superior, Robert Andrews.606
Not only did Jervis perform his duty of supervising the assaying process but he also
somehow managed to secure the rent of 1796 the pearl fishery for PNP 150,000.607
However, the fishery got off to a slow start and Jervis submitted a petition to the
Company in late March or early April 1796 requesting an annulment of his contract for
the rent. The Board of Revenue stated “that several difficulties had occurred to prevent
the Pearl Fishery taking place to the extent that was expected” and the “Renter had
entirely receded from his Engagements.”608 James Cordiner, the British chaplain at
Colombo, wrote in his account of Ceylon, “From the unsettled state of the country, no
native made suitable offers for the fishery; it was therefore let to Mr. John Jervis, a junior
merchant in the Company, on terms, by which he might have acquired a handsome
fortune; but his courage failed him, and he was released from the bargain.”609 The pearl
fishery, however, reportedly turned a three-fold profit after the Company released Jervis
605

John Penry Lewis, List of Tombstones and Monuments in Ceylon (Colombo: Ceylon Government Press,
1913), 405-7. For more on Venkatachalam Pillai and members of his extended family, see Susan NeildBasu, “The Dubashes of Madras,” Modern Asian Studies 18, no. 1 (1984), 7-8, 17.
606
TNA, BOR Proceedings, Vol. 139, 8405 (12 November 1795).
607
BL, IOR, H, 606, 355; BL, IOR, Madras Revenue Proceedings, Range 275, Vol. 8, 458; De Silva, “The
Pearl Fisheries of Ceylon,” 434; Subrahmanyam, “Noble Harvest from the Sea,” 155.
608
BL, IOR, H, 606, 355.
609
Cordiner, Description of Ceylon, 2:71-2.
215

from his contract and farmed it out to a group of native merchants. Jervis had in all
likelihood come to the pearl fishery saddled with massive private debts and it appears that
Venkatachalam Pillai was not only his dubash but also his primary creditor.
Venkatachalam Pillai later penned a personal narrative or memorial about his life,
sections of which include discussions of his relationship with Jervis. He wrote, “I had
proceeded [to the pearl fishery] in the hope that he would be able to discharge his
debts…But I have been greatly mortified at Mr. Jervis’s having given up the lucrative
farm of Pearl Fishery.”610 His financial ruin combined with the collapse of his
relationships with Jervis sent Venkatachalam into a downward spiral because he was
“overwhelmed with grief.”611 Venkatachalam described how he “wandered so far as
Bombay and Poona to linger out the rest of my day in misery and obscurity…I thought
my deplorable condition better among strangers than among acquaintances. I lost Mr.
Jervis and all I had in the world.”612 Not only did Venkatachalam lose his wealth but also
his personal honor and private friendship with Jervis. From the perspective of
Venkatachalam, he and Jervis certainly had a bond that exceeded the prototypical
relationship between a dubash and his employer, which further illustrates the integral role
of credit and debt in the economy of the pearl trade as well as the financial risks of such
investments.
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Regimes of Renting, Risk, and Remission
From the moment the East India Company secured managerial control over the pearl
fishery of the Gulf of Mannar, British officials on both sides of the Gulf desired to turn
the industry into “a state of certain, regular, and rich, annual reproduction.”613 One way
that British administrators set out to achieve this goal was by compelling local pearl
merchants to modify and adapt their business practices, which many viewed as
speculative and reckless. Dutch officials had also expressed concerns about the
speculative nature of the enterprise. Governor Daniel Overbeek addressed the problem in
a report to his successor, Julius Stein van Golleneese, in April 1743 that the fishery
“cannot be otherwise than injurious to the Company, and especially to the people.”614 He
wrote: “[The pearl fishery] is nothing but a lottery or a gamble, at the close of which
hundreds and even thousands, return home completely ruined, against one or a few who
may make a fortune. To the unfortunate ones nothing remains but their imagination, so
their minds are upset, much to the distress of their families. And no wonder! From the
moment a pearl fishery has been ordered, weavers, dyers, merchants, everyone leaves his
long practiced occupation, and as the saying is, ‘not an old woman remains at her
spinning wheel,’ but each and everyone makes preparations to take part in the dangerous
game of the pearl fishery, each flatter himself with the expectation of good luck, and
driven by the hope of a fortune even beyond his dreams.”615 Likewise, British officials
denigrated the habits and behaviors of pearl merchants as “rapacious” and
“superstitious,” but they also understood that government finances benefitted immensely
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from the episodic injection of local capital made by the pearl fishery. While there was
nothing that resembled the coordinated legislative efforts to differentiate gambling and
speculation in colonial north India during the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, administrators in early colonial Madras and Ceylon tried to reform the
economic and financial practices of pearl merchants in other ways.616 Through careful
attention to managing the industry, British officials believed that merchants engaged in
the pearl fishery and its attendant trade would turn from reckless speculators into
responsible economic subjects. It was therefore the responsibility of the government to
reduce the hazards of the pearl fishery and turn it from a “Speculation of Loss” to a
“Speculation of Advantage,” as Governor North wrote.617 In a letter to the Court of
Directors in London, North remarked, “[The Pearl Fishery] is not, like a Lottery, a
Speculation of Loss but a Speculation of Advantage to the Persons engaged in it. It
appears to me therefore as much the Interest of Government to Diminish the Hazard of it
and to reduce it as nearly as possible to a clear and calculated advantage, as it is certainly
the Duty of Government to Discourage that mad and desperate Spirit of Speculations
which is but too Prevalent among this rapacious and superstitious People.”618 As the
previous chapter explored vis-à-vis the bazaar, administrators of Madras and Ceylon
sought to create a safe and secure economic space through good management and
governance that would not only turn the pearl fishery into a regular and predictable
stream of revenue but also mold mercantile practices.
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Remissions were one way through which the government interfered in the
economy of the pearl fishery and attempted to turn it into a predictable and profitable
venture despite the many physical hazards and financial risks associated with the pearling
industry. The cancellation of debts was a privilege enjoyed by the renter and his partners
based on their contractual relationship with the governing body that held managerial
rights over the pearl fishery. Governor North wrote to the Court of Directors in London
with an argument in favor of the government awarding this particular indulgence. He
described how the financial fates of the government and renter were interwoven and it
was in the best interests of all parties to safeguard the investment. He wrote: “The
advantage of the Proprietor, I should think, be increased in proportion to the safety of the
Speculator, that by the Certainty of the Profit of and Diminution of the Risk, and the
more extensive the concern and the greater the Risk, the greater, in a high Progressive
Proportion, must be the Profit held out to the Enterpriser to induce Him to undertake it. In
the Pearl Fishery Government is the Proprietor, and, of course, must gain whatever the
Speculator pays on account of Security, and lose whatever he withholds on account of
Danger.”619 For the Madras and Ceylon governments, forgiving the debts of renters was a
small concession if the pearl fishery was to remain a viable source of revenue. But not all
officials believed extending remissions was the best policy. British Ceylon civil servant
Anthony Bertolacci, for example, discussed some of the advantages and disadvantages of
this practice, suggesting that while granting remissions removed some of the risk for the
renting party it overextended state finances. He wrote, “For when the fishery has failed,
the Ceylon Government has made a proportionate remission of part of the payment to the
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contractor, that he might not be a loser.”620 He continued: “This remission, from the
nature of that fishery, the Colonial Government will and must always allow;
notwithstanding an article is never omitted in the contract, by which it is agreed that it
shall not be granted. But if, upon the fishery proving unsuccessful, Government were to
refuse it, no person would come forward, at the next fishing, to purchase it.”621 Bertolacci
noted that these levels of risk were associated with this particular management system.
Instead of awarding all the boats to a single renter, the government should dispose of
them “all to one contractor, it is subject to a great chance of losing a considerable profit,
without that of making one, if the produce should be so trifling as to disappoint the
general expectation.”622
Governor Maitland of Ceylon (1805-1812) also expressed concerns about handing
out remission payments to the renter at the end of the pearling season. He recommended
“getting rid of the evil of the practice of granting Remissions.”623 The mode of
conducting the pearl fishery, according to Maitland, was a secondary concern to whether
or not a sufficient number of pearl oysters were present on the banks. In a letter sent from
Colombo to London in 1806, Maitland wrote, “Whichever of these plans is abstractedly
the best, in the situation in which I found the Island was a matter of very trivial
consequence, as by the heavy Remission granted on a former Pearl Fisheries by my
Predecessor, it did not become a matter of any consideration how we let it in
commissioner of getting rid of the evil of the practice of granting Remissions.”624 In
1806, Maitland introduced a new system of management, one that reduced the number of
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boats and sought to limit the frequency and size of remissions claims, an attempt to block
a key avenue through which merchants protected their investment in the pearl fishery.
Maitland recommended renting the entire fishery of fifty boats to a single renter on one
important condition. The principal renter was prohibited from sub-leasing the boats to
other merchants without the express approval of the governor’s private secretary. The
renter was also required to advance a large sum of money to the government. According
to Maitland, “The evident gain from adopting this line was that Government had all the
advantage of the Aumany Fishery, and the Renter became neither more nor less than the
Black Agent of Government who by his Knowledge of the habits of the Natives managed
the letting of the Boats in a manner infinitely more genial to their Habits than could have
been done by a European.”625 However, the new system never gained traction and British
Ceylon reverted back to the previous mode of management. The debate, however,
continued to animate discussions about how to best managed the pearl fishery. More than
three decades later, James Bennett warned about the practice of extending remission
payments to renters, which he found parasitic and self-destructive. Bennett even proposed
doing away with the renting system all together and suggested replacing it with a true
lottery. Instead of reviewing proposals and granting the lease of the pearl fishery to a
renter, the government of British Ceylon should simply sell tickets. Bennett argued that a
lottery was not only a better way to realize a handsome profit but it also reduced the
chance of the principal renter bringing forth a remissions claim. He wrote, “a lottery
might be preferable to farming it…to the highest bidder; but it is very bad policy to hold
out an expectation, that, in the event of failure, the speculator may claim a reduction of
his rent; for these gentry take very good care, in the event of the profits exceeding their
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calculations, to keep the overplus [sic] to themselves. The sale should be peremptory; and
the speculators forewarned, that, in the event of failure, the government will not, under
any circumstances whatever, entertain their claims to a reduction of the rent.”626
Government largesse in the form of remissions payments was also intended to
ingratiate wealthy merchants and to keep their capital invested in the pearling industry.
Remissions though were not indiscriminately handed to the aggrieved parties following a
fishery that underperformed. As much as Madras depended on the money and authority
of local merchants for the pearl fishery to function effectively from season to season,
British officials often found themselves in antagonistic positions with elite pearl
merchants. Through petitions, letter-writing, and in-person appearances before British
officials and administrative bodies such as the Board of Revenue, renters and their
associates had to prepare and present cases for remission payments. Those who brought
claims before the government also employed strategies beyond formal petitioning and
letter-writing, such as decamping and withholding payments. While British officials
viewed such behavior as ignoble, and often times took such conduct into account when
considering the validity of a remissions claims, these functioned as viable economic and
political strategies for merchants with their wealth and reputations at stake. Remissions
granted by the governments of Madras and Ceylon could prove the difference between an
absorbable loss and total ruin. But the constraints placed by trust, honor and the desire for
a good name also established expectations of what constituted proper conduct. Perhaps
counterbalancing the prodigious risk assumed by renters and their guarantors and the
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uncertainty that hung over the pearl fishery camp, these constraints seemed to have
offered a way to bring stability and regularity to an otherwise volatile industry.
As much as the rent of a pearl fishery brought with it financial and reputational
risks it also held the potential for enormous gains on both fronts. It not only provided
immediate access to one of the world’s most abundant sources of natural pearls but it also
boosted the profile of a renter in the certain sectors of the business community. One
media channel through which the renter gained notoriety was official government
publications, especially newspapers and pamphlets that spread information about the
ensuing pearl fishery and its lease holder. The Collector of Ramnad received a letter from
the Board of Revenue in March 1800 that instructed him to “publish throughout your
districts that the pearl Fishery at Tutacoryn has been rented for the present season to Mr.
Gregory Baboom Armenian Merchant.”627 In another instance, an item in the Ceylon
Gazette from February 1816 highlighted that Gopalan Chetti rented the pearl fishery at
Arippu: “We understand that Kopalen Chitty of Jaffna has been declared the highest
bidder for the Pearl fishery which is soon to commence. If Kopalen Chitty should fulfill
the stipulated conditions of which from his respectable character and punctuality at a
former fishery that he rented we have no doubt his contract will be finally concluded and
signed on Friday next.”628 As the rent of the pearl fishery advanced the business interests
of merchants and promoted their reputation in the commercial world, it also nestled them
more snuggly into the arms of Company-directed and colonial state-controlled
commerce. In some cases, merchant-renters had business arrangements with the East
India Company that were not limited to the pearling industry, such as contract shipping
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and commodities trading. Holding a cowle for the pearl fishery presented the renter with
further opportunities to interact directly with high-ranking government officials. This was
the case at Arippu in 1804 when Tamil merchant Vydelinga Chetti met with Governor
North of Ceylon. According to one eyewitness account, “The renter soon went and
waited on the governor, and paid him many compliments in the figurative style of his
country. He is the only native, belonging to the British territories in the island, who
enjoys the privilege of sitting in his excellency’s [sic] presence.”629
Following the examination of the pearl oyster beds, if the superintendents
determined that a pearl fishery was feasible, then officials distributed advertisements in
the capital cities of Madras and Colombo and throughout the coastal districts. The results
of the examination regularly produced enthusiastic and optimistic responses from
officials that were not only intended to increase the likelihood of a pearl fishery but also
intended to stoke interests amongst merchants with renting aspirations. Stephen
Lushington, the Collector of Ramnad, wrote ahead of the 1800 pearl fishery at Tuticorin:
“The examination which has been made of the Banks gives the fairest promise of a larger
produce than has ever known from them, and the privilege of fishing them is an object of
speculation, in which many merchants and Individuals in these Countries are desirous of
embarking.”630 At the same time, advertisements also had to temper expectations so as to
reduce the likelihood that the government would receive remissions claims from
merchant-renters disappointed in the yield of pearls and profits. These advertisements
often became a reference point for the renter in his attempt to secure a remission
following a fishery that fell short of expectations. For example, a petition submitted by
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Vydelinga Chetti in 1804 read, “That in Consequence of [the] Examination account
Certified in the newspaper, I have…rented this Fishery, by trusting that the number of
Oysters will yield every day agreeable to the former Fisheries.”631
Advertisements for the pearl fishery usually appeared in Tamil and English but
also sometimes Sinhala and even Dutch during the early years of British management.
The language of advertisements reflects the social and cultural heterogeneity of the pearl
fishery, as well as the complex political history of the region. While the divers, boatmen,
and petty merchants received word of an upcoming fishery through pamphlets, handbills,
and public proclamations, most of the renters hailed from elite commercial classes and
received invitations to tender applications in newspapers such as the Government
Gazettes and Madras Courier.632 These same newspapers also provided periodic updates
to the reading public once the event was underway. A short article from the Ceylon
Gazette read: “Our letter from Aripo of the 17th state the Pearl Fishery to be going on
well, Oysters continued to be fished in abundance the average Number about 15,000 each
Boat per diem in some instances Boats have brought in 25,000.”633 Members of the
Board, as well as the superintendent of the fishery, communicated directly with the
editors of these publications about advertisements for the pearl fishery. In March 1818, a
representative from the Board of Revenue sent a letter to the editor of the Government
press “to request that the enclosed notice may be printed underneath the advertisement on
the subject of the Pearl Fishery at Pinnacoil under date the 23rd February 1818 and that
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the same may be published in Hand bills through the President as soon as possible.”634 A
decade later, the Board sent multiple letters enclosed with drafts of the advertisement to
the Madras Gazette and Courier to promote the 1828 pearl fishery.635 Advertisements
included technical information, such as the number of oysters caught and the type and
quantity of pearls found, as well the dates, scale, location, and managerial mode of the
forthcoming fishery. Merchants submitting proposals for the rent of the pearl fishery
frequently referred to such notices in their applications. For example, the application of
one Cabal Mahomed Maraikkayar of Kilakkarai for the rent of the 1810 pearl fishery at
Tuticorin began, “Wherever it is mentioned in that advertisement published under dated
[sic] the 11th February 1810 that a Pearl Fishery will Commence at Tutacoryn on the 25
of March Next.”636 The organizers of the pearl fishery also made samples of pearls
available for inspection by prospective renters. The pearls were sorted, classed, and
valued by specialist jewelers employed by officials overseeing the preparations for the
pearl fishery. Advertisements contained information about the class and size of pearls
gathered during the examination process and gave notice to prospective renters that
samples were available for inspection. As an official wrote to Lord Clive at Fort St.
George ahead of the 1800 pearl fishery at Tuticorin, “Musters of the Pearls accompany
and as they are in the event of advertising the Banks to be reserved for the inspection of
bidders care should be taken that they are not mixed.”637 The advertisement for the 1830
pearl fishery at Tuticorin read: “Muster of the Pearls may be seen and further particulars
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known on application to the Office of the Board of Revenue or at the Cutcherry of the
Collector.”638

Figure 8. Pearl Fishery Advertisement, Ceylon Government Gazette, 12 January 1814 (United Kingdom
National Archives, Kew Gardens).

Advertisements distributed by Madras and Colombo also included specific
instructions on how to tender applications. Prospective renters submitted sealed proposals
with the amount of rent and the terms and conditions of the engagement to officials at
district-level offices, the Board of Revenue at Fort St. George, or branches of the Ceylon
government depending on the location of the pearl fishery. Applications had to be
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inscribed with a specific note on the front of the parcel. As the advertisement for the 1818
pearl fishery read, “It is required that all proposals bear on the envelope the following
superscription ‘Proposals for renting the Pearl Fishery in the Vicinity of Pinnacoil’ and
that they contain a tender of sufficient security for the due performance of the
Engagement.”639 Advertisements set deadlines for the submission of proposals, which
colonial officials observed rather closely, though there was some flexibility on a case-bycase basis. Collector James Hepburn of Tirunelveli wrote to the Board that he was
considering shifting the application deadline because he did not want to “run the risk of
my misconception which an alteration of the time might occasion.”640 He subsequently
forwarded “Copies & Translations of three different Proposals” to Fort St. George on
“the day fixed for the receipt of Proposals.”641 Failure to abide by such strict deadlines
was often met with the scorn of Company officials. For instance, Collector Cotton of
Tirunelveli received a message from the Board in January 1815 that instructed him “to
accept the most favorable tender that may be made within the time prescribed for the
intended pearl fishery” and asked why the collector had “so long delayed submitting any
communication on the subject.”642 These were not idle concerns, as there were in fact
many instances in which government officials rejected applications because they had
been submitted after the published deadline. In March 1800, for instance, Collector
Lushington of Ramnad replied to an applicant who tendered an application after the
stated deadline, “your reference to the advertisement published under my signature in the
639
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newspaper without noticing the Proclamation limiting the time tendering offers…issued
at this place for the information of yourself in common with the other Inhabitants of
Tutacorin.”643 The faithful observance of application deadlines was not simply the result
of officials being sticklers for the bureaucratic rules but stemmed from fears over fraud
and collusion. Officers believed that late applications were more likely to be fixed with
information about the other amounts and that such proposals were blatant attempts to
manipulate the price of the rent. For instance, the collector disqualified two applications
for the rent of the 1807 pearl fishery at Tuticorin, “having been tendered two days after
the appointed time are therefore obnoxious to the suspicion of having been fabricated
from a Knowledge of the other proposals.”644 In another instance, a district-level official
describes how a certain Chidambaram Chetti, who was also then serving as security for
one of the applicants, “produced from under his cloths [sic] another sealed proposal the
amount of which Rupees 70,350 exceeded the highest of the former offers by Rupees
135.”645
District collectors and members of the Board of Revenue were the principal
officials in charge of reviewing applications. Much of the important work in this process
took place at the administrative headquarters of the district within which the pearl fishery
that particular season was located. Thus, the district-level office or cutcherry emerged in
the early nineteenth century as an important site of governmental and bureaucratic power
in Madras. Historian Bhavani Raman has described these spaces as “the central point of
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contact between officials and inhabitants.”646 Officials maintained that the district
collector had a better sense of a prospective renter’s character and creditworthiness
compared to those who sat in Madras and Colombo. For instance, the acting collector in
Tirunelveli wrote to Fort St. George that the Board “may look to me as being more
immediately on the Spot, for some information respecting those men who are represented
as Securities.”647 Madras and Ceylon officials gathered information about the renter and
his partners through various channels and often summoned each applicant for evaluations
and credit checks. For instance, the Board ordered that Collector Hepburn of Tirunelveli
call the five highest bidders to his office and “question them with regard to the
Conditional offers set forth in their respective proposals.”648 Collector Hepburn reviewed
the candidates and reported to the Board: “The three first Proposals in the accompanying
List, though considerably highest in point nominal amount, were clogged with a
condition which greatly reduced their [value].”649 After all the proposals were received
and evaluated, the collector of the district within which the fishery was to be held invited
prospective renters to his office. In front of the applicants, he announced the
government’s decision and awarded the rent to the winning bidder. The acting collector
of Tirunelveli reported to the Board in January 1807 that he had “opened and read aloud
[4 Tenders] in the Cutcherry and in the presence of the several Bidders.”650 Such
ritualized procedures were not mere formalities but important steps in evaluating the
reputation and character of the renters and his guarantors by both government officials
and competing applicants.
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It is noteworthy that the governments of Madras and Ceylon did not always award
the rent of the pearl fishery to the highest bidder. For example, the Board of Revenue at
Fort St. George received thirteen proposals for the 1807 pearl fishery at Tuticorin while
four other prospective renters tendered their applications at the Tirunelveli cutcherry.651
Officials dismissed four applications from the outset because they doubted the reputation
of the person serving as security or the applicant failed to offer the name of a guarantor. It
was further discovered during the review process that one of the sureties offered by an
applicant was “by report not able, in any case of any accident to furnish the whole sum
for which he must enter into a Bond.”652 The reputation and conduct of a prospective
renter and his guarantor during the application process could further impact the fate of his
proposal. For example, the collector of Tirunelveli summoned the five highest bidders for
the 1810 pearl fishery to his office to discuss the terms of their proposals. One of the
renters, however, did not answer the call and it was later revealed that his guarantor could
only cover a fraction of the total rent. In another case, the Board referred to the highest
bidder for the 1815 pearl fishery at Tiruchendur as an “obscure individual.”653 Officials
disqualified the applicant and granted the cowle to the next highest bidder, a certain
Cuttah Narrainaswami, whom appeared to the Board “to be a respectable man, and the
security he has given is unexceptionable.”654 Cuttah Narrainaswami had also forwarded
two security bonds of worth 10,000 Sicca Rupees and had the support of a British private
merchant named Thomas Parry.655 The reputation of man’s family and his business
651
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associates was also taken into consideration during the review process. For example,
Collector of Tirunelveli James Hepburn referred to the family of Said Muhammad
Maraikkayar when reviewing his application for the rent of the 1810 pearl fishery. He
noted that the prospective renter was “the Grandson of Old Abdul Mahoomed Murcay of
Kilkerry,” one of the most “respect[ed] Merchants on the Coast.”656 Even for men who
enjoyed sterling reputations and commanded vast wealth, the rate of failure for renters
was remarkably high. Yet the promise of the pearl fishery continued to attract the
attention of investors and serve as a site of considerable commercial activity, partly
through the efforts of the Madras and Ceylon governments to mitigate the dangers of
investment in the pearling industry.
While British Ceylon and the Company Raj were dependent upon the infusion of
local capital to the pearl fishery, many government officials also expressed the desire to
break-up certain merchant coteries. In doing so, Company and Crown officials hoped to
open new opportunities to merchants with lesser means and broaden participation in the
industry without reducing the overall revenue potential. Ceylonese officials, particularly
those under the influence of Governor North, wanted to short-circuit the sway of
commercial elites over the pearl fishery, to pry the industry away from the grip of Tamil
merchants from mainland India and the northern districts of Ceylon. During the early
years of British rule in Ceylon, this was viewed as a way to keep money on the island
instead of losing it to the mainland. Anthony Bertolacci, the author of an early colonial
history of Ceylon and former personal assistant to Governor North, advocated “giving an
opportunity to the small capitalists in Ceylon to venture upon this speculation, and to
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purchase the boats direct from Government, instead of paying an advanced price to the
renter, who has almost always been a merchant of the continent of India, and not an
inhabitant of Ceylon.” 657 By granting favors and concessions to merchants from India,
British Ceylon was a willing participant in its own financial demise, allowing merchants
to rent the fishery with little to no risk, after which time they returned home with coins,
pearls, and other spoils of the land and sea. A family of Tamil merchants from Jaffna
helmed by Kundappah Chetti and Vydelinga Chetti was the primary target of such
efforts. As one British officer wrote, “Their Influence must be considerable over all the
Boat Proprietors and Divers, their exertions and representations, and that dread of novelty
and of innovation which is so prevalent amongst all the Natives may prevent many
persons from speculating.”658 Governor North wrote to the Court of Directors in London
at the end of February 1799 in reference to these two notorious merchants from Jaffna,
upset that they had formed “combination among the black Capitalists who speculations
are not likely to be attended with the same advantage now, when open competition is
offered.”659 North also bemoaned the fact that the renter “was impossible to controul [sic]
& to overlook,” as they also offered to lend money at an “unconscionable Premium.” He
concluded, “These are the evils against which I am to struggle.”660
The motivation for government officials to break-up certain merchant groups or
“combinations of bidders” was manifold. Primarily, superintendents of the pearl fishery
sought to prevent collusion and price-fixing for sub-rented and auctioned boats. The
manipulation of the market for boats by merchants such as Vydelinga Chetti had the
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potential to reduce the overall revenue derived from the pearl fishery. Further anxiety
over price-fixing stemmed from the fact that such activities occurred secretly between
merchants, as members of the same family and businessmen with established connections
came to agreements that were not sanctioned or known by officials thus beyond the
immediate purview of government officials. Renters exercised undue power and sway
over operations at the pearl fishery in other ways. For instance, officials believed that
renters unfairly manipulated labor pools by selecting the best divers for their boats and
distributing the less skilled ones to boats that they put up for sale. At the same time,
however, the power of renters to select divers for boats in their employ was seen as a
customary right that found its way into renting proposals and contracts. For example, in a
bid for the 1805 pearl fishery at Tiruchendur, a certain Cappanayar Mercair submitted a
proposal that contained the following clause: “Out of the Boats and men Collected I am
to choose what Boat and man are fit after so if any Boat or Boats man or mans [sic]
should find any accident not fit for the service I am to change them.”661
From the perspective of the renter, the prospect of a remission all but guaranteed
either a healthy share of the oysters and pearls or a proportionate refund, which
effectively reduced financial risks and increased potential rewards. Remissions could
mean the difference between an absorbable loss and total ruin for the renter and anyone
else tangled in his web of credit and debt. For Madras and Ceylon, the extension of
remissions and cancellations of debts functioned as generous incentives for investment by
prospective renters because it safeguarded local capital. Such protections were thought to
spur economic activity at the pearl fishery, leading to increased prices in boat sales and a
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more robust market for pearls and oysters, which further enriched the public treasury.
However, an overly generous remission payment could reduce the overall profit margin
of the enterprise, an effect that officials certainly recognized and wished to avoid. For
example, as Bertolacci wrote, “The fisheries of the years 1808, 9, and 14, were sold to the
same renter. That of 1809 had been sold for 260,000 Porto-novo pagodas; but having
failed, a remission was granted him, which reduced the revenue of that year to
25,000l.”662 This was not always the case, however. A healthy yield of pearls and oysters
and robust markets for such produce could also minimize the chances that a renter
brought forward a remission claim. For instance, Governor North wrote to Lord Hobart in
London with an update on the 1803 pearl fishery at Chilaw in an uncharacteristically
cheerful tone: “Every Boat was let for its full value, every oyster sold for its highest
Price, and I am justified in declaring that no Renter who would not have clogged us with
Remissions which would have frittered away the whole Emolument could have
undertaken it with any Prospect of Success.”663 British officials also hoped that the
extension of remission payments would instill a sense of confidence in the group of
merchants likely to rent the pearl fishery. For example, the renter of the 1815 pearl
fishery at Tiruchendur, Cuttah Narrainasawmi, wrote to Fort St. George with a request for
a remission, after which the Board “recommended a liberal remission to the renter, with a
view of guarding against the impression which the unfavorable [result] of that attempt
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was calculated to produce on minds of speculators in such undertakings as well as on
grounds of justice.”664
Even as British officials acknowledged the important function of remission
payments they laid down policies designed to limit such indulgences. Efforts to reduce
the likelihood of a renter bringing forth a remission claims began at the earliest stages of
application process and continued through end of the engagement. Company and Crown
officers were liable to reject proposals that stipulated each boat catch a minimum number
of oysters per day. For instance, Collector Hansbury of Tirunelveli reviewed applications
for the rent of the 1807 pearl fishery at Tuticorin. He reported to the Board, “The
Proposals it will be seen are replete with Conditional agreements the most Considerable
of which relates to the number of Oysters to be taken by each boat where the Renter
seems disposed to provide perfectly for that security against Loss, to which as you have
observed, he must in some measure be considered to be reasonably entitled.”665
According to Hansbury, accepting proposals with this conditional clause “really involves
all the risk and inconvenience of aumanie [direct management] for whilst it secures the
renter from all uncertainty and even keenly in considerable profit, it subject[s]
Government to indefinite loss.”666 The collector remarked that many “men of credit and
substance” submitted applications for the 1807 pearl fishery but were “embarrassed with
the objectionable clause.”667 Officials sometimes entered into negotiations with the
prospective renter about the terms and conditions of their contract. For example, William
Petrie, President of the Board, wrote to Lord Clive in March 1800 concerning the contract
664
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of Gregory Baboom, the renter of the pearl fishery at Tuticorin. He wrote, “The offer of
Mr. Baboom being the highest, we called before us and explained to him that it was
objectionable in that part which stipulates for a specific number of Oysters per Boats and
that we could not accept or recommend any Proposal containing such a Clause since it
opens a door to unavailing contention and the frauds of servants etc. and while it gives a
certainty to the Proposer subjects the Company to indefinite loss.”668 The protocols for
remission claims were often included in the renter’s contract. For example, Gregory
Baboom’s contract contained the following article: “If by any storm or interruption from
an enemy the fishery should be impeded a reasonable remission is to be granted to me
upon a full representation of the circumstances.”669 The renter was supposed to “make an
immediate representation” to the superintendent “on the spot who must ascertain without
delay the truth of the reports made.”670 Renters were therefore compelled to watch
proceedings at the pearl fishery closely so that they could submit a petition on the spot.
Company and Crown officers also used the extension of remission payments to
smooth over relationships between the government and merchants. Remissions could
therefore have a palliative effect. For instance, Vydelinga Chetti, the patriarch of a
powerful Tamil merchant family from Jaffna, rented one hundred and fifty boats for
thirty days at PNP 300,000 during the 1804 pearl fishery at Arippu. British chaplain
James Cordiner addressed the rent of the 1804 pearl fishery in his travel account: “As he
had been unsuccessful, he was allowed the produce of the extra days at the rate of 400l.
Sterling each day. Government also granted him a remission of about one-third of the
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rent which he had bargained to pay; so that the total gain to the revenue by this fishery
did not exceed seventy-five thousand pounds sterling. Government however would not
have realized nearly so much, if they had conducted the concern on their own account,
for it was well known that the renter lost by it.”671 Vydelinga Chetti submitted a petition
directly to Governor North, a man with whom the renter was personally familiar.
According to the petition: “If the Oysters fished were so much fewer than the usual
number in former fisheries, so as to change the concern from an advantageous to a
ruinous one, a Remission would be granted to me on your Excellencies [sic]
Consideration of the Circumstances.”672 Governor North consented to the Vydelinga
Chetti plea and granted him a remission of nearly one-third his total rent. Governor North
reasoned that this short-term sacrifice to the public treasury was necessary if merchants
of such wealth and resources as Vydelinga Chetti were to remain confident in British
oversight of the pearling industry. Governor North then sent a letter to Lord Hobart in
London with the following update: “I am happy to add that this remission was most
thankfully received by Him, and has certainly rendered the other Capitalists in India well
disposed [sic] to this Government, which may, perhaps, hereafter, stand in great need of
their assistance.”673

Pearls into Peas: The Curious Case of Gregory Baboom, c. 1800
At the turn of the nineteenth century, an Armenian merchant named Gregory Baboom
made a bold play to corner the opium trade between India and China. Described by a
671
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contemporary English writer as a “noted character” and “equally well known in Bengal
and Madras as in Canton,” Baboom managed an impressive and diverse portfolio.674
From opium and spices to camphor and tin, Baboom was, like many of his
contemporaries engaged in long-distance trade, well-versed in the buying and selling of
an assortment of bulk and luxury commodities. He brokered deals with local merchants
and European trading companies in vibrant port cities of India, China, and the
archipelagoes of Southeast Asia, spinning a web of business relationships that spanned
the eastern Indian Ocean and South China Sea.675 Baboom even traveled to Philadelphia
in the second decade of the nineteenth century as the agent of a Hong business partner to
collect the debt of an American opium trader.676 However, his attempt to secure an
exclusive contract with the Company to transport opium between India and China failed.
Company officials in Calcutta rejected his offer, after which Baboom turned his attention
for a brief period to another venture.
In January 1800, Gregory Baboom tendered an application to the Board of
Revenue at Fort St. George for the rent of the pearl fishery at Tuticorin. As the first fullscale fishery on the India-side of Mannar organized by the Company since its annexation
of Dutch Ceylon, British officials expected a high level of interest. The pearl banks off
the coast of Tuticorin had not been fished since 1768 because the Dutch VOC held
industry in abeyance during a protracted dispute with the Nawab of Arcot. Company
officials presumed that the long fallow period had restored the health and vitality of the
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pearl oyster populations and that the coming harvest would be abundant and profitable.
Collector Stephen Lushington of Ramnad wrote, “the Banks have not been fished for
several years it is likely that an advertisement for Proposals to rent the Fishery may bring
forward offers to a large amount.”677 Four merchants including Gregory Baboom
responded to the call for applications. Baboom tendered the highest amount (PNP
137,000) and he was also the only applicant who supplied the name of a guarantor. In line
to receive the cowle, Baboom’s application, however, included the so-called
“objectionable clause” that stipulated each boat fish at least 4,000 oysters per day.
Fearing that such a provision would expose the government to frauds and necessitate an
expensive remission payment, the district collector and members of the Board rejected
the terms of Baboom’s proposal. The Board then summoned Baboom to Fort St. George
and requested that he remove the clause from his contract. According to the Board, “It is
agreed to call Mr. Gregory Baboom before the Board who having attended at it explained
to him that his stipulations are so objectionable that the Board cannot recommend a
Proposal containing a clause which cannot fail to open a door to unavailing contention,
and the frauds of servants, and while it gives to the Proposer a certainty, subjects
Government to an indefinite loss.”678 Baboom agreed to strike the section from his
proposal, which satisfied the Board and awarded him the rent of one hundred and twenty
boats for thirty days at an adjusted rate of PN 60,000.
Although the pearling industry would become increasingly dominated by local
capital in the early nineteenth century, it is significant that the Board granted the first
pearl fishery on the India-side of Mannar organized by the Company to an Armenian
677
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merchant with whom it had previous conducted business. In 1799, Baboom approached
the British East India Company’s committee on the China trade with an audacious plan.
He submitted an application for an exclusive contract to move opium from the plentiful
poppy fields of eastern India to China, the primary consumption market of the drug.
Baboom wanted a three-year agreement with the Company that fixed the price and
quantity of product. The deal would have made Baboom very rich but he never realized
his vision of dominating the opium market because Company officials in China and
Bengal rejected his proposal.679 Baboom had also brokered a deal with the Company to
transport specie and spices between Canton and Madras for P 80,000.680 The Board may
have also viewed Baboom and his affiliation with the Armenian trading community as a
safe and reliable alternative to local Indian capital. Furthermore, Baboom had brought
together two distinguished businessmen of Madras—Samuel Moorat and John De Fries—
to underwrite the venture and guarantee his contract. A prominent leader of the Armenian
community in Madras, Moorat bore honorific titles, such as Agha. He was also the
proprietor of a pleasant garden in Egmore known as the Pantheon and the epitaph of his
marble tombstone memorialized his munificence and philanthropic work.681 Baboom also
joined Moorat in some of his charitable work and bestowed gifts to the same religious
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and cultural institutions.682 The other guarantor of Baboom’s contract was John De Fries,
one of three members of a family that operated an eponymous merchant house in
Madras.683 Like his co-guarantor Samuel Moorat, John De Fries was embroiled in the
scandal over the debts of the Nawab of Arcot.684 He was also named as a witness in the
investigation of the mysterious circumstances surrounding the death of Governor Pigot of
Madras.685 Moorat and the De Fries family became tangled in a separate affair concerning
litigation over some slaves in 1817-1818.686 De Fries was also a proprietor of the
Carnatic Bank and he financed numerous urban infrastructure projects such as the
construction of fortified walls, hospitals, and bridges in Madras.
While the exact terms of the agreements between Baboom and his partners are
unknown, it appears that both Moorat and De Fries had interests in the pearling industry
beyond their respective roles as sureties. For instance, Baboom carried with him to
Tuticorin a letter of credit in Moorat’s name. As the Board wrote to Collector
Lushington, “Mr. Gregory Baboom informs the Board he may have occasion for money
at Tutacoryn and Carries with him a letter of Credit from Mr. Samuel Moorat Armenian
Merchant you are authorized to take Mr. Baboom's bills on Mr. Moorat in favor of the
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Board of Revenue for such sums as you may be able to advance from your treasury.”687
The house of De Fries engaged in the buying and selling of pearls and other marine
commodities, such as coral.688 A newspaper advertisement in the Madras Courier from
June 1790 notified the public about the sale at “Public Outcry” by De Fries & Co. “in the
Black Town on Monday the 21st June, a Parcel of fine beautiful large Pearls for ready
money.”689 The firm had also submitted application for the rent of the 1800 pearl fishery,
as well submitted applications for the rent of the 1808 Ceylon pearl fishery and 1815
pearl fishery at Tiruchendur, but in neither of those instances was it awarded the cowle.690
A number of problems plagued the 1800 pearl fishery at Tuticorin, which brought
both Baboom and Madras face-to-face with the possibility of heavy losses. On the one
hand, there were circumstances beyond the immediate control of the superintendent and
renter. For example, strong southerly winds created unsafe boating and diving conditions,
which delayed fishing days and reduced productivity. Aside from climatic issues, a large
contingent of divers boycotted the fishery because one diver reportedly died from injuries
sustained from a jellyfish attack.691 On the other hand, there were many problems at
Tuticorin that were directly connected to the management of the pearl fishery. The
superintendent and other government officials, for instance, had mishandled the
recruitment of labor. A sizable group of divers from Kilakkarai arrived late to Tuticorin
because the start date of the fishery overlapped with Ramadan. Collector Lushington
wrote to the Board in March 1800 that Kilakkarai was one of the “principal Ports from
687
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whence the Boats and Divers are furnished for the Fishery” and that there was
“considerable delay having arisen in their departure in consequence of the Rumjan [sic]
Feast.” 692 Government officials were also miffed by the late arrival of Baboom and two
native agents in his employ, which further delayed the start of the fishery. A member of
the Board of Revenue wrote to Collector Lushington: “[I] hope that Mr. Gregory Baboom
will have arrived in time to Commence the Pearl fishery within the period specified in the
Cowle which as it admits the employment of an additional Number of boats if
procureable [sic] will they also trust make up to Government the full amount of the rent
agreed to be paid, in the event of the weather, proving unfavorable toward the close of the
fishery and preventing it being carried on for thirty days.” 693
Without any known experience with the pearl fisheries or trade, Baboom
appointed two native agents—Rama Chetti and Venkatachala Chetti—to manage the
affairs of his rent at Tuticorin. Baboom appears to have tasked Rama Chetti and
Venkatachala Chetti with a range of duties and responsibilities, from overseeing the
washing and sorting processes to outfitting the boats with divers and pilots. Yet
interfacing with government officials superintending the pearl fishery was perhaps their
most important duty. Rama Chetti and Venkatachala Chetti represented themselves as
“Managers of the Pearl Fishery on the part of Mr. Baboom” in the written record of these
exchanges.694 The two agents also explicitly stated in their appeals to Company officials
that they were bound by duty and obligation to faithfully conduct the “Business then
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entrusted by our employer in [the Company’s] Care.”695 Through various forms of oral
and written communication, including petitions (arzee), face-to-face meetings, and
middleman messengers, Rama Chetti and Venkatachala Chetti conveyed to government
officials a set of demands and grievances. Rama Chetti and Venkatachala Chetti wanted
the authority to outfit the renter’s boats with the best available divers. They also wanted
to grant the pearling fleets access to the entire oyster banks instead of limiting the range
of boats to within demarcated boundaries marked by buoys and guarded by gunboats.
Baboom’s agents also complained to government officials that the pearls were of poor
quality and in short supply. According to a petition addressed to Collector Lushington:
“Since these three days we found the Oysters brought to be very young ones and that by
the tryal [sic] we made, produce very little Pearls in them and if should be continued so,
will attend to great prejudice to the Renter.”696
Collector Lushington wrote to Rama Chetti and Venkatachala Chetti to declare
that it was not the government’s responsibility to compensate the renter because the pearl
fishery was not “interrupted by Storms or Enemies.”697 Baboom now faced arrears on his
rent, but instead of paying down his debt, it appears that he absconded to China where he
continued to trade in a range of bulk and luxury goods and even flirted with smuggling
opium and other contraband.698 Before he disappeared from Madras, however, Baboom
sent a letter that enjoined the Board to collect the outstanding payments for his rent from
his guarantors. In this capacity, Moorat engaged in lengthy deliberations with the
government, demanding that, at the very least, the Board grant a remission for two days
695
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of unproductive fishing. Moorat refused to cover Baboom’s debts until the Board heard
his plea. He wrote in a letter addressed to the government, “Mr. Baboom has left no
Instructions with me for the payment of the additional Sum you have claimed from him I
am sorry Consistent with my duty I cannot Comply with the discharge of any other than
the Sum I have already Tendered you.”699 Moorat eventually acquiesced to the
government’s demands, and by the end of his negotiations he paid his truant associate’s
debt of more than PNP 43,700.700
Meanwhile, in China, Baboom had a sealed contract for the sale of pearls for
100,000 Spanish Dollars with Pan Changyao (Conseequa), a prominent and powerful
Hong merchant based in Canton.701 While Baboom was in India procuring the product
through his rent of the pearl fishery, a certain Charles Mackinnon served as Baboom’s
agent in China. Pan Changyao found Mackinnon less than amicable and the Company
refused to intervene because Baboom carried heavy debts, though it is not known whether
these debts were related to his rent of the pearl fishery.702 An English diplomat and
traveler John Barrow based in China provided an account of a curious exchange between
Baboom and an unnamed Hong merchant, who may very well have been Pan Changyao:
“Just before his failure in about a half million sterling, [Baboom] deposited a valuable
casket of pearls, as he represented them, in the hands of one of the Hong merchant, as a
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pledge for a large sum of money, which, when opened, instead of pearls were found to be
a casket of peas.”703

Wealth, Status, and Patronage: Manali Chinniah Mudaliar, 1800-1805
From its founding as a British settlement in the mid-seventeenth century, Madras had
been a center of the pearl trade and other marine commodities such as chanks, coral, and
fish skins. The consolidation of power by the British East India Company further
solidified Madras as a hub in the capital and commodity networks that coalesced around
the pearl fishery and its attendant trade. Historian Susan Neild-Basu marks the turn of the
nineteenth century as a “historical juncture” in the history of Madras, a moment when the
city was “poised between its long-standing role as a territorial enclave of foreign
commercial enterprise and its future status as the regional capital of an imperial
power.”704 Economic historian Tirthankar Roy describes this type of urban
transformation as one of the hallmarks of early modernity in Indian economic history.705
At the center of this dynamic urban culture was a loosely associated class of commercial
and political magnates, men from dubash families who self-styled themselves “merchantkings” through temple patronage and other forms of charitable giving.706 In the dual
registers of kingship and divinity, wealthy men patronized artists, endowed temples,
mediated local disputes, and served as intermediaries between state and local society.
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Historian Susan Lewandowski finds that Madras between the late seventeenth and early
nineteenth centuries witnessed a veritable explosion of temple construction, a boom
financed largely by merchants. She argues that “Hindu commercial communities used a
classical pattern of gift-giving to legitimate their power base during a period of capitalist
intrusion.”707 In doing so, she continues, “merchants involved in building temples in
Madras City were not only acquiring religious merit in their acts as donors, they were
also legitimizing their authority over the new neighborhoods they established.”708 Many
discussions of dubashes in eighteenth-century and nineteenth-century Madras, however,
downplay their economic roles and argue that their power and influence derived from
their political functions and social positions and less their role as brokers and
financiers.709 To her credit, Neild-Basu speculates that a “deeper enquiry into family
histories, court archives, and the records of agency houses may yet disclose further
commercial interests among dubashes.”710 Indeed, records related to East India Company
management of the pearl fishery suggests that the pearling industry was one such
“commercial interest” that continued to attract the attention of dubashi elite in the early
nineteenth century. Many of the merchants from Madras that bid for the rent of the pearl
fisheries hailed from dubashi families and invested directly in the pearling industry,
diversifying the portfolios of Madras-based merchants, which often included land
holdings and stakes in other commercial interests and trades. The rent of a pearl fishery
further increased the status and standing of the cowle-holder in the quick-changing urban
milieu of Madras, providing another source of wealth that could be applied to

707

Lewandowski, “Merchants and Kingship,” 153.
Ibid., 159.
709
Neild-Basu, “Dubashes of Madras,” 19-20.
710
Ibid.
708

248

philanthropic and charitable works. Patronage was not a new area of engagement for
pearl merchants, as the demonstrated by the life and work of Cītakkāti, a celebrated
patron of Tamil literary culture who is memorialized as a righteous and generous
benefactor.711
One of the most prominent members of this emergent class of politically involved
and economically powerful men in Madras City was Manali Chinniah Mudaliar.712
Chinniah Mudaliar is an important figure in the history of the pearl fisheries because he
and other members of his family were involved in the industry on at least four
documented occasions. He submitted applications for the rent of the 1800 and 1805 pearl
fisheries, successfully securing the lease for latter, and in 1809, he requested funds from
the Madras government to speculate at the Ceylon pearl fishery at Arippu. For the 1822
pearl fishery, one of his sons wanted to provide security and serve as the guarantor for the
principal renter’s contract with the Company. Besides materials directly related to the
pearl fisheries, there are myriad references to Chinniah Mudaliar and his family in the
records of the Madras government from the late eighteenth century and early nineteenth
century that, when taken together with texts from the literary sphere, provide a
remarkable picture of his commercial and political activities. Chinniah Mudaliar pursued
the rent of the pearl fisheries with the same verve that made him a prolific and celebrated
patron of literature, music, and religious institutions. Cultural patronage and
philanthropic giving for men like Chinniah Mudaliar also provided a venue for the
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distribution of surplus capital, some of which was acquired through the rent of the pearl
fishery, and created a positive feedback loop between commerce and charity.
Chinniah was a member of an elite Vellala family from Manali, a village near
Madras. He managed extensive landholdings in the hinterlands of Madras, mostly in
Chingelput district, and participated in the financial sector as a moneylender, describing
himself as a “saukar” and serving as one of the directors of a Madras-based bank.713 Like
Gregory Baboom, Chinniah Mudaliar had previous financial engagements with the East
India Company. For instance, he was a member of a nineteen-person party that extended
a loan for nearly two lakh pagodas to the Madras government at a rate of twelve
percent.714 Other business interests included lending capital to local landowners in
Thanjavur district and extensions of credit to rice merchants.715 Chinniah Mudaliar built
upon the success of many within the Vellala community, which made significant
economic and social advances during the course of the eighteenth century. A historical
caste marker of agricultural elites in South India, many Vellalas moved into positions of
economic and political power in urban Madras, standing alongside, and in some cases
displacing, traditional commercial groups. Indeed, by the late eighteenth century, many
of the dubashes in Madras came from communities that did not have prototypical ties to
finance and business.716 Vellala elites remained connected with their village roots,
effectively drawing upon a rural register of power and authority that differed from their
urban counterparts. As historian Susan Neild-Basu writes, “the interplay between high

713

Ambirajan, “Laissez-Faire in Madras.”
Neild-Basu, “Dubashes of Madras,” 22; Kanakalatha Mukund, The Trading World of the Tamil
Merchant: Evolution of Merchant Capitalism in the Coromandel (Chennai: Orient Longman, 1999);
Brimnes, Colonial Encounter.
715
Neild-Basu, “Dubashes of Madras,” 24.
716
Ibid., 10.
250
714

rural status and wealth and influence acquired in the colonial urban context became an
important feature of the growing prestige and authority of the late eighteenth-century
dubashes, both in the city of Madras and in its hinterlands.”717 By straddling the line
between rural and urban cultures and authority, Vellala dubashes and other nouveauxriches served the Company’s emergent interests in land revenue systems all while
enriching their own material well-being and social standing.
In such an urban environment, Vellala dubashes and other urban elites fashioned
themselves as merchant-kings through cultural patronage and philanthropic giving to
religious institutions. Many of these men, including Chinniah Mudaliar, appear in the
annals of Madras as cultural and political brokers, mediating disputes between left-hand
and right-hand caste communities, as well as between natives and the colonial state.718
His father, Manali Mutukrishna Mudaliar, for instance, was the last Chief Merchant of
the East India Company in Madras before the post was dissolved and the dubash system
filled its place. Mutukrishna later became dubash to Governor Pigot, adding profits from
Company-directed trade to his considerable land holdings in Chingelput district. The
elder Mudaliar was also one of the founders and primary benefactors of the Chenna
Kesava Perumal temple in Madras, the construction of which benefitted from land and
monetary donations from the Madras government. As historian Joanne Punzo Waghorne
finds, “The Company provided the land and a portion of the funds needed to construct the
building. Mutukrishna Mudaliar put up 5,202 pagodas (currency) to the Company’s
1,173, with the rest of the 15,652 raised by subscriptions from the community at
717
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large.”719 Following his father’s death, Chinniah Mudaliar became the trustee or
dharmakarta of the temple, at title the family would eventually struggle to keep through
litigation in the 1830s. He was according to one government report regarded as a “person
of respectability and well liked by those interested in the good conduct of the affairs of
the Pagoda.”720 A plaque at the complex records the name of Manali Mutukrishna
Mudaliar and his son, above which on a pillar is a carved figurine of the donor.721
Aside from temple patronage, Chinniah Mudaliar and members of his family were
also major benefactors of the budding literary and musical scene in Madras at the turn of
the nineteenth century. Though it may be apocryphal, Chinniah Mudaliar reportedly had
an instrumental role in introducing the violin to South Indian classical music. Chinniah
Mudaliar connected Baluswamy Dikshitar (1768-1858) with a European teacher who
trained the famous musician in basic violin techniques, which allowed him to develop
and adapt the instrument to the Carnatic context.722 References to Chinniah Mudaliar and
his father are also found in Tamil and Sanskrit texts. The most famous example of
commercial and cultural elite sponsoring the production of literary works is the dubashdiarist Ananda Ranga Pillai, who commissioned at least three Sanskrit and Tamil works
with biographical themes.723 Likewise, the father of Chinniah Mudaliar extended
patronage to the Tamil poet Arunachalakavirayar, the composer of a Tamil Ramayana set
719

Joanne Punzo Waghorne, Diaspora of the Gods: Modern Hindu Temples in an Urban Middle-Class
World (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 61; Brimnes, Colonial Encounter, 154.
720
Brimnes, Colonial Encounter, 154; Madras Tercentenary Commemoration Volume, 360-1.
721
Waghorne, Diaspora of the Gods, 59-60.
722
V. Raghavan, “Some Musicians and their Patrons about 1800 AD in Madras City,” Journal of the
Madras Music Academy 16 (1944), 129; Amanda Weidman, Singing the Classical, Voicing the Modern:
The Postcolonial Politics of Music in South India (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006), 29.
723
V. Raghavan, “Notice of Madras in Two Sanskrit Works,” Madras Tercentenary Commemoration
Volume, 107-12; David Shulman, “Cowherd or King? The Sanskrit Biography of Ananda Ranga Pillai,” in
Telling Lives in India: Biography, Autobiography, and Life History, eds. David Arnold and Stuart
Blackburn (Bloomington: Indian University Press, 2004), 175-202.
252

to song and verse (Ramanatakam). The poet refers to Mutukrishna Mudaliar “as a king
(bhupati), learned in all languages and looked up to by everyone as a person who always
spoke the truth.”724 Chinniah Mudaliar is also mentioned in the Sarvadevavilāsa, a
campū-kāvya Sanskrit text from the turn of the nineteenth century.725
All accounts appear to suggests that Chinniah Mudaliar had the economic,
cultural, and social capital to make a competitive offer for the rent of a pearl fishery.
Around the turn of the nineteenth century, Chinniah Mudaliar received a fillip to his
accumulated wealth when he inherited a sizable estate from a Komati merchant, a certain
Suncoo Chinna Kistnama.726 Chinniah Mudaliar was the primary creditor to Suncoo
Chinna Kistnama and became the trustee of the estate at the time of the Komati
headman’s death, shortly after which time he submitted an application for the rent of the
1800 pearl fishery at Tuticorin.727 Inheriting the estate certainly increased Chinniah
Mudaliar’s capital base and perhaps made the rent of a pearl fishery—a notoriously
uncertain and risky venture—a more viable investment option. In 1800, Chinniah
Mudaliar had competed against Gregory Baboom, De Fries & Co., and another prominent
merchant named Chidambaram Pillai for the rent of the pearl fishery. According to his
application, “As soon as the fishing is over the account shall be settled and the amount
which may produce from me as a Renter shall be paid into the Honble Company's
724
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treasury at Madras three months after the fishery is over if the Board approve of the
above Proposal I am ready to give sufficient security for the punctual payment of my
Engagement.”728 Chinniah Mudaliar failed to receive the rent because his bid was lower
than Baboom’s offer and he did not provide any further information about his security
deposit.
Five years later, an examination off the coast of Tuticorin found a large batch of
ripe oysters, a surprising development that sent Madras officials scrambling to organize a
fishery. As the Board wrote to Governor Bentinck, “Unless this Bank be fished in the
course of the present season, it is probable that the whole produce may be lost.”729
Klattee Paar, the bank on which the examiners found a healthy supply of pearl oysters,
was significantly smaller than Tolayeram Paar, the site of the previous fishery in 1800
and the largest bed off the coast of Tuticorin. The superintendent in consultation with the
Board therefore decreased the number of boats and reduced the duration of the fishery.
Government officials placed an advertisement in the Madras Gazette that announced
sixty boats and ten days of fishing were available for rent. Chinniah Mudaliar answered
the advertisement with a durkhaust or proposal for PNP 500 per boat. The Board initially
rejected his proposal, after which Chinniah Mudaliar increased his offer to PNP 700 per
boat, which was enough to beat his competitor, a certain Cappanaynar Mercair.730 As the
winning bidder, Chinniah Mudaliar signed a contract with the East India Company at Fort
St. George in March 1805 in which he agreed to make an advance of P. 10,000 and
pledged to pay all outstanding charges on his rent within thirty days of the close of the
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fishery.731 The application of Chinniah Mudaliar was remarkable because the Board
accepted it without the usual requisite of a named guarantor. Instead, he put forward land,
mortgaging some property holdings as payment and security for the rent.732
Chinniah Mudaliar was mired in debt from other engagements and he had trouble
meeting the obligation of his contract. Chinniah Mudaliar belatedly deposited the final
payment of his rent into the treasury in June 1805, which irked members of the Board of
Revenue because they did “not perceive any good cause for delay in the payment of
Current revenue due by Chinniah.”733 At the same time Chinniah Mudaliar was closing
his rent of the pearl fishery he also faced arrears on his lands, a chronic problem that
continued to burden his family through at least the 1830s. Described as the “largest
zamindar” in Chingelput district, Chinniah Mudaliar had somehow fallen behind on his
payments. In 1812, for example, Chinniah Mudaliar had not paid the necessary taxes on
at least nine of his estates in Chingelput, representing to the district collector that he lost
P. 2.5 lakhs over an eight-year period.734 While Chinniah Mudaliar ultimately fulfilled his
contract with the Company for the rent of the 1805 pearl fishery, he remained in debt and
the Madras government eventually seized and subdivided his property. The Collector of
Chingelput received papers from the Board that contained the following instructions: “If
you have not already completed the Subdivisions of Chinniah Moodely's Estate, the
Board desire that you will lose no time in effecting this object in the mean time you will
acquaint him that if he does not immediately discharge the arrears…due by him,
measures must be taken to enforce payment and will with that view submit draft of an
731
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advertisement for the sale of the Lands in question.”735 Chinniah Mudaliar was insolvent
at the time of his death yet members of his family continued to find the pearl fishery an
attractive arena of investment. In 1822, only six years after his father’s death,
Mutukrishna Mudaliar agreed to serve as security for the rent of the pearl fishery at
Tuticorin.736 However, Mutukrishna had three brothers, all of whom objected to the
agreement. The brothers argued that they constituted an “undivided family,” a form of
joint property relations, which effectively required Mutukrishna Mudaliar to account for
all matters related to his father’s estate.737 The brothers brought a suit of equity against
Mutukrishna Mudaliar via their English barristers James Minchin and Thomas Teed, who
notified the Board that the estate would not be offered as security for the rent of the pearl
fishery.738

Credit, Honor, and Reputation: Annasami Chetti, 1807
Competition for the rent of the 1807 pearl fishery at Tuticorin was fierce. The Tolaiyirum
Paar off the southeastern coast of India had not been fished in seven years, which
provided ample time for the pearl oyster population to reach its optimal age. The
advertisement that year promised “that quantity of Oysters on [the Bank] is very great
that they are now arrived at maturity and tho’ small, are of very [fine] color and good
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shapes.”739 The collector and the Board received a total of seventeen applications. Acting
Collector James Hansbury of Tirunelveli received four proposals at the district cutcherry,
while the other thirteen applicants tendered applications to the Board at Fort St.
George.740 At the time, this was the largest number of applications received by the
Madras since the East India Company secured managerial rights over the pearl fishery,
surpassed by 1810 pearl fishery at Tuticorin when eighteenth prospective renters tendered
proposals.741 Despite being an “a man unknown” to government officials, Annasami
Chetti received a cowle for the rent of two hundred boats for thirty days.742 The proposal
of Annasami Chetti was unusual because it did not specify a monetary amount but instead
“unconditionally” agreed to pay PNP 7,500 over and above the highest offer. Annasami
Chetti’s competition dwindled as soon as the review process started when the collector
and members of the Board disqualified two applications because they had been received
after the deadline.743 Another set of applications stipulated that boats had to fish a
minimum number of oysters per day, the so-called “objectionable clause” that found its
way into many proposals. As one official wrote, “Numbers 2, 5, 6, 7, 9, 11, 14, 15 and 16
tho [sic] in five of them has security been sufficient, are mostly then made by men of
credit and substance they are however most of them embarrassed with the objectionable
clause.”744 A certain Cottah Sanganah submitted the highest offer of PNP 90,000 and
emerged from the pool of applicants as the top contender but his application was riddled
with one problematic clause after the other. The Board wrote that the application “is
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qualified with a restrictive clause and is moreover in some degree objectionable on the
protracted period proposed for payment and the non specification [sic] of Securities the
man however, the Board believes is himself fully competent.”745 Left with few options,
the Board awarded Annasami Chetti the rent for a hefty sum of PNP 97,500. For the
purpose of the rent, it appears that Annasami Chetti borrowed the entire amount from a
banker named Hari Prasad. Hari Prasad was a Madras-based agent of the firm Gopaldas
Manohardas of Banaras, one of the largest and most successful indigenous banking firms
in eighteenth-century and nineteenth-century India.746 Annasami Chetti received the
cowle but he did not appear before the Board to receive it or any other documents related
to his lease. Instead, Hari Prasad went before the Board to seal the contract, advance the
rent, and receive the grant. The absence of the principal renter and unorthodox mode of
payment did not escape the suspicious eye of the Board, which commented that Hari
Prasad “appeared impatient for a conclusion of the agreement.”747
A number of problems impacted Annasami Chetti’s rent of the 1807 pearl fishery
at Tuticorin. In the first instance, the boats were not properly numbered and a forceful
northerly wind prevented vessels from arriving to the pearl fishery in a timely fashion and
safely reaching the pearl oyster banks. As Collector Hepburn wrote in late March 1807,
“In consequence of the forty six [sic] of the Boats having arrived here late…they could
not be numbered and their Crews registered and the necessary preparatory for fishing
made on their part to enable them to begin…as intended.”748 He added: “The winds also
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blow strongly in a northerly direction which rendered it impossible for any Boats to reach
the Bank. For these reasons it was found necessary to delay the commencement of the
Fishery.”749 The fishery quickly hemorrhaged labor and capital, which weakened an
already depressed market for pearls and oysters. As Collector Hepburn wrote to the
Board in a dispatch from Tuticorin, “the Oysters sell at a very low price in the Bazar of
this place and if a Calculations of the produce of the Fishery be made accordingly the
value of it will appear very low.”750 Divers and boatmen started to flee the camp and
there was also famine with which to contend.751 The collector sent the following report to
the Board: “In Consequence of the great scarcity prevailing this year in all the
neighbouring Districts the number of Strangers here is very small, hardly anybody indeed
but the Boat men and Divers, the thousands of speculators Cheats and Gamblers that
were seen on former Occasions are not now to be met with and as there is but little
demand there is consequently no competition in the purchase of Oysters.”752
Annasami Chetti entered into protracted disputes with Collector Hepburn and
other Company representatives over the terms and conditions of his contract. As
Annasami wrote, “I have addressed several Petitions to the Collector Sub Collector and to
the Board of Revenue on the subject of my Rent, but no proper redress been given.”753
Most of the issues over which Annasami Chetti and Collector Hepburn wrangled
concerned the limits of the renter’s rights and authority. For example, Annasami Chetti
complained that the collector usurped his authority by inflicting corporeal punishment on
laborers and refusing to allow the renter access to all the pearl oyster beds. According to
749
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the renter, the collector unfairly flogged divers for refusing to work and subjected moneycollectors in his employ to the same harsh treatment. Not only did a government official
physically punish his agents but the collector also confiscated the money in their hands
without cause, which Annasami Chetti wanted back.754 Annasami Chetti then invoked
custom, asserting that it was his right to inflict such punishment. His reportedly said, “a
Pearl renter everywhere punished his people at will short of hanging or cutting off their
heads and that if [I] had known he was not to do so, [I] would not have rented the
Fishery.”755 Annasami Chetti also operated under the assumption that the principal renter
had free reign over the industry during the time of his rent. He wanted to let the pearling
boats venture beyond the demarcated boundaries of the fishery, but Collector Hepburn
prevented him from doing so. Annasami Chetti claimed that this check on his authority
further contributed to his heavy financial loss. He remarked in a petition, “As the
Collector did not deliver me the whole place of Toolayeram Paar which I Rented for
97,500 Portonovo Pagodas, but limited small Spots thereof I request that such Spots may
be measured and after deducting the value thereof, at the Rate of 97,500 Portonovo Pags
per whole place of Toolareyeram Paar, order the remainder to be paid to me.”756 He
further claimed that the quality and quantity of the produce did not match the description
found in the advertisement: “That the Oysters taken out from the abovementioned limited
place are extremely worse unriped [sic], and no pearls in great many of them. The Pearls
are not in the least comparable with the quality and description described in the
Government Gazette. I do not know where are the such Kind of Pearls.”757 Tensions
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between the renter and collector escalated, as Annasami Chetti went so far as to claim
that the collector “took the Oysters to his own advantage.”758 For his part, Hepburn wrote
to the Board with unflattering reports about the renter’s behavior at Tuticorin: “Instead of
exerting himself to make his loss as small as possible, he has adopted another Policy and
hopes that by stating frequent and frivolous objections and throwing unnecessary
impediments in the way of the Fishery.”759
It became apparent during the course of the pearl fishery that the renter would
bring a remission claim to the Board and Collector Hepburn sent advanced warning to
Fort St. George. He alerted them to the fact that Annasami Chetti would likely “proceed
to Madras to sue for a remission.”760 Annasami Chetti departed the camp for Madras with
ten days left on his contract to present his case to Company officials at Fort St. George.
According to a report from the collector, “The Renter himself suddenly disappeared one
night about a fortnight ago giving [out] that he was gone to Ettiapore but without leaving
any authorized agent to manage his concerns or acquainting me either with his departure
or with whom I was to communicate on his part during his absence.”761 There were other
incidences that reflected poorly on the renter in the eyes of government officials. Not
only did Annasami Chetti informally designate an unnamed agent without proper
documentation to manage his affairs at the pearl fishery but he also, according to
Collector Hepburn, left his share of the seasons catch “lying in heaps unopened.”762 As
Annasami Chetti’s oysters festered on the beach, the unnamed gomastah or agent had
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reportedly “shut himself up in his house and would not allow one of the Renting people
to attend to open the Compound or to receive and take care of the Renters share of the
Oysters.”763
Annasami Chetti eventually reached Madras and appeared before the Board of
Revenue with a series of petitions in Telugu that demanded the “Honourable Company
shall become answerable for the loss” sustained by him as the renter.764 In these
documents, Annasami Chetti first represented himself as a competent businessmen with
extensive knowledge of the pearling industry, demonstrating a remarkable command and
fluency in the trade, by referencing different categories and classes of pearl.765 Yet, in
subsequent pleas, Annasami Chetti struck a different tone as a hapless and disgraced
man, one who thought that he could “derive some advantage from the fishery” and took
the published results of the examination of the pearl oyster beds at face value. He wrote:
“As I am a poor man and thought that I can derive some advantage in the Fishery and
your Honors are sensible in my Proposal mentioned that I would pay the highest Sum. No
Oysters had been taken from the Sea by me, even made a trial before I purchased the
Farm but depended on the news paper [sic], that has been published, when my Proposal
was accepted for the Fishery and on bringing the Soucar to be Security, you have
demanded sum to pay the amount in ready money, which he did as I am a poor man, it
became dangerous to my Life, but the Honble Company would not unjustly ruin any one
and well known in the world that they are acting with justice.”766 Annasami Chetti
claimed that the advertisement was misleading and the produce of the pearl fishery was
763
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disproportionate to the numbers in the newspaper. He wrote, “I had Rented this pearl
Fishery and paid ready money thro’ my security placing my entire trust and confidence
upon the Government Gazette, I do not know that I would be disappointed in the manner
abovesetforth.”767 Other times he tried to prove that he was a trustworthy individual who
had simply fallen on hard times. For example, he reassured the Board that all the produce
from the pearl fishery was accounted for and protected: “The Oyesters [sic] that were
fished in the Fishery are deposited in the Banksalls the washed Pearls are also lodged
there, there are Company Guard placed over it and there is an account Kept for what has
been expended.”768 Annasami Chetti then claimed that he was “subject to an Entire Ruin”
and “destruction by the heavy loss.”769 He even referred to how the loss of money as
renter of the pearl fishery threatened both is life and honor. “It seems that the Soucar will
not leave me with life,” read one of his petitions.770 Annasami Chetti’s petition
continued: “I have borrowed the money of him and paid the Company and purchased the
Fishery but I did not swallow it up, I am not the man that has a estate of 4 or 5,000
Pagodas but maintained sucsess [sic] by being faithful but my misfortune was such that I
apprehend, it will cost me my life, I am a poor man and has a large Family to maintain
and it rests with your Honors to save my life and honor and support me.”771
The record of Annasami Chetti’s conduct at the pearl fishery, which the collector
and members of the Board viewed as ignoble, further impacting his claim for
compensation. During the course of deliberations, government officials lambasted
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Annasami Chetti’s character.772 Collector Hepburn wrote about the “extraordinary mode
of conduct observed for some time past by the Renter of the Pearl Fishery.”773 Even the
Governor of Madras “observed with suprize [sic]” when he read about the “perverse
conduct of the Renter.”774 Additionally, the Board considered the dubious transaction
between Annasami Chetti and another merchant. According to the claims of Dutch
merchant A. L. De Veer, Annasami Chetti fleeced him by sub-renting a boat at an unfair
price. According to a petition submitted by De Veer, Annasami Chetti charged him SP
200 more than the other sub-renters, despite having “assured me upon his honor” and “on
account of the Friendship betwixt between us” at a previous fishery that he was receiving
a fair price.775 The Board, however, refused to intervene in the matter because it was a
private transaction and advised De Veer to submit a claim to the Tirunelveli zillah or
district-level court.776 In light of this information, Madras responded coldly to the plight
of Annasami Chetti and attributed his loss to the “indolence, indiscretion, and
mismanagement.”777 According to the Board, “the renter so far from having cause for
complaint has been treated with uncommon indulgence and that his disappointment may
in great measure be attributed to his own indolence indiscretion and mismanagement.”778
Like his business associate, Hari Prasad submitted petitions for remission to the
Board. The House of Gopaldas Manohardas faced a deficit of more than SP 88,000 for
which they sought full compensation. In addition to the loss of SP 30,000 sustained
during the fishery, the government held a portion of the rental payment and its accrued
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interest. Hari Prasad feared that he would “inevitably fall sacrifice to the just resentment
of [the house of Gopaldas Manohardas] and thereby draw upon him his total ruin.”779 As
the experiences of Annasami Chetti and Hari Prasad illustrate, the rhetoric and practices
of honor and trust were integral not only to the formation of business relationships based
on lending and borrowing of money, but were also strategically deployed in the pursuit of
remission following the underperformance of a fishery that brought renter and their
creditors face-to-face with financial insolvency and a spoiled reputation.

The Prodigal Son Returns: Kundappah Chetti, 1821-1822
Kundappah Chetti has a recurring role in the history of the pearl fisheries during its early
years of British management. He and his father Vydelinga Chetti were the principal
renters of numerous pearl fisheries on the Ceylon-side of Mannar during the late
eighteenth century and early nineteenth century. Even after the fallout of the
investigations into corruption at the pearl fisheries in the late 1790s (Chapter 5),
Vydelinga and Kundappah Chetti continued to engage with the government of British
Ceylon on at least three occasions. Two decades later, Kundappah Chetti used
Nagapattinam as the staging ground for his return to the world of the pearl trade when he
made a successful bid for the rent of the 1822 pearl fishery at Tuticorin. According to his
application, Kundappah Chetti “learned from the Government Advertisement recently
published that the pearl fishery at Toolayerampar subject to Tooticorin will be rented
out,” for which he bid M. Rs. 720,000 for a thirty-day fishery with two-hundred boats.780
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The experience of Kundappah Chetti is noteworthy because he successfully negotiated
favorable terms and conditions ahead of his rent and then secured a sizable remission
from the government after the venture went south. Practiced in the art of the pearl trade,
Kundappah Chetti used his skill and expertise to negotiate a remissions claim and other
concessions with the Madras government. For example, he submitted a petition or arzee
to the Board before the event started some special accommodations such as a postponed
start date and the supply of protective forces to guard his coterie of merchants. He wrote,
“As the place of pearl fishery being abounded with Robbers, and as they pilfer the
bankshalls where Oysters are stored, and as the Merchants having incurred considerable
losses in the former fisheries I humbly beg your Honorable Board will be pleased to
direct the Collector of Tinnevelly or commanding Officer to post an adequate number of
sepoys and also such other peons that may be sufficient to secure the Oysters and of
supporting the renter with the Merchants connected with this transaction.”781 Kundappah
Chetti clearly knew the threats and challenges presented by the rent of a pearl fishery and
how to effectively reduce such risks to his persons and property. His confidence is
apparent in subsequent petitions and other interactions with representatives of the Madras
government. He refers to his experience as a renter of the Ceylon fisheries and speaks
authoritatively about the rules and procedures for collecting a remission payment. The
case of Kundappah Chetti thus illustrates how a senior pearl merchant not only used his
knowledge of the industry to negotiate a cancellation of debts but also how he leveraged
his status to secure a more favorable outcome for himself and his business associates.
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Last fished in 1810, the Tolaiyerum Paar off the coast of Tuticorin held out the
promise of an excellent return for both renter and proprietor. After a twelve-year break,
government officials were quite optimistic about the profitability of the upcoming
pearling season. Collector Hudleston of Tirunelveli wrote, “The estimated value of the
produce of the Oysters taken up during the examination fully equals my most sanguine
expectations and holds out the prospect of a much richer fishery than has been known
since the first undertaken.”782 An examination of the bank was undertaken by the jati
talaivan in late January and early February of 1821 determined that the pearl oyster
populations would admit a fishery of one hundred and fifty boats over twenty-five days.
However, the logistics for organizing a fishery on such short notice were far too difficult
for the collector and his agents to overcome. Besides the quick turnaround, the East India
Company was involved in a protracted dispute with Dutch authorities over the status of
Tuticorin and other erstwhile territories of the defunct VOC. After careful consideration,
and heeding the advice of the jati talaivan, Collector Hudleston recommended
postponing the fishery until the following year. He wrote to the Board, “[After a great
deal of conversation with the Jathee Taliven] on the [subject] it appears to me that he is
disposed to defer the fishery altogether to next year although he has reported a partial one
practicable.”783 The collector continued: “[The jati talaivan] states that the addition of a
year to the age of the oysters will so greatly enhance their value that the loss in quantity
by the various contingencies of Currents Monsoon or the species of fish which destroy
the oysters will be greatly counterbalanced by the superior quality of those which
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remain.”784 An examination of the same banks the following year found an ample supply
of pearl oysters and the jati talaivan thus determined that there would be “a very valuable
fishery in the ensuing season.”785
The Madras government distributed an advertisement in early January for the rent
of the 1822 pearl fishery at Tuticorin. The official publication of the advertisement came
after some delay, as Company officials took time to determine the best or preferred mode
of management. Collector Hudleston had initially recommended that the government
organize the fishery under a modified amani system in which boats were sold at public
outcry to separate renters. On the one hand, Hudleston wrote, “The [amani] mode of
conducting the fishery might very probably produce much more to Government and I am
disposed to be of opinion that it would from the difficulty of finding employment for
capital sensibly experienced by monied [sic] men at present and the avidity with which
the native merchants pursue this speculation.”786 On the other hand, “[renting] secures to
Government under the stipulated conditions which appear equitable and conformable
usage a Revenue unprecedented on the occasion of any former fishery.”787 Collector
Hudleston averred that direct management by the Company was the best course of action
unless a merchant came forward with a particularly attractive offer. The appearance of an
angel investor was not beyond the realm of possibilities. As the pearling season
approached, the collector referred to the alacrity “with which this speculation is pursued
in this country,” and that such pursuits are “well known and the public expectation which
has been strongly excited on this occasion from the general impression of the richness, of
784
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the Examination.”788 Hudleston’s hesitation to farm out the entire fishery stemmed from
his fear that the produce would not meet expectations and open the government to a flood
of remission claims. He wrote, “the only doubt which I have as to the expediency of
renting the whole fishery arises from the uncertainty how far the produce may fall short
in quantity of the estimate made of it though that [estimate] is as much to be relied on as
any former one.”789
In early February 1822, Kundappah Chetti—represented as the “son of
Vydealinga Chetty Merchant of Jaffanapatam and now residing at Nagapatam”—
answered the advertisement with what he described as a “humble proposal” to the
Board.790 He proposed leasing the whole fishery—two hundred boats for thirty days—for
M. Rs. 720,000.791 Despite his early doubts, Collector Hudleston eventually conceded
that Kundappah Chetti’s offer was far too attractive to ignore. He wrote, referring to the
prospective renter’s durkhaust or proposal, “Upon the whole I think the most
advantageous mode of disposing of the fishery will be the acceptance of the proposal
which is now forwarded.”792 Kundappah Chetti’s winning bid vied with three other
prospective renters for the grant. The next most competitive offer came from one of his
family’s chief rivals, Abdul Cader Maraikkayar of Kilakkarai. The elder Maraikkayar
merchant submitted his application to Collector Hudleston at the Tirunelveli cutcherry
but it only amounted to M. Rs. 561,750. Abdul Cader did not receive the rent of the pearl
fishery but the Board awarded him the right to all the chanks fished during the pearling
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season.793 As for the other bidders, a certain Ramaswami Mudaliar of Chingelput
submitted an application for M. Rs. 532,000, while Said Tambi Maraikkayar in his
capacity as an agent for Said Sathakootulla Maraikkayar of Kilakkarai tendered a slightly
lower bid at M. Rs. 530,000.794
Those members of the Board of Revenue at Fort St. George who reviewed renting
applications found many favorable aspects of Kundappah Chetti’s proposal. In the first
instance, Kundappah Chetti agreed to pay his rent in three equal cash installments rather
than credit and bank notes: “Should my proposal meet your approbation and the farm be
granted to me I will pay the amount of my farm as follows. One third of the amount to be
paid at the place of fishery previous to fishing. One third of the amount to be paid after
fifteen times fishing from the day of fishing and the last Instalment to be paid on a thirty
times fishing as soon as the fishing is over. The different sums to be paid in different
coins of the Madras Currency.”795 Kundappah Chetti also referenced his previous
engagements as renter of the pearl fishery in the application: “It will appear on reference
that I have been very punctual in my engagement with both the Madras and Ceylon
Government and therefore humbly solicit the Kind compliance of your Honorable Board
to my humble proposal.”796 It is curious, however, that the Board did not bear in mind
that Kundappah Chetti’s previous rents of the pearl fisheries had subject to accusations of
fraud, corruption, and misconduct (Chapter 5).
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Another important aspect of Kundappah Chetti’s application was that he offered
the names of two “respectable persons” as security.797 The Board of Revenue accepted
Gopal Chetti of Nagapattinam and Manali Mutukrishna Mudaliar of Madras as
guarantors of their contract with Kundappah Chetti, both of whom had previous
engagements with the pearl fishery. Manali Mutukrishna Mudaliar was a member of a
prominent business family and his father had rented the pearl fishery of 1805. Gopal
Chetti had submitted an application for the rent of the 1810 pearl fishery at Tuticorin.798
He was also awarded the rent of the 1816 pearl fishery at Arippu. However, Gopal Chetti
remarked that “he had made an erroneous calculation; that the Merchants would not come
forward to support him, and that the was unable to compleat [sic] the Installment.”799 At
the 1822 pearl fishery, the renter and his two sureties formed an agreement, the preamble
to which read: “Know all men, by those present, that we Cundapah Chitty of
[Jaffanapatam], Manally Moodookistnah Moodely of Madras and Gopaul Chitty of
Negapatam are jointly and severally held and firmly bound into the Honorable the United
Company of Merchant of England trading to the East Indies.”800 The two guarantors
entered into the bond for M. Rs. 1,440,00, or twice the amount of the total rent, providing
further evidence that the renter and his associates assumed significant risk when they
obtained a cowle for the pearl fishery. The bond between Kundappah Chetti, Manali
Mutukrishna Mudaliar, and Gopal Chetti also illustrates the various legal and extra-legal
mechanisms through which merchants moderated behavior. For example, a section of the
bond captures the mutual obligations the renter and his guarantors accepted between each
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other and with the Company: “The said Cundapah Chitty hath inconsequence offered the
above bounden Manally Moodookistnah Moodely and Gopaul Chitty as his sureties. Now
the Condition of the before written obligations is such that if the said Cudapah Chitty his
Heirs Executors or Administrators shall and do in all things well and truly observe,
perform, fulfil [sic] and keep all and every the stipulations and agreements contained in
the said Above statement and in the said Muchilka or Agreement.”801 Mutukrishna
Mudaliar and Gopaul Chetti signed these papers in the presence of three British officials,
after which Kundappah Chetti sealed the contract with the Board and the government
awarded him the cowle for his rent. These documents also laid out the terms of the
agreement between the government and the renter, which included the payment schedule
and the expectations of the guarantors.
Kundappah Chetti further leveraged his experience renting the pearl fishery to
win additional concessions from the Madras government. For instance, Kundappah Chetti
requested that the government provide him with armed guards during the period of his
rent. British Ceylon and Company Madras regularly supplied such services to renters, a
benefit that went beyond the usual deployment of armed vessels and other forces during
the pearling season. Kundappah Chetti wrote, “I humbly refer your Board to the records
of your office of 1797-8 and a similar indulgence was shewn [sic] to me by the
Government of Ceylon in subsequent years.”802 The Board complied with Kundappah
Chetti’s request and sent a letter to members of various military divisions of the Madras
government instructing them to mobilize troops for security detail. According to its
minutes, the Board “Ordered that the copy of [a] letter be transmitted from the Military
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Department to the Town Major of St. George with authority to furnish the Native detail
desired in it to accompany the Renter of the Taleyaram Parr Pearl fishery until his return
to this Presidency.”803 Arrangements for the safe travel of Kundappah Chetti and his
entourage appear to have been made to the satisfaction of all parties. A Company official
reported that Kundappah Chetti departed Madras “accompanied by the Guard which the
Honorable the Governor in Council were pleased to allow for the Security of his own
Property, and of the large sums of Money taken down by the Merchants who
accompanied him, to purchase the Oysters when drawn up.”804
However, the pearl fishery of 1822 at Tuticorin failed to meet expectations. The
fishery did not yield a sufficient number of pearls and oysters. According to a report from
the collector to the Board, “the Boats went out yesterday morning to the Toolaurum Bank
to commence the pearl fishery, but from the wind not being as favorable as could be wish
and their having left the shore late, did not arrive at the Bank till 11 o'clock when it was
found that two of the Buoys had drifted from their stations during the night before; under
these circumstances a productive day’s fishery could not be expected, and some
disappointment has been occasioned by the smallness of the return.”805 The Collector and
other officials blamed the jati talaivan for the problem. They went so far as to open a
formal investigation into whether he had intentionally misled the government about the
state of the pearl oyster population with an eye towards fishing the banks at the close of
the fishery for his own benefit.806 Epidemic cholera also struck the compound, which
disproportionately affected laboring classes. Disputes with Dutch authorities at Tuticorin
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and other nearby settlements were also contributing factors. According to Collector
Hudleston: “the result of the Fishery…has too fully confirmed the apprehensions
entertained of absolute failure of produce from the Bank.”807 He remarked that these
circumstances “render it unpracticable [sic] to carry on the fishery according to the
original engagements with any hope of satisfactions or advantage to Government or any
of the parties concerned.”808
In the face of considerable financial losses, and motivated by the conviction that
the Madras government had bungled its management duties, Kundappah Chetti pursued a
remission and demanded that he be released from his contract. Government officials
generally agreed that annulling his contract was the best course of action. The Collector
wrote to the Board, “the Pearl fishery as far as it has gone has totally failed to answer the
expectations formed of it and proposing that the engagements of the renter be
immediately declared void and the Oysters hitherto fished up.”809 Collector Hudleston
also argued that the experience of Kundappah Chetti at the Ceylon fisheries had skewed
his expectations. The Ceylon pearl fisheries were far more abundant than those on the
India-side of Mannar, which meant, according to Hudleston, that Kundappah Chetti
submitted a higher amount for the rent. He wrote: “The calculations upon which the
produce of the Fishery was estimated are borne out by the result of former fisheries both
as to quantity and quality. The offer however of the renter was higher than any data could
have warranted and appears to have been made under the influence of his experience in
the fisheries in which he had been concerned at Manar, where the Banks are generally
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much more productive and valuable than those off the Coast of Tinnevelly. Even there
several instances of failure have been met with equaling [sic] in extent that which took
places on this occasion.”810 The collector ultimately acquiesced to the demands of
Kundappah Chetti and recommended that the government extend a remission and award
an annulment. He wrote, “the Renter should be released from engagements to fulfill
which must have involved him in hopeless and inextricable ruin.”811 The Board initially
refused to release Kundappah Chetti from his contract because the pearl fishery was not
yet complete at the time of the request. They reasoned that releasing a renter from his
contract at the “first appearance of any unfavorable circumstances would be an example
of relaxation which would produce most dangerous consequence.”812 The rent of a pearl
fishery brought with it inherent risks and, according to the Board, it was not the
responsibility of the government to indiscriminately compensate renters for financial loss
unless it was found culpable or negligent. According to the Board, “it is a principle of all
contracts of the nature of the present rent that the contractor takes upon himself the risk
of loss as well as the prospect of gain.”813
The experience of Kundappah Chetti at the Ceylon pearl fisheries helped him
during the course of his negotiations with Madras. He claimed that on previous occasions
the Ceylon government annulled his contract and provided him with a generous remission
when a pearl fishery failed. He was also granted the option to fish the banks for free and
awarded the right to purchase oysters fished by the government under amani at fixed
prices. Based on his experience across the Gulf, Kundappah Chetti believed he was
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entitled to the same treatment as renter of the 1822 pearl fishery at Tuticorin.
Government officials of Madras, though, were not familiar with this policy, and
Kundappah Chetti compelled them to examine the records of the Ceylon pearl fisheries
conducted under the authority of the East India Company in the late 1790s. As Collector
Hudleston wrote, “In an instance which was brought to my notice on this occasion at the
Pearl fishery at Manar the documents connected with which were submitted to my
[Perusal], the Government of Ceylon in Consideration of the Comple[te] failure of the
Bank not only released the Renter from his obligations but permitted him to fish for 3
days gratuitously as some remuneration for the expense he had incurred in so great an
undertaking.”814 In other words, the renter used knowledge derived from firsthand
experience to gain an edge in negotiations with Madras over the validity of his contract
and financial obligation. Kundappah Chetti was subsequently released from his contract
“citing precedents of similar arrangements to Ceylon.”815
Kundappah Chetti also used his expertise to negotiate better terms for his
associates. For example, Kundappah Chetti claimed in his petitions that he and other
members of his renting party were damaged both financially and physically by the failure
of the pearl fishery. In a petition to Fort St. George, Kundappah Chetti wrote, “The
fishing commenced according to your orders on the 15th of March the produce of the
Boats was so trifling on the very first day that on its being represented to you were
sensible that the produce was insufficient.”816 Kundappah Chetti continued: “It is now 36
days since the period and our accounts remain unadjusted nor are we enabled to return to
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our homes in Consequence of which I and the purchasers of Boats are exposed to great
loss by waiting absent from our mercantile pursuits at great expense.”817 Besides the
financial damages, Kundappah Chetti referred to how the insalubrious conditions of the
pearl fishery camp affected the physical health of his party, writing that “we also find our
health affected by the water at this place disagreeing with us.”818 Taking all of these
factors into account, Kundappah Chetti expected the Madras government to annul his
contract and compensate him for losses. Again, he highlighted the fact that he
“frequent[ly] had the rent of Pearl Fisheries not only under the Madras but the Ceylon
Government” and wrote that he was in “partnership with others in these speculations in
which I am perfectly experienced.”819 Kundappah Chetti continued: “I entrust that you
will settle my accounts and those of my partners in Conformity with the agreement which
I executed, to you, and speedely [sic] permit us to receive back our money and return to
our places of residence without further loss.”820 Instead of returning home to
Nagapattinam, Kundappah Chetti decided to stay at the spot of the fishery, partly to settle
his accounts with merchants whom he had lent and borrowed money.821
In the end, all of these negotiating tactics and strategies appear to have worked for
Kundappah Chetti. The Board decided on the claim of Kundappah Chetti by June 1822, a
rather quick turnaround time since such matters were often left to lie on the table for
months or even years. Kundappah Chetti was released from his engagement and
reimbursed for certain expenses accrued during his rent, as well as a portion of the rental
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payment he advanced.822 The cowle and security bond were also voided by Madras and
the first installment of the rent (Rs. 240,000) returned to Kundappah Chetti. He agreed,
however, to purchase more than three million oysters directly from the government for
Rs. 52,963. He also agreed to pay the government for some of the expenses related to the
materials, construction, and labor for the erection of bungalows and other structures,
which totaled Rs. 807.823 These sums were subsequently deducted from the money that
he had deposited into the government treasury in advance of the fishery (Rs. 105,000), so
roughly half of his money was actually returned after the deduction. However,
Kundappah Chetti was not able to collect these payments in person. In a final petition to
the Board, Kundappah Chetti wrote that he had fallen ill and was not able to make the trip
to Madras to receive the money from the treasury. He wrote: “[Your petitioner] would
have likewise proceed to Madras (as he is directed by the Honorable Board) to receive
the money deposited there, had he not been sick and closely confined to bed otherwise.
Your Petitioner therefore sends his son…for the purpose and humbly trusts that your
Honorable Board will be graciously pleased to deliver the deposit into his hands…Doing
which favor he shall always [be] with the liveliest and real sentiments of manifold
gratitude.”824
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Conclusion
The rent of a pearl fishery offered an outstanding opportunity for merchants such as
Gregory Baboom, Chinniah Mudaliar, Annasami Chetti, and Kundappah Chetti with the
requisite economic, social, and cultural capital to boost their profits and reputation in a
fast-changing business environment. However, pearling was a notoriously uneven and
unpredictable venture. Naturalist Henry Le Beck observed during his visit to Arippu at
the close of the eighteenth century that “it was generally supposed that the renter would
be infallibly ruined, as the sum he paid for the present fishery was thought exorbitant.”825
However, he continued, “this conjecture, in the event, appeared ill-founded, as it proved
extremely profitable and lucrative.”826 Indeed, sometimes the pearl fishery was
“profitable and lucrative” for the cowle-holder, which also meant generally that the
government received a generous fillip to its coffers. However, time and again the rent of
a pearl fishery turned merchants into debtors and besmirched their reputation, honor, and
social standing. Financial mechanisms that facilitated lending and borrowing not only
provided the means to secure transactions, but also mediated social relationships between
merchants. Lending and borrowing sought to mitigate the financial risks of investing in
the pearling industry by spreading the possibility of risk across multiple parties. But even
such forms of risk management could not overcome the financial fallout from a fishery
that failed to deliver on its expected returns. The twin factors of extraordinary promise
and potential peril shaped the business worlds and economic practices of merchants
engaged in the pearl trade. Fundamentally a form of speculation, merchants borrowed
and advanced prodigious sums of money with no assurance that the season’s catch of
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oysters would yield a favorable return of pearls and profit. The dangerous conditions of
pearling and its attendant trade redoubled the importance of trust and reputation between
agents and principals, interweaving economic credit and social credit into the fabric of
the pearl fishery and its economy. The business worlds of pearl merchants are all the
more remarkable because of the high value of the commodity and speculative nature of
the enterprise, which elevated the significance of trust and reputation between lenders
and borrowers and agents and principles. Securing the rent of a pearl fishery thus
required the mobilization of capital in all its forms—economic, cultural, and social—and
entrepreneurial merchants effectively placed both financial and personal assets on the line
when submitting a proposal to the colonial government. East India Company officials
from the halls of Fort St. George to district-level collectors acted to mitigate financial
risks to all parties involved through the protection of credit. At the same time, the
government held out the prospect of a remission, though such an indulgence was difficult
to obtain for a renter and his associates. In other words, the colonial government sought
the best of both worlds. It wanted to reduce risk and maximize profit and at the same time
further incentivized investment in the pearling industry by local capital through the offer
of remissions. Relationships of credit and debt that coalesced around the pearl fisheries
were deeply implicated in a political and commercial landscape shaped by colonial and
imperial expansion of the East India Company and British state in the late eighteenth and
early nineteenth centuries. British involvement in the lending and borrowing practices of
pearl merchants were meant to bring greater regularity and oversight to an uncertain
branch of revenue, while, at the same time, produce good economic subjects to be
incorporated into the British Empire.
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CHAPTER 4: THE MOST SOVEREIGN COMMODITY

SOVEREIGNTY

In March 1828, two agents of Avudaiyarkoil, a Shaivite temple also known as
Tirupperunturai located in present-day Pudukkottai district, led a six-person party across
the Gulf of Mannar to Arippu. Sundaralingam Pillai, Muttu Pillai, and four cooks and
peons set out from their hometown through Rameswaram and continued by boat to
Kondachi Bay. The group ventured across land and sea to receive mauniam [Tm.
māniyam] or tax-free boats and diving stones on behalf of the temple. However, they
encountered an unforeseen roadblock. Governor Edward Barnes of British Ceylon
reversed decades of precedent by refusing to deliver boats and divers usually allocated
for Indian religious institutions. Sundaralingam Pillai, Muttu Pillai, and representatives
from four other rights-bearing temples—Rameswaram, Thirupallani, Thiruchendur, and
Uthirakosamangai—made repeated appeals to government officials with the help of
professional scribes whose services were offered at the pearl fishery. They also scheduled
a series of face-to-face meetings through local go-betweens to plead their case to
government officials. The temple agents petitioned Governor Barnes in what they
described as a “polite manner” and attached “ancient [documents] given in the time of
[Tirumalai Nayak] and [the Setupati of Ramnad],” which, Sundaralingam Pillai and
Muttu Pillai maintained, would “prove the enjoyment” of Avudaiyarkoil and demonstrate
“much of the holiness of the Pagodas.”827 They presented copper-plate inscriptions
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awarded to the temples by the Nayakas of Madurai and Setupatis of Ramnad alongside
government-issued certificates and passports from the Dutch and British to substantiate
their claims that tax-free boats and divers were protected rights conferred by former
sovereigns of India and subsequently recognized by European powers. Sundaralingam
Pillai and Muttu Pillai also suggested that government officials solicit the opinions of
“the other Gentlemen and the great Merchants” attending the pearl fishery who “will
Certify the truth of our allegation.”828 Despite a mountain of evidence before them,
Governor Barnes and his colleagues maintained that the government was under no
obligation to recognize such claims to tax-free boats and divers. Sundaralingam Pillai,
Muttu Pillai, and representatives of the other temples returned home empty handed.
Reports about the confrontation at Arippu streamed into the Madras government. The
temple agents reached out to Company officials and asked them to intervene in the
dispute with British Ceylon.
The events at Arippu in 1828 set off a decade-long debate between the East India
Company and British Ceylon about rights and authority at the pearl fisheries. British
Ceylon officer George Lee, former postmaster general at Colombo, who “undertook
laborious examination of a large and very interesting mass of Documents” concerning the
claims of the “Indian Pagodas,” issued a report in 1838.829 He delivered the results of his
investigation to Governor J. A. Stewart Mackenzie at the Queen’s House in Colombo in
August 1838. The Lee Report on the “Claim of Indian Temples on the Pearl Fisheries”
came at the end of a period in which the pearling industry had been the object of targeted
governmental reform and improvement. Drawing on the power of monopoly, Governor
828
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Barnes and his colleagues proposed abolishing the renting system and implementing a
type of direct management in which the pearl banks would be fished each season as a
government enterprise. What appeared to be an innovative reform was actually the return
to an older system of management. The Portuguese and Dutch had both managed the
pearl fishery along the same lines until the mid-eighteenth century when VOC officials
introduced the renting system. British Ceylon and the Company Raj elaborated this mode
of management in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries but the rights of
religious institutions at the pearl fishery had not been stripped away. British Ceylon tried
to decouple the claims of religious institutions to tax-free boats and divers from the wider
political economy of the pearl fishery, which went hand in hand with efforts to disembed
local networks and institutions from the industry more generally. The work of Governor
Barnes and his colleagues came at the precise moment when the British colonial office in
London appointed commissioners W. M. G. Colebrooke and C. H. Cameron to bring
liberal-minded and reform-orientated perspectives to the political, economic, and social
structures of the island.
Questions surrounding the rights and privileges of Indian religious institutions at
the pearl fishery became palpable during moments of political transition. Dutch officials
deliberated about the nature of such claims when the VOC wrested managerial control
over the pearl fishery from their Portuguese rivals in the mid-seventeenth century. At the
turn of the nineteenth century, when the East India Company emerged as the predominant
European power in the region, officers revisited the question of the Indian temples. The
early nineteenth century witnessed a series of attempted reforms to the pearling industry
and British officials on both sides of the Gulf designated the mauniam boats and other
283

privileges as one such target. From modifying the number of tax-free boats to revoking
privileges outright, British Ceylon and the Company Raj sought to change the
relationship between local institutions and the pearl fishery. British officials on both sides
of the Gulf preferred to validate claims to material benefits derived from the pearl fishery
but often refused to acknowledge any political rights. This chapter examines the
relationship between political sovereignty and the pearl fisheries in the late eighteenth
and early nineteenth centuries. It focuses on two key institutions—local polities and
religious institutions—and describes how British Ceylon and Company Madras sought to
terminate the preexisting rights and privileges enjoyed by courts and temples. The first
part of the chapter analyzes a series of diplomatic negotiations over the rights and
revenue to the pearl fishery between the Dutch East India Company, Nawab of Arcot, and
English East India Company in the 1780s. The second section returns to the events at
Arippu in 1828 and examines efforts by Madras and Ceylon to redefine the role of
religious institutions at the pearl fishery.
The title of this chapter— “The Most Sovereign Commodity”—evokes a famous
passage in Pliny the Elder’s Natural History. In his encyclopedic text from the early first
millennium on the natural world, Pliny referred to pearls harvested from the Indian Ocean
as “the richest merchandise of all” and “the most sovereign commodity throughout the
whole world.”830 Pliny alluded to the symbolic associations of pearls with kings and
queens but he also invoked another meaning of the word in which pearls might be seen as
the purest and supreme expressions of precious stones. Indeed, unlike gems extracted
from mines, such as diamonds and rubies, pearls do not require any cutting, polishing, or
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shaping. Besides drilling holes to string them together, pearls remain largely untouched
by jewelers. The royal connotations remained as kings and queens and shahs and sultans
in royal courts across Europe and Asia displayed pearls as symbols of royal wealth,
power, and prestige. The relationship between the production and consumption of pearls
and sovereignty was articulated in a different context, as British Ceylon and the Company
Raj hitched claims to legitimacy over the land, water, people, and resources of Mannar to
their control over the pearl fishery.
The Gulf of Mannar held considerable military, commercial, and political value
for European powers and indigenous polities and the pearl fishery was a keystone
industry in the geopolitics of the region.831 Historians Lauren Benton, Kerry Ward, and
others have advanced compelling arguments that the geographies of early modern and
modern empires were not uniform but manifested themselves through the creation and
management of intersecting fields of partial sovereignty.832 As Benton writes in A Search
for Sovereignty: “Empires did not cover space evenly but composed a fabric that was full
of holes, stitched together out of pieces, a tangle of strings. Even in the most
paradigmatic cases, an empire’s spaces were politically fragmented; legally
differentiated; and encased in irregular, porous, and sometimes undefined borders.”833
The geography of empires between the fifteenth and twentieth centuries, in other words,
was more like a patchwork quilt. By that same token, as historians Jane Burbank and
Frederic Cooper write in Empires in World History, “The world did not then—and still
does not—consist of billiard-ball states, with impermeable sovereignty, bouncing off
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each other. The history of empires allows us instead to envision sovereignty as shared
out, layered, overlapping.”834 Likewise, according to Benton, “Although empires did lay
claim to vast stretches of territory, the nature of such claims was tempered by control that
was exercised mainly over narrow bands, or corridors, and other enclaves and irregular
zones about them.”835 Mannar was one such “corridor” through which the English East
India Company and British colonial state of Ceylon stitched together various, and often
times contradictory, claims to territorial and thalassic control. Efforts to control land and
sea were of course not unique to early modern oceanic European empires and historical
evidence suggests that indigenous polities in the Indian Ocean sought to “territorialize”
the sea through state-sponsored violence.836
Sovereignty was no small matter for the Dutch and English East India Companies
in Asia. Scholars have long recognized the fact that European trading organizations were
not pure business enterprises. Even contemporary critics of the East India Companies
noticed fundamental contradictions in the organization and structure of these nominal
business corporations. Scottish philosopher Adam Smith also expressed contempt for the
East India Company in The Wealth of Nations. Smith maintained that the commercial
work of these corporations was antithetical to the role of political sovereign that they had
assumed in West and East Indies. He wrote: “A company of merchants are, it seems,
incapable of considering themselves as sovereigns, even after they have become such.
Trade, or buying in order to sell again, they still consider as their principal business, and
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by a strange absurdity regard the character of the sovereign as but an appendix to that of
the merchant, as something which ought to be made subservient to it.”837 In 1788,
Edmund Burke remarked in a speech at the impeachment of Warren Hastings, “the East
India Company in Asia is a state in the disguise of a merchant. Its whole service is a
system of public offices in the disguise of a counting-house.”838 Modern historians have
further outlined the tensions between the political and commercial mandates of European
international trading corporations. For instance, Dutch historian Jurrien van Goor
characterizes the VOC as a “hybrid state” that was preoccupied with “business concerns”
but acted “like a kingdom.”839 Likewise, historian M. C. Rickleff describes the VOC as a
“quasi-sovereign power” based on the rights it was granted from the States-General
charter.840 Historian Janice Thomson writes in a similar vein that the VOC was “endowed
with nearly all the powers of sovereignty.”841 More recent works have challenged the
characterizations of the East India Companies as “strange absurdities” and excised
qualifiers such as “quasi-“ and “hybrid.” Pioneering studies by Philip Stern on the British
East India Company in India and Adam Clulow on the Dutch East India Company in
Japan have shown that these corporate trading ventures functioned essentially as early
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modern political states. The Dutch and English East India Companies were therefore not
abnormal or strangely mutated merchant-empires. The possession of territory, the power
to negotiate treaties, the ability to mobilize an army, the means to organize tribunals, and
the use of select political discourses all indicate how these purportedly mercantilist
operations were effectively “company-states” from their founding in the early
seventeenth century.842 As historian Philip Stern writes, “While the English East India
Company may have become a territorial power in South Asia in the mid-eighteenth
century, it had actually been a form of government, state, and sovereign in Asia for some
time.”843
Founded by royal charter in 1600, the East India Company enhanced its own
corporate and political sovereignty by piecing together treaties, grants, charters, and other
agreements with indigenous rulers across the Indian Ocean realm and wider Asian world.
In the late eighteenth century, treaties and grants from local rulers in India became
increasingly important for the Company as it sought to legitimate its presence in the
region and form an “empire by treaty.”844 Numerous studies of the East India Company
and British Empire have wrestled with the problem of imperial sovereignty in Asia.
Eminent British historian Vincent Harlow famously characterized late eighteenth and
early nineteenth centuries as a transitional period between the “First British Empire” and
“Second British Empire, the autumn of an “old imperial order” and dawn of a “new
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imperial order.”845 Revisionists such as C.A. Bayly and others of the so-called Cambridge
school of imperial and colonial history doubted Harlow’s characterization of the British
Empire as a coherent and centrally-commanded political force that methodically spread
its reach across the globe. In Imperial Meridian, Bayly found that global political
formations like the British empire were fragmented into smaller imperial units. He also
placed Asian empires such as the Mughals and Ottomans on equal footing with European
powers and suggested that the East India Company entered a fully-formed and dynamic
Asian political and economic scene. Bayly and others also maintain that the position of
European trading powers fit easily within the Indian environment, that it was in fact the
dynamics of the eighteenth-century Indian political economy that pulled the Company
away from its commercial work into the political realm.846 He added that “all the most
important features which characterized the European rise to dominance in this ‘greater
southeast Asia’ were represented in the island of Ceylon.”847 In response to
interpretations that see the East India Company as a “ragged and conflict ridden
community of separate interests,” historian Sudipta Sen writes, that one “can easily lose
sight of a remarkably powerful and decisive state that won out in the colonial
confrontation with local powers and succeeded in containing much endemic
resistance.”848 In the case of the pearl fishery, the East India Company and British state
entered a political landscape in which many rights, claims, and authorities coexisted and
overlapped. From mauniam boats for temples to revenue sharing with local polities, a
patchwork of rights characterized the political structures of the pearl fishery through the
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early period of British management. British Ceylon and the Company Raj sought to
transform the pearl fishery into a simplex of rights and authority with corporate and
colonial sovereignty as its organizing principles.
In a classic study by historian C. H. Alexandrowicz, An Introduction to the
History of the Laws of Nations in the East India, the author situates British treaties and
other legal activities in the context of European expansion in the Indian Ocean.849 He
finds that British and Asian powers competed on a level playing field as full and active
participants in the so-called “law of nations,” a legal-political concept concerning natural
law stemming from the works of Hugo Grotius, Emmer de Vattel, and other jurists and
political philosophers. In the early seventeenth century, questions surrounding the
legitimacy of the East India Companies in Asia converged with disputes between the
British and Dutch over North Sea herring fisheries, which came to a head at the AngloDutch Colonial Conferences in London and The Hague in the 1610s.850 One of the
representatives of the Netherlands United Provinces was jurist Hugo Grotius, who just a
few years prior to his attendance at the conference had anonymously published Mare
Liberum, which argued that the seas were free and open to all nations.851 Scottish law
professor William Welwood wrote a rejoinder to Grotius and his followers, which argued
against the notion of the “free seas” and advanced the view that states could claim
849
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dominion over water.852 Political and legal theorists further deliberated on the
relationship between the sea and sovereignty, so-called “non-floating fisheries” such as
pearl oysters, conch shells, and coral, as well large marine mammals like seals and
walruses, were singled out because these animals lived along or just beyond the
shoreline. German political theorist Samuel Pufendorf had also addressed the topic of
fisheries in Of the Law of Nature and Nations. He wrote, “tis very usual that some
particular kind of fish, or perhaps some more precious commodity as pearls, coral, amber,
or the like, are to be found only in one part of the sea, and that of no considerable extent.
In this case, there is no reason why the borderers should not rather challenge to
themselves this happiness of a wealthy shore or sea than those who are seated at a
distance from it. And other Nations can with no more justice grudge or envy them such
an Advantage.”853 During the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,
European legal thought turned from the theory of natural law to legal positivism. The
continual use and exploitation of natural resource, a principle outlined as “positive
prescription,” was wedded to territorial claims.854 Jurists elaborated a state-friendly vision
of the relationship between the sea and sovereignty, whereby Swiss political theorist
Emer de Vattel could ask, “Who can doubt that the pearl fisheries of [Bahrain] and
Ceylon may lawfully become property?”855 For Vattel, coastal fisheries were the
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exclusive property of a sovereign and control over such resources brought with it
territorial rights to the coastline. He wrote in The Law of Nations (1758):
The various uses of the sea near the coasts render it very susceptible of
property. It furnishes fish, shells, pearls, amber, &c. Now in all these
respects its use is not inexhaustible; wherefore the nation to whom the
coasts belong may appropriate to themselves, and convert to their own
profit, an advantage which nature has so placed within their reach as to
enable them conveniently to take possession of it, in the same manner as
they possessed themselves of the dominion of the land they inhabit. Who
can doubt, that the pearl fisheries of [Bahrain] and Ceylon may lawfully
become property? And though, where the catching of fish is the only
object, the fishery appears less liable to be exhausted,—yet if a nation
have on their coast a particular fishery of a profitable nature, and of which
they may become masters, shall they not be permitted to appropriate to
themselves that bounteous gift of nature, as an appendage to the country
they possess, and to reserve to themselves the great advantages which their
commerce may thence derive in case there be a sufficient abundance of
fish to furnish the neighbouring nations?856
He added that “a nation may appropriate to herself those things, of which the free and
common use would be prejudicial or dangerous to her.”857 It was for this reason that
Vattel concluded a governments could lawfully “extend their dominion over the sea along
their coasts, as far as they are able to protect their right.”858
Discourses on the relationship between the sea and sovereignty further migrated
into the writings of Dutch and English officials and shaped the management of the pearl
fisheries. A recurring argument in favor of dominion over the sea was that it protected
natural resources. Pearl oysters, like other luxury marine products—and unlike
“inexhaustible” floating fish populations such as cod or herring—were viewed as
particularly vulnerable to over-exploitation and therefore needed special protection. And
it followed that the power to provide such environmental protections could only be
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exercised by authorities of a sovereign body. Dutch officers made arguments in this vein,
suggesting that the exploitation and conservation of the pearl oyster banks further entitled
the VOC to territorial and thalassic control. For instance, Dutch Governor Hendrick
Becker wrote about the importance of holding regular inspections of the pearl oyster
banks in a report to his successor, Isaac Rumpf, in 1716: “These yearly inspections are
held in the hope that these profitable banks may furnish the Company with the rich
revenue to which it is indisputably entitled as Lord of the Shores, and also to enable it to
purchase this jewel of the sea at a reasonable price so as to meet the demand.”859 Regular
examinations of the oyster banks not only determined the feasibility of hosting a pearl
fishery but it also reinforced sovereign claims to the land and sea based on the principal
of prescriptive use. In March 1762, Dutch Governor Jan Schreuder discussed the
relationship between the pearl fishery and VOC claims to the island in a report to his
successor, Jan Baron van Eck. Schreuder and other VOC officials believed that agents of
the Kandyan court sponsored smuggling activities. He wrote: “And we may add to this
how the Kandyans have more than once attempted to dispute our rights of exclusive
monopoly and possession of our valuable marine products and to participate in the same,
and with that object in view have caused our pearl banks to be inspected and
surreptitiously fished for pearls.”860 He added: “A clear proof that the Company has
nothing in which the King does not seek to take a share and to play the master, even in
matters which are out of this jurisdiction as the sea, as if he would also appropriate to
himself our sea rights.”861 According to Schreuder, the VOC had “by right of conquest,
naturally acquired the full rights which the Portuguese had exercised,” which Dutch
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officials interpreted as “sovereign rights over the sea and its products along the shore.”862
He recommended like his predecessors that regular examinations should be undertaken
“with the object of exercising our dominium maris.”863 Dutch officials like Jan Schreuder
pointed to a treaty signed between Admiral Adam Westerwold and King Rajasinha of
Kandy at Batticaloa in May 1638 as further evidence that Company had an exclusive
right to the maritime areas of island.
The British East India Company appropriated the pearl fishery as a so-called
“right of conquest” from its Dutch rivals in 1796. Company officials produced reports on
the history of the island that attempted to shore up these claims to the coastal areas of
Ceylon. As one Company officer wrote at the turn of the nineteenth century, “It is clear
that we are, by right of Conquest, & the consequent devolution to us of whatever
belonged to the Dutch, entitled to all the most valuable part of the Island.”864 He
continued: “Our Sovereign possession of that uninterrupted belt which follows the whole
circumference of the coasts and encircles and hems in the entire Kingdom of Candy,
places that Kingdom virtually under our control & dominion.”865 Like the Dutch VOC,
the East India Company connected rights to the natural resources of the island to
territorial control and political sovereignty. According to author of this report, “our
command of the Sea & Harbors makes us masters of the other Chief sources of riches to
Ceylon, the Pearl fishery. Such being the case, is not the independent [sic] and
Sovereignty of the King of the interior of the Island, a name more than anything else?”866
This idea—that the pearl fisheries could be the lawful property of a sovereign—was
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further codified by a British colonial act in 1811, which extended the state’s dominion
over the pearl banks beyond three miles from shore, the distance previously recognized
by international law. British Ceylon now had control over waters extending anywhere
from six to twenty miles from shore, depending on the exact location of the pearl banks.
The regulation expanded state policing powers and permitted British Ceylon officials to
arrest any unauthorized vessels traveling along the pearl oyster beds in the name of
security and environmental conservation.867 This law even found its way into debates
between the United States and Britain over seal hunting in the late nineteenth century.
According to records of the summit between American and British leaders, “[The
Ceylon] pearl fisheries have been treated from time immemorial by the successive rulers
of the island as subjects of property and jurisdiction, and have been so regarded with the
acquiesce of all other nations.”868
The East India Company had to reconcile a mix of local state and customary
rights with a fledging European legal and political framework concerning maritime
spaces. The patchwork of customary and legal rights that structured the industry appear in
the documentary record as particularly frayed during moments of political transition. In
1796, when the East India Company secured managerial rights to the pearl fishery from
the VOC, British officials turned to the archives of their vanquished rivals to develop a
deeper understanding of the issues. British administrators inherited a massive store of
documents, some of which remained in their original location at Colombo, Tuticorin, and
other erstwhile Dutch settlements, while others were sent to Fort St. George. Company
officers used Portuguese and Dutch records to glean information about the pearl fishery,
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building a body of knowledge about the industry through which to adjudicate claims,
assess taxes, and improve management. These records were put into conversation with
other materials, such as local historical narratives of the past written in Tamil and
accounts supplied by village accountants or record-keepers known as karanam or
kanakkuppillai, a position and title that was later incorporated into the bureaucratic
apparatus of the company-state of Madras.869 Cutcherry assistants translated and
organized the documents and district collectors and their European staff communicated
information to their superiors at Fort St. George and London. These materials included
internal correspondence and letters between officers, as well as compilations of “native”
documents such as literary texts and copper-plate inscriptions. Most of these textual
sources were available in translation, as British officers did not permanently store
original inscriptions in the “records rooms” of the district offices but instead worked
mostly with versions rendered in English by cutcherry scribes. One reason for this was
that those institutions, individuals, and families that held grants to mauniam boats at the
pearl fishery kept copper-plate inscriptions and other valuable documents in their
possession, submitting them to Company authorities for review upon request. Many of
the grants awarded to private individuals and families such as hereditary positions like
the jati talaivan remained in possession of families well into the twentieth century.870
There are also references to agents of the temples carrying the original grants and deeds
with them to the site of the pearl fishery, which, of course, brought with it certain risks
such as theft and damage. For example, a petition to Company Madras following the
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1828 pearl fishery at Arippu from agents of Rameswaram read: “Although the oldest
account of the Pagoda had been destroyed by time and age still the accounts for the last
100 years are in the Pagoda to prove the privilege which the Church had enjoyed likewise
the various documents to and certificates hereunder mentioned granted by the several
Gentlemen who superintended the fishery at Manar in the different periods from the year
1796 to 1814 will also establish the right of the Pagoda.”871 In another case, Company
officer George Parish undertook an extensive investigation into the pearl fishery shortly
after the turn of the nineteenth century.872 He referred to the “History which has been
given by the Curnan [karanam] of Tutacoryn of the first Settlement of the Portuguese and
the Dutch of Tutacoryn,” which showed that the Dutch had conducted the pearl fishery
“upon certain Conditions prescribed by the Hindoo Government of the Country.”873
However, according to Parish, “Gentoo Sovereignty” sunset and “the Dutch drew the
Revenues of the Fisheries of the Coast for a time entirely to themselves.”874 Through this
interpretation of archival materials and local textual sources, the East India Company
constructed an historical narrative in which they were depicted as rightful sovereigns of
the land and sea.

Pearl Fishery Diplomacy
Pearls were an important feature of courtly and political cultures in Europe and Asia. The
courts of early modern Europe invested pearls with symbolic value. The use of pearls not
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only associated royal courts with sovereignty but also symbolically and materially
connected them with pearl-producing areas in Asia and the Americas.875 Pearls, as well as
other precious stones like emeralds and turquoise, were also an important aspect of
kingship within the wider cultural imperium of Islamic Eurasia.876 Flemish gem merchant
Jacques de Coutre characterized the Mughal court as a black hole for precious gems and
stones: “I am here to say that of what I have seen, the Mogul has more treasures in
precious stones, gold, and silver than all the kings of Europe together…It is a very certain
thing that from all parts of the world are sent pearls, emeralds, rubies, and jewels of great
price to the India of the East, and we know that it all ends up with the Mogul.”877 In
another famous account, French jeweler and merchant Jean-Baptiste Tavernier described
a bejeweled peacock throne of the Mughals that had an elaborately decorated canopy
“covered with diamonds and pearls, with a fringe of pearls all round.”878 According to
historians Annemarie Schimmel and Burzine Waghmar, “pearls played an especially
important role during the time of the Mughals, and double and triple strands of pearls
were symbols of nobility by the time of Akbar at the latest.”879 Precious gems like pearls
and diamonds also functioned as objects that mediated encounters between European
ambassadors and Indian courtiers. For instance, French physician and philosopher
François Bernier visited the court of Aurangzeb in the late seventeenth century. He wrote
in Travels in the Mogul Empire that the emperor wore a “necklace of immense pearls”
875
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and that gifts from courtiers, which included pearls of considerable value, served “as an
act of courtesy and condescension.”880 Englishman James Tod also wrote about pearls as
objects in courtly gift-giving protocols: “I gave [Prince Kurrun] a rich necklace of pearls,
another day an elephant, and it was my wish to give him rarities and choice things of
every kind.”881
Evidence from literary and visual cultures also suggest a close link between pearls
and royal courts in southern India and Sri Lanka. For instance, Marco Polo reported that
the King of Ma’bar possessed a necklace of “104 large pearls and rubies of great price,”
passed down from king to king, which he used as a rosary during his daily prayers.882
There are also eighteenth-century murals at the Ramalinga Vilasam that depict various
uses of pearls at the court of the Setupati of Ramnad. One of the panels at the Ramnad
palace represents the Setupati awarding strings of pearls to dancers.883 In another panel,
European courtiers appear before the Ramnad king with a tray of pearls stacked like a
pyramid. The shape of their hats and style of dress suggests that the envoys are agents of
the VOC.884 Pearls were also significant in the self-styled representations of the Nawab of
Arcot. For instance, a famous portrait by Scottish portraitist George Willison of
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Muhammad Ali Khan (r. 1749-1795) depicts the Nawab in his regalia, draped with a long
string of pearls around his neck. Historian Susan Bayly writes that Willison’s portrait of
the Nawab also “had political value in its own right.”885 According to Bayly, “in the
Muslim states of the Deccan and North India, the ceremonial presentation of portraits had
long served as a means of expressing suzerainty and overlordship.”886 Art historian
Natasha Eaton has also addressed the relationship between portraits and empire in
eighteenth-century India with special attention to the East India Company and the Nawab
of Arcot.887
There is evidence from Dutch and English archival sources that the East India
Companies used pearls as diplomatic gifts to mend relationships with local courts. For
instance, in the 1760s, Dutch Ceylon requested permission from Ramnad to erect stone
buildings and warehouses at Kanyakumari, but the VOC was rebuffed by the Setupati in
no uncertain terms. Dutch Governor Jan Schreuder wrote: “According to general opinion
we might have attained our object had we insisted strongly enough and complied with his
request [of] four handsome pearls.”888 Pearls also found their way into political intrigue.
Dutch Governor Daniel Overbeek expressed concern that “avaricious courtiers” from
Kandy were subsidizing smugglers to shuttle goods between the island and mainland. He
suggested gifting some men of the court high quality pearls to drive a wedge between
members of the faction and break-up their alliance with the band of pearl-runners that
Overbeek characterized as “Chettis and Moors.” He wrote that a “beautiful string of
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pearls of No. 1 quality will soften their resentment and especially His Majesty would be
made to understand in significant terms how much more beneficial and profitable it will
be both for his own subjects and those of the Company to remain at their work.”889
The place of pearls and other precious jewels in encounters between European
and Asian courts is well documented in early modern travelogues, European archives,
and vernacular language sources, all of which reveal the true value of pearls in the
diplomatic realm. A close look at the courtly and diplomatic spaces occupied by the pearl
fishery in the late eighteenth century indicates a further layer. Like the pearl fisheries of
Mannar, the diamond mines of Golconda were hotly contested by native and foreign
powers, particularly in the seventeenth century, and a look at the sources from whence
such precious gems and stones came sheds further light on the place of the production of
such commodities in the political economy of the region.890
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Figure 9. Muhammad Ali Khan Wallajah, Nawab of the Carnatic, Oil on Canvas, George Willison, c. 1774
(British Library, London).

The pearl fisheries emerged as a discrete topic in diplomatic negotiations between
the Dutch VOC, Nawab of Arcot, and English East India Company in the latter half of
the eighteenth century. The problem stemmed from a series of encounters between the
VOC and Arcot at the 1767 pearl fishery at Tuticorin and the 1768 pearl fishery at
Arippu.891 An agent of the Nawab of Arcot, Virappa Pillai, came to Tuticorin and Arippu
to receive mauniam boats, collect a share of the revenue in the form of a day’s catch, and
perform some ceremonial functions such as raising the Arcot flag over the bazaar. Dutch
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VOC officials, however, had no intention of awarding recognition to the claims of Arcot.
The agent of the Nawab were also “attended by a large party of Armed Sepahis
[Sepoys],” which the Dutch perceived as an act of aggression and exacerbated the
problem.892 At the same time, however, representatives from Ramnad received a warm
welcome from Dutch officials, and the Setupati of Ramnad received his usual share of
boats and divers. According to a letter from Colombo to a Dutch official presiding over
the pearl fishery, “We expressly forbid you by these presents to allow to the Nabob’s
envoys more than ten Dhonies, and with respect to the Theuver to depart one hair’s
breadth from what is given him by our treaty and we order you to abide most closely by
these instructions, even should they happen to put a stop to the fishery; and if force is
employed on their side, you will meet it with force.”893 VOC officials alluded to a treaty
signed between Dutch Ceylon and Ramnad in 1767 that conferred Ramnad a portion of
the revenue and access to tax-free boats at the pearl fishery.894 Ramnad received two free
diving boats at all future pearl fisheries off the coast of Madurai and the right to purchase
five boats at the Ceylon fishery. Ramnad ceded possession of Palk Strait—the narrow
passageway between the northern tip of Ceylon and promontory of Rameswaram—and
transferred the power to levy duties, control shipping traffic, and station armed vessels.
The violent encounters between the VOC officials and agents of Arcot and
Ramnad at Arippu in 1768 reverberated through the pearling industry for nearly three
decades. The intervening years witnessed protracted disputes over the rights and revenue
to the pearl and chank fisheries between the Dutch VOC and Nawab of Arcot. Relations
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between Dutch and Arcot intensified shortly after the events at Arippu. In 1770, Dutch
commander Pieter van Sluysken traveled from Colombo to Arcot on a diplomatic mission
to address the pearling industry inter alia. Sluysken tried to reduce the award of the
Nawab to twenty boats. Sluysken kept a detailed diary of his journey to the Nawab’s
palace at Chepauk on the outskirts of Madras. There is an oft-cited exchange between
Sluysken and the Nawab Muhammad Ali Khan Wallajah (r. 1749-1795) that offers a
window on the place of the pearl fisheries in the political geography of the southern
India. The Nawab reportedly said to Sluysken, “These provinces have always belonged to
the turban wearers. Are they meant to be under the rule of Europeans?”895 The Nawab
continued to interrogate Sluysken: “Which nations inhabited those lands in the past? Men
who wore turbans or hats? Were the white or black the people who owned the country
before? The white were always in Europe and the blacks always have occupied these
lands!”896 Nawab Muhammad Ali sent a letter to Sluysken in October 1770 that
recapitulated his claims to a share of the pearl and chank fisheries: “As to Tutacorin, the
whole pearl and Chank Fisheries of this place is the property of the Circar, what right
then have the Dutch to half of that pearl fishery, and the whole of the Chank Fishery?”897
From the perspective of Arcot, the pearl and chank fisheries fell squarely within the
Nawab’s territory, which invalidated the claims of the Dutch to a portion of the seasons
produce and revenue. This was, after all, the land of “turban-wearers” and did not belong
to European “hat-wearers.” The Dutch, on the other hand, claimed a share of the pearl
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and chank fisheries based upon their usurpation of Portuguese territories. Dutch VOC
officials also reasoned that the native powers such as Arcot did not hold compelling
documentary evidence to substantiate such claims. As Sluysken wrote, “it may perhaps
be the case, says he, that under the King [Tirumalai Nayakar], the pearl fisheries were
held in the manner your Highness details in the following paragraphs, but there exists
nothing to prove all this.” 898 In fact, Sluysken continued, “all the documents which can
be produced show, that the Hon. Company became independent proprietors of the Pearl
Banks by force of arms, and have been always acknowledged as such, and the Fisheries
have ever been conducted by the Company without opposition or discussion.”899 The
summit resulted in multiple drafts of provisional accords but the contracting parties never
ratified a single version. Colombo and Arcot remained locked in a stalemate. Even
though it never reaped profits from the pearl oyster banks, the VOC continued to find
value in its control over the industry. Between 1768 until 1796, Dutch Ceylon let the
pearl oyster beds lay fallow. The decision to hold the pearl fishery in abeyance was went
hand in hand with its policy towards Arcot. According to the logic of this policy, if Arcot
did not scale back its demand for full recognition of rights to the pearl and chank
fisheries, then the VOC would continue to deprive the embattled and deeply indebted
state of much-needed revenue.
The tête-à-tête between Sluysken and Nawab Muhammad Ali in late 1770 did
little to resolve the gridlock between Colombo and Arcot. Debates over rights and
revenue at the pearl fishery continued to flow beneath the surface of Dutch-Arcot
relations for the next decade and a half. In 1786, the East India Company entered the
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fray. As the debts of the Nawab mounted, and the Company continued to penetrate the
administration of Arcot, the Nawab was left with little more than the trappings of a
sovereign ruler.900 The arrival of an envoy representing Arcot to Colombo in 1786
marked the beginning of a new round of talks between the Dutch and Nawab. This time,
however, officials of the East India Company represented the interests of the Nawab, who
continued to face crushing debts. The head of the party from Arcot was James Dott, an
English ambassador at the Nawab’s court. These talks led to the draft of a treaty in
1786.901 According to the Dutch-Arcot-English treaty of 1786, “The pearl-fishery at
Tuticorin will be publicly auctioned to the highest bidder, and the price at which it has
been purchased will be divided between the Noble Company and the Nawab, as Lord of
Madurai and Lord-Suzerain of the Marava country, in two equal portions.”902 It also
stipulated “the farmer will be ceded all the rights that may exist over the bank or banks
that he has farmed. He will do with the oysters and the pearls that he extracts what he
will, and shall in consequence conduct this operation in the freest manner, and so that no
one may interfere in it. All other usages and customs, contrary to the what has been
established in this article, will be revoked and abolished.”903 The 1786 treaty stipulated
that the Nawab was to receive half the profits from fisheries off the coast of the mainland
and thirty-six free boats at the Ceylon fisheries. For their part, the Dutch continued to
900
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enjoy their monopoly over the cloth trade, but many issues, specifically the chank fishery
and fisheries held at certain areas on the Ceylon-side of Mannar, remained moot.
Two years later, another Company officer arrived at Colombo to negotiate on
behalf of the Nawab. James Buchanan represented the Nawab Muhammad Ali in an
ambassadorial capacity during negotiations with Dutch Ceylon over rights and revenues
to the pearl fishery of the Gulf of Mannar. Buchanan, appointed by the Governor
Archibald Campbell of Madras to attend the Nawab’s court, was subsequently tapped by
Muhammad Ali to serve as a special envoy to Colombo. The 1788 summit at Colombo
resulted in a treaty signed by Buchanan and Dutch Governor Jacob Van de Graaff on July
7, 1788.904 The treaty awarded Nawab Muhammad Ali a quarter of the revenue from
fisheries held on the Ceylon-side of Mannar and half of the revenue from fisheries held
on the India-side. Like Sluysken before him, James Buchanan kept a detailed record of
his mission, the results of which are contained in the so-called “Buchanan Letter Book”
and contain materials in English, Dutch, French, and Persian related to the summit.905
From the outset, Buchanan expressed to his Dutch counterparts a desire for a swift
and amicable solution to the problem of the pearl fishery. He wrote in May 1788, “I have
now to propose to you that as the right and proportions of His Highness the Nabob and
the Honourable Dutch East India Company to the Pearl fishery of Tutacorin and Manar,
have long been a subject of dispute between His Highness and the Honorable Company,
and as they are not yet clearly understood by the Partys [sic], a Negociation [sic] to
remedy this misunderstanding and to place their respective Rights and Proportions on a
904
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clear and permanent Establishment by treaty, may be now commenced.”906 However, a
“clear and permanent establishment” did not come easy to Buchanan and the others
involved in the negotiations. The parties agreement on the terms of a treaty came only
after long and tedious negotiations that stretched deep into the year. A letter from
Buchanan to the Nawab captured the Englishman’s frustration with the intransigence of
the Dutch VOC. “I have obtained much and granted nothing,” Buchanan wrote.907 “They
have been extorted like Drops of Blood from them, and a good deal of plain language and
altercation has been used to bring them to those terms, which I can assure your Highness
are the best to be obtained from them.”908
The Nawab not only mandated that Buchanan negotiate a favorable set of terms
concerning the pearl fishery but also tasked him with related responsibilities. For
instance, the Nawab instructed Buchanan to get hold of the pearls allocated for Arcot. A
letter from Muhammad Ali to Buchanan read: “All the Pearls that are received by you as
the Circars share of the Fisheries you are to keep, and to forward them to the Presence
when directed.”909 The Nawab also authorized Buchanan to purchase “any large pearls”
brought up by the divers during the pearl fishery “[on] Account of the Circar.”910 Even as
Muhammad Ali tasked Buchanan with these responsibilities he also placed limits on the
Englishman’s autonomy, reminding Buchanan that he served at the pleasure of the
Nawab. A letter from Arcot to Colombo asserted that the Nawab had ultimate decisionmaking power: “You are not even to enter into any preliminary treaty with the Dutch
[until they] shall have clearly stated their demands and that they have been laid before us
906
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from our Approbation or disapprobation.”911 The Nawab also stationed a native
commercial agent at Tirunelveli to support Buchanan during the negotiations and serve as
a point-person for Arcot.
According to correspondence between Buchanan and the Nawab, the question of
the pearl fishery was the most important item on the agenda. In January 1788, near the
start of the summit at Colombo, Buchanan received a letter from Chepauk Palace with
instructions concerning his mission to Ceylon. Nawab Muhammad Ali stressed the
importance of the pearl fishery and instructed Buchanan to table matters related to the
chank fishery and cloth trade. After a particularly drawn-out discussion with his Dutch
counterparts, Buchanan wrote to the Nawab: “The reason the Chank Fishery was not
included in the proposals for a Treaty was, that I understood from the Nabob Ameer [i.e.
Amir al-Umara, the younger son of Muhammad Ali] verbally two days before I took
Leave he wished me to settle the Pearl Fishery first, and let the Chank alone for the
present.”912 Buchanan also counseled Muhammad Ali to continue asserting his claim to
the pearl fishery and refuse any offers to transfer rights to the VOC. As Buchanan wrote
to the Nawab from Palamcottah (present-day Palayamkottai in Tirunelveli) in March
1790, “I have said that in the event Your Highness thought of assigning part of Your
Countries, this wou’d be the last of them you wou’d think of making over, as there are
two Fisheries of Pearls depending on it for next year, That of Tutacoryn certain, and
every likelihood that the Dutch will [no] longer object to your Highness’s people seeing
the banks of Manar.”913 He continued: “Your Highness wou’d certainly lose two
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Fisheries of Pearls by assigning over this Country however short a time the War may
last.”914
There were other issues that animated the negotiations at Colombo. A particularly
sticky issue was the right asserted by the Nawab to hoist his flag at the pearl fishery.
Muhammad Ali maintained that he had a customary right to have a representative “attend
the Fishery with Troops and a Bazar to hoist His Highness the Nabobs Colours during the
Fishery, and to receive the Customs of the Bazar for the Circar.”915 However, the Dutch
continued to deny the Nawab his right to display the Arcot flag at the pearl fishery
Buchanan wrote in a letter to the Nawab that “the right to hoist your Highness’s Flag at
Manar was long disputed.”916 The issued appeared in a draft of a treaty between the
negotiating parties. Article Four permitted both Dutch and Arcot flags to fly above the
bazaar during the pearl fishery: “The Colours & Flags usually display’d by the High
Contracting parties during the Pearl fishery, the Bazar for Provisions & all other things of
that nature shall remain on the usual footing.” Article Seven of the same provisional
treaty also addressed “honors and distinctions,” which reiterated the rights of the Nawab
of Arcot to display his flag above the camp of his representatives: “Should His Highness
Chuse [sic] to send his Donys as above mentioned to the Manaar fishery, the person
Charged with the Conduct of them shall be permitted as a mark of honor & Distinction to
hoist His Highness’s Flag Close to his habitation & more over he may have a guard of 50
men of His Highness Seapoys [sic] Commanded by an officer.”917 Buchanan commented
on the significance of this clause in a letter to the Nawab: “This Article settles his
914
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Highness’s right to display his Flag at Manar which the Dutch strongly objected to, and
still more to the Company of Sepoys; the keeping a Bazar for the benefit of the Circar
they reject as a right to which they cannot consent nor ought to be expected.”918 He
added: “It would ill become me to insist on this being the only obstruction to the Treaty,
as His Highness was pleased to say I might receive the benefit of the Bazar for any own
use; I have therefore agreed it shou’d not stand in the way of accommodation of
differences.”919 It was agreed in the end that an agent of the Nawab was only permitted to
display Arcot insignia near the house in which he stayed. Buchanan addressed his
concerns about the flag to one of his Dutch counterparts in a letter from late November
1789: “As to what you say of the Company's Flag being hoisted at the same time with the
Nabob’s, I confess I have looked with much Surprize[sic] of your neglect in that respect,
as you must know that it is ill timed at present, and that common Decency required that
the Dutch Flag ought to be hoisted in Compliment to His Highness. These Neglects can
have no good Effect, but may produce mischief.”920 Buchanan even wrote to Arcot to
recommend that he put the flag issue to rest and focus more on securing proportionate
shares of the seasons catch and revenues. He wrote afterwards to the VOC: “I wou’d
recommend that in lieu of these various Rights and Claims of His Highness, such general
proportion of the whole Fishery as appears to you to be just & adequate on fair and
liberal principles.”921 A clause concerning banners and colors at the pearl fishery
compound was included in a provisional draft of a treaty but the parties ultimately
crossed it out of the final version.
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A new problem emerged when Buchanan and Governor De Graaf ratified the
treaty. The parties had to enforce the terms of the agreement. Apparently pleased with
Buchanan’s work as an ambassador, the Nawab of Arcot appointed the English officer to
manage his commercial affairs in Tirunelveli and oversee the implementation of the
treaty. In December 1789, Buchanan received a letter from Chepauk concerning his new
role: “In consideration of your great friendship and attachment, I have entrusted the
whole business of the Pearl Fisheries etc. Manar & Tutacoryn to your management.”922
The Nawab wrote: “You must therefore use all your exertions to see the Fisheries
conducted, in concert with the Circar’s People, with success, which will convey great
pleasure and satisfaction to my mind. But if the Dutch in their conduct depart from the
rules of rectitude and good faith; I will, with the Helping of God, take such steps as it
shall never more be in their power to act a dishonest part towards my Circar.”923 He
added: “You will therefore be pleased to exert yourself with a cheerful heart in the
accomplishment of the Circar’s Business.”924 Buchanan was joined by a native agent of
the Nawab, a certain Mahomed Aslam Cawn, who, was “merely by way of an Ameen to
be under [his] directions.”925 Buchanan received a handsome salary and other perquisites,
including a distinguished title, fine horses, and a loan of one lakh SP.926 Making sure that
the Dutch followed the terms of the treaty presented more of a challenge to Buchanan
than hashing out the details of the actual agreement. For instance, an article in the treaty
allowed Arcot to have representatives attend the annual examination of the pearl oyster
banks. According to this section: “Those, to whom the high Contracting parties, shall
922
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confide this care, shall in the most convenient time caused the above mentioned [pearl
oyster banks] to be visited and after they have been visited they are Judged Rich enough
for a fishery shall be announced to the publick [sic] as customary at what day the sale
shall be made which shall be done before the Commissary’s appropriated of both
sides.”927 This was more than a mechanism for Arcot to jointly prepare for the pearl
fishery. Nawab Muhammad Ali wrote to Buchanan from Chepauk House in December
1788 on the subject and contextualized it in terms of political sovereignty: “The Dutch of
Tutacoreen [sic] in fact were always subject to the Princes of the Country during the
times that the [Rajahs] held the Government of Trithcinpoly [sic] and Madura, and indeed
ever since, the Dutch of Tutacorin were constantly held in subjection.”928 He declared,
“By the Grace of God, I am now the Sole Sovereign of the Carnatic.”929 It was for this
reason that the Nawab of Arcot further asserted his customary right to the pearl fishery.
He added: “In the year [1751-52] I went to arrange the affairs of the Tinnevelly Province,
I fixed my encampment near Tutacorin. At that time the Dutch who were settled there
had not the presumption to attempt any measures contrary to the Ancient established
usages. These established Customs I consider to be still in force and my Friends the
English are the Supporters of all my Rights. I cannot therefore allow the Chief of
Tutacorin to deviate from the former Customs.”930
October-November 1789 marked the first examination of the pearl oyster beds
following the ratification of the treat between the Nawab of Arcot and the Dutch VOC. In
accordance with the terms of the agreement, the Nawab dispatched his agents to the Gulf
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of Mannar to assist with the assaying process. Three persons—Muhammad Islam, Abdul
Kader Maraikkayar, and Shankar Das—joined Buchanan on the western shores of
Ceylon. Buchanan used the power of his office to facilitate the travel of the Nawab’s
agents. He provided them with the necessary certificates and passports to travel from
Palamcottah to the location of the examination. According to one of the documents, “The
Bearer of this Letter, Abdul Kader Tumby Maracayar, is directed to take charge of the
management of the four Tonies sent on His Highness the Nabob's part to examine the
Pearl bank.” 931 Buchanan and these three men joined Dutch VOC officials “to the end
that the true state of the Banks may be fully known to be both parties.”932 Yet anonymous
reports reached Chepauk House that revealed VOC officials had been undertaking secret
inspections of the pearl banks without notifying the Nawab. This was a clear violation
treaty. According to these reports, the Dutch resident of Tuticorin had commissioned
twenty-one boats over a two-month period to assay the pearl oyster beds. It also came to
light that VOC officials had intentionally spread misinformation about the results of the
pearl fishery. The anonymous source reported to Nawab Muhammad Ali that the Dutch
resident at Tuticorin “pretends the Pearls are not ripe enough for a fishery.”933 The
Nawab and his advisors hoped that Buchanan would “plainly see the unfair and deceitful
conduct of the Dutch.”934 However, Buchanan questioned the veracity of this information
and dismissed it as rumor and hearsay. He advised the Nawab to take a more measured
and diplomatic response. He wrote: “Twenty one [sic] Tonies cannot be employed in the
way Your Highness is informed without the knowledge of many people at Manar, and if
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your Highness’s informers cannot bring proof, I humbly think they might be punished,
because [Governor] Van de Graaff will require that Proof be made before he punishes the
Chief of Manar.”935
Another issue related to enforcement of the treaty was the custody of pearls. This
matter came to the fore when reports arrived to Arcot that the Dutch were not only
surreptitiously examining the pearl oyster beds but also hoarding pearls collected during
the process. Despite the small quantity and modest value of the sample product,
Buchanan reminded his Dutch counterparts that the Nawab of Arcot had a legitimate
claim. He wrote, “I know they are very small of little or no value, but it is proper they
should be sent here, and this I demand not as a matter of Favor but of right it is also
proper that His Highness the Nabob who is Sovereign of all this Country should have due
respect paid to him by the Chief of Tutacorin.”936 In April 1789, Dutch Governor Van de
Graaff replied to Buchanan: “Concerning the Pearls found at the examination of the Pearl
banks of Tutacoryn, I think, henceforth one may follow this rule that immediately after
the Examination is done and that the pearls have been examined by the Committee that
they may make their report of their business and value they shall be immediately divided
in two parts and then one half shall be took for each of the high Contracting parties.”937
This expression of good faith was followed by a shipment of “five small parcels” of
pearls to Arcot, the receipt of which Buchanan confirmed in a letter to Dutch officials.938
Buchanan wrote that the “Samples of the Pearls found on the Examination of the
Tutacorin Banks“ represented “Proof of your Friendship towards His Highness The
935
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Nabob.”939 He included a caveat: “If they had been sent as they ought, when first
demanded, tho’ of no value it might serve to show your good inclination, but withheld by
you so long as they have been contrary to His Highness’s Rights I cannot look upon your
sending them now in any point of view but that of barely doing Justice.”940
The ambiguity surrounding the claims of Arcot to the pearl fishery continued
through the early years of British management. When the East India Company obtained
managerial control over the pearl fishery in 1795, British officials extended the Arcot’s
claims without much controversy. One channel through which the Company Raj
managed its relationship with Arcot was by simply honoring preexisting treaties. For
instance, in February-March 1796, Nawab Umdat ul-Umara, the son and successor to
Muhammad Ali, sent a letter in Persian to Governor Hobart of Madras: “Understanding
that your Lordship has farmed out the Pearl Fishery at Manar, I have to request that you
will be pleased to furnish me with a positive order to your People, directing them
according to ancient Custom, to deliver the Sirkars share to the person whom I shall send
for the purpose from my pursue to pay him the same honors as the Dutch were acustomed
[sic] to do, to give him the usual place for his residence at Manar, and to do everything
that has heretofore been Customary.”941 George Powney, Collector of Ramnad, also
recommended to the Board of Revenue that Madras deliver Arcot advanced notice of the
examination dates. He wrote: “I beg leave to recommend that his Highness the Nabob
may be addressed on the Subject, and a proposal made to him that the Banks at Tutacoryn
should undergo examination according to the usual mode by persons appointed on the
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part of His Highness and Government in the Month of November next.”942 Powney added
in a separate letter that he had “written to the Nabobs Manager at Tinnevelly” and was
“ready to adopt measures in Conjunction with him [that] he examine the Pearl Banks at
Tutakoryn.”943 The Madras government in turn notified Nawab Umdat ul-Umara about
the pearl fishery and he appointed Mahomed Islam Khan “to act in concert with
[Powney] in the examination of the Pearl and Chank Banks at Tuticorin and the Conduct
of the fishery.”944
This policy of accommodation quickly became far more restrictive. The
superintendent of the 1796 pearl fishery at Ceylon, Robert Andrews, instructed an agent
of the Nawab to leave the pearl fishery and travel to Madras. At Fort St. George, the
native agent would adjust the Nawab’s account and receive the share of the produce and
revenue due to Arcot. However, during two subsequent pearl fisheries, the Company Raj
rejected the claims of Arcot and instructed Andrews to limit the role of the Nawab’s
agents. The Madras government wished for the superintendent to bring the boats usually
allocated for Arcot under his direct supervision. He would account for the produce and
add the results to the Nawab’s account.945 According to a letter from Fort St. George to
London in August 1796, “We soon after received information from the Resident on
Ceylon that His Highness’s Agent had arrived at Manar without a single boat or any other
preparation for the fishery, and that he had demanded the use of the whole number of
boats then at the fishery for that the space of one day.”946 The letter continued: “We have
informed the Nabob that the Island having been taken possession of in the name of His
942
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Majesty, we are not at liberty to relinquish any part of its Revenue without authority, and
according to the Assurance we have given His Highness, we beg leave to refer the matter
to your consideration.”947 The Company Raj and Arcot therefore had very different ideas
about the exact nature of the rights and privileges that structured the pearl fishery.
The East India Company extended support to Nawab Muhammad Ali Khan
Wallajah during his dispute with Dutch Ceylon over the rights and revenues to the pearl
fishery of Mannar. However, the Company Raj took a different position towards Arcot’s
claims to the pearl fishery after the Dutch withdrew from the region. Madras officials
further eroded the rights of Arcot. In January 1799, North sent a collection of documents
to Fort St. George concerning Arcot and the pearl fishery. He feared that agents of the
Nawab would interfere with the pearl fishery at Arippu he was in the process of
organizing. North wrote, “I must at the same time request your Lordship in Council, to
stipulate that whatever advantage, you may be inclined to grant those Princes may be
taken from the Proceed of the Fishery and they may not be allowed to interfere in the
management of the Fishery itself.”948 North found no compelling evidence that the socalled “Indian Princes” had access to the pearling grounds during the assaying process.
Importantly, the pearl fishery at Arippu in 1799 was the first one conducted under
North’s supervision, and he was steadfast in his commitment to staging a smooth and
well-managed event. He wrote: “Such an interference can only Cause a Concurrence
prejudicial to both parties, besides subjecting us to disputes, and difficulties, and
preventing the effects of the strict and vigilant Administration of the Concern, which it
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has been my wish to Secure.”949 North also sent instructions to the superintendents of the
pearl fishery turn away agents of the Nawab. He wrote, “Should any persons arrive at the
Fishery as Agents for the Nabob of the Carnatic…and set forth any Claims, to priviledges
[sic] therein, you will decline any such, till you shall have received Instructions from the
Supreme Government concerning the claims of their respective Masters.”950

Sacred Rights: Companies, Crowns, Temples and Dargahs
When the East India Company obtained managerial control over the pearl fishery in
1796, the status of Indian religious institutions at the pearl fishery of the Gulf of Mannar
was not fiercely disputed. Company officials scrutinized the claims of Arcot and other
Indian polities but recognized the rights of temples and dargahs to mauniam or tax-free
boats and divers. The sacred rights of Indian religious institutions were viewed by British
officials as more pieces in the patchwork quilt of the pearl fishery. Five temples—
Rameswaram Avudaiyarkoil Thirupullani, Thiruchendur, and Uthirakosamangai—and
one dargah—Nagore—received a relatively small share of the total number of boats that
fished the pearl oyster banks each season. As British chaplain and traveler James
Cordiner wrote in the early nineteenth century, British Ceylon awards “small privileges
to several other pagodas of less note than that of Ramisseram [sic].”951 These “small
privileges” were based upon “ancient grants made by the rajahs of the country, before
European settlements were formed in India.”952 Notably absent from Cordiner’s
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description is the dargah at Nagore, which reflected colonial-era prejudices about the
function of such grants in the political economy of India. During the course of the early
nineteenth century, British Ceylon and the Company Raj attempted to strip away the
political significance of the mauniam boats at the pearl fishery. The pearl fishery at
Arippu in 1828 was a watershed moment, when efforts by Madras and Ceylon to
extricate the rights of temples and dargahs intensified, and the role of Indian religious
institutions in the pearling industry was problematized by British officials.
The events at Arippu in 1828 set off a decade-long debate between the East India
Company and British Ceylon about rights and authority at the pearl fisheries. British
Ceylon officer George Lee, former postmaster general at Colombo, who “undertook
laborious examination of a large and very interesting mass of Documents” concerning the
claims of the “Indian Pagodas,” issued a report in 1838.953 Three salient questions
emerged during the course of his investigation. A letter from the Colonial Secretary in
London to Colombo outlined the agenda in July 1836. First, investigators needed to
ascertain “the real nature of the grants” and determine “whether they may be fairly
characterized as private or political acts.”954 Second, “whether if the superstitious feelings
of the Chiefs and Priests were consulted they would be found to extend to such a regard
for the interests and welfare of the temples on the continent of India as to desire a
maintenance of the grants in question.”955 Third, colonial officials asked whether
religious institutions on the island received the same sets of benefits as temples and
dargahs on the mainland.
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The scope of the investigation extended beyond the limits of these three questions
and British official addressed many important issues that the problem of tax-free boats
and diving stones at the pearl fishery. Company and Crown officers interpreted “private
acts” as charitable work performed by a native head of state. According to this line of
reasoning, when the Nawab of Arcot or Setupati of Ramnad granted tax-free boats to a
temple or dargah, he did so as a munificent gesture for his own religious merit and not as
a political act. It followed that the status of the mauniam boats at the pearl fishery
originated as a form of religious philanthropy and was therefore not the work of a
sovereign. Madras and Ceylon were therefore under no obligation to admit the mauniam
boats at the pearl fishery because the conditions of the gift had effectively sunset.
Company and Crown officials also believed it was incumbent upon the government to
determine the sources and substance of each grant. British officials traced the history of
each award and decided whether the Company and Crown governments were obligated to
recognize the rights claimed therein. For instance, agents of Tiruchendur presented
Collector Eden of Tirunelveli with a copper-plate grant from Tirumalai Nayaka of
Madurai. According to the grant, Tirumalai Nayaka awarded the temple one boat and five
diving stones at the Tuticorin pearl fishery. Collector Eden wrote to the Board in October
1836: “Under what authority or circumstances the Pandian Dynasty were entitled to make
such a grant on the Manar Pearl Fishery, I am unable to furnish any information, but the
Temple in question has been in the actual enjoyment of this Privilege for a great number
of years, and the validity of the grant has not hitherto [been known].”956 British officials
often conduct inquiries regarding the authenticity of copper-plates and other materials
presented by temples as evidence of their long-standing right to mauniam boats. For
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instance, in 1818, around the time at which Company Madras restored Tuticorin and
other erstwhile VOC territories to the Netherlands, Collector John Cotton of Tirunelveli
looked into the claims Tiruchendur and Uthirakosamangai. He wrote that “the Pagoda
People here, say they have accounts of 50 or perhaps 100 years back, and these I have
now ordered to be brought to [his] Cutcheree and examined.”957 The agents of
Tiruchendur and Uthirakosamangai claimed that the documents, which included a
copper-plate grant from Tirumalai Nayaka dated 1541, were completely genuine.
However, Collector Cotton expressed some doubt about his ability to verify these claims.
He wrote to the Board in May 1818: “It is however, I fear quite impossible to trace out
when the first discovery of the Pearl Oysters in the Gulf of Manar was made or when by
whom the first Pearl fishery was carried on, for the Grant which is written on Copper, to
the Pagodas this place of one Maunium Boat in the fisheries that take place both at Manar
and on this Coast, bears date so long back as the year 1541, on the reign of [Tirumalai
Nayaka], 244 years ago, and there are few accounts extant.”958 Even as British officials
struggled to ascertain the exact nature and substance of these awards copper-plates and
other “ancient” documents were invested with a high degree of authority. For instance,
Collector Cotton wrote in November 1818 that even though the copper-plates are “nearly
alike in form” they should be sufficient “to bring to light any historical facts, that may be
traced from them.”959 In another case, Collector Blackburn of Madurai wrote to the Board
in October 1836: “A perusal of these documents, which to my mind fully established the
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rights of the temples, have every appearance of being genuine and granted by competent
authority and their long undisputed exercise of this right confirms me in its justice.”960
Representatives of the so-called “Indian Pagodas” appeared sensitized to the
arguments advanced by Company and Crown officials that sought to erode the
foundations of their claims to mauniam boats. For instance, the managing authorities of
Rameswaram submitted a petition to Fort St. George that argued Madras and Ceylon
must honor gifts made to the temple by previous regimes: “Whatever Enams, free gifts or
Charities established by the former ruling power to the Churches and Mosques etc. were
upon producing authentic documents in continuance according to Mamool [custom] by
every subsequent Government.”961 The petition continued: “Though the Ramnad
[Setupatis] do not at present enjoy any privileges there can be no reason why the
Churches should be deprived of its rights and privileges. If the [grants] of the former
powers are unauthorized groundless, or fraudulent, it ought to be discontinued, but if
otherwise, the Columbo Government should in justice protect the continuance of such
charities under the existing laws and Regulations Enacted by Government.”962 British
Ceylon officials felt otherwise. For instance, Governor Edward Barnes wrote, “However,
I confess myself, I have always doubted the necessity of the British Government granting
these claims as a matter of right, under the Grants produced, and I should rather be
inclined to imagine the concession originated more as a measure of expediency and
indulgence, than as an absolute right.” 963 He continued: “The circumstances of the times
with regard to Indian Affairs are materially altered, and as the Pearl Fishery at Aripo has
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become the sole and exclusive property of the British Government by right of conquest, it
may fairly be considered questionable, how far these claims forwarded as they are upon
grants of this nature made by former Rulers of the Country, should be conceded.”964
Governor Barnes alluded to a line of argumentation that both Company and
Crown officials liked to follow during these disputes with Indian religious institutions.
Madras and Ceylon officials like Governor Barnes were of the opinion that their
European predecessors had invested native powers with the authority to award the
temples and dargahs mauniam boats in exchange for services rendered at the pearl
fishery. For instance, Dutch Ceylon recognized the rights of Arcot at the pearl fishery
because it was pragmatic, a de facto exchange of access to the cloth trade for access to
the pearl fishery. According British Ceylon officer George Lee in his report, “the
monopoly of [the cloth] trade had been guaranteed to the Dutch by several commercial
Treaties, the first of which appears to be dated in 1690 for the sake of [the cloth] trade,
concessions in the Pearl Fisheries beyond any forms precedent had been made to the
Nabob.”965 He also wrote that “the Dutch conceded to the Nabob and Theuver certain
boats from 1667 to 1732, that they might not prevent divers & boats coming to the
Ceylon Fisheries from their Coasts.”966 George Lee and other colonial officers found that
the Dutch VOC had awarded Arcot and Ramnad certain concessions at the pearl fishery
in exchange for their cooperation. The source of the mauniam boats were also
fundamentally transactional, as native kings had awarded tax-free boats and divers to
local religious institutions to accrue religious merit. Undersecretary R. W. Hay of Britain
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wrote to Colombo from Downing Street in August 1835: “It appears from the documents
which were formerly transmitted to this Department from Ceylon, that the grants made to
the Indian Temples were in the nature of offerings presented by individual princes of the
Island to their favourite Gods or Goddesses or as private gifts of charity for which the
individual who offered them was promised infinite blessings; and the permanency of
these gifts was anticipated by the denunciation of innumerable ills on those who should
‘obstruct them.’”967 By defining grants of tax-free boats and divers to religious
institutions as private acts, British Ceylon and the Company Raj supplanted the
preexisting relationship between temples and polities in the political economy of the pearl
fishery. Hay wrote that the grants “do not seem to have proceeded upon any principle of
national intercourse between the Indian Temples on the one hand and the Temples of
Ceylon on the other.”968 Officials drew upon historical and anthropological evidence to
support their argument. Most accounts in the early nineteenth century found that temples
used mauniam boats and divers to collect pearls and other marine products like conch
shells for use in religious ceremonies.969 For example, in a written plea submitted by
representatives of Rameswaram in June 1828, the petitioners refer to a copper-plate grant
that Vijaya Ragunatha, the Setupati of Ramnad, awarded to the temple in 1636 to use
three diving stones “for the purpose of making Jewels to the said Deity to be worn on
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Friday festivals.”970 Reports also found that the Nagore Dargah used the produce and
proceeds from mauniam boats to support activities at the shrine.
As the sole proprietors of the pearl fishery, Company and Crown officials
maintained that services once rendered by the temple and dargah to native powers were
no longer needed. “Hindu” and “Islamic” rulers may have reinforced divine authority
through relationships with local religious institutions but British Ceylon and the
Company Raj drew upon a set of legalistic principles. The kings that had originally
bestowed mauniam boats and divers on Indian religious institutions had either collapsed
or lost any semblance of real political power in the region. Company Madras and British
Ceylon sought to interrupt the preexisting circuits of gift-giving and instead fit the
mauniam boats somewhat awkwardly into a fledgling legal and political framework.
Scholars have shown that that mauniam, inam, and other forms of gift-giving were
integral to the political economy of medieval India. The extension of land grants to
temples and monastic orders, the reduction of tax burdens to merchant communities, and
conferring honorific titles to dutiful courtiers and valiant warriors were all important parts
of the pre-modern Indian political economy. Historian Burton Stein wrote that “important
forms of property, such as maunyam or inam privileges to revenue immunity were simply
defined as direct gifts from kings and gods, which in many cases would then pass into
market circulation.”971 Anthropologist and historian Nicholas Dirks documents in The
Hollow Crown the course through which temple rituals, honors, and distinctions
underwent substantial changes in southern India under the Company Raj. Dirks writes,
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“The cultural system of both state and temple was radically revised under
colonialism.”972 He continues: “Like religion itself, the temple was reinvented in an
attempt by the colonial state as a protector of all that as good and inviolable in Indian
culture and institutions while removing the life force that had pulsed through them in the
old regime.”973 For Dirks and others, the Madras company-state stripped any real political
meaning and influence that temples enjoyed under the ancien régime, and these efforts
extended into the political and economic realm of the pearl fishery.974
At the turn of the nineteenth century, Company and Crown officials considered
the rights of religious institutions at the pearl fishery as nebulous but they did not reject
the claims outright until 1828. For instance, Governor Frederick North of Ceylon
regulated access to tax-free boats and divers usually allocated for Arcot and Indian rulers
at the Arippu pearl fishery in 1799, but he was not overly concerned with the so-called
“Indian pagodas.” He received orders from his superiors at Fort St. George to maintain
the status quo and admit the temple claims “without any Reform or alteration.”975 At the
close of the pearl fishery, North wrote in a letter to Madras that “the Claims of the
Pagodas and Persons interested in the Fishery” are “Small, well known and easily kept
within due bounds.”976 Governor Barnes would late cite these words in his
correspondence concerning the question of the mauniam boats in the late 1820s and
1830s.977 However, the conservative approach followed by Governor North and his
colleagues at should not be mistaken for indifference. Even though he viewed the claims
972
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of Indian religious institutions as “small” and “easily kept within bounds” it was
nevertheless incumbent upon the government to probe the nature of such rights. North’s
curiosity came at transitional moment when British officials were largely in the dark
about the pearl fishery. An investigation would provide Company and Crown officers
with useful information about the industry. Reading Portuguese chronicles, delving into
the records of Dutch Ceylon, and interpreting “ancient” copper-plate grants provided
Madras and Ceylon with an opportunity to filter such texts through a framework that
suited British interests.
Efforts to adjudicate the rights and claims of Indian religious institutions to taxfree boats and divers at the pearl fisheries began somewhat modestly at the turn of the
nineteenth century. In 1799, Governor North reached out to Robert Andrews, former
revenue officer at Jaffnapatnam and superintendent of the first three pearl fisheries
organized by the Company. Andrews was considered by his peers to possess intimate
knowledge about the pearling industry. He compiled a dossier that included formal
treaties, certificates issued by the government to temple agents, and translations of
copper-plate grants. Henry Smith, a barrister commissioned by the East India Company
to investigate charges of corruption against Company employees at the pearl fishery, also
addressed the Indian temples in a report. Inquiries by Andrews and Smith came at a
moment of when Company officials exhibited tremendous optimism about their newest
resource because the pearl fishery held out the promise of delivering extraordinary
revenues to a cash-strapped organization. Through greater knowledge and careful
management, the East India Company could turn a moribund industry into a lucrative
source of steady and regular profit.
328

During the course of the early nineteenth century, however, officials on both sides
of the Gulf changed their attitudes towards the mauniam boats at the pearl fishery. The
Company Raj continued to admit various privileges and entitlements to religious
institutions. British Ceylon followed a different course and undertook efforts to erode the
foundations upon which the temples and dargah claimed tax-free boats and divers. The
decision by Governor Barnes to deny religious institutions mauniam boats at Arippu in
1828 stemmed from a wider set of policy reforms. In the 1820s, British Ceylon officials
wanted to downsize the number of boats admitted to the pearl fishery each season and
increase the frequency of the event. According to these proposals, a handful of boats,
about ten or fifteen, would fish the banks on an annual basis. Previous regimes followed
an older model of resource management in which the government proprietor sought to
maximize the number of pearling boats and increase yields. The reforms proposed by
Governor Barnes and other British Ceylon officers reverberated through debates about
Indian religious institutions and the mauniam boats. If British Ceylon held small annual
fisheries, then the boats and divers regularly allocated for religious institutions would
represent a larger share of the produce and revenue. Moreover, colonial officers wanted
to discontinue the practice of leasing the pearl fishery to local merchants and instead fish
the banks under a system of direct management. Governor Horton of British Ceylon
wrote in February 1835 that “small Fisheries should be carried on in order that native
speculators of small capital may have an opportunity of entering upon the speculation,” a
policy suggestion that anticipated the policy conformed to many of the proposals found in
the liberal-minded Colebrooke-Cameron commission.978
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British officials viewed the dissolution of claims to mauniam boats by Indian
religious institutions as an important step in this process of reform. For example, James
Steuart, superintendent of the 1828 pearl fishery at Arippu, wrote about the “very
doubtful privilege had been withheld by…Governor Sir Edward Barnes, who considered
it inconsistent with the bearing of a Christian Government to contribute towards the
support of such Temples.”979 These temples were also “not situated within the territory of
Ceylon” and therefore “they could have no political rights connected with its
fisheries.”980 High-ranking officials of British Ceylon further sought to erode the claims
of religious institutions through narrow and creative interpretations of documentary
evidence. Governor Barnes even moved through judicial channels when he solicited the
opinions of members of the supreme court of British Ceylon in 1829. As there were no
“Law Officers of the Crown” on the island, the governor hoped that two judges, Richard
Ottle and Charles Marshall, might adjudicate the claims of the temples and dargah and
throw their weight behind the governor’s position.981 Ottle and Marshall ruled that British
Ceylon was under no obligation to recognize the claims of the Indian religious
institutions. In October 1829, they wrote to Governor Barnes, “upon considering the
origin and the nature of the claim, we do not think that the documents before us would
furnish sufficient grounds in the point of Law, to call upon a Court of Justice to enforce
it.”982 The judges conceded that the awards had been legitimacy honored during the
ancien régime, writing that “the grants of the Indian Rajahs or chiefs were binding on
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their Successors and on all who derived their Title to the Fishery thro [sic] them.”983 The
Portuguese and Dutch had chosen to recognize the claims of religious institutions to
mauniam boats even though they were under no obligation to do so. There was, in other
words, no legal precedent binding British Ceylon to the decisions of its predecessors.
Judges Ottle and Marshall wrote in a report to Governor Barnes: “We do not think that
any obligation to continue the privileges conceded, was imposed upon the Dutch or any
other…which derived its Title from conquest and even admitting that the Dutch had
allowed the Native powers or their Grantees to participate in the benefit of the Fishery,
we cannot from thence conclude that the British Government was under any obligation to
make similar concessions.”984
Debates over the mauniam boats continued for at least the next decade and
culminated in 1838 with the release of a report by George Lee, former postmaster general
of Colombo.985 He delivered the results of his investigation to Governor Mackenzie at the
Queen’s House in Colombo in August 1838. The Lee Report on the “Claim of Indian
Temples on the Pearl Fisheries” came at the end of a period in which the pearling
industry had been the object of targeted governmental reform and improvement. Lee set
out to determine the extent to which Indian religious institutions had a right “to employ
Boats, free of the payment of purchase money, at the Pearl Fisheries.”986 He undertook a
“laborious examination of a large and very interesting mass of Documents” concerning
the claims of the “Indian Pagodas” at the Ceylon pearl fisheries.987 Drawing largely from
Portuguese and Dutch records in his possession, as well as East India Company and
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British Ceylon records at Colombo, Lee reaffirmed the pronouncement of Judges Ottle
and Marshall. Members of the administration of British Ceylon showered the Lee Report
with praise. For example, James Steuart wrote, “Much light has since been thrown upon
this subject by Mr. George Lee, the Post Master General of Ceylon. With great industry
and research, and with much public spirit and considerable ability…this gentleman has
selected and translated from the records of the Dutch in Ceylon, many interested papers
on the subject of the pearl fishery.”988
British Ceylon also viewed the question of the mauniam boats through a financial
and economic lens. Lee drew attention to this problem, writing that “employing a very
limited number of Boats, which by admitting the privileges of the Temples on their
present footing, would cause a loss to the Government.”989 From the perspective of Lee
and other British Ceylon officials, the most expedient solutions was to simply revoke the
privileges that Indian religious institutions enjoyed. According to Lee, Robert Andrews
“may have felt the expediency in 1796 of this conciliation of the Priests,” and Governor
North “may not have been willing too scrupulously to investigate the claims,” but those
approaches to the question the mauniam boats that did not suite the current situation.990
He wrote, “this Colonial Government need surely not be influenced by the motives which
actuated Mr. Andrews, or Mr. North, when they feel the claims to be large most doubtful,
and in small fisheries highly exorbitant.”991 Lee’s colleagues applauded his work. For
instance, James Steuart wrote, “[Lee] has satisfactorily shewn [sic], that the Hindoo
Temples and Priests never had the right, under any former Government, of sending boats
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to fish for any pearl oysters free of payment; nor, that under any other circumstances
should they permitted to do so in future under this Government.”992
Debates about the place of Indian religious institutions at the pearl fishery
assumed new meaning in the context of the rivalry between British Ceylon and the
Company Raj. The Company and Crown governments in the region competed for more
than the human and natural resources of the pearling industry. Madras and Ceylon were
also preoccupied with their own territorial and sovereign claims that ran through
managerial control over the pearl fishery. For instance, there was speculation that
Governor Barnes rejected the claims of the temples and dargah because the East India
Company had violated a gentleman’s agreement that stipulated the two governments
would not host concurrent pearl fisheries. Colombo notified Madras about their plans to
organize a pearl fishery at Arippu in 1828, which was the first planned event since 1820.
However, Company officials ignored these requests and moved forward with its own
plans to host a pearl fishery in the vicinity of Tuticorin and Punnaikayal. The collector of
Tirunelveli sent a letter to the deputy secretary of Ceylon in March 1828 that contained
correspondence on the subject. He wrote, “on enquiry it is found to be unpracticable [sic]
to meet the wishes of the Ceylon Government to obtain the attendance of the Divers of
this Coast at the present fishery at Arippoo all the divers who are likely to be employed at
Pinnacoil are making necessary preparations for that purpose and it would be impossible
for them to proceed at the present Moment to the Banks.”993 Company officials further
sabotaged the efforts of their Ceylon counterparts by hesitating to distribute
advertisements for the event. A letter from Madras to Colombo stated that “the
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publication of the Advertisement…might interfere with its success.”994 The Company
also surreptitiously mobilized labor and capital in preparation for its own fishery.
According to a petition from the temple agents, “Government had commenced fishery on
their part at Tutocoreen in opposition to his with a view to put a stop to this fishery and
consequently the Maharajah [Governor of Ceylon] had sustained great losses from half
the Number of Merchants having proceeded to Tutocoreen.”995
Company officials appear to have supported the claims of Indian religious
institutions to mauniam boats at the Ceylon pearl fisheries. For instance, the collector of
Ramnad shared a large collection of documents from his office with the Board of
Revenue ahead of the 1828 pearl fishery. He wrote that these documents “fully prove the
right of the Pagodas to the privileges claimed, and which I hope will be restored to
them.”996 Between 1829 and 1831, agents of religious institutions continued to present
their case but British Ceylon officers refused to award them mauniam boats time and
again. However, records from the 1832, 1835, and 1836 pearl fisheries indicate that the
government reinstated the mauniam boats and that each institution enjoyed at least one
boat and five diving stones.997 Even the Rani of Ramnad entered the fray when she
submitted a petition to the Board on behalf of Rameswaram.998 As James Steuart wrote in
his 1843 account, “In the absence of proof to the contrary, the Home Government viewed
it as a political and religious right, which in justice, should not be interfered with, and the
Secretary of State for the Colonies instructed the Governor of Ceylon, to allow those
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Temples of Hindostan, that had previously enjoyed the privilege, again to share in the
pearl fisheries of the Gulf of Manaar.”999
Tensions between Company and Crown governments over the pearl fisheries
spilled over into the unexpected domains of accounting and record-keeping. In 1817,
Madras expanded its bureaucratic control over religious institutions in the Presidency
through Regulation VII, also known as the “Madras Endowments and Escheats
Regulation.” This act allowed the government to become the principal managers of
religious lands, money, and endowments of sacred institutions within its domain. A
power formally invested in the Board of Revenue, the Madras government exercised
considerable control over all sorts of religious institutions, from churches and shrines to
temples and academies. Anthropologist Arjun Appadurai and others have documented
how the early nineteenth century witnessed increased bureaucratization and centralization
of temple affairs in Madras.1000 Governor Barnes of British Ceylon referred to this
institutional arrangement a memorandum on the pearl fishery. He wrote, “I have only
further to add that, with exception of the Temple of Nagore, which is a Mahomedan
Institution, I am given to understand that the East India Company possess themselves of
all the Temple Revenues allowed the Temple, in lieu thereof, and of dedications and
offerings, a fixed sum annually for their proper maintenance and keep, which is,
considerably less than the Revenues they receive.”1001 The superintendent of the pearl
fishery assigned the revenue and produce from each mauniam boat to accounts of the
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district within which each temple was located. As the superintendent of the 1822 pearl
fishery at Tuticorin wrote to the Collector of Madurai, “The sum due to the Pagodas is in
deposits in the Treasury here & will be paid to any persons authorized to receive.”1002
Governor Barnes and other Ceylon officials found this system suspicious. For example,
Governor Barnes of Ceylon wrote, “The East India Company possess themselves of all
the Temple Revenue (with exception of the Nagore Temple which is a Mahomedan
institution) allowing them in lieu thereof and of dedications and offerings a fixed sum per
annum for the proper maintenance and keep of authorised Temples.”1003 His successor,
Governor Horton, also addressed the problem: “My attention has been very forcibly
drawn to the subject of the Boats allowed to certain Temples on the Continent of
India.”1004 He found that the Indian temples “derive no direct benefit from this
permission, in as much as the Madras Government receive their revenues under an
arrangement existing between them.”1005
British officials on both sides of the Gulf paid special attention to the shrine of
Shahul Hamid at Nagore in Tamilnadu.1006 The dargah and its mauniam boats were an
exception at the pearl fishery for reasons besides its categorization as a “Mahomedan
Institution.” Nagore did not possess copper-plate grants from Indian rulers like the
temples, which confused government officials in charge of adjudicating its claims. P. B.
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Smolleff, Secretary to the Board of Revenue of Madras, wrote in August 1837, “the
Mahomedan Durgah at Nagore…possess no grants, but its right has to a certain extent
been acknowledged by the Ceylon Government.”1007 He added: “the privilege of fishing
during a rented Fishery has been actually enjoyed by it during the years 1831-33 and 35.
This does not however appear to have been allowed when the Fishery has been under
Aumany management.”1008 Instead of copper-plate inscriptions, Company and Crown
officials accepted government-issued certificates and passports issued to the Nagore
dargah in support of its claim to tax-free boats and divers at the pearl fishery. N. W.
Kindersley, Collector of Thanjavur, wrote to Fort St. George in May 1837, “The Nagore
Durgah holds no grant, but its claim to 2 boats is in some sort admitted by the Ceylon
Government [and] its agents produce the accompanying Certificates granted to them for
three years.”1009 The question of the dargah was further complicated by the fact that it did
not receive any mauniam boats when the pearl fishery was conducted under the amani
system. According to Collector Kindersley, “The great disproportion in the receipts of the
two institutions, the former being allowed one boat, and the latter two, is explained by the
[Temple] claim being admitted only in the Aumany Fishery which takes place after the
rented Fishery has closed. Whereas the Durgah is allowed 2 boats during the rented
Fishery, but denied any in a year in which the Fishery is not rented.”1010 In many of the
document related to the mauniam boats, the concessions enjoyed by Nagore are effaced
by terms such as “charity,” which further placed them in a bureaucratic category separate
and apart from the temples. The claims of the dargah were further complicated by the fact
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that the privileges do not appear to have been invested in the institution per se but held by
individuals who fished on its behalf. A report by Robert Andrews to Governor North in
January 1799 referred to a certain Chinna Tambi Maraikkayar from Nagore who was due
2 boats or 10 diving stones for “charity.”1011 At the 1822 pearl fishery at Punnaikayal, a
certain Madar Sahib received tax-free boats on behalf of the dargah, but the
superintendent was not unable to determine the validity of the claim because there was no
record of this person at previous fisheries. According to an investigation by Collector
Cotton of Tirunelveli, Madar Sahib enjoyed the privilege of tax-free boats and divers at
the 1797 pearl fishery. He also appears to have submitted an application for the annual
rent of the Tuticorin chank fishery in 1798-1799.1012 Madar Sahib submitted a copperplate deed to Collector Cotton but he was dubious of its authenticity: “A writing on
copper purporting to be a Deed of Gift of the mauniam claimed, by one of the Hindoo
sovereigns of the Carnatic upwards of 300 years old was presented in support of the
Claim, but as there were no public accounts showing that the Boat applied for had been
allowed on the occasion of any former fishery, I have not examined into its
authenticity.”1013
In search of a solution to these problems with the mauniam boats, high-ranking
officials such as Governors Barnes and Horton pitched a new idea. Instead of permitting
boats and divers to attend the pearl fishery on behalf of the temples and dargah, British
Ceylon would simply transfer money to the accounts of each institution. According to
this plan, British Ceylon would provide a “commuted money-allowance,” a figure
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determined by the average profit derived from the fisheries during the last three seasons.
George Lee addressed this proposal in his report. He wrote, “The most advisable means
for their satisfactory adjustment will be the grant of a commuted money-allowance, to be
paid by the Ceylon Government, to such of the institutions referred to us have hitherto
been in the enjoyment of the privilege, including the Durgah of Nagore.”1014 This
proposal acknowledged the rights of the religious institutions to a share of the pearl
fishery but protected the financial interests of British Ceylon by curbing the total number
of crews that fished the oyster banks each season. However, not all parties involved
agreed to this plan, as representatives of the religious institutions in question refused to
capitulate to the demands of British Ceylon. Madras officials appeared amenable to the
solution. Collector Eden of Tirunelveli wrote to the Board in October 1836, “I should
imagine the [trustees] of the Pagoda would have no just grounds of Complaint, if they
were allowed in lieu thereof an annual sum equivalent to the average of their
receipts.”1015 The collector also communicated to the Board that agents of Tiruchendur
showed no interest in modifying their claims. He wrote, “I am sorry to say I have
proposed this to them without success, nor can I induce them to entertain any
compromise whatever. They state generally that they are unwilling to have this privilege
placed on any other footing.”1016 Three months later, Collector Eden returned to the
Board with same news. “I regret to have to state the [Trustees] of Trichendoor Pagoda
continue to refuse their consent to any other adjustment of their claim to employ Boats in
the Manar Fishery, than as it now exists.”1017 The trustees of Tiruchendur considered that
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“the privilege itself is much more valuable to the Pagoda, than any advantages arising out
of it.”1018 The Board also received depositions of representatives of Tiruchendur. These
documents further illustrated the conviction with which the temples demanded
recognition of their rights to mauniam boats. A statement signed by no less than sixteen
representatives of Tiruchendur presented the position of the temple in very clear terms:
“Some time ago you said that you would state your opinion regarding the employment of
boats in the Manar Pearl Fishery on account of Soobramanaswamy Pagodas at
Trichendoor after you were informed of the manner in which the claims of the Stalatars
of the Pagodas at Madura and Tanjore to employ Boats in the same Fishery might be
adjusted you will now state how and in what manner you wish the Revenue derived from
one boat each day which is allowed to be employed in the above Fishery on account of
the said Pagoda should be paid.” The statement continued: “It is our desire that during the
period the Fishery may continue one boat should be employed each day on our account
according to Mammool and we prefer this to any other arrangement.”1019 A member of
the Board of Revenue responded to these claims: “It does not, however, seem probable
that this arrangement will be assisted by the Staladars of the Tirchandoor Pagoda, but in
the Board’s opinion it is in the power of Government in its capacity of Guardian over all
public institutions to make arrangements of this description.”1020
It is perhaps no coincidence that the next time at which the question of rights of
religious institutions came at another moment of political transitions. In 1857, when the
Company Raj transferred control of India to the British Crown, George Vane, the
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superintendent of the Ceylon pearl fisheries, addressed the place of “Hindu temples of the
Madras Presidency” at the pearl fishery. He linked this question to debates surrounding
the renting system. Vane wrote, “The renting system and Temple claims had given much
trouble at former fisheries so conducted, and led to abuses of the rights of the divers and
boatmen (also, as believed, to the over-fishing of the banks.”1021 Vane and his colleagues
determined that they would conduct the 1857 pearl fishery under amani and, unlike the
renters at previous fisheries, refuse to admit “the Hindu temples of the Madras Presidency
to fish on their own account.”1022

Conclusion
As propriety over the pearl fisheries successively passed through the hands of three great
European colonial powers, the Portuguese, Dutch, and British bundled together various
sorts of rights and privileges. As British powers entered the complex political landscapes
of eighteenth-century India and Sri Lanka, the Company and Crown governments sought
to interrupt the traditional circuits of gift-giving and sovereignty that had animated the
pearling industry. British officers on both sides of the Gulf analyzed rights claimed by
Indian polities and religious institutions to the pearl fishery and fit them somewhat
awkwardly into a fledgling juridical-politico framework. In doing so, the British sought
to not only present themselves as rightful sovereigns to the land and sea but also
restructure certain aspects of the pearl fishery.
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CHAPTER 5: FOUL OYSTERS

CORRUPTION

In late 1799, Governor Frederic North of Ceylon detected some alarming inconsistencies
in the account books of the recently closed pearl fishery at Arippu. North did not expect
to learn anything new about the event as he leafed through these documents. He already
knew that the produce and profits from the seasonal event had fallen short of
expectations, a disappointing return for the first pearl fishery conducted under his
governorship. North had appointed three officers to superintendent the pearl fishery and
to keep him abreast of the situation on the ground with regular dispatches from Arippu.
From the number of oysters each boat fished per day to petty skirmishes amongst
merchants, North felt that he had a good handle on most matters related to the pearl
fishery that year. However, Governor North’s audit of the accounts, together with
intelligence he gathered during an extensive tour of the coastal districts of Ceylon,
brought new information to light. The number of boats released to fish the pearl banks
exceeded the corresponding amount of money received by the government. The accounts
also failed to reconcile nearly two hundred pounds of pearls that belonged to the East
India Company. Signs of inconsistent bookkeeping combined with the missing pearls lent
credence to rumors that the commissioners of the pearl fishery—Hugh Cleghorn, Lt.
George Turnour, and John McDowall—had engaged in dishonest behavior during their
assignment. Under “circumstances of suspicion” concerning the “Conduct of the
342

Superintendents during the Fishery as well as the Agents employed by them,” Governor
North convened a committee to investigate the 1799 pearl fishery at Arippu.1023 Three
specially appointed British officers—General Hay MacDowall, Colonel Josias
Champagne, and Judge James Dunkin—produced a multi-volume dossier. From
colluding with local merchants to accepting bribes and embezzling money, the range of
accusations was remarkable, and a dark cloud settled over the East India Company’s
management of the pearl fishery. As the investigation progressed it revealed that the
alleged fraudulence at Arippu in 1799 was only the tip of the iceberg. It found repeated
“frauds and abuses” at the previous three pearl fisheries and portrayed the pearl fishery as
a den of iniquity and corruption. Governor North wrote that the losses incurred by his
government at Arippu in 1799 were “but a flea-bite,” and a “gross and incalculable
fraud” had befell his pearl banks on previous occasions.1024 Like the 1799 pearl fishery at
Arippu, the preceding pearl fisheries became millstones around the governor’s neck, and
corruption weighed down yet another territory at the expanding frontiers of the East India
Company. In a few short years, the pearl fishery had gone from being seen as one of the
greatest natural resources won by the East India Company to an industry beset by
ineradicable and endemic corruption.
Efforts by Governor North and other high-ranking officials of the East India
Company to stamp out corruption at the pearl fishery were not cordoned off from a wider
imperial landscape shaped by anti-corruption ideologies and policies. During the course
of the eighteenth century, corruption became an increasingly salient term in the
administrative language of the East India Company and wider sphere of British political
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culture. The specter of corruption haunted the pages of political tracts and the floor of
Parliament and manifested itself through the East India Company and its governance of
India. From the halls of British parliament to the shanty camps of the pearl fishery, anticorruption discourses and crusades dovetailed with the making of the British empire in
Asia. An examination of the pearl fisheries at the end of the eighteenth century through
the lens of corruption throws light on colonial state formation and empire-making in late
eighteenth-century and early nineteenth-century India and Sri Lanka. It is no coincidence
that corruption reared its ugly head during a political transition, the precise moment at
which the East India Company assumed territorial control over Dutch Ceylon. The
decidedly firm course of action followed by Governor North and other British officials
hastened the establishment of the island as a formal colony of the British Crown and
facilitated the erection of a government bureaucracy designed to manage the labor,
capital, intelligence, and natural marine environment of the pearl fishery. Officials set
into motion a series of reforms designed to limit so-called “private” influence at the pearl
fishery, which targeted elite pearl merchants usually leased the industry from the
government. Investigations into corruption at the pearl fishery also signaled to politicians
back home, Company employees in India and Ceylon, and local elites and power brokers
that the East India Company was capable of managing an unpredictable and volatile
industry such as the pearl fishery. As historian Nicholas Dirks writes in The Scandal of
Empire, “the history of empire—or of the Company—in the eighteenth century has been
written about as a problem of management and control in which scandal was an
impediment to the success of the Company rather than endemic to it.”1025 Scandals like
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the charges of corruption that wracked Company management of the pearl fishery at the
turn of the nineteenth century provided an entry point for government intervention. While
never reaching the spectacular heights of the impeachment trial of Warren Hastings, the
events that took place at the pearl fisheries in the late 1790s and early 1800s offer no less
insight into how the modern British Empire was born in scandal. The mobilization of
corruption and anti-corruption discourses created moments at which the implementation
of policies and reforms intended to improve the management of the human and natural
resources of the pearl fishery became possible.

Corruption, History, and the East India Company
Scholars of various stripes have noted that corruption is a notoriously ill-defined and
capacious term. From biological connotations of decay to individual moral failings and
compromised institutions, the polysemy of the term corruption makes it difficult to nail
down an exact definition.1026 Many commonly cited definitions in social sciences such as
political science and economics refer to corruption as the use of public office by an
individual for private gain. Political scientist Joseph Nye offers a classic formulation. He
defines corruption as “behavior that deviates from the formal duties of a public role
(elective or appointive) because of private-regarding (personal, close family, private
clique) wealth or status gains.”1027 Political scientist Carl Friedrich provides another
succinct definition: “Corruption is a kind of behavior which deviates from the norm
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actually prevalent or believed to prevail in a given context, such as the political. It is
deviant behavior associated with a particular motivation, namely that of private gain at
public expense…[I]t is the fact that private gain was secured at public expense that
matters.”1028 In most scholarly studies, as well as policy-oriented reports by governments
and think tanks, corruption is seen as a breach or violation of the normative boundaries
between public and private and legal and illegal. The assumption underlying this
understanding of corruption is that it is a transgression of idealized bureaucratic norms of
western modernity, that a person holding public office should perform his or her duties
free of private influence or interest. Alongside such efforts to define corruption as a
transgression of the boundaries between public and private and legality and illegality
comes the largely neoliberal and policy-oriented viewpoints that corruption is endemic to
emerging market societies. From this viewpoint, corruption is a managerial problem that
wracks the developing world and it can only be rooted out through institutional
reforms.1029 In that regard, corruption is seen as a problem that affects the non-Western
world and further evidence that developing nations have deviated from the normative
paths of political and economic development. Corruption in India is often seen as a
particularly thorny topic and the mainstream international business community has
broadly viewed it as a hindrance to economic development and barrier to investment.1030
Such definitions of corruption, however, gloss over the multiplicity meanings of the term
by accepting it as transgression of cultural and institutional norms. There are many
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scholars who have flipped the negative connotations of corruption on its head and
maintain that such violations are effective mechanisms through which marginalized
peoples can access power, influence, and resources in rather inequitable conditions.1031
From this perspective, corruption can be seen as a positive force that accelerates political
and economic development in institutional settings that are otherwise weak and
compromised.1032 Sociologist have constructed relational models that move towards a
more dynamic understanding of how corruption operates amongst social actors. Eminent
sociologist Diego Gambetta, for instance, views “corruption as a market” in which
“agents of corruption” conduct what are essentially exchange transactions.1033
Corruption can be understood not just as the use of private office for public gain
but must also be seen as entailing a range of social and cultural behaviors and practices
that vary by time and place. For instance, corruption can open lines of communication
between citizen subjects and states or function as a type of protest. Corruption, and
responses to it, can also be a channel through which governmental power and state
violence flow. Approaching the critical study of corruption as a discourse and practice
and less as an abstract theoretical concept have been particularly profitable in the context
of the Global South.1034 The South Asian context has received a remarkably large share
of scholarly attention on the role and place of corruption in modern and contemporary
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societies. One reason for this output has been that Indian domestic politics in recent years
have turned state corruption into a favorite talking point on the campaign trail. Corruption
has emerged as an issue that spans the ideological spectrum and become the object of
spectacular political protests.1035 From gaining access to public utilities to encounters
with police and electoral politics, corruption, and the way people talk about corruption, is
woven into the fabric of everyday life for many people in South Asia. Amidst such
political and cultural phenomena, anthropologists have produced fine-grained and
sophisticated analyses of corruption, the state, and everyday life in contemporary
India.1036 From rural police stations and electoral politics to bureaucratic centers and
urban water infrastructure, the anthropology of corruption in modern and contemporary
India offers rich theoretical insights to understanding ideologies and discourses
corruption in different historical dispensations. Anthropologist Akhil Gupta, for instance,
remarks, “the ‘system’ of corruption is of course not just a brute collection of practices
whose most widespread execution occurs at the local level. It is also a discursive field
that enables the phenomenon to be labeled, discussed, practiced, decried, and
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denounced.”1037 Recent work by anthropologist Lisa Björkman also offers a way to think
critically about the state and corruption. Björkman’s Pipe Politics, Contested Waters is a
political ethnographic study of the connections between water infrastructure,
liberalization, and politics in twenty-first century Mumbai. Björkman offers a fresh
theoretical perspective on discourses and practices of corruption through her ethnography
of “hydraulic landscapes” in contemporary urban India. She writes, “The corruption
discourse allows for a widespread belief in the coherence of the waters department’s
knowledge and authority over the distribution network to coexist alongside everyday
experiences of breakdown, shortage, and volatility.”1038
Corruption discourses and practices, however, have not received the same level of
critical attention in historical scholarship.1039 Yet areas of historical scholarship that have
received a fair share of attention are the East India Company in British politics, the
infamous impeachment trial of Warren Hastings, and the activities of Company
employees in India. In the latter half of the eighteenth century, the discourse and practice
of corruption became a mechanism through which the Company and Crown imagined
and symbolically represented their respective empires in Asia. The representation of the
Company Raj and British Crown through the discourse of corruption also enabled various
interest groups to critique or offer, to borrow a phrase from Gupta, a “diagnostic of the
state.”1040 Those studies that focus on the East India Company have largely reiterated
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certain social scientific assumptions about corruption as a real and identifiable problem
within the corporation’s organization. While many officials and British parliamentarians
concerned with the affairs of the Company more or less agreed that corruption was a
problem, there was less agreement on the practices and activities that actually fell under
its rubric. The ambiguity of the term in British political discourse and the administrative
language of the East India Company thus had something in common with seventeenthcentury Portuguese India and eighteenth-century China in which corruption had multiple
meanings and struck different discursive registers, including religious, moral, legal, and
philosophical.1041 It was the capaciousness of the category that gave corruption its
rhetorical power, and that allowed it to be an engine of reform and improvement in late
eighteenth-century and early nineteenth-century Madras and Ceylon. Corruption was
neither an obstacle to state formation nor a hindrance to economic interests, but rather an
instrument that facilitated the construction of the Company Raj and paved the way for the
establishment of Ceylon as a Crown Colony that would become the so-called “The Pearl”
of the British Empire.
Eighteenth-century Britain was home to major changes in conceptual
understandings of corruption.1042 A religio-philosophical understanding of corruption as a
degenerative force gave way to a view that saw it as a violation of the virtuous separation
between the interests of the commonwealth and individuals. In British political culture,
this meant the decline of “old corruption,” described by one scholar as “a parasitic system
that taxed the wealth of the nation and diverted it into the pockets of a narrow political
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clique whose only claim to privileged status was its proximity to the sources of
patronage.”1043 The waning of “old corruption” gave way to a new understanding of
corruption in which individuals used public resources and offices for private gain.1044
British and Scottish philosophers such as Hume, Locke, Smith, and Burke engaged with
the topic of corruption and such “civic humanist” ideas penetrated Whig and liberal
political discourses in the eighteenth century.1045 The expansion of trade and empire was
also a significant factor that contributed to a conceptual sea change in the intellectual
history of corruption. As historian Philip Stern illustrates, the relationship between the
East India Company and corruption was present from the corporation’s founding in the
early seventeenth century but was effectively concealed through the humanistic language
of virtue, honor, and service. He demonstrates that corporations were originally seen as
noble entities that protected against corruption by discouraging individual gain at the
expense of shared profit. However, critiques of mercantilism and monopolism by liberal
political economists became mainstream in the latter half of the eighteenth century and
the East India Company was represented as a breeding ground of corrupt behavior. Talk
of corruption by Adam Smith, Edmund Burke and many other liberal thinkers and
parliamentarians were some of the most forceful blows to the standing and reputation of
the world’s most powerful corporations. A set of loosely connected scandals concerning
the East India Company’s overseas territories, from the trial of Warren Hastings to the
debts of the Nawab of Arcot, rocked the British political establishment in the latter half of
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the eighteenth century.1046 At the precise moment when the Company turned from a
network of trading enclaves into an expansionist territorial power, the balancing act
between public and private good and merchant and sovereign faltered.1047 Shifts in
attitudes towards empire combined with attempts to eradicate old networks of traditional
power and influence within British political cultures also led to tightened regulations over
imperial affairs overseas.1048
Intellectual critiques of the East India Company by liberal political economists
combined forces with parliamentary action to upset the equipoise between Company and
Crown. As Stern writes, corruption became the “political and legal foundation for
Parliamentary intervention into the ‘private’ Company’s empire on behalf of the ‘public,’
rescuing the British Empire in India, while in the long run, condemning the Company to a
gradual loss of autonomy and political power.”1049 Beginning with a parliamentary
inquiry in 1767, British politicians gradually increased their oversight of the East India
Company through a series of legislative acts: The Regulating Act of 1773 was the first
concerted effort to regulate the Company’s government in India through caps on annual
profits and dividends, prohibitions against officials accepting gifts or “presents” from
local rulers, the establishment of a high judicial body at Calcutta, and the political
reorganization of the government in India. The East India Company Act of 1784
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established the Board of Control, formally subsuming the Company under the authority
of the British state. Additionally, the Charter Acts of 1793, 1813, and 1833 were
important because they contained determinations about the Company’s monopoly and
other matters, such as political appointments and policy reforms.1050 The Charter Act of
1793 renewed the East India Company’s royal charter and was, according to the
document, “An Act for continuing in the East India Company for a further term the
Possession of the British Territories in India.” Besides the China trade, the Company lost
its monopoly over commerce with the renewal of its charter in 1813, an act that also
asserted sovereignty of the British crown over India. By 1833, the Company lost its
monopoly over the trade in tea and other commodities from China, which effectively
ended its commercial authority and removed what was once one its most effective tools
of power. In the end, the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries witnessed the birth
of a new relationship between British state and East India Company, one that mapped
onto transformations in the intellectual sphere, as the principles of mercantilism
competed with economic liberalism in the domain of political economy.
Critics of the East India Company made connections between the consumption of
precious stones with political corruption and the cultural excesses of India. The
association of jewels and corruption had been made with regard to the courts of Stuart
England and Mughal India, but it acquired a new meaning in the context of British
imperialism in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.1051 Many first-hand
accounts by early modern European travelers such as Thomas Roe, François Bernier,
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Jean-Baptiste Tavernier recorded European views of Mughal excess. For instance,
Thomas Roe described the jewelry and costume of Jahangir during his ambassadorial to
the Mughal court in the early seventeenth century: “His sash was wreathed about with a
chain of great pearls, rubies, and diamonds drilled. About his neck he carried a chain of
most excellent pearl…so great I never saw; at his elbows, armlets set with diamonds; and
on his wrists three rows of several sorts. His hands bar, but almost every finger a ring; his
gloves, which were English, stuck under his girdle; his coat of cloth of gold with sleeves
upon a fine [cloth] as thin as lawn; on his feet a pair of embroidered buskins with pearls,
the toes sharp and turning up.”1052 Such fantasies are were also captured on the British
stage, such as John Dryden’s Aurangzeb from the early 1700s and Elizabeth Inchbald’s
The Mogul Tale, which premiered in 1784.1053 The association between jewels, royal
splendor, and sovereignty can also been seen in images from the Padshahnama in which
Shah Jahan receives jewels and precious stones from European courtiers, and a mural
from the Ramnad Palace in which European “hat-wearers” are depicted giving pearls to
the Setupati.1054
However, by the mid-eighteenth century, the association of Indian jewels and
Oriental excess was no longer exclusively tied to the courtly cultures of Europe and India
but instead became wrapped up in the nouveaux riches of English society.1055 In the latter
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half of the eighteenth century, England witnessed an influx of men known as nabobs who
returned to England from India with money in their pockets and political aspirations on
their mind.1056 For members of the establishment, nabobs represented a new breed
corruption that combined the worst aspects of mercantilist commerce with the excess and
decadence of Asian despotism. In the public sphere, nabobs were the objects of fierce
mockery in pamphlets, newspapers, and political cartoons.1057 Political and social elites
feared that Nabobs returning from India would upset the hierarchies of British society by
purchasing estates and titles, entering the rarefied world of the landed gentry, seeking
political office, and introducing garish tastes to the cultural world. Lord Chatham, for
example, remarked on the creeping influence of nabobs: “The riches of Asia have been
poured in upon us, and have brought with them not only Asiatic Luxury, but, I fear,
Asiatic principles of government. Without connections, without any natural interest in the
soil, the importers of foreign gold have forced their way in Parliament by such a torrent
of private corruption as no hereditary fortune could resist.”1058 Scholars have drawn
attention to the place of diamonds, pearls, and other precious gems in the construction
nabob identity.1059 Prominent members of the East India Company conspicuously
displayed symbols of wealth and status upon their return to England. For instance, Robert
Clive gave his wife a “new set of jewels” and the wife of Warren Hastings attended a
party in 1784 wearing diamonds with an estimated value of nearly £20,000.1060 The
associations between the East India Company, nabobs, jewels, and corruption deepened
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in the literary sphere. For instance, Elizabeth Ryves’s satirical poem Hastiniad (1785)
seized on the association of nabob decadence, jewels, and corruption in an unflattering
portrait of Hastings and his wife: “Next glitt’ring on a high rais’dcar, / To catch
th’admiring gaze from far, / The Dame's regalia beams sublime, / Rich spoils of many a
ransack’d clime. / And costly robes all broider’d round, / With pearls in farthest India
found; / Or studded, glorious to the view, / With opals of each varying hue.” 1061
The self-representation of nabobs in particular and East India Company
employees more generally were remarkably different than the savage derision they both
faced in the British public sphere.1062 Take for instance a painting commissioned by the
Court of Directors of the East India Company for their headquarters on Leadenhall Street
in London. On the ceiling of the hall where the Revenue Committee met was an ovalshaped oil painting by Italian artist Spiridione Roma in a baroque and neo-classical style
titled The East Offering its Riches to Britannia. Now held at the British Library, The East
Offering its Riches to Britannia depicts an allegorical female figure representing India
with pearl earrings and naked from the waste up presenting strings of pearls on a pillow
to Britannia, the female embodiment of the British nation. Alongside the figure
representing India is a woman dressed in stereotypical Chinese costume offering tea and
pottery. A merchant ship flying the English and Company flags appears in the
background and the gods Neptune and Mercury flank Britannia. This image resonates
with an engraving from The Universal British Directory of Trade and Commerce (1751),
which depicts female personifications of the four continents appearing before Lady
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Britannia. The figure representing India notably proffers Britannia a box of jewels.1063
There is also the marble relief by John Michael Rysbrak titled Britannia Receiving the
Riches of the East India, commissioned by the Company in 1728 as a chimneypiece for
the East India House, which depicts Britannia receiving pearls and precious stones from
allegorical female figures of Asia and Africa. The painting and relief commissioned by
the East India Company bears a striking resemblance to a satirical image by William
Dent, The Wise Man of the East Making His Offering, published in 1788. The artist
depicts Hasting kneeling before George III with a gift of pearls and diamonds. George III
replaces Britannia as the recipients of gifts from the East. The dress of Hastings is a
visual allusion to the biblical Magi from the East who brought gifts to infant Jesus.
Hasting is also kneeling before the King as if being knighted. The visual repertoire of the
image brings together the symbolism of Islamicate kingship and sovereignty, as well as
the royal objects and paraphernalia, note turban worn by Hastings and the jewels he is
presenting to the king, which refer to the Governor-General laying claims to political
power and sovereignty in India. As art historian Romita Ray writes, “Thus the caricature
accentuates the former Bengal governor as the confluence of multiple fears defined by
the now influential polity of nabobery, the troublesome alliance between the monarchy
and the Company, and the perceived infusion of nawabi if not Mughal customs and taste
into the upper echelons of British society.”1064
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Figure 10. “The East Offering its Riches to Britannia.” Spiridione Roma, Oil Painting on Ceiling of the
East India House, London, 1778 (British Library, London).

Corruption and State Formation in Ceylon 1796-1802
Whereas India continued to be governed by the East India Company until 1856-7, the
early history of British Sri Lanka is marked by three distinct organizations of power:
Between 1796 and 1798, the East India Company governed Ceylon from Fort St. George.
In 1798, the introduction of a system of dual-control meant that the formal sovereignty
was invested in the Crown while the East India Company handled most day-to-day
administrative matters. In 1802, Ceylon became a colony directly administered by the
British state along the same lines as the Cape of Good Hope and other overseas
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possessions.1065 When the East India Company incorporated Dutch Ceylon into its
expanding territorial empire, officials naturally turned their attention to governance and
administration in these areas. The question of corruption loomed large from the start of
British rule in Ceylon. British officials depicted the Dutch VOC government as
particularly rapacious and corrupt. For instance, British officials such as Henry Dundas,
the Secretary of War and member of the body in charge of guiding the transition of
maritime Ceylon to British rule, looked disparagingly upon Dutch management
strategies. He wrote in a letter addressed to the chairmen of the East India Company that
Ceylon was a “Settlement recently withdrawn from the oppressive System practised by
the Dutch in the [Governance] of their Colonial Possessions, and particularly those in the
Eastern World.”1066 Besides the administrative structures and revenue system of Dutch
Ceylon, East India Company officials also held VOC officers in low regard. In a dispatch
to the Board of Directors, members of the council at Fort St. George wrote that Dutch
VOC employees on the island appeared “enveloped in corrupt obscurity.”1067 Modern
historians have echoed British attitudes towards the administration of Dutch Ceylon.
Historian P. E. Pieris, for example, wrote in his early twentieth century monograph
Ceylon and the Hollanders, “Ceylon was treated as a convenient spot where blockheads,
libertines, and bankrupts who had influence with the Directorate could easily be
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dumped.”1068 Reorganizing the revenue system was no small matter for officials such as
Henry Dundas. He wrote, “the Settlement both under the Portuguese and the Dutch
Governments has been so woefully mismanaged it will be considerable time before its
Trade Agriculture and interior prosperity can be restored to that state of which it is
capable.”1069
An early set of reforms to the existing revenue system came at the
recommendation of Robert Andrews, the head of a committee that investigated social and
economic conditions on the island. Andrews recommended that the Company Raj replace
local intermediaries and revenue collectors with company-trained amildars and dubashes
from Madras. Native Indians in these capacities would come to exercise political power
in the coastal districts of Ceylon and participate in revenue farming. Andrews also
recommended the revocation of many import and export duties, as well as the eradication
of uliyam and rajakariya service requirements. Some historians have described how these
reforms “affected all strata of society and every ethnic group in the population” and
“provoked immediate and widespread opposition.”1070 There was serious blowback to the
policies, and the riots and rebellions the followed remain a particularly heated debate in
the historiography of Sri Lanka. Historian Nira Wickramasinghe argues against
nationalist interpretations that see this violence as a response to increased taxes and a sign
of proto-nationalist consciousness. She offers a more textured reading in which shifts in
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local authority interrupted previously open channels of communication where local
peasant populations had once directed grievances to the Dutch government.1071
Another concern for officials guiding the transition from Dutch to British rule of
maritime Ceylon was the so-called “unity of the Indian Government.” The British state
had obtained control over Dutch Ceylon with the political and military support of the East
India Company in the context of the Napoleonic Wars. A central concern therefore was
which British power should govern the island. Officials also had to decide whether the
East India Company should rule Ceylon as part of its India government. Another option
on the table was the establishment of a separate government for Ceylon under the
auspices of the East India Company. A third possibility was the establishment of Ceylon
as a formal colony of the British Crown. Two competing visions of empire met during
these debates. Henry Dundas wanted to establish Ceylon as an official British colony
under similar terms and conditions as the Cape of Good Hope. Leadership of the East
India Company, however, had a different idea. The Court of Directors in London in
concert with Governor-General Wellesley in Calcutta advocated for the unification of
India and Ceylon under the authority of the East India Company. Wellesley took a
broader regional view of the problem. He considered Ceylon, with its protected harbors
and passageways, to be of vital importance for the Company to maintain its military and
commercial strength.
In 1796, it was decided that the East India Company would rule Ceylon from Fort
St. George. This arrangement was followed by a system of dual-rule introduced in 1798.
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As Dundas wrote to the Court of Directors, “it gives me much satisfaction to announce to
you my Sentiments that a System may be adopted which will obviate any legal difficulty
in the Establishment of a Government, and at the same time substantially preserve that
unified authority which you so strongly urged.”1072 Frederic North, Earl of Guilford and
son of British Prime Minister Lord North, was appointed as the first British governor of
Ceylon. British officials such as Dundas and North advocated for the expansion of British
power over the Ceylon trade. Dundas wrote in December 1800, “But altho [sic] I am of
opinion that the Political Government of Ceylon should be carried on in different hands
than the Government of India, I am equally of opinion that in every Commercial Point of
view it ought to be held upon a footing more beneficial for the East India Company than
even the Territories under their own immediate administration. Our Indian Possessions
are open to the Trade of all other Nations, as well as of our own East India Company but
this cannot be allowed with regard to the Trade between Ceylon and Europe.”1073 He
continued: “In that respect it must be held upon strict Colonial Principles and the
Monopoly of its Trade must be reserved for the East India Company.”1074 Dundas also
referred to revenue derived from the pearl fishery and cinnamon. He wrote, “There are
several smaller Articles from which a Revenue arises, but exclusive of the Pearl Fishery,
the only really valuable Article of Trade, is the Cinnamon.”1075 The system of dual rule
ran its courses by the end of 1800, however. Dundas wrote to the Court of Directors,
“when the expedient was adopted of blending together the Governments of India and
Ceylon it was done upon a very superficial knowledge of the Subject and upon an
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erroneous supposition that such a measure was necessary in order to preserve the unity of
our Indian Empire.”1076 Dundas described how he spent “many months…reading the best
informed authors upon the subject of Ceylon and by conversing with those most qualified
to give me information, taken a more comprehensive view of the subject.”1077 He decided
to “place the Island of Ceylon upon the footing of a Royal Government and to administer
its affairs upon the principles which the Government of the Cape of Good Hope is
conducted.”1078 Dundas found that the “junction” between the “government of the
Company [and the] King’s hands [had] done no good, and [caused] a good deal of
mischief.”1079
Company officials saw the pearl fisheries of India and Ceylon as a potentially
lucrative source of revenue that could facilitate the expansion of Company trade and
offset military expenses. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Dutch VOC
officials had also recognized that profits from the pearl fishery could be used to
underwrite military ventures. For instance, in 1665, shortly after the Dutch VOC defeated
the Portuguese, Rijklof van Goens, Governor of Ceylon and Governor-General of the
Dutch East Indies, wrote: “Because when the Portuguese recover their strength they are
very likely to attack this Island. That besides the protection of the Island itself attention
should be paid to its revenues, derived from the pearl fishery and from dye-roots, salt,
and elephants.”1080 In the latter half of the eighteenth century, the East India Company
faced heavy financial burdens from military campaigns against native powers such as
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Tipu Sultan and the petty lords of the Tamil country. The Company was also engaged in
military battles with its French and Dutch rivals, which further added to its financial
woes. As historian Anthony Webster and others have noted, “At the time of the
acquisition of the Bengal diwani the mood in London and Calcutta was bullishly
optimistic; it was believed that Indian revenues could finance a huge expansion of the
Company's trade.”1081 The Company could recoup the cost of conquest through the
extraction of revenue and levying of duties in newly incorporated areas. As Dundas
wrote, “the first consideration…is the inexpediency of encumbering at present the
Revenues of India, with the expenses of this Settlement [Ceylon].”1082 The cession of
Ceylon to the East India Company in 1796 was not only practical but it was also meant to
compensate the East India Company for wartime expenses. The Court of Directors made
this clear in a letter to Governor North: “The acquisitions may be rendered as productive
as possible, in order to defray the Expenses of the military and other Establishments,
which may be deemed necessary for the defence of the Island, and the due
Administration of Civil Affairs.”1083
British officials believed that the pearl fishery would become an important source
of revenue for the East India Company in Ceylon. However, the pearl fishery was a
highly specialized industry with which the British had little or no managerial experience.
As Henry Dundas wrote, “it is truly singular that notwithstanding the long possession
which the Portuguese and the Dutch have successively held of the valuable Fishery we
are at this Moment much in the Dark both as to the real value of and as to the best manner
1081
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of conducting it.”1084 Governor North appointed Davey Roberson and George Turnour to
gather information about Portuguese and Dutch management of the pearl fishery.
Robertson and Turnour compiled reports on the economic and social conditions of
Ceylon and each devoted considerable attention to the pearl fisheries.1085 North also
employed French naturalist Eudelin de Jonville to undertake an extensive survey of the
island, which resulted in an illustrated manuscript on Ceylon’s natural history, and late
became the first surveyor general of British Ceylon.1086 Through such appointments,
North was determined to investigate the natural world of Ceylon “with a view to its
future cultivation and improvement.”1087 British officials also turned their attention to the
organization and management of the industry. They believed that the government
monopoly claimed over the industry would be an effective mechanism through which to
“reduce [the pearl fishery] into such a regular train of management as to render it
materially productive.”1088 As Henry Dundas wrote in 1800, “It is perfectly clear that the
Banks of the Fishery cannot be exposed to an indiscriminate use and possession but the
Fishery must remain a Monopoly in the hands of Government to be occupied either by
annual Leases or by a more extensive tenure.”1089 He continued: “The Trade and Profit to
be made by the Sales of Pearls in Europe or elsewhere should belong to the East India
[Company] seems to me at present to be the most eligible.”1090 The East India Company
also asserted its monopolistic control over the buying and selling of pearls between the
Asian and European markets. Whereas debates in the British public sphere exposed
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cracks in the edifice of mercantilism, the East India Company’s monopoly over the pearl
fishery and its attendant trade sat as a curious outlier.
The nature and organization of employment in the East India Company was
another important matter for officials to consider. Some high-ranking members of the
Company believed that talented administrators were unlikely to accept work at Colombo
or one of its subordinate stations because the rank-and-file believed that there was less
opportunity for promotion and fewer avenues towards personal enrichment compared to
India. As Dundas remarked, “If therefore the Servants of the Company in India were to
be employed as they have been in the Service of Ceylon it would be unreasonable to
expect that the servants of Superior talents and capacity would wish to be employed in
situations in which their prosperity would be comparatively very limited…[T]heir hearts
could never warmly engage in the service of Ceylon.”1091 It was generally accepted that
India was by far the more attractive assignment. The wages may have been low but the
opportunities to amass small fortunes through private trade and gift-giving or “presents”
were ample. Critics of the East India Company like Edmund Burke believed that such a
climate created a breeding ground for corruption. He remarked, “emoluments…so week
[sic], so inadequate to the integrity of the character that it is impossible…for the
subordinate parts of [the East India Company] to exist, to hope to exist…in a state of
incorruption.”1092
The character of government officials was an important consideration for men
like Governor North. For instance, in a book on the economic and social conditions of
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British Ceylon, his personal secretary Anthony Bertolacci made an explicit connection
between good governance and good governors. He wrote, “To govern those regions, able
men are requisite, who have served a long apprenticeship in the science of combining the
happiness and wealth of the subject with the power and prosperity of the Sovereign—
men of steady and firm temper, possessing a liberal and enlarged mind, well stored with
the knowledge of civil laws and polity, and as exalted as the station in which they are
placed.”1093 Governor North was forced by his superiors in Madras and London to fill
many vacant posts in his administration with Company servants from Fort St. George. He
doubted whether the training received by Madras officers was even applicable to Ceylon
and he emphasized character, honor, and other such virtues. According to North, officers
from Madras did not fit this profile and he wrote frequently about the chicanery and
insubordination he witnessed amongst of Madras-trained administrators. For example, in
a letter to a secret committee of the East India Company, North wrote, “that determined
and systematic spirit of Opportunities and of Hatred, which has guided Them in all their
Actions, and which has made them turn every Mark of Confidence which I have shown
them, & every Authority with which I have invested them into Engines to Discredit my
Person, and to thwart my Government.”1094 Madras had acquired during the course of the
eighteenth century the reputation of being a hotbed of corruption, the chief culprits of
which were the city’s dubashes.1095 As one Madras-based officer wrote in 1789, the city
was overrun with “tribes of dubashes,” and Company employees were seen as
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particularly vulnerable to the overtures of dubashes.1096 For instance, Lord Cornwallis
wrote that East India Company servants “are obliged, both from habit and necessity, to
allow the management of their officials, as well as their private business, to fall into the
hands of dubashes.”1097 He described dubashes as “cruel instruments of rapine and
extortion” who could turn “the most upright and humane intentions…perfectly useless to
the interest of the company, and to the unfortunate native who happen to be within reach
of their power and influence.”1098 As Sanjay Subrahmanyam notes, Governor North saw
the events that transpired at the 1799 pearl fishery “as a sign of the venality to be
associated as a norm with Madras-trained officials,” who were “aided and abetted by
Indian mercantile interests.”1099
Anxieties about the role and influence of local intermediaries led to a series of
reforms to the revenue system and legal infrastructure of Company Madras in the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Measures included the establishment of a new
legal system and efforts to regularize land revenue, first in the form of a permanent
settlement based on the Bengal model, and then the ryotwari system designed by Thomas
Munro.1100 These reforms were meant by and large to insulate the “public” operations of
the state from “private” or “local influence” of Indian professional classes and the kin and
patrimonial networks within which they traveled.1101 Indeed, breaking or neutralizing
preexisting professional and patrimonial bonds in the legal or administrative spheres and
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the marketplace was undergirded by the principles of British liberal-utilitarianism and
Whiggism. As in the case of the cutcherry analyzed by historian Bhavani Raman, reforms
to the pearl fishery were also intended to create docile and responsible economic subjects
and remove local influence. British Ceylon and the Company Raj wanted to operate on
the idealized principles of modern liberal governance by limiting private influence of
over public affairs. However, both Madras and Ceylon were dependent upon the local
networks of knowledge, capital, and labor that they wished to abolish. Raman illustrates
in Document Raj that one way in which this contradiction of early colonial rule was
resolved came through the depiction of Indian servants and other subordinates as
disreputable and untrustworthy. According to Raman, the precise moment at which the
Company Raj consolidated its power in the region and expanded its administrative
apparatus, “cases that portrayed cutcherry employees as embezzlers and tricksters began
to come thick and fast.”1102 She writes, “The condemnation of the dubashes and the rise
of the Madras revenue servant did not end the lucrative tie of kin and cash at the
administrative frontier.”1103 Yet even as the dubashi system waned at the turn of the
nineteenth-century it flourished in newly incorporated areas, which brought “cycles of
corruption and reform and discussions of clerical deviance” to the “administrative
frontiers” of places such as Ceylon.1104
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Corruption at the Pearl Fishery, 1796-1799
The East India Company organized four consecutive pearl fisheries in the late 1790s.
These were the first full-scale pearl fisheries on either side of the Gulf of Mannar since
1768. The pearl banks had not been fished for nearly three decades because the Dutch
VOC had been involved in a protracted dispute with the Nawab of Arcot over the rights
and revenue to the industry. However, shortly before the turn of the nineteenth century, at
the end of this four-year period, a large volume of documents arrived to the desk of a
London barrister. As Sanjay Subrahmanyam writes, “the corruption investigation…has
the characteristic flavour of such enquiries in the period, revealing a sub-stratum of
suitably Machiavellian ‘native interests’ which manipulated the Commissioners and in
fact covertly controlled the entire operation.”1105 The reality of the situation was far more
complicated. Henry Smith, solicitor for the East India Company, was recruited by
Governor North and appointed by the Court of Directors to issue a legal opinion on a
complicated case. Three superintendents of the pearl fishery faced charges of corruption
and Smith received a dossier that contained a wide range of materials. From official
correspondence and revenue reports to private papers and transcripts of depositions,
Smith assumed the role of an armchair barrister. The nature of the materials and the
modus operandi of the investigation further complicated Smith’s assignment. For
example, the investigators questioned Tamil-speaking and Sinhala-speaking witnesses
with assistance from language interpreters, the transcripts from which government clerks
excerpted. Company officials in Madras and Colombo selected documents from local
records offices to include in the dossier and therefore many documents of interest to
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present-day historians never reached London. After he “endeavoured to see how far Mr.
Cleghorn, Mr. Macdowal or Lieutenant Turnour are implicated as Parties to the
[Offences],” Smith determined that “the depositions of the Witnesses” and “the
Documents produced before the Commissioners put it beyond a doubt that the grossest
frauds, abuses and corruption and even theft were committed at the Fishery of 1799.”1106
A striking feature of the investigation is the litany of acts that became subsumed
under the categories of “frauds, abuses and corruption.” The salient statute was of the
East India Company’s code was “33 Gov. 3rd Cap. 52 Sec. 65,” which referred to “any
willful breach of trust & duty of any officers or Servants of the Company in the East
Indies.”1107 Solicitor Smith enumerated no less than twelve charges against the
superintendents at the beginning of his report: First, Cleghorn and Turnour did not
faithfully represent the state of the pearl oyster beds and failed to report and deliver
pearls collected during the examination to the proper authorities. Second, the
superintendents did not accurately record the number of oysters collected during the
assaying process. Third, the most valuable pearls collected by government-employed
boats disappeared on the watch of the commissioners. Fourth, Cleghorn stole pearls from
one of the warehouses for his private use. Fifth, the superintendents brought only 86 ½
lbs. of pearls to account when government’s share of oysters should have produced 188 ½
lbs. of pearls. Sixth, that “Bribery, Corruption and Extortion” were rife during the sale of
boats and leasing of shops. Seventh, a parcel of pearls was sold for P 800 but the
Company only received credit for P 550. Eighth, the amount collected from sea customs
was less than what appeared on the accounts submitted by the superintendents. Ninth,
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fines levied and goods confiscated were not properly registered. Tenth, the statement of
charges accrued during the preparation and management of the pearl fishery was more
than the actual costs. Eleventh, a set of “false accounts” meant “to deceive Government
were fabricated and rendered.” Twelfth, and lastly, the commissioners had “delegated the
whole of their very extensive Authority to a Common Dubash” and closed the lines of
communication between themselves and the “speculators” that assembled at the pearl
fishery.1108
Despite the mountain of evidence before him, Smith was not fully confident in his
ability to undertake a comprehensive investigation. He wrote, “I apprehend the Evidence
will not be thought sufficiently creditable to ground upon it any positive charge of
corruption against the Superintendents.”1109 A source of his doubt stemmed from the fact
that much of the information related to the alleged frauds and corruption came from the
testimony of Narayana, a person which Smith described as a “common dubash.”
Narayana served as the cash-keeper and supervisor of the government’s storehouses
during the 1799 pearl fishery at Arippu. Smith and other Company officials doubted the
veracity of his statement. Not only was his testimony self-incriminating but it also
appears to have been made under some duress. Governor North had issued a warrant for
the arrest of his father, Jagannath Nayak, and ordered Company agents to confiscate
documents in his possession related to the pearl fishery. Narayana, Jagannath Nayak, and
other persons of interest were arrested and extradited to Colombo, where, according to
reports, Narayana was kept in “iron to force him to confess.”1110 According to a report,
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“examination [of Narayana] might have thrown much light on many dark and nefarious
transactions which took place in the various branches of the Fishery.”1111
Governor North portrayed Ceylon as a resource-rich island in dispatches to
London. He described rich pearl banks and fragrant cinnamon groves and maintained that
proper management could turn Ceylon from a moribund Dutch colony into a prosperous
British territory. North maintained that the Dutch had mismanaged the natural resources
of Ceylon and the reforms of Robert Andrews had not improved the situation. He wrote,
“Altho on my arrival on this Island I did not know so well as I now do, how full of
Corruption and Iniquity the System of Government had been.”1112 North arrived to the
island to find a financially strapped government and he made it his prerogative to turn
Ceylon from a liability to an asset. He asked the Court of Directors to delay in forming an
opinion about the “pecuniary advantage” of Ceylon. He wrote, “I have arrived to an
empty Treasury, an insisting Country, and resisting Population, probably neither the Pearl
Fishery, nor the Cinnamon Investment of the two next years, will be so complete and
productive…as they have been since our possession of the Island.”1113 Company officials
in London responded favorably to North’s initiative and asked him to form an exact view
of the natural resources and revenue prospects of the island.
The status of Ceylon was ambiguous during the Anglo-French Wars at the end of
the eighteenth century. Neither Dutch or British officials knew for certain whether the
island would be returned to Holland at the conclusion of the conflict. It was entirely
possible that the East India Company would possess Ceylon for only a short period.
1111

Clark, An Enlightened Scot, 208.
BL, IOR, F, 4, 130, 2403, 22.
1113
Ibid.
1112

373

Company officials were therefore eager to draw the greatest possible revenue from the
pearl fisheries while Ceylon was under its control. In a report on the economic and social
conditions of Ceylon, British official Davey Roberson wrote, “From the uncertainty of
future possession, it has been judged adviseable [sic] to draw the greatest possible
revenue from the [Pearl] Banks while in [our] possession.”1114 The Company organized
three consecutive pearl fisheries (1796-1798) under the direction of Robert Andrews.
Fresh from his recent success as ambassador to the Kandyan Court, and with the relevant
experience as former resident and superintendent of revenue, Andrews was the natural
choice to oversee the first full-scale fishery under British management. He conducted the
preliminary examinations of the banks and decided that the pearl oyster population was
sufficient to admit a fishery each season. He was also responsible for giving passports to
boats, delivering boats and divers to merchants, ensuring that pearling fleets stayed
within demarcated boundaries, and protecting the compound from raiders.
Although the initial focus of the committee was the 1799 pearl fishery, the
investigation became a dragnet that reviewed nearly all of the documents related to the
pearl fishery in possession of Madras and Ceylon. The widened scope of the investigation
not only brought the conduct of Andrews as superintendent under suspicion but it also
threw the integrity of the entire pearling industry into question. The investigation found
that under his watch nearly twice the number of boats registered by the Company had
launched from the fishery compound to the pearl banks. The terms of the renter’s contract
permitted only one hundred and fifty boats per day but some witnesses testified that some
days upwards of four hundred to five hundred boats fished. These were extraordinarily
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high numbers even for the most robust fishery. Anywhere between 12,000 and 15,000
boats could have fished the banks over a thirty-day period even though the account books
registered only 5036 boats in 1797 and 4474 boats in 1798. Officials estimated that
allowing the extra boats to fish without payment “must have amounted at the very least to
upwards of five lacs of Pagodas.”1115 Andrews fought against these charges tooth and
nail. One particularly hard fought battle he won was the right to review the multi-volume
dossier. He read and annotated these documents and his marginalia along with other
writings provide insight into the logic of his defense. In a letter to Lord Clive in Madras,
for example, Andrews wrote, “I now stand accus’d of malpractices, the result of which I
trust will be such as to induce your Lordship and His Excellency to acquit me of all
dishonorable Conduct and to restore me that Character and Confidence, which I have
hitherto sustained unblemish’d for the space of twenty four [sic] years in the service of
the Honble. Company.”1116 At stake for Andrews was not only his employment and
material well-being but also his “character and confidence.” High-ranking officials
similarly remarked that Andrews’s reputation was in jeopardy. Lord Clive, for example,
in a somewhat lukewarm defense of Andrews, called for an expedient resolution to the
case, emphasizing that it “so deeply affects his fame and Interest.”1117 Clive relayed these
sentiments to his counterpart in Colombo. He wrote to Governor North, “We are induced
to hope, by every motive connected with the honor of the British administration of India,
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that Mr. Andrews may be able to relive his Character from the imputation of fraud so
public and extensive.”1118
The list of people that gave testimony to the special committee ranged from the
elite merchant classes to low-level laborers and divers through Europeans employed by
the Company. In his review of the dossier, Henry Smith found no reason to doubt the
sincerity of the witnesses, an attitude that contradicted feelings that many had towards
native Indians in British colonial legal culture. Smith wrote, “None of the witnesses
appear to be of bad or doubtful Characters, or to have been themselves (with exception of
[the Renter]) Parties to any Fraud, or to be actuated by any Malice against Mr. Andrews,
or to have had an Interest to misrepresent the facts they stated.”1119 Daniel Roderigo, a
Tamil Parava who served as the chief pilot during the pearl fisheries of 1797 and 1798,
was one of the most important witnesses. Roderigo emphasized his experience and
knowledge of the industry by saying that he had “been brought as a Pilot on the Pearl
banks from my Infancy and employed in that way for forty years.”1120 The crux of
Roderigo’s testimony contradicted many of the official accounts submitted by Andrews.
He testified that upwards of four hundred and fifty to five hundred boats were active at
the pearl fishery in 1797 despite having recommended to Andrews that only one hundred
and twenty to one hundred and fifty boats be permitted. Roderigo remarked, “he knew
[the number of boats] perfectly well as none could go without his permit it was the
general opinion that by allowing so many Boats to fish, the Banks would be exhausted
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and ruined.”1121 Roderigo further claimed to know these figures because he had employed
one of the shark-charmers to count the boats that were left behind on shore each day.1122
The shark-charmer and Roderigo reportedly kept these accounts in a private logbook that
never found its way before the committee. Despite the fastidiousness with which
Roderigo saw to his duties, and notwithstanding the veteran status he enjoyed after four
decades of work at the pearl fishery, some committee members questioned the motivation
of his testimony. On the one hand, Roderigo had an incentive to accurately count the
number of boats because he received a single payment of one pagoda from each boat and
a daily payment of five oysters from each boat. On the other hand, the committee
surmised that it was also in Roderigo’s best interest to inflate the boat tally because he
would receive a larger reward. It also appears that Roderigo received P 100 from the
renter but no such baksheesh from Andrews, which aroused suspicion that he was
motivated purely by revenge, intent on ruining superintendent’s reputation because he
was stingy with his tips.1123
Other testimonies shed light on the intrigue at the pearl fishery. A certain Naga
Mudaliar, for instance, corroborated the account of Roderigo. Naga Mudaliar’s duties at
the pearl fisheries are not known but it appears that he was employed by the East India
Company to be an arripar or officer in 1798 and was present at the examination of pearl
fishery in 1797. He arrived ten-days late to the pearl fishery because he was in Jaffna
attending to an undisclosed matter, but he sent a person to Arippu on the condition that
they would split any profits from the job. After his arrival, for some unknown reason,
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Naga Mudaliar started to count the boats. According to his testimony, Naga Mudaliar
counted at least 500 boats, more than three times the official number submitted by
Andrews. The fact that he counted the number of boats for no other reason than his own
interest was a highly dubious motive in the eyes of the investigators. Henry Smith looked
askance at his testimony: “[I did] not pay much attention to his Account. As I do not
think the account which a Man took merely for his amusement without any useful
purpose to be answered.”1124 During a second round of testimony, Naga Mudaliar
reportedly submitted a statement and account in Tamil on a palm-leaf written in his own
hand. The numbers corresponded roughly to the statement of Roderigo. While the
committee had no reservations about the legitimacy of the palm-leaf account, Andrews
questioned its authenticity and inferred that it was evidence of a conspiracy.1125
The testimonies of Daniel Roderigo and Naga Mudaliar brought many issues to
light but they were marginal figures compared to the renters. In 1797 and 1798,
Vydelinga Chetti and his son Kundappah received the rent of the pearl fisheries.
Vydelinga Chetti and Kundappah Chetti were two members of a prominent Tamil
mercantile family from Jaffna who became thorns in the side of the Ceylon government
in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Vydelinga and Kundappah rented
one hundred and fifty boats for thirty days for a total of PNP 277,000. The grant or cowle
also contained a clause that if the boats did not fish a certain number of oysters then the
renters were owed a proportionate remission. Testimony after testimony implicated both
father and son at the center of controversy that had engulfed the pearl fishery. For
example, a certain merchant named Sivalingam Chetti testified at a temple in Nellore on
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November 22, 1800 that his father Muthu Chetti had partnered with Vydelinga and
Kundappah for the rent of the 1797 and 1798 pearl fisheries. According to the terms of
the partnership, Muthu Chetti contributed one-eighth of the rent in 1797 and one-fourth
of the rent in 1798. Muthu Chetti was the brother of Vydelinga and Sivalingam’s
testimony is replete with salacious details about backbiting and underhanded dealings
amongst family members. Sivalingam, for example, fell out of favor with his father after
he complained about the quality of divers that came equipped with the boats he purchased
at the pearl fishery. Muthu Chetti was also on bad terms with his brother Vydelinga and
his youngest son, Gopaul. Though Sivalingam reported that he never spoke with his uncle
Vydelinga at the pearl fishery, he testified that he overheard him talking about the pearl
fishery one day when he passed by his home, though he was unable to make out the
content of the conversation.1126 Compelled by Governor North’s aggressive interrogation,
Sivalingam remarked, “It was said they have made a great deal of Money.” To which
North barked, “Does he know nothing of his own knowledge what did he think people
meant by making Money the wrong way was it giving bribes to the Gentlemen.”1127
The testimony of Abdul Cader Saib, the patriarch of a prominent Maraikkayar
family from Kilakkarai, is also noteworthy. He and other members of his family regularly
attended pearl fisheries and made sizable offers for the rents of both the pearl and chank
fisheries on numerous occasions. Abdul Cader Saib appeared before the commission at
Jaffna on December 8, 1800. He reported that Vydelinga Chetti had approached him with
a proposition to recruit “4 principal [sic] men with himself” to testify before the
government commission. Vydelinga Chetti wanted him to testify that there were no more
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than two hundred boats at the pearl fisheries in 1797 and 1798. Vydelinga Chetti
informed Abdul Cader Saib that the chief pilot Daniel Roderigo observed more than four
hundred boats though it was known amongst those that attended only one hundred and
fifty were authorized to fish. In exchange for his testimony and efforts to mobilize four
other men, Vydelinga Chetti would give Abdul Cader Saib a cash payment of P 500.
Abdul Cader Saib returned with two other individuals to whom Vydelinga Chetti made
the same offer. But he had a change of heart. Abdul Cader Saib remarked that a certain
Nagalingam Pillai had “told him that it was not proper to give false evidence however he
was sent for three times the last time he went and gave Vydelinga a positive Answer that
he would not interfere in that Business.”1128

Corruption at the Pearl Fishery of 1799
After three consecutive fisheries, the prospect of organizing a pearl fishery in 1799 was
an open if not daunting question for Company officials in Madras and Ceylon. According
to some preliminary reports, the resource was stretched thin and it was not known
whether the oyster populations could support another season of intensive pearling.
Examinations helped officials reach a different conclusion. The results of an examination
determined that certain areas had “escaped the general rapacity and which may be
dragged next February with every appearance of profit.”1129 In advance of the 1799 pearl
fishery at Arippu, Governor North appointed Hugh Cleghorn, George Turnour, and John
McDowall as superintendents. Cleghorn had written to Henry Dundas with some doubt
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about the short-term viability of the industry, remarking that the “Pearl Fishery would for
several years be altogether unproductive.”1130 Private letters between Cleghorn and
Turnour contain a more optimistic tone. For instance, before he arrived to Ceylon,
Cleghorn wrote to Turnour from Bombay and asked for a report on the economic and
social conditions of the maritime provinces of Ceylon that the East India Company had
recently annexed. Turnour had undertaken an extensive survey of the island and paid
special attention to the pearling industry. He sent “many papers concerning the Pearl
Fishery” to Cleghorn in Bombay.1131 Cleghorn reviewed these documents and determined
without “a doubt that the Banks may be fished this season with every appearance of
success.”1132 A few months later, however, the superintendents informed Governor North
at the close of the season that the pearl fishery failed to meet expectations. They wrote,
“our success when compared with the splendid profit of former years may appear
inconsiderable but your Excellency will have the goodness to recollect that we have only
had the gleanings of former harvests.”1133
In January 1799, Governor North provided Cleghorn, Turnour, and McDowall
with detailed instructions about how to undertake preparations for the pearl fishery.
McDowall was the first person to arrive at Arippu, dispatched by North to start gathering
labor and supplies for the construction of the compound. He hired local labor to assist
with the process. McDowall was told by North to “employ natives of this Island that may
learn the Conduct of the Fishery.”1134 North also instructed McDowall to construct
warehouses for washing and storing oysters, prepare the layout for the bazaar, and find a
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suitable renter for the sale of arrack. He wrote: “You will farm all the shops of Bangsalls
by public outcry, leaving open spaces where necessary for persons to sell Provisions in
[stalls] on whom no Tax shall be levied, but a Register should be kept of them.”1135 North
told the superintendents that they “should exercise over the Fishery itself and the persons
coming to it, and employed in it, the fullest and most completed authority.”1136 Indeed,
Governor North invested the superintendents with much authority over the persons and
affairs at the pearl fishery. Turnour came from a military background and North awarded
him all the pretensions befitting an officer. He wrote, “take the Command of all the
Troops sent to Aripo” and enjoy “the same Military honour both in Respect their
Habitations and their Persons” that the superintendents of the previous year received.1137
There were a number of problems that impacted the pearl fishery at Arippu in
1799. The commissioners informed Governor North that environmental conditions such
as strong winds and boisterous seas prevented boats from sailing to the pearl oyster
banks. According to a dispatch from Arippu, “The wind has been entirely contrary for
some days part, and consequently no Fishing has taken place, and even during many of
the latter Days that the Boats did get to the Banks, the quantity of Oysters taken was so
small, as to leave no encouragement to the Divers and Boatmen to make the necessary
exertions.”1138 The pearl fishery of 1799 was also delayed for nearly two weeks because
the divers and boatmen were dilatory in their arrival to Arippu, which caused a temporary
labor shortage. Other problems included a lack of specie, an insufficient number of troops
to guard the camp and fishery grounds, and the need for an on-site medical professional.
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There was also low turnout. Many of the officials attributed the relatively small number
of merchants at the pearl fishery to wars in peninsular India, which made travel between
the island and mainland unsafe. As Governor North wrote to the Court of Directors in
London, “At the beginning of the Fishery, the Commissioners finding the few
Speculators whom the Circumstances of the [War] had allowed to resort to Arripo, avers
from entering into any deep and dangerous Speculation.”1139 A low supply of basic
provisions such as rice and liquor added to the general climate of insecurity. British
officials feared that there would not be enough grain to feed the four hundred thousand
people that they estimated would attend the pearl fishery. Governor North, for example,
wrote to Lord Clive in Madras, “I lose no time in calling your attention to the Situation of
the immense multitude which will shortly be assembled at Arrippo for the Pearl Fishery
as their probable number is estimated near four hundred Thousand.”1140 John McDowall
was in charge of the rice supply and he warned Governor North that a terrible famine was
on the horizon. He wrote, “The important object of securing a sufficient supply from the
immense Crowd of Speculators who assemble at the Fishery and my anxiety to ensure the
due Collection of so important a Branch of the Revenue will I trust appear to your
Excellency a sufficient cause.”1141 The problem, however, was that Madras had placed an
embargo on rice exports due to famine in its own countryside, so it was difficult for
North and his commissioners to gather a supply of rice that would satisfy demand. As
most of the rice for the Ceylon market came from southern India, the organizers of the
pearl fishery were dependent upon shipments from the mainland. As Governor North
wrote to Lord Clive, “As they can draw no one article of Provision from this Island I
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most earnestly request your Lordship in case the prohibition should be general to order
your resident at Nagore to Ship and Consign to Mr. McDowall Collector at Aripo on
account of this Government such a quantity of Rice as maybe adequate to the demands of
that Population for two months or at least as much as you can spare.”1142 North cobbled
together bags of rice from various ports and towns in the region. For instance, he
requested three to five thousand bags of rice from the commissioner of Cochin, found
room for four hundred bags on one ship and fifteen hundred bags on another one set for
Ceylon. North bought fifteen hundred bags rice from a local grain merchant, Sekupati
Maraikkayar. The merchant had expressed interest in speculating at the pearl fishery with
his profits, so the commissioners were instructed to pay him in a currency that would suit
that purpose. North instructed the commissioners to pay him with bills they had on hand,
but if no money was available, the commissioners could secure RD 25,000 from the
collector at Jaffna. When McDowall received the shipment he noted that there had been
“great wastage” at Arippu and found that large quantities of rice had already been
discharged to troops and laborers stationed at Kondachi and Calpetyn.1143 He added that
“one of the Chests of Wine for the Hospital of Trincomale” had been broken open in
Kondachi and “many Bottles taken from it.”1144
During their assignment at Arippu, the commissioners believed that local
merchants at the pearl fishery engaged in highly manipulative and dishonest forms of
behavior. British officials witnessed various practices that they described as bribery,
embezzlement, and the falsification of accounts. For instance, Cleghorn wrote, “the sums
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of money which have been offered me in this miserable district, to continue occupants in
their offices, exceeds [sic] belief.”1145 It appears that Cleghorn described a practice in
which a local man of standing offered money and goods in exchange for an appointment
as an officer at the pearl fishery. As early as December of 1798, Cleghorn had written to
Governor North to gripe about such pay-to-play tactics. Cleghorn reported that the gobetween of a local amildar offered him P 2,000. Cleghorn agreed to meet the messenger’s
employer and requested that he bring the promised money to the rendezvous point. In a
trade for cash, Cleghorn would give the amildar an official document bearing the
governor’s signature that could be exchanged for a formal appointment at the pearl
fishery. Cleghorn apprised Governor North of the situation: “Whatever letter I may judge
it expedient to give him to you…you will know how to appreciate it and if he presents it
in person before my arrival at Colombo, you will determine whether he ought to be
secured.”1146 In another instance Muthu Chetti—the brother of Vydelinga Chetti and
uncle of Kundappah Chetti—sent a letter to Cleghorn requesting that the superintendents
appoint one of his confidants to the position and manager and cash keeper of the fishery.
The letter read, “Yourself and Mr. Turnour can undoubtedly get an advantage of about
20,000 Pagodas besides your commission.”1147
The superintendents wrote to Governor North in February 1799 shortly before the
start of the pearl fishery with their plan to “render the produce of the Fishery as beneficial
as possible to Government.”1148 The primary strategy employed by Cleghorn, Turnour,
and McDowall was to increase demand for boats by limiting the number of boats for sale.
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As the commissioners wrote to Governor North, “We have judged it advisable among
other resolutions, to limit the number of Boats, to be employed at the ensuing Fishery,
that the adventurers knowing with certainly what proportion of the whole may be
considered as the property of each Individual may thereby be encouraged to speculate
with more Confidence.”1149 Once the event was underway, however, the superintendents
decided to expand the number of boats from one hundred and fifty to three hundred and
fifty. This decision seemingly ran counter to reports sent by the superintendents from the
fishery camp that contained alarmist anecdotes about inclement weather, food shortages,
and stagnant markets. Governor North nevertheless approved of the increase in the
number of boats because he believed it would reduce the likelihood of clandestine
fishing. He wrote, “Since so great a concourse of Boats are assembled, it is no doubt very
probable that if they were prevented from Acting openly, they might Fish
fraudulently.”1150 Yet the decision to increase the number of boats for auction became
overshadowed by the overall low demand and price of pearls and oysters. The
commissioners believed that a cabal of merchants colluded to keep the price of boats low.
Writing to Governor North from Arippu, the commissioners remarked, “it is possible
from a Combination of Bidders, or from some other cause, the price offered for Boats
towards the end of the Sale may fall below their full value.”1151 This “combination of
bidders” referred to by the superintendents appear to have artificially deflated the price of
boats, which could have negatively impacted the revenue return for the East India
Company. In an effort to minimize the loss and crackdown on the scheme, the
superintendents decided to purchase boats on account of the East India Company.
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Cleghorn, Turnour, and McDowall wanted to avail themselves of the “power of
purchasing some Boat per Government to prevent the price being Commanded by a few
Monopolist Exporters.”1152 The superintendents continued in a letter to Governor North:
“We could not however any Instance exceed the Sum of PNP 1200 per each Boat, and we
thought ourselves perfectly justified in doing so as the specimen from the Banks during
the two last days fishing has been sufficiently favorable.”1153 Purchasing boats on account
of the government would stimulate the market and break up the clique of merchants who
they believed were responsible for deflating boat prices. They recognized, of course, that
this plan was fraught with risk. The commissioners wrote to Governor North, “we will
exert ourselves to obtain for [Government] every possible advantage from the
undertaking tho’ at the same time we will endeavour to dispose of [them] as soon as an
opportunity offers, at a price [if] possible not less these that at which they have been
purchased.”1154
Despite efforts by the commissioners to stoke demand by increasing and
decreasing the number of boats for sale and purchasing boats with government funds,
activity in the marketplace remained rather weak. The commissioners responded by
offering select merchants certain concessions to purchase large clusters of boats. The
superintendents meant to splinter the “combination of bidders” that they believed were
manipulating the market for boats. As they wrote to Governor North, “the effects of the
combination then alluded to amongst the Principal Bidders have daily become more
apparent and have compelled us to take the strong measure of suspending the sale in the
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hope of detaching one or more of the most wealthy by offering them a credit or some
other Indulgent to stand forward as great speculators.”1155 One of the merchants they
hoped to put forward as a “great speculator” was perhaps the most influential and
powerful individual at the pearl fishery, Vydelinga Chetti. The commissioners
approached the Jaffna merchant and proposed that he purchase one hundred boats.
Vydelinga Chetti initially accepted the plan but then reneged on his promise because he
was reportedly “actuated by the general alarm occasioned by the want of success in the
Boats employed.”1156 After Vydelinga Chetti backed out of the agreement, a relative,
Ram Nayak of Thanjavur, came forward and offered Kundappah Chetti as his guarantor.
The key clause in these proposals concerned the number of oysters that each boat fished
per day. The merchants wanted to include a provision in the contract that stipulated each
boat must fish at least 4000 oysters per day. When neither Vydelinga Chetti nor Ram
Nayak agreed to accept the offer, the commissioners instead threatened a total
government takeover of the fishery. They wrote, “we gave out that it was a resolution to
fish all the boats upon hand, for the benefit of Government. By appropriating Public
Banksalls, and by increasing the Number of Peons and guards the Merchants were
convinced that we were resolved to carry this plan into effect.”1157 Once the
commissioners recognized that this saddled the Company with even greater risk, and
incidentally increased the chances of “fraud” and “embezzlement,” they returned to
Vydelinga Chetti. In a letter to Governor North, the commissioners wrote: “To the chance
of profit is to be opposed the probability of neglect and the certainty of embezzlement.
And the moment we conceived ourselves at liberty to abandon this Project will prospect
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of advantage to the Public we did not hesitate a moment to relinquish a system whose
Management was attended with so much risk to Government.”1158 The two parties
modified the terms of the contract so that Vydelinga Chetti became eligible for a
proportionate remission if a boat did not fish at least 5000 oysters per day.
The commissioners circulated advertisements through the bazaar that notified the
merchants about the sale of boats at public auction. The first advertisement set the criteria
of a remission at a minimum of 5000 oysters per boat per day. The second advertisement
was more generous and offered boat-owners a remission if the divers fished less than
4000 oysters per boat per day. These were not arbitrary figures but based upon records
from previous fisheries. The pearl fishery of 1797 saw each boat fish an average of 8000
oysters while boats at the 1798 fishery brought up an average of 6000 oysters per day. It
was this decision by the commissioners to modify the advertisement and extend
remissions that would be their undoing. A low yield of oysters resulted in the government
being faced with numerous remissions claims from merchants. Moreover, due to various
problems merchants faced accessing credit during the pearl fishery, many of the boats
had been purchased with cash instead of letters of credit or draft notes, which made it
difficult for the commissioners and their agents to track the transactions. The money
advanced to the commissioners was “partly sent to [Governor North] & partly sent to the
Supreme Government,” which meant that it was no longer available on site for the
commissioners to include as remission payments.1159 The commissioners sent numerous
letters to officials including Governor North, Lieutenant Governor Josias Champagne,
and Lord Mornington, the Governor-General in Council at Fort St. George, requesting
1158
1159

Ibid., 47.
Ibid., 64.
389

that the government issue merchants draft notes to these merchants as a form of
repayment. For instance, in a letter to Lieutenant Governor Josias Champagne in
Colombo, the commissioners wrote, “this Circumstance may lay us under the
unavoidable necessity of requesting you to grant us to different Individuals now here,
Bills on the Supreme Government to pay them the balance of their Respective
Deposits.”1160 They also included a list of all the persons to whom the government owed
money along with the requested amounts.1161 The commissioners received a letter from
the government secretary in Colombo a few days later with the bills and instructions “to
deliver to the persons in whose favor they are Drawn in payment of the balance of their
respective Deposits.”1162 This matter of remission payments in the form of governmentissued bills came to haunt Cleghorn, Turnour, and McDowall because investigators
alleged that money went missing during the flurry of exchanges.
There were also questions about record keeping practices at the pearl fishery.
Cleghorn, Turnour, and McDowall believed that the boat owners had intentionally
underreported the number of oysters fished by each boat. They reported to Governor
North from Arippu that “a great proportion of the Boat holders did not give in a fair
return of the number of Oysters delivered by their Boat at their respective Banksalls.”1163
This not only “exposed Government to a certain and unavoidable defalcation of the
expected Revenue” but it also “augmented that defalcation by fraud.”1164 The motivation,
according to the superintendents, was to augment the case for a remission payment by
reducing the reported number of oysters all while keeping the pearls and oysters from
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each boat. As the commissioners wrote, “We believed that the Boatholder, with very few
exceptions are Guilty of Gross misrepresentations in the Accounts they delivered of the
quantity of Oysters brought by their respective boats.”1165 The commissioners claimed
that their response to the boat owners “was calculated solely to prevent the Company
from suffering a defalcation of Revenue by a fraud.”1166 Not all of the boat owners
engaged in such acts, according to the superintendents. The alleged frauds and
misrepresentations were “universally acknowledged by the honest boatholders.”1167
Vydelinga Chetti and Kundappah Chetti were at the center of intrigue at the pearl fishery
again. According to the investigation, the boat holders were under the thumb of
Vydelinga Chetti and Kundappah Chetti, who misled the superintendents and their agents
about the number of oysters that were fished in order to bolster remissions claims. Yet
there was no evidence to support such claims. Governor North lamented that it was
difficult to prove their direct involvement with the scheme: “That the Renter connived at
his abuse and received advantage from it I can not pretend to aver, the Difficulty of
Preventing it I have already mentioned, and the immense Profit which he received from
the Enterprise though it may be generally suspected, cannot easily be known and can
never be made a Positive Proof any Direct Infringement of his Contract.”1168
Another issue that riled Governor North was the late submission of the account
books. Governor North had already grown suspicious that something strange was afoot
when he had not received the pearl fishery accounts in July, two months after the close of
the fishery. This was not only a sign of misconduct to North but it also impacted his own
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duties because he could not submit reports on the pearl fishery to London. Transport
between Colombo and London was infrequent, which meant North needed to review and
copy all the pertinent documents in time before the next ship disembarked. He tried to
compel John McDowall to expedite the accounts to no avail. One problem was that the
superintendents had not received sufficient instructions on how to reconcile 86 ½ lbs. of
pearls fished with government funds. Nor had the pearls been properly valued, which
made it a challenge to reckon the final accounts. It was also reported that there should
have been 188 lbs. of pearls on the government account, which the governor and other
officials in his administration took as positive proof that the produce disappeared. As
Deputy Governor Josias Champagne wrote to the superintendents, “These pearls form the
subject of an after account, but I cannot see how their not being immediately sold or
value, can hinder the Commissioners from making their accounts in the manner now
required of them.”1169 When McDowall finally delivered the accounts to Colombo, the
governor and his deputy both remarked on “the principal inaccuracies and informalities
of those documents.”1170 Aside from McDowall’s late submission of the accounts, the
missing pearls were also the subject of an investigation into the conduct of Cleghorn and
Turnour, as they had reportedly skimmed a few pearls for personal use. In his report,
Company solicitor Henry Smith wrote that Cleghorn and Turnour “admit to the fact and
state they that they looked upon [the pearls] as a perquisite out of which they defrayed
certain expences [sic].”1171 While the overall value of the pearls was a drop in the bucket
compared to other forms of defalcation that the government reportedly experienced,
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allegations of petty theft hurled at the superintendents lent more credence to the belief
that the pearling industry was morally and ethically compromised.
At first, Governor North defended the conduct of Cleghorn, Turnour, and
McDowall in communications with his superiors in Fort St. George and London. The
most commonly cited factors for the disappointing results of the pearl fishery were low
yields of oysters and pearls due to overexploitation at the preceding fisheries and a
general climate of insecurity caused by war in the region. With regard to the decision of
the superintendents to grant remissions to merchants, Governor North was ambivalent.
On the one hand, he shielded Cleghorn, Turnour, and McDowall from formal censure. On
the other hand, he acknowledged that the decision to extend remissions to the merchants
that purchased boats was ill-advised. As North wrote to Fort St. George, “I hope [you
will] not be inclined to blame the Commissioners for having at the end of the Fishery
acted against words and sense of their own Proclamation.”1172 To be sure, North was
displeased with the decision of the superintendents to reduce the number of oysters that
made merchants eligible for remissions. But he also wanted the Madras government to
honor such requests and return the money owed to pearl merchants and boat purchasers.
He saw this as a necessary concession to preserve the “credit and good faith” of the
Ceylon government amongst the mercantile communities that gathered at the pearl
fishery each season.1173
North changed course as more information came to light. He launched salvo after
salvo, attacks that culminated in the formation of the committee of inquiry that ultimately
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led to reprimand and suspension of the superintendents. Governor North directed much of
his frustration and resentment towards McDowall. McDowall was a Madras-based civil
servant in the East India Company, which made him a serviceable scapegoat for the
governor’s campaign against the “corrupt” and “wicked” Madras clique. Governor North
wrote of McDowall: “But the violence of Mr. MacDowall, the head of that Party [i.e. the
Company employees from Madras] has so far exceeded the bound of Prudence, that it has
broken out into acts of positive and direct Disobedience to my orders and those of the
Lieutenant Governor during my absence.”1174 One reason that McDowall was
reprimanded was because he apparently abandoned his post at the pearl fishery for a few
days without notifying the proper authorities. As Cleghorn wrote to North, “I never
imagined I had the smallest power to grant leave of absence to any person, except
perhaps a clerk in my office. When Mr. MacDowall notified me [of] his intention of
meeting you at Mannar I observed that there were none here who could grant him
permission. I think he replied that a Collector required none to visit any part of his own
district.”1175 Then there were the accounts. Besides the tardy submission of the accounts
and the missing pearls, McDowall had failed to reckon over 2000 bags of rice. Like the
government’s share of pearls, McDowall complained that he was not informed on how to
bring the rice to account by Governor North.1176 Cleghorn too submitted his opinion on
the rice shipments and corroborated McDowall’s version of the events. He wrote, “When
the Government rice arrived, it was marked in our minute and ordered to be sold at the
price fixed by you [Governor North]. And I believe this to be a really done as if the
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business was transacted before my own eye.”1177 Governor North suspended McDowall,
which was also perhaps a harbinger of things to come for the other superintendents. In
McDowall’s place, Governor North appointed General Hay MacDowall as collector and
authorized him to investigate the matter of the unaccounted for rice. General MacDowall
then measured the parras of rice and tallied the number of bags with “scrupulous
exactness” and stated confidently that “no collusion, artifice or stratagem has been made
use of to defraud the Government.”1178 If McDowall was guilty of anything it was
carelessly reporting the sales but these were but “venial trespasses.” He was allowed to
return to his office but discharged one month later for an offense unconnected to the pearl
fishery.
The commissioners of the 1799 pearl fishery engaged in full-throated defenses of
their conduct in correspondence with the governor and members of the investigative
committee. But this was the limit of their defense because the superintendents were not
given an opportunity to appear before the committee in person. As tensions mounted
between government officials and the superintendents, Cleghorn, Turnour, and
McDowall wrote to Champagne to elucidate the circumstances at the pearl fishery. They
wrote, “We have thought it at once our duty to his Excellency, to our Royal Superiors in
Europe, and to ourselves to state such facts, and suggest such reasons as we flatter
ourselves will convince His Excellency Mr. North, that we did not deserve the censure he
has passed upon us.”1179 The commissioners claimed that they had never received a letter
from Governor North. They wrote: “Had these forms been communicated to us our duty
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would, and must have obliged us to obey them. We are perfectly satisfied that no
uncandid [sic] reflection can originate with your Excellency, but in [understanding] of so
heavy a charge we must remark that your Excellency in this instance has been led into a
mistake.”1180 The commissioners reiterated that they acted “with the purest motives” and
“with the utmost zeal for the Interests of Government & the Company.”1181
The defense of their management, however, degenerated into vicious backbiting
and character assassination. Cleghorn, for example, wrote to North that the failure of the
pearl fishery began with Turnour’s shambolic organization of the preliminary
examination of the pearl oyster beds. According to Cleghorn, Turnour’s “plan looked so
well on paper” but was “all fallacious in practice.”1182 Cleghorn, in other words, passed
the buck, trying to stay in favor with Governor North. “I confess I was deceived and I
regret that I may have been the means of deceiving you,” he wrote to North. Cleghorn
represented Turnour as a mercurial and volatile personality who was unsuited for the
important work of pearl fishery superintendent. He wrote that Turnour was prone to
“sudden impressions” and preferred “the distress of disappointment to the constant
vexation of suspicion.”1183 Cleghorn launched further attacks on the reputation and
character of his colleague, even casting aspersions on the relationship between Turnour
and his dubash. In a separate letter to Governor North, Cleghorn wrote: “[Turnour] is
completely under the management of his Dubash who may make him a bankrupt
tomorrow. Our banksaal was robbed and upwards of 3,000 Pagodas worth of pearls
carried off. It was done I believe by the Dubash of Turnour dared not take the least step
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to an enquiry.”1184 This dubash referred to by Cleghorn was the notorious character
Narayana, who was in charge of the banksalls and served as the head cash keeper at
Arippu. Narayana had, according to Smith, “exercised in a most corrupt and scandalous
manner, and that the Superintendents did not personally interfere either to watch the
washing or sorting of the Pearls, or even, when washed or sorted to take charge of
them…that the Company was greatly plundered.”1185 Cleghorn appeared to shift blame to
Turnour for the lack of oversight he exercised over Narayana, which allowed the dubash
to pilfer the warehouses of pearls and oysters and shorten the store of cash.
It appeared that Cleghorn and North had developed a mutually beneficial
relationship. Cleghorn pegged the worst of the transgressions at the pearl fishery on his
fellow commissioners and North received information that augmented his anti-corruption
campaign. However, the relationship between Cleghorn and North turned soured rather
quickly when details about Cleghorn’s alleged theft of pearls came to light. According to
the testimony of the dubash Narayana, Cleghorn had “clandestinely secreted and carried
off a quantity of selected pearls” and hired a jeweler to “bore pearls at his bungalow near
Colombo for fifteen days to the number of 2,600.”1186 Cleghorn “came into the Banksaal
one Morning and Emptied an earthen Pot of Picked Pearls into his Handkerchief telling
Narrain to keep it secret.”1187 Jagannath Nayaka, a relative of Narayan, offered further
details about the arrangement with Cleghorn, testifying that Cleghorn had hired him to
bore and string the purloined pearls, pearls that were later found by the investigators at
his house in the suburbs of Colombo stowed away in a bag hidden from plain sight.
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According to the investigators, “Jaggaloo Naig then pointed out a chest which stood in
the room where we sat examining him and which he said contained the pearls he was
speaking of, when removed from his house after his arrest.”1188 The investigators opened
the chests and found a few small packets of pearls. One of the bags contained an
incriminating piece of evidence: a note written on a bit paper in Cleghorn’s hand that
read “bad.” This bag—labeled “No. 3”—contained 2 ½ lbs. of pearls that were later
appraised at PNP 847.1189 In a letter to the Court of Directors in London, Governor North
addressed the case against Cleghorn: “These are circumstances not depending on future
proof, not resting like the story of the pipkin-full of pearls emptied by Mr. Cleghorn into
his handkerchief on the unsupported assertion of a rogue, but solemn facts.”1190 Cleghorn
later explained to Governor North that a “person of rank” had contracted him to purchase
pearls at the fishery, a task that Cleghorn delegated to Narayana. The “person of rank”
referred to by Cleghorn was Henry Dundas. Dundas had asked Cleghorn to purchase
pearls with the intentions of giving them to his wife. Dundas wrote that he told “Lady
Jane that I would make her such a present from the produce of one of my own
conquests.”1191

Conclusion
During a moment of political transition between Dutch and British rule, the pearl fishery
became an economic and political space cast in the long shadow of corruption. As a
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political discourse within the British imperium, and a social and cultural practice within
the administration of the East India Company, official responses to corruption were
important features of colonial governance and state formation in Madras and Ceylon at
the turn of the nineteenth century. Identifying and responding to corruption in all its
forms became one way through which the East India Company (and later the British
Crown) imagined sovereignty and created channels through which governmental power
flowed. To recall the words of anthropologist Akhil Gupta, “The ‘system’ of corruption is
of course not just a brute collection of practices whose most widespread execution occurs
at the local level. It is also a discursive field that enables the phenomenon to be labeled,
discussed, practiced, decried, and denounced.”1192 The various sorts of behaviors grouped
under the umbrella term of corruption—bribery, embezzlement, fraud, and
insubordination, for example—did not ruin attempts at establishing Ceylon as a British
territory but instead catalyzed the process. What British officials marked as corruption at
the pearl fisheries in administrative documents and private writings was actually the
mobilization of kin and patrimonial networks. Ceylon held strategic military value for the
East India Company and the pearl fishery was a potentially lucrative source of revenue.
The administration of Governor North sought to maximize the productivity and value of
the pearl fishery through principles of good governance and natural resource
management. He used the investigation into corruption at the pearl fisheries as an
opportunity to introduce managerial reforms. For instance, he proposed a system in which
the location of the fishery would rotate every seven years. Governor North drew upon
both scientific and local knowledge to propose a system of natural resource management
that essentially amounted to crop rotation. In a letter to the Court of Directors in London,
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North referred to his plan of “dividing the [bank] into Seven Parts” and described that
“one of which may [be] Fished each year by a Proportionate number of Boats, so that at
the Expiration of the Seventh year (which is the Supposed Term of the Maturity of Pearl
Oysters) the First Division may again [be] Fished and a Constant succession of Fishery
be in that [Manner] without danger of exhausting or injuring the Banks.”1193 North was
praised by his contemporaries for his attempts to root out corruption at the pearl fishery
and turn the industry into a viable and profitable venture. George Annesley wrote, for
example, “it may be affirmed, that few men ever entered the British dominions in the
East with purer intentions, or more enlightened views, or left them with a higher
character for honour and benevolence.”1194 Governor North also reflected on his time in
Ceylon. He wrote: “But whatever be my Fate, my conscience will never allow me to
regret that I have not contributed to our national and the Dilapidation of our National
Resources, by overlooking gross and Scandalous Negligence and by encouraging in the
Guardians of the public Interests that dangerous system of blind and ideal Confidence in
Agents of known Intrigue and Improbity which has proved the Scourge of our Subjects
and will prove the Ruin of our Employers.”1195
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CONCLUSION: SONG OF THE PEARL THAT MIGHT BE

In Harriet Martineau’s fictionalized story about the plight of pearl divers, “Cinnamon and
Pearls,” a character cries, “Who is it that robs us, not only of our spice and our pearls, but
of all that many another country would give us for our spice and our pearls, if it be not
the English.” The voice of this anonymous villager captured Martineau’s sentiments
regarding colonial dirigisme. The publication of “Cinnamon and Pearls” in Martineau’s
magnum opus The Illustrations of Political Economy came at the tail end of a period
during which intellectuals and policymakers rethought the relationship between the East
India Company and British Crown, and brought forward ideas rooted in liberal political
economy to manage the affairs of state. By blending literature and economics, Martineau
described the virtues of laissez faire capitalism, and translated the liberal philosophies of
Smith, Ricardo, Mill, and Malthus into romantic allegories. In “Cinnamon and Pearls,”
Martineau used the tragic tale of Rayo and Marana to advance a critique of mercantilism
and highlight the downside of British rule in Ceylon. She offered a vision of imperialism
based on liberal political economy and charged Britain to spread civilized society
overseas. A fictionalized story about the plight of pearl divers, “Cinnamon and Pearls”
anticipated her concern for the welfare of women and the campaign for the abolition of
slavery. Later in life she advocated for government intervention to help the downtrodden
and enslaved, which was a departure from the attitude she held with regards to the
government’s role in the economy. In British Rule in India (1857), published at the
precise moment when the East India Company transferred its Indian territories to the
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Crown, Martineau reflected on the impact of British rule on Ceylon. In a chapter titled
“Beginning of Comprehensive Domestic Amelioration,” Martineau appeared satisfied
with the long-term results of British rule. She described Ceylon as “the most effectually
improved part of our eastern dominion,” adding that “nothing but misrule could spoil
such a country.”1196 Martineau attributed the favorable outcomes to the influence and
steady hand of the British government. She wrote, “Besides the ordinary treasures of the
sea, pearls and pearl-shells abounded within reach of its shores…The change within a
few years after their welfare was fairly taken in hand by the British was remarkable.”1197
This history of pearling in the Gulf of Mannar during the late eighteenth and early
nineteenth century reflects that the situation on the ground was far more complex and
variegated than Martineau and others described. The governing effects of Company and
Crown rule during this period of political flux left impressions of varying depths on the
people, institutions, and environment of the pearling industry. This project explores the
space between success and failure, and tracks such developments through the evolving
contexts of colonialism and imperialism in India and Sri Lanka. It finds that the overall
impact of British management was less extensive than the Madras and Ceylon
governments had envisioned. The introduction of policies designed to improve pearling
in the Gulf of Mannar were more often miscarriages of reform. As this dissertation
shows, pearling in the Gulf of Mannar was a source of a tremendous amount of discursive
energy for Company and Crown officials. In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries, European powers in the region—whether company-states such as the Dutch
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and English East India Companies or formal colonial governments like British Ceylon—
devoted considerable attention to the pearling industry. From sending diplomatic
missions to local courts and examining the pearl oyster banks, to the deployment of naval
vessels and the construction of camps, British Ceylon and the Company Raj committed
substantial resources to the management of people and oysters. In many ways, the interest
in the people, institutions, animals, and environment of the pearling industry far exceeded
the hunt for gems and profits.
A historical study of the pearling industry in the Gulf of Mannar highlights some
underlying aspects of British colonialism, imperialism, and governance in late eighteenthcentury and early nineteenth-century India and Sri Lanka. The vicissitudes of early
colonial Madras and Ceylon patterned the conditions under which British Ceylon and the
Company Raj managed the human and natural resources of the pearling industry. It was
during moments of political change that Company and Crown officers addressed
questions about the status and organization of the pearling industry with the greatest
verve. Historians have characterized the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries as
a transitional period between the First and Second British Empires. This same timespan
witnessed the emergence of the East India Company as the preeminent political power in
India, as well as the establishment of Ceylon as a formal colony of the British state. This
roughly seventy-year period has been characterized as the period of “colonial transition,”
and historians have engaged in contentious and spirited debates about the exact nature of
this era. Pearling in the Gulf of Mannar offers an interesting case to further parse
questions that animate the historiography of this period. The time period covered by this
dissertation, c. 1770-1840, is not only important for understanding the history of the
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pearling in the Gulf of Mannar, but also significant in the broader historiography of South
Asia.
The political reorganization of the region introduced new ideas about how to
govern human populations and manage natural resources located in areas under British
authority. The late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries witnessed a sea change in
political economic thought, as classical liberalism displaced mercantilism as the
prevailing framework for interpreting the relationship between the state and economy.
The debates between mercantilist and liberal principles in the sphere of political
economic thought percolated through Company and Crown management of the pearling
industry. Historian Sudipta Sen has shown in Empire of Free Trade that a transition from
a monopolistic system based on the principles of mercantilism to free trade liberalism
never fully materialized. He looks at Company Raj engagements with the political and
symbolic economies of “prestige goods” such as betel, salt, and tobacco in eighteenthcentury Bengal. Like Bengal, British officials introduced policies designed to establish
private property regimes in the countryside, but asserted monopoly control over the
commodity production of pearls. Debates about the management of the pearl fishery did
not take place independent of wider concerns within British administrations about
agrarian lands and revenue. Many of the issues that motivated the introduction of land
tenancy systems in Bengal and Madras reverberated through the management schemes
that British officials imposed on the pearling industry. In the late eighteenth and early
nineteenth century, the pearling industry of Mannar was situated between free trade and
monopoly, which not only created a contradictory state of affairs, but also produced some
rather uneven results.
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The Company and Crown governments brought an assemblage of ideas to bear on
the management and governance of people and oysters that sought to not only increase
productivity, but also reshape the preexisting social, economic, and political conditions of
the industry. British officials targeted labor and capital networks, as well as institutions
that claimed certain rights and privileges at the pearl fishery, such as temples and local
courts. From temples and kings to divers and merchants, numerous local people and
institutions had important roles in the pearling industry. Officials depended upon these
same networks and institutions for authority, labor, information, supplies, and capital,
which further complicated the efforts of reform-minded officials. Each chapter of this
dissertation addresses a different area of the pearling industry that British officials
deemed problematic and thus open to government intervention. Chapter 1 considers
labor. Chapter 2 looks at markets. Chapter 3 explores the business world of merchants.
Chapter 4 examines the relationship between the pearl fishery and sovereignty. Chapter 5
wades into the question of corruption. As each chapter shows, liberal-minded reforms did
not initiate an era of open markets and technological progress, but rather further exposed
the human and natural resources of the pearl fishery to distinctly modern forms of
governmental power.
The shallow fertile waters between present-day India and Sri Lanka were once
home to one of the largest sources of natural pearls in the world. A historical study of
British management of the pearl fishery offers a fresh perspective by virtue of its place
near the shoreline. Indeed, many of the debates about ideology and policy in early
colonial South Asia have focused on agrarian land systems. As an intermittent and
seasonal event, British officials differentiated the pearl fishery from other revenue405

generating industries. They also marked pearls as a special type of commodity. British
officials found that the unique nature of the product, as well as the sensitive marine
environment within which pearls were produced, rendered the fishery vulnerable to
overuse. Company and Crown officers thus promoted a position that only the skilled and
capable hands of a strong government could properly protect and manage the industry,
and implemented policies and practices in accordance with that viewpoint.
This dissertation also draws attention to the political and geographic significance
of the Gulf of Mannar and its pearl oyster banks. An area of military and commercial
value, the “microworld” of Mannar was home to a vibrant coastal trade, while the Palk
Strait afforded safeguarded passage between the eastern and western zones of the Indian
Ocean. Historian Lauren Benton notes in her book A Search for Sovereignty that early
modern and modern empires “did not lay claim to vast stretches of territory.”1198 Instead,
she writes, the “nature of such claims was tempered by control that was exercised over
narrow bands, or corridors, and other enclaves and irregular zones about them.”1199 A
reading of British discourses on geographic space and political sovereignty in the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries suggest that the Gulf of Mannar was one such
“narrow band” or “corridor” through which the Company and Crown laid claim to
territorial and thalassic control. In the first half of the nineteenth century, the pearl oyster
beds were located within the domains of two different British powers. The movement of
people and things through the Gulf of Mannar at the time of the pearl fishery undermined
attempts by Madras and Ceylon to actualize a vision of distinct realms for the Company
and Crown. From seasonal migration to smuggling and disease outbreaks, circulatory
1198
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patterns related to pearling compromised the ability of Madras and Ceylon to solidify and
police the maritime borderlands of Mannar. The pearling grounds of the region found
their meaning in the permeability of the political and geographic area in which they were
located, along the frontier zone between land and sea, humans and animals, island and
mainland, Company and Crown, and Europe and Asia.
The roughly seventy-year timeframe covered by this dissertation represents a blip
in the long history of human engagements with pearl oysters and the marine ecosystems
of the Gulf of Mannar. For thousands of years, pearls—formed by secretion of nacre by
mollusks to coat and neutralize foreign irritants like stones and sand—were harvested in
the natural marine environments like the Gulf of Mannar. However, the early twentieth
century witnessed the decline of natural pearling centers across the globe, including the
Gulf of Mannar, and debates about the best mode of management continued up to that
point. For instance, British Ceylon awarded a twenty-year lease in 1906 to a private
corporation, Ceylon Company of Pearl Fisheries Limited.1200 The former governor of
British Ceylon, Joseph West Ridgeway, and William Herdman, marine biologist
commissioned by the Ceylon government, were at the helm of the company.1201 The
Ceylon government sang a variation on an old tune. As Subrahmanyam writes, the
“Ceylon government’s position was that it was anomalous for the state to take charge of
productive enterprise; for, in fact, this was the business of private capital.”1202 The
Ceylon Company of Pearl Fisheries only enjoyed the fruits of two harvest, however. The
corporation collapsed by 1912 and the next pearl fishery did not take place until 1925.

1200

Kunz, Book of the Pearl, 108-11; Subrahmanyam, “Noble Harvest from the Sea.”
Subrahmanyam, “Noble Harvest from the Sea,” 167.
1202
Ibid.
407
1201

The government continued to sponsor examinations of the banks, but results were
disappointing. One of the last recorded pearl fishery was 1958, the first one organized
under the authority of the independent state of Ceylon. This pearl fishery is also notable
because of its use of heavy machinery. According to S. Sivalingam, a government
scientist, “Most of the difficulties encountered by employing skin divers for fishing
operations can be overcome by dredging the oyster with the help of mechanized
boats.”1203 His argument that a dredging machine reduced “capital expenditure” and “no
extra staff is required for supervisory work” echoed voices from the previous century.1204
The government then auctioned bags of presorted oysters to merchants at a market in
Colombo. Sivalingam observed that “owing to the excitement of a fishery after the
longest interval of blank years on a record, the prices were very high at the start.”1205
However, he continued, “the buyers were mostly those who bought them for personal use
or out of curiosity or those trying their luck.”1206 He thus lamented the absence of “the
usual [Indian] businessmen” whom typically purchased “large quantities for trade
purposes.”1207 Sivalingam commented further that “the success of future fisheries” was
contingent upon finding “a suitable export market,” and speculated that “there still
appears to be a good market for natural pearls in India though cultured pearls offer stiff
competition.”1208
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Indeed, another important development in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries was the introduction of commercially viable cultured pearls.1209 An ancient
technique in which a foreign object was inserted into the fleshy part of the animal and
then submerged in shallow water was mastered in fin de siècle Japan. Experimentation
with this process led to an innovation in which spherical cultured pearls could be
produced at an economical scale. This innovation is most closely associated with
Mikimoto Kōkichi, who, in 1893 under the tutelage of a Tokyo professor, successfully
produced a cultured pearl. Mikimoto enjoyed immense commercial success and his name
is still synonymous with high-quality cultured pearls today. The wider availability and
lower cost of pearls in the first half of the twentieth century came with a democratization
of fashion. It was during this time that icons like Coco Chanel turned pearls from a royal
luxury into an object of everyday elegance. Scientist in India also developed the
capability to produce spherical cultured pearls on a commercial scale in the 1960s and
1970s. India, however, has not been able to build a cultured pearl industry and the market
continues to be dominated by China.1210 Cultured pearls from China are produced at an
industrial scale and have flooded the global gem markets, driving down prices while
increasing consumption. Today, cultured pearls fill the cases of retail stores up and down
the hierarchy of the consumer market, from Tiffany’s to Target.
It would be far too easy to plot the history of the pearling industry into a familiar
declension narrative to explain human-induced changes to the environment. From
dredging and overfishing to the rise of industrial manufacturing in the region, the latter of
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which attracted labor and capital previously concerned with pearling, a confluence of
local and global forces probably led to the slow death of the pearling industry. A longterm perspective suggests that a common thread in the history of pearling in the Gulf of
Mannar is its intermittent and seasonal character. From the sixteenth century onwards, the
period during which historical documents are most accessible, each successive generation
ruminated over the mercurial nature of the pearl oyster and its marine environment.
Marine biologist Daniel Pauly has identified a similar phenomenon that he calls “shifting
baselines” and introduced historical perspectives to the study of the marine environment
and fisheries populations.1211 William Bolster’s The Mortal Sea builds upon the idea of
“shifting baselines” to show that each generation of Atlantic fishermen feared dwindling
supplies of fish, which directly challenges characterizations of the sea as an exhaustive
resource. Bolster uses historical evidence to show that fish populations in the Atlantic
remained relatively stable until mechanization. Those engaged with the management of
the pearl fishery of Mannar from the sixteenth century onward always feared that a crisis
of productivity was imminent. For instance, Dutch Governor Baron van Imhoff wrote in
1740, “it is now several years since the pearl banks have fallen into a very bad state both
at Manaar and Tuticorin; this is mere chance, and experience has shown that, on former
occasion, the banks have been unproductive even for a longer period than has yet
occurred at present.”1212 In the early nineteenth century, Ceylon civil servant Anthony
Bertolacci remarked, “the pearl fishery, is doubtless, one of the great resources of the
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Colonial Government; but it is one of a very uncertain nature.”1213 He added, “It has, I
believe, been the ambition of every successive Governor, since we acquired possession of
Ceylon, to place this source of revenue upon such a systematic plan, if possible, to derive
from it a permanent sum yearly: but hitherto their endeavors have failed; and the periods
at which the fisheries can be effected, appear, still, to remain a matter of great
uncertainty.”1214 As this dissertation shows, the “uncertain nature” of the pearl fishery did
not hinder but rather enabled European engagements with the human and natural
resources of the industry. The peculiar logic of colonial rule and governance meant that
people and oysters were always in need of improvement. As marine biologist William
Herdman wrote in the early twentieth century, “there is no reason for any despondency in
regard to the future of the pearl fisheries, if they are treated scientifically.” In other
words, he added, “the material exists, ready for man’s operations.”1215
The symbolic association of pearls and the Gulf of Mannar continues to the
present day. Travel writing still characterizes Sri Lanka as the “Pearl of the East,” and
materials promoting tourism on the island describe it as “pearl-shaped island” and a
“pearl-shaped tear hanging from the cheek of India.”1216 Across the Gulf of Mannar,
Thoothukudi is known as the “Pearl City,” and there is an express train of the same name
that travels to and from Chennai. There are even efforts to revive the industry underway
in Tuticorin today.1217 Cities across the globe have assumed this title of the “Pearl City.”
Hyderabad in Andhra Pradesh, known as the “City of Pearls,” continues to be famous for
its gem markets and tourists flock to gape at the jewels of the Nizam. Pearling is all but
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extinct today, but many cities and states have taken undertaken efforts to memorialize
this bygone world. For instance, Doha, the capital of Qatar, connects to its pearling past
by proudly displaying a statue of an oyster with a pearl in its shell. There are even manmade islands off the coast of Doha that are designed to resemble a string of pearls. The
project, known as The Pearl-Qatar, is a multi-billion-dollar real estate development
project complete with luxury apartments, hotels, and shopping. Nor has the association
between politics and geography completed faded away. There are regular news reports of
state authorities arresting fishermen for violating the maritime boundaries of India and Sri
Lanka. A government-contracted consulting firm has also developed a geopolitical theory
called “The String of Pearls,” which refers to a Chinese strategy to create military and
commercial alliances across the Indian Ocean.1218
One of the central aims of this dissertation is to not only analyze the techniques
and applications of governmental power, but to also find a suitable role for a simple
bivalve mollusk in the story. To this end, the discussion tries to view the pearl oyster as
more than a producer of gems and shells, but also a live actor in a complex formed by
interactions between humans and the environment. In a path-breaking essay titled “Can
the Mosquito Speak?” historian Timothy Mitchell challenges popular historical narratives
about Egyptian development in the second half of the twentieth century. For Mitchell, the
development goals of Egypt were not only hamstrung by war and colonialism, but also
unassuming malaria-carrying mosquitoes. Yet historical scholarship has not considered
the impacts of malaria and mosquitos because social scientific biases privilege human
1218
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agency, which, in turn, reproduces forms of modern techno-political power. Mitchell
instead emphasizes “hybrid agencies.” Understanding how technology, environment,
animals, and humans interact sheds light on the features and functions of modern
governmental power and techno-politics.1219 The inability of British officials to
completely overhaul the pearling industry was complicated by a notoriously fickle marine
environment. The growth and production of pearls and oysters also retained an air of
mystery and wonder. In many ways, British interventions in the industry were bound to
fall short. Each season, tens of millions of oysters were harvested from the shallow
waters of Mannar, yet only a fraction yielded pearls, and only a handful of those were of
any quality and value that are commonly associated with precious gems. Vexed officials
found the yield of oysters and pearls nearly impossible to predict and the revenue and
production often fell short of expectations. At the end of the pearling season, merchants
regularly submitted petitions to British Ceylon and the Company Raj seeking
compensation for financial losses. Government officials drew upon a contradictory set of
discourse and practices that did not work with any consistency on the people, animals,
institutions, and environment that constituted the pearling industry of the Gulf of Mannar.
Pushing for change, but unable to escape the underlying dynamics of the industry, the
British were unable to realize a vision of widespread reform. But, alas, this was the nature
of the beast.
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GLOSSARY

amāni – lands or resources under direct management of government
ani, annee – first-order pearls
arzdasht, arzee, urzee – formal petition or supplication (Persian: ‘arzdāsht)
ballam – boats made from a single piece of timber used for washing oysters
bangsal, banksall – warehouse, storage facility; godown
calapa, calakku – pearl oyster
campanottis – boat owners
canku, sangu – conch shell
carāppu – moneylender, moneychanger, finance banker
circār, carkaar, sarkar, sircar – government, the state
Chetti, Cetti, Chitty – South Indian community associated with banking and trade
cowle – formal contract or grant
dargah – Muslim saint’s tomb
dhonie, doney, thoney, toni – small, shallow boat with one mast; coastal craft
dubash – “two tongues,” broker, agent, or secretary for Europeans in Madras
darkhast, durkhaust – petition, representation, supplication
dustoor – tax relief
fasli – annual revenue cycle
gōmāstāh, gomashta, gomastah, gumāshta – agent, representative
īnām – tax-free land or other gifts for religious or charitable purposes; present; reward
jāti talaivan – “caste headman,” community leader of Paravas
kachcheri – cutcherry, government agent’s office, usually at district level
kadalkatti – “binder of sharks,” shark charmer
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kanakkuppillai, karnam, karanam – accountant, bookkeeper, scribe
kāval – protection
kāvalgār, kāvalkārar – local policemen; military post charged with protection
kōvil, kōyil – temple, church, and other buildings of worship
kootoo, cottoo, kutu – warehouse for washing and storing oysters
kuliyal – pearl and chank diver
Labbai, Lubbai – Tamil-speaking Muslim coastal community
lascorn – indigenous soldier
māniyam, manyam – tax-free or low tax award, usually of land or other resources
mantakkam, mundadies, munducks – assistant to diver
Maraikkayar – elite Tamil-speaking Muslim community, mostly merchants
masie, masi – small pearls that do not pass through baskets
masjid – mosque
muccalikkā, muchelka, muchalika – formal agreement; written obligation; contract
Mudaliyar – title used by Vellala elites
muttu, muthu, mootoo – pearl
Nakarattar – Tamil-speaking trading caste
narkkayiru – coir rope
nāyaka, nayak, nayakkar – lord, warrior, chief, or general; viceroys of Vijayanagar; term
used by South Indian lineage of rulers of Kandyan kingdom
ōlai – palm leaf used for writing and recordkeeping; manuscript; document
pār, par, paar – pearl bank
Parava – Roman Catholic Tamil speaking maritime community
parra – unit of measurement
pagoda – temple; gold coin
palam – unit of weight
palhota – thatched hut
pākam – share, measurement, portion
415

Pattangattim – Tamil caste authority or notable
pattayam – copper
peon – indigenous foot solider or unskilled laborer (Por. peão)
Pillai – title taken by high-caste Vellala
ryotwāri – system of land collection in which government collected taxes directly from
cultivators without the use of
sanad – written document conferring honor or title
sepoy – Indian soldier
Setupati – “guardian of the bridge,” title of Marava rulers of Ramnad
shroff – moneylender, moneychanger, banker
Silāwatorre – fish market or landing spot
sowker, soucar, savukar – banker, financier
Tevar – title meaning godly, godlike, or holy often used by Maravas
tool, thul – seed pearls
vēlālar, vellālar, Vellala – elite agricultural group of Tamil country
zamīndār, zemindar, zamindar – landlord or estate owner under permanent settlement
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APPENDIX

Governors of British Ceylon, 1798-1841
Frederick North, 1798-1805
Thomas Maitland, 1805-1811
John Wilson, 1811-1812
Robert Brownrigg, 1812-1820
Edward Barnes, 1820-1822
Edward Paget, 1822
James Campbell, 1822-1824
Edward Barnes, 1824-1831
John Wilson, 1831
Robert Wilmont-Horton, 1831-1837
James Alexander Stewart-Mackenzie, 1837-1841
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